The ammunition question

Best read it again DB. This is your problem, you only read the bits you want to. Read the full accounts posted not between the lines.

LH

He says he returned to camp and found all the boxes screwed down, but he came across a box with he
distributed among his men.

You have totally lost me. The account posted is a transcript. What you read it what he says, nothing more nothing less. If your telling me this is incorrect, please post the account you obviously have.

There are primary source accounts which suggest an effort was made to deliver ammunition to the firing lines and inevitably, some will have reached its destination.
There are also numerous reliable primary accounts which suggest that some troops were running short and desperately sought resupply.

Isn't this the simple truth?

No doubt however that ammo supply problems will have affected tactics, rate of fire etc and therefore was a factor (to some impossible to ascertain degree) in the defeat at iSandlwana.

That about sums in up. It was a big battlefield, with many different stories, told through eyewitness accounts, reports obtained , and speculation.

This is the ultimate sum- up.

"

Quote :

I have always thought that there was a very genuine problem with ammunition supply from the earliest stages of the battle. Namely, that it was not supplied forward and distributed fast enough to enable the rifle coys to maintain enough volume of effective fire to stop their positions being rushed, penetreated or outflanked by the Zulus. If they had indeed been adequately supplied to fire across their company arcs of fire, then at least two considerations emerge. Firstly, that fire was not very effective (which could have been caused by a variety of factors) and that 'arithmetic' (capable of being the subject of statistical modelling and modern 'Operational Analysis') defeated them. Secondly, it might tend to support the theory that for the greater part of the defence of the camp, the Zulus were prevented from advancing towards the front and flanks of mutually companies, but not to their wider flanks and rear - especially where Isandlwana crag provided a covered approach. A combination of both themes seems most likely. Ammunition was probably being delivered fast enough, and in adequate volumes. Perhaps, it was not being fired fast enough, or to good enough effect. Either way 'an ammmunition problem'.
I also do not subscribe to the idea that only details mentioned in primary sources actually happened. The corollary to that would be that if it was not recorded, therefore it did not happen. Hardly a basis for assessment or analysis!"

Source: MIke McCabe. ( You won't get better)

Quote :

"I also do not subscribe to the idea that only details mentioned in primary sources actually happened. The corollary to that would be that if it was not recorded, therefore it did not happen. Hardly a basis for assessment or analysis!"

Totally agree 100%

DB. I'm struggling to see your point regarding Vauses account. It does say a Kaffir, found a box with some cartridges in and they were given out. What are you disputing.

Ulundi. He is avoiding this because, Vause states that on arrival at the camp to his dismay, The ammuntion boxes weren't opened. This goes against his theory there wasn't a problem.

It's starting to look like that is the case.

LH

My point was, the boxes were screwed down, but they got ammuntion anyway, so the boxes being screwed down
didn't matter.

littlehand wrote:

Quote :

"I also do not subscribe to the idea that only details mentioned in primary sources actually happened. The corollary to that would be that if it was not recorded, therefore it did not happen. Hardly a basis for assessment or analysis!"

Totally agree 100%

Yep, all very well put. Has to be about right.
"Namely, that it was not supplied forward and distributed fast enough to enable the rifle coys to maintain enough volume of effective fire to stop their positions being rushed, penetreated or outflanked by the Zulus."
I have always concurred with this point.

Which of course mean's there was an ammuntion problem. In one way or another.

DB just a quick one, are you convinced Essex's statement is true, and what he says happen. Or do you have any doubts that some of it is in correct.

DB. It's a simple question.

John wrote:

DB. It's a simple question.

I think he's (both DB14 account users) have gone to ground on this one John.

Is it know, how many men were in each company of the firing lines.

I have based this on 1100 men with rifles at Isandlwana. I'm not sure how many rounds the Coloinal regiments carried with them ( per person)

So this calculations is only taking into account 900 British soldiers who we know we're allocated 70 rounds each.

70 x 900 = 63,000 rounds between them, without resupply.

900 men firing 6 rounds each = 5,400 per minuite.

Based on 1 man firing for 60 minuites he would require 6 x 60 =360 rounds

Based on 900 men firing for 60 minuites. 360 x 900 = 324,000 with resupply

So 324.000 take away the original 63,000 = 261,000 addional rounds would be required to keep the men supplied with ammuntion per hour.

But if we stick with the 63, 000 rounds which they had beween them at commencement of battle. And it is said approximately 3000 Zulu were killed at the battle, that leaves approximately 60,000 rounds unaccounted for. Not to mentioned those Zulus killed by artillery fire.

This is just a rough calculation as I have not included the Coloinal units.

So in a nut shell did they need a resupply. 900 seasoned men 70 rounds each. 63,000 rounds between them, 20,000 zulus.

Hope this makes sense. I have been out...

I haven't checked.

Quote :

261,000 addional rounds would be required to keep the men supplied with ammuntion per hour.

In which case 600 rounds per ammo box. It would need 435 ammo boxes to be opened.

Either your calculations are wrong. Or the men did not go to the firing lines with the allocated 70 rounds. But there would have to be a lot if give and take. I believed the first half hour is when most of the damage was done to the Zulu.

If 900 men fired three well aimed volleys and everyone hit its mark, casuties would have been 2,700. Then take into account your artillery and Coloinal fire the number could have hit the 3,000 mark.

Leaving the 900 men with 67 rounds each. Total of 60,300 between them.

Failing to see if we have gone wrong somewhere or if something bad when wrong at Isandlwana. We need to take into account lost and damage ammuntion, misfires, jamming, ect.

No doubt someone has a better maths head than us. We will soon find out..

Just before I go.. If based on your 900 men with 63,000 rounds between them. Let's say the battle lasted for 5 hours that equates to 12,600 rounds per hour. Anyway off to bed....

Hi John / Impi.
Good effort by both of you attempting the maths Cartridge table but the trouble with these tables is accuracy !
Obviously it can't be worked out with accuracy because as you said John you dont know how many rounds the Colonials had on their person . Impi your time estimate is certainly incorrect , I think the majority of the imperial troops had well and truly parted this world after possibly 2 - 2 1/2 hrs , only the larger last stands were in operation after this time , and within 3 - 3 1/2 hrs I'd think all resistance had virtually ceased . . That is the allure of this battle the fact being we dont know what happened to 100 % accuracy and will never know barring the invention of a time machine . Interesting perspectives all the same .
Cheers 90th.

The Zulus were driven to ground after around 10 miniutes of opening fire, the rate of fire would there for decrease.
The men wouldn't have been firing 6 rounds a miniute, they were told only when desperatly pressed to fire at the
rate of 4 rounds a miniute. Kambula was just as fierce as Isandlwana, by the end of it the men had fired an average
of 33 rounds each. They would have been firing in controlled volleys, the Zulu sources record the devastion of British
Vollyes.

John. I believe there is something in what you say.

Although you have based you calculations on 900 we do know, you could add a few hundred more.

Now that's a lot of ammuntion use against 20,000 Zulu's.

Brickhill says.

"I could see nothing of the details of the infantry fighting because of the low lying land, but if the increasing gun roll kept up was any indication at all, the enemy's losses must have been terrible indeed. Our mounted force was now compelled to retire to the gulley. The Zulu left horn had extended two miles on the road to Mangeni Valley. They did not come on in lines, but evenly distributed. Nowhere could you catch three men well together and rarely two. In some places their front was a third of a mile in advance of their rear. This gulley the mounted forces held most tenaciously, every shot appearing to take effect, so much so that, with the havoc caused by the shell thrown in the kraal before mentioned, a thousand Zulu dead must have lain between the conical hill and the gulley. The leading Zulus finding that they were being mown down so terrible, threw themselves flat upon the ground to wait for others to come up, when up they jumped and came on again."

So can we asume that the men had a full allocation of ammuntion, to cause that much damage on the emery. "but if the increasing gun roll kept up was any indication at all," this can only be put down to control volley fire. Howmany volleys were fired we don't know. What we do know is that 70 rounds would last a seasoned soldier around 11.5 mins.

If we take your "Based on 1 man firing for 60 minuites he would require 6 x 60 =360 rounds.
Now Neill would have to jump in here, but I fairly sure if the soldier had managed to be resupplied the 360 rounds. I doubt very much in those conditions , including the climate that the Martinti Henry rifle would not have been able to cope, over heating, fowling, jamming,

Again using your calculation, if the casualty rate is correct, 3000 dead and wounded isn't that much, even taking into account the law of averages. 90% of the casualty rate would have occurred within the first half hour based on control fire. So what happen to the rest of the ammuntion.

1) Did they have thier allocation of 70 rounds in the first place.

2) We're the soldiers sent out, to show the Zulu what they we're up against, after all, they always assumed the Zulus weren't going to attack.

3) What was the casualty rate on the Britsih side when the Zulus returned fire.

4) Were the line officers, to controlling in the fire rate, did they wait until they were within 500 yards when the Martinti was at is most effective. Could they load quick enought, in Battle condition.

5) Did the line break panic witin the ranks,

6) Did they carry out a controlled withdrawn using what ammuntion they had carefully, in the hope they could get back to resupply.

But the main question has to be what did they do with ammuntion they had at commencement of battle. If they only downed 3000.

Quote :

Kambula was just as fierce as Isandlwana, by the end of it the men had fired an average

Kambula was fortified, and I believe had Gatling guns. The two battle differ very much, no comparison.

Quote :

The men wouldn't have been firing 6 rounds a miniute, they were told only when desperatly pressed to fire at the
rate of 4 rounds a miniute. Kambula was just as fierce as Isandlwana, by the end of it the men had fired an average

So you don't think the men were desperate at Isandlwana.
The firing was hard and fast. Again Brickhill says.

"

Quote :

if the increasing gun roll kept up was any indication at all, the enemy's losses must have been terrible indeed

"

Increasing not decreasing.

Kambula had no gatlin gun, no comparison ? The Zulus got into the laager, and had to be driven out by the bayonet.
Wood described it as " a close run thing ."

The fortification used Kambula consisted of a hexagonal laager formed with tightly locked wagons, and a separate kraal for the livestock, assembled on the southern face of the ridge. Trenches and earth parapets bordered both sections, and a stonework redoubt had been built on a climb just north of the kraal. A palisade blocked up the hundred yards between the kraal and redoubt, while four 7-pounders were situated between the redoubt and the laager to cover the northern advances. Two more guns in the redoubt covered the north-east.
Not a lot different from Blood River. They to we're laagered.

Completely different set-up to Isandlwana which was a vast in un-fortified area.

Please let's stick to the battle of Isandlwana. If you feel it's over you head now, just observe. Or answer the questions relating to the posts.

LH

What do you think of this ? This is describing Ansetys running fight, showing at the very late stages the 24th
still had ammuntion.

From umohti

"A portion of the British force passed over the Nek and took up a Position under the cover of the dongas on the right of the road and from that place kept up such a fire that no Zulu dared show his head over the Nek, from here they were dislodged by the right horn and tried to retire across the road and down the fugitives track,in overwhelming force and pushed among the dongas of the Manzimnyama, where they made their last stand, this body of soldiers fought well and whenever they faced about to retire they fired over their shoulders at us."

Quote :

running fight

Running fight is not he same as line formation. It would be the occasional, turn around shot or over the shoulder. Try to concentrate on the Battle as a whole, and not individual pocket battles, or individual accounts, what ever was witnessed would have been for a few mins if that. The fact they they were running is a good indication that's something wasn't quite right wouldn't you say, along with the fact where he and his men were killed.

But you haven't tryed to account for the 63'000 rounds based on 900 men having a 70 round allocation. We know there was more than 900 with the Coloinal regiments. But John as based his on 900 British soldiers.

That's the problem LH, that much ammuntion, but very little impact, something went very wrong on that day. I,m guessing on the first couple of volleys, lthe Brit's where hoping they would give up. But as we know that wasn't the case. how seriously can we take Ian Knights video. Many are happy with the fact he busted the myth regarding the opening of a ammuntion box with the butt of a rifle. But when they showed the problems with the MH jamming after 14 shots it's frown upon. The biggest problem with all this, is that people take what they want from various sources to make their theories work. You can't do that it either happen or it didn't.

Hi John.

Correct, ........ something else went very wrong that day!.
David Rattray had this to say about the accuracy of fire, the quote is verbatum from his " Guide book to the Anglo -Zulu war" (p212) ;

...modern studies suggest that relatively few soldiers , even in the best trained units , actively aim at and seek to kill the enemy in combat, most firing the weapons wildly and some not even firing at all. Certainly the ratio bewtween the number of rounds fired and the number of casualties inflicted on the enemy in the well documented combats of the last few centuries has been staggeringly low, usually at least several hundred to one.', unquote , Dr Adrian Goldsworthy, Cannae.

So , considering that and the fact that once the MH was fired in quck succession, copious quantities of blue/black smoke ( a characteristic of black powder munition propellants) from the MH muzzles obscured the target until the wind blew the discharge away ; and some weapons had a propensity to overheat ( probably as a result of malformed rolled brass cases allowing combustion blowback through the breach), and
ammunition was only trickled through to the line , but not enough to permit a ROF ( rate of fire) to suppress the onrushing enemy.
This fact can be established by working the maths backwards. If the the Zulus captured of the order of 300,000 rounds, which was the battalion reserves of 200,000 rds , plus 100,000. This only left 100,000 rds only to do battle with.
Taking the maths a step further 100,000rds /1100 riflemen means only 90.91 rds went to each man and would have permitted firing for 22,5 minutes, @ 4 rds a minute , which ROF was clearly not enough for the job.
In reply to an earlier question on this thread I can confirm that the Colonial units, ie NC, NMP etc were also issued with 70 rounds at the commencement of battle. Most of them were equipped with the Swinburn-Henry carbine.
By contrast, the ammuntion expended per man at RD was about 180 rds, yet their target was much smaller at about 4000 enemy, oppposed to 25,000 at Isandlwana. So, in short, RD had 1/6th the enemy with twice as much ammunition.


regards

barry

Quote :

NMP etc were also issued with 70 rounds at the commencement of battle. Most of them were equipped with the Swinburn-Henry carbine

So alot more than Johns original calculation of 63,000 Rounds.

Well it appears, there was a problem with the ammuntion.

What happen to it.

You can always tell, when a twist in the tail arrives, it goes quite. Can anyone give a reasonable explanation to the amount of ammuntion supposedly used at Isandlwana.

Looking at Barrie's post, David Rattay says, some soldiers didn't fire. Why wouldn't they fire.

Ulundi wrote:

Looking at Barrie's post, David Rattay says, some soldiers didn't fire. Why wouldn't they fire.

Psychological studies show that humans (just like animals) are normally reluctant to kill other members of their species, even in war, and further analysis of combat situations in various wars shows that expenditure of ammunition and firing accuracy do not correspond to the number of enemies killed. In that regard, there's numerous reports of soldiers from several wars who simply wouldn't shoot at their enemies or aim too high.
To what degree this was the case at Isandlwana can only be estimated, though, since killing inhibition can be trained away and depends also on the perceived status of the enemy.

So the ammuntion problem at Isandlwana, as taken another turn. Has the amount of ammuntion they had between them in the first instances been discussed before, on this forum or any other. 70 rounds doesn't seem a lot but when you combine altogether that's some amount of ammo. Do we know how many men were in the various Compaines. This will allow us to work out how much fire power the individual Compaines had.

It's too simplistic to merely point at one aspect (ammunition supply) in analysis of a loss of this battle.

The primary fault lies with the commander, Chelmsford. On entering this campaign he should have looked at the success and failure of previous battles between the Zulu and European based forces. i.e. the Boers.

The Boers had a succession of battles with the Zulu and only once succeeded in defeating them. The primary factors involved were; European forces were always heavily outnumbered and despite superior weaponry were always defeated except at Blood River.

That was the battle that Chelmsford and his commanders should have examined in detail. This examination would have revealed that with the type of battle plan executed by Zulu forces against small mobile forces was to overpower them by shear weight of numbers and get into close hand to hand combat where their fighting techniques were superior to rifle fire.

In another thread I contrasted Blood River/Rorke's Drift with Isandlwana. What is absolutely clear is that for a small force outnumbered 20:1 and armed with rifles needs to be able channel the enemy into a confined field of fire to ensure success.

Also in that thread; at Rorke's Drift the British Force had 20 0000 round available and less than 100 round left at the end. They were attacked by a force of 5000. At the end the hit rate on the enemy was 1:20. The Zulu force casualties amounted to approximately 1000 killed and wounded. This was the success rate of fire concentrated at the enemy at distances of less the 100 meters.

What chance of success has a force spread over 5 miles of frontage at a range greater than 100 meters?

This defeat is purely about lack of tactical preparation, arrogance(fundamental problem) and deployment.

Quote :

The Zulu force casualties amounted to approximately 1000 killed

I thought the upper limited was around the 500 mark at RD.

I'm not sure we are to bothered at this stage, to who's fault it was, the question is at commencment of Battle and going by the field regulations of the day each man had 70 rounds, multiply that by 900 ( We know theres more) but they had available 63,000 rounds. So was it a matter of the ammuntion supply or was there mass panic, sights not being ajusted, rifles failing, men breaking ranks reducing numbers, did they have the allocated 70 rounds or less.

Zulus say Isandlwana was the worst battle, somewhere like 3,000 killed or wounded. There was
something like 4000, 000 rounds in the camp that day.

DB. That may be true. So now account for 59,500 rounds of ammuntion.

Quote :

There was something like 4000, 000 rounds in the camp.

How-many did the Zulu's carry off.

No-one knows, but i'd say as much of it as 20,000 Zulus could carry.

17,000. 3,000 were killed or wounded.

Was there any other complaints regarding the ammuntion boxes, after the
22nd Jan 1879.

Just out of interest, I read somewhere that an officer who escaped down "Devils Pass" wrote home to his parents, in which he describes what equipment he was carrying during his desent. Part if that being "70 Rounds" does this tell us that he did not fire a shot during the whole event.

If anyone else has heard this story, I would be interested I the officers name.
If of course its true.

impi wrote:

Was there any other complaints regarding the ammuntion boxes, after the
22nd Jan 1879.

Just out of interest, I read somewhere that an officer who escaped down "Devils Pass" wrote home to his parents, in which he describes what equipment he was carrying during his desent. Part if that being "70 Rounds" does this tell us that he did not fire a shot during the whole event.

If anyone else has heard this story, I would be interested I the officers name.
If of course its true.

If this account really exists it would tell us a lot. I am still yet to be convinced that all those officers who escaped on horseback weren't cowards.

LH

Can you show the primary source that the 24th companies fell back because they didn't have enough ammuntion and
that the supplies weren't reaching the front line while it was on action fast enough.

Impi and Tasker

The man was Captain Cecil D'Arcy, no way was he a coward, everyone was running that day,
plus he was awarded a VC later on in the War.





Cheers

"Can you show the primary source that the 24th companies fell back because they didn't have enough ammuntion and
that the supplies weren't reaching the front line while it was on action fast enough"

Perhaps the people who would have been "primary sources" all got killed ?

Garry

There is no evidence that the line ran out of ammunition.

Neither are there are survivors form the firing line who have said they were well supplied with ammunition the whole time .

When they retreated they were firing heavily, when they got back to camp they were firing heavily, when they
were surrounded they were still firing, at this point they ran out, no evidece they ran out before hand.

Curling had the 24th to his left and right, he makes no refrence to them running out or fire slackening.

What exactly constitutes "firing heavily" - don't you think it is rather subjective ?