The missing five hours.

Here yer go. I posted it in this thread on page 5.


Isandlwana: A Timetable
By Keith I. Smith

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Rather Good.

Makes one wonder, why nothing was done when the very first report came in that large number of Zulus were in area, taking into account the camp was under manned.

Becuase the british were totaly confident that they would win a fight against the Zulus, in all
other Wars large bodies of Natives sited at a distence hadn't posed a threat, and if they
did attack they ran within the first few volleys.

Old H

Something was done, all the men were formed up in column of coys on the 2/24th parade ground, a note was
sent to Chelmsford and more mounted men were sent out.

Also the men in the camp were joking about on an attack on the camp, they believed they could easily win, 7,000 zulus would not have overwhelmed the camp, Wardle and H Coy had beeten the same number of natives a year before taking no casulties.



Cheers

Not when the first report came in.

Old H

It was.




Cheers

Snooks theroy is that the right horn was sent forward early on the morning of the 22nd to find cover ngedla heights
and it was these Zulus that Whitelaw saw. Then at around 9am when heavy firing broke out at the force with Chelsmford
the right horn throught the whole army was engaged and began to advance on the camp, at this point the Uncijo regiment also left the valley as it thourght there rival the Ingobamakhosi was engaged. The Umcijo realised there mistake and returned to the valley, and the 3 regiments of the right horn aslo realsied there mistake and turned back. It was them that Barry saw and reported. 2 of the regiments wheeled back the way they had come and the last one kept advancing till it reached the spur, when they realsied there mistake and reatreated along the spur in full view of the camp.




Cheers

DB
My problem with that is the distance and time involved. Thats one heck of a distance, and a significant amount of time, if the army was in the Ngwebene Valley. It is just not feasible to believe that a zulu commander so intent on keeping his presence secret would allow a regiment, more than one really, to now jog for 5 miles taking around 45 minutes without stopping them? This wasnt a 5 minute short distance sprint.

Any regimental commander would surely have looked around to see his sister regiments and suddenly realised, 'Im on my own". And that long before they had reached the ridge, long before.

The second issue I take task with is the early morning apearance was seen in the North East and moving towards the back of the mountain. Thats completly the wrong aproach for the right wing. They would have, and eventually did aproach via the Mkwene Hill, that to a great degree masked their aproach. So one would assume that the regimental commanders had been briefed before hand on their respective rolls and tactics how did this one get it so wrong.

Sorry DB just doesnt work, Mike Snook has developed a concept and with a really big hammer and chisel made the facts fit into it.

Cheers Mate

Thanks Littlehand and Springbok, I have read Kevin's analysis up to the 'marched them down again' part (Cavaye and Mostyn's companies). Will look at the rest later as they have no real bearing on the subject - which, you may recall, is mainly concerned with the 05:30-10:30 timeframe

Springbok, your point about hindsight is exactly what I am trying to eliminate by application of military principles, which remain valid whether the commander is Julius Caesar, Wellington, Napoleon or Pulleine.

As an example, hindsight tells us that in 1940 the French should have had their main armoured forces covering the exit roads from the Ardennes.
Military principles tell us - without hindsight - that they should have at least pushed scouting units up those roads when the allied advance to the Dyle river began.

So to some extracts from Kevin's analysis and my observations from them

[Kevin] It now becomes necessary to determine a reasonable time for the first key event, based upon the available evidence; that event is the arrival of Colonel Anthony Durnford at the camp because everything that followed seems to flow from there.

Uhhh - everything tends to follow what has occurred before what followed did - nitpick maybe :lol:

If, as I believe, what he is trying to say is that this gives a fixed time-point from which we can work backwards and forwards then I can only agree to a certain extent as I will show.

[Kevin] Shortly after his arrival, perhaps about 10.45, and following a briefing from Colonel Pulleine, Durnford also sent Lieutenant Wyatt Vause with his No. 3 Troop, Zikhali’s Horse, to provide further support for the baggage train which Lieutenant Davies says was four miles (6.5 kilometres) behind:
After riding through the camp we halted a few minutes and gave the men their biscuits. Col. Durnford sent for me and ordered me to ride back and meet our wagons as the Zulus were seen in our rear, and he expected they would try and cut them off.

About 11.15 am, after a quick meal taken while standing -]

This was also when Durnford suggested the troops fall out for a meal - which begs the question why they had not been being fed before -
given the amount of time they had already been 'standing to' (from 8am)- this order being issued earlier, say 09:30 would have allowed them to fall
out several companies at a time - more strange inaction by the staff.

[Kevin]The firing reported as being heard in the camp about noon caused the camp to stand-to again:
About 12 o’clock we were turned out, as heavy firing was heard in the direction of Colonel Durnford’s force.

More weirdness - how can this be correct given that Cavaye deployed onto Tahelane at around 11:30 ?

[Kevin] We have now established a coherent range of times for Colonel Durnford’s activities, arriving about 10.30 a.m., departing about an hour later and taking up his position in the donga about 1.00 p.m. Furthermore, we have been able to estimate the time of the discovery of the Zulu army as about 11.45 a.m., not in the Ngwebeni ravine at Mabaso, but much closer to the camp, to the north-west of Ithusi

David Jackson estimates that Higginson would have taken about 20 minutes to reach Shepstone, riding at 10 miles (16 kilometres) an hour, close enough to our own 15 kilometres an hour. (56) We thus have an opportunity to determine where Jackson thought Shepstone was at that time, because the distance Higginson travelled could not have been more than 5 kilometres and places his furthest point of travel near the ridge of Ithusi Hill at about 11.50 a.m., almost immediately after the discovery of the Zulu army. This provides ample proof that the time of the discovery, as calculated, is about right and, more importantly, that the discovery could not have occurred on the lip of the Mabaso Hill ravine, which is five kilometres further to the north-east.

This all seems to be about as correct as can be expected and again supports what many of us have calculated, that the Zulu force deployed out of the Ngwebeni Valley/Mabaso ravine, starting immediately the posts were driven in around 05:37-05:45 and moving up onto the plateau.


[Kevin] We noted earlier that Lieutenant Cavaye and his company had arrived at the top of the spur about 11.30. The Zulu right horn was already beginning to deploy from the upper part of the ravine when the discovery took place shortly afterwards and was unimpeded in its advance. Six kilometres would have brought them within the stated 800 metres of Cavaye’s company on the spur, a distance that would have taken them about 45 minutes to cover and bringing the time to 12.30.

This does not accord with the observations from 08:00 - (some of which may have referred to other Zulu bodies - possibly including the arrival of the force from the Mangeni area which had fought Dartnell) - until 09:30 when Chard's observations, which are clearly referring to the advance of at least the major part of the horn, which is definitely going past the flank of the camp and behind Isand hill. If they had not then why all the concern about Durnford's transport ?

Requote :After riding through the camp we halted a few minutes and gave the men their biscuits. Col. Durnford sent for me and ordered me to ride back and meet our wagons as the Zulus were seen in our rear, and he expected they would try and cut them off.

This ties in with Chard's observations at 09:30, (which he had reported to Durnford as he hastened back to RD) - when Durnford arrived in camp and got confirmation
regarding Chard's report he immediately became concerned that his wagons, still around 5.5-6.5 K's back on the RD track, would be taken by this large force of Zulu's.
There can be no doubt that this was a large part of the Zulu right horn, now already well behind the left-rear of the camp.

My thought on this is that these were the first two regiments, which were intended to come down well behind Isand hill and cut the road to RD - then swing into line with the third regiment -before advancing to come up over the saddle into the camps right-rear.
This would have had the effect of denying a retreat route across a wide frontage and if Raws had given them time to complete their manouvre would have left us with no witnesses from the camp at all.

But. as a result of Raws discovery of the main force, causing the attack to be launched prematurely, they arrived too late to have any part in the battle and so went on to attack RD.

This would make sense of Kevin's timing above as the force then observed was likely the third regiment of the right horn which (appears) to have been tasked to advance along Tahelane spur and come down off the ridge either directly onto the left flank of the camp or behind Isand hill.
The time of their departure would then make sense as their atttacking movement would then conform with the first two regiments. Again speculation, but sensible speculation, they had less distance to travel so left later.
Certainly they arrived in time to engage with Cavaye & Mostyn and also to move behind Isand hill, cut the road to RD shortly after the first 'runners' had headed back towards RD (Addendorf, the Eland troop etc), then attacked up across the saddle into the camp, which along with the left horn, caused the British attempt to retreat and collapse of the firing line.

Which in turn, renders Durnford's (still inexcusable), sudden retreat moot as a cause of leaving the flank open, as mere minutes later the regiment of the right horn was over the saddle and into the rear of the British anyway.

This kind of confusion (thinking that the last regiment of the right horn beginning it's advance was the whole right horn, thus ignoring the observations of Essex and Chard and the sending back of troops to guard Durnford's wagons ) - are why I was trying to eliminate much of this - for the purpose of focusing not on the confusing reports such as this one but rather to focus on the ones that are unambiguous - primarily the Vedette being driven in around 05:37-45 , Essex' report at 08:00 and Chard's at 09:30.

My purpose was, as Mr Cooper has clearly grasped, to show that Pulleine, as commander, did not react as a competent military commander should have to his Vedettes/piquets being driven in. Why put them there if you are not going to react properly when they fulfil their function?

He didn't even order stand to until the 8am report !!

I defy any veteran to argue that his reaction was militarily sound - that is to do … nothing

Let me repeat again my point.

A competent commander would have reacted, as I stated in two posts now, to the driving in of the post/s and made those assumptions and the decisions necessitated by this.

The only competent decision regarding the force under his command was to get them constructing a fortified position immediately, certainly by 06:30 (given time to issue orders regarding where to construct the position and allowing for time to deploy the various forces to their particular tasks, for example having the wagon drivers start inspanning the wagons etc.

And no I don't want to have to detail the necessary activities to get this fortification constructed - do it yourselves ya lazy lot :lol:

Conclusion for those who can't be bothered to read all the above: There are a number of reports regarding the zulu's the timing and location of which are somewhat confusing, a couple I have stated here.
This obscures the main issue which, to me anyway, is not what the Zulus were doing - but what Pulleine should have been doing.

DB may well be right that the British were confident they could beat the 'natives' , this does not excuse Pulleine for not acting on sound military principles. Julius Caesar was confident his men could beat the Gauls, but they still forted up every day.

The men can be as cocky as they like, but the commander has responsibility to make the correct assumptions and decisions to ensure his force has the best chance of defeating the enemy possible, which in the circumstances Pulleine faced was to fort up. He didn't.
This and his other inactions and incorrect actions, show he was clearly not competent to command the force at Isand.

Cheers

Aidan
[left]

Aidan
If the sole reason for your discourse is to hammer Pullein, so be it you wont get to much of an argument from me.
If its to try and get a more enlightened look at the day as a whole then one has to look at every aspect and fit them into the matrix.

I still believe we over complicate things and look for nuanses that really arent there. Thats what Chelmsford did, and all the earlier authors, " we cant understand how we were beaten so lets make the lack of fact fit the circumstance and create myths."

That issue of the 9.30 impi is still the one that does not fit, its not the Zulu way to send of one horn before the rest. It doesnt fit. And to my mind its still a critical point in understanding the battle from a zulu point of view. The original eShaka strategy behind the horns of the bull was his regiment would advance in a tight unit, shields edge on to the enemy, at a signal the fastest runners would sprint of to the sides and the shields would be turned to the front, voila, a magically enlarged army. The horns would then sprint out to surround the enemy. Thats the tradition. The army moved as a unit.

For that reason, amongst others, I dont believe the right wing was sent out on its own. If it was it went to the left by mistake ( see my earlier post to DB ).

As I said earlier Aidan, send the daughters out to work and get over here. :lol:

Cheers MAte

By the Way, its Keith Smith not Kevin.

Springbok:

That issue of the 9.30 impi is still the one that does not fit, its not the Zulu way to send of one horn before the rest. It doesnt fit. And to my mind its still a critical point in understanding the battle from a zulu point of view. The original eShaka strategy behind the horns of the bull was his regiment would advance in a tight unit, shields edge on to the enemy, at a signal the fastest runners would sprint of to the sides and the shields would be turned to the front, voila, a magically enlarged army. The horns would then sprint out to surround the enemy. Thats the tradition. The army moved as a unit.

Yet the observation of it is unambiguous, the fact that it occurred is clear both from Chard's observation, his reaction to it - and also from Durnford's reaction when he confirmed that report on arrival at the camp.
We have to accept that a large force of Zulu went past the camp on the Tahelane ridge at 09:30.
That they passed out of sight behind Isand hill means they were on the left of the camp not the right which means they did not go to the left but to the right.
This may not accord with Shaka's original strategy, nevertheless it is the sound action to take to ensure that the right horn closed off the enemies retreat and came onto it's flank/rear.

Which we know from subsequent events is exactly what they did.

The Zulu commander was clearly very competent tactically, the Zulu knew the ground well and he also knew that whatever action the British might take as a result was going to leave them in an even more exposed position when the main attack was launched.
He had a win-win situation and exploited it, this is the only militarily sound assumption we can make mate.
All we can do with much of this is speculate on probability and I am trying to do that from a position of military principles applied to the reports and observations we have to work with


As I said earlier Aidan, send the daughters out to work and get over here. :lol:

The daughter's don't even live with me mate, one still lives with her mum and is at uni on a nursing course, also working part-time
The other is house-sharing and working two jobs while also training as a nutritionist/health consultant.
They manage for the most part but sudden large expenses come along such as new brakes, new tyres, car rego, insurance excess for rear-ending someone - and that's just in the last 3 months. To give them credit they are trying to manage on their own, but Perth is now one of the most expensive places to live in the 'west'



By the Way, its Keith Smith not Kevin.[/quote]

Ack

Hi Aidan
Perths probably expensive because of all the SA expats living there. :lol:

Point Im trying to get across about the 9.30 sighting is:

Yes its incontrovertible it did happen, and it was a large force. That much is fact.

They were spotted first in the NE, thats above itusi/the notch the then moved along the ridge and went behind the mountain. Thats also fact.

The position they appeared in was/is the position of a left horn attack, part of the left horn did use this as an entry point to the plain.

The right horn later in the day aproached from the North and went behind, Mkwene Hill on the ridge. This is the correct and shortest approach to the Manzimyama valley and the back of the mountain.

If that force was the right horn they really screwed up there approach and what on earth would be the point in breaking secrecy? Makes a mockery of going to all the trouble of the round about approach of the army from ulundi, they could just have easily come in from the South.

No Im afraid not, Ntshingwayo planned his approach for a stealth attack, all about tradition, at the time "of the horns". Thats the time in the morning when the sun has risen just enough that it glistens of the point of the bulls horns in the cattle enclosures. Or to Europeanise it, Dawn on the 23rd.


Without repeating myself from earlier, there is another explanation for that force. It does not have to be A) a Zulu mistake B) some advanced tactical plan departing from tradition.

The Zulu had never fought the British before. Settlers and Boers yes. Then they had either attacked early morning, Bloukraanz massacre is a classic example, Weenen the same, and achieved fast victory. Or they had beaten there heads against the Laager as at Blood River.

Cetshwayos explicit instructions were to fight the battle on the Zulu terms, not go up against fortified positions. So no Ntshingwayo would not expect to find the British in an exposed position attacking late in the day, history was against that. And believe me the Zulus learn from history. Why would he want to warn them he was coming? To do so would have been to invite them to Laarger.
Suprise was his main weapon, 20000 zulus pouring over the hills at dawn...........end of the column, with minimum casualties.

When all esle fails look for the simple solution.

Cheers Mate

[quote="springbok9"]

Darn you Springbok, you stubborn ol boer :lol:

Now I am going to have to go back to the maps and each individual regiment of the two horns and when and where they show up, just to prove yer wrong :P

Meantime chatter amongst yourselves

Perth is so expensive because of the mining boom in WA drawing lot's of miners with big pay packets, driving up the cost of housing.
And to the State govmt that has upped electricity by around 60% - with our wonderful Federal 'pm' Gillard's 'Carbon Tax' soon to bite too.
Finally to the huge increase in the cost of food as a result of the hugely wasteful 'green' initiative to turn corn in fuel (which actualy costs 39% more
fossil fuel to do the conversion than the energy gained from the final product) - how did the world become so insane when I wasn't looking?

Cheers mate

Aidan

Late PS: I do agree though that it's always better if you can see the ground, which I would very much like to do - one the few remaining things on my 'bucket list' along with Antietam and Gettysburg etc. Oh, yeah and Dealey Plaza.

I have wandered around the Oosterbeek/Arnhem battle areas (the airborne 44 battle), over Waterloo, Bosworth (which they have now apparently proved was not actually the battlefield ), Marston Moor, Tewkesbury, Shrewsbury, Bastogne, Pozieres, right around the Ypres Salient (Menin gate, Hellfire Corner, Hill 60, Polygon wood, Tyne-cot etc)

Then when reading the histories of these places of inglory they are more understandable - it's always better if you can see the ground.

Thanks for your pics by the way - haven't studied them carefully enough yet, but yep was a surprise that you could see up onto the ridge from ISand hill

As a risk of getting me wrists slapped I thought I would post this. Originally posted on another forum, but it's by the well known Historian and Author Mr Peter Quantrill, one of the authors of the TMFH. As he not a member of this forum ( YET) and can't post in his defence the reasoning behind TMFH I thought I would post it.

It's from Peter Quantrill to Col: Mike Snook.

"Greetings Mike,
At the risk of boring readers it is well to summarise that The Missing Five Hours(TMFH) refreshed thesis was conceived and based on the established fact, beyond any reasonable doubt, that the annotated maps held by the Campbell Collections, Durban, (originally two Isandlwana base maps surveyed by Captain Anstey, RE, and Lieutenant Penrose, RE, and duly signed off in November 1879) were in the hand of Brigadier General Sir Henry Evelyn Wood who was, with little doubt, the Anglo-Zulu wars most successful field commander. Near similar maps are held at the Royal Engineers Museum, Chatham. TMFH deals with the arrival of the maps in Durban and subsequent analysis leading to the conclusion that the annotations were, again, beyond reasonable doubt, in the hand of Wood. The latter not only diagrammatically showed on the maps the disposition of designated Zulu regiments deployed outside the deep Ngwebeni valley/ravine, but also an X marked on the map which Wood described as I believe about where the Basutos fired on the Umcityu.
However, subject to correction, you clearly believe that the discovery of the Zulu army was in the Mabaso ravine. (How Can Man Die Better -HCMDB)

In Zulu Victory – The Epic of Isandlwana and the Cover-Up we believed that the discovery took place in the area north east of iThusi. Certainly, for reasons that will be advanced, not in the ravine overlooking the Mabaso plateau. This view was held until, with the co-operation of the Durban Campbell Collections, we established that the annotations made on the Anstey/Penrose maps were in the hand of Wood. The latter convincingly demonstrated that the area of the Natal Native Horse (NNH) contact was approximately three miles west of the accepted historical version of the contact being in the deep Ngwebeni valley/ravine.
In 2004, the prestigious Journal of the Society for Army Historical Research published an article by us titled The Encounter with the Zulu Army, 1879, in which we advanced the argument that from a time/space perspective, it would be nigh impossible for the NNH to reach Mabaso, contact the impi, and for the latter to arrive to do battle on the Nqutu plateau overlooking the camp in the times recorded historically.

The distance from the camp to the edge of the Mabaso plateau, is approximately 7.5 miles. (Measured flat off the map.) Durnford’s e.t.a. at the camp was generally assessed as 1030 hrs. It is also generally accepted that the NNH (Shepstone, Barton, Raw and Roberts) left the camp at approximately 1100hrs. It is also established, via primary source, that the impi, on discovery by the NNH, were seen in force attacking the camp at approximately 1200 hrs. That leaves exactly 60 minutes for two troops of NNH, mounted on hardy Basuto ponies, but short of stride and already partially blown as a result of Durnford’s quick 9 mile movement from the Rorke’s Drift area to Isandlwana (carrying perhaps additional ammunition, and assorted gear such as blankets and feed bags) to not only make contact with the impi 7.5 miles distance, but for the impi to present themselves attacking the camp at 1200 hrs. A more accurate time/space allocation, if the impi was located in the Ngwebeni ravine/valley, would be nearer to 3 hours turnaround time, estimated and confirmed by an experiment we conducted in conjunction with Rob Gerrard, historian Isandlwana Lodge. In this experiment we used two Zulu athletes and set them off on a similar bearing to that taken by the NNH assuming that the target was Mabaso. It took 91 minutes for the athletes to reach Mabaso. Their speed was in keeping with a speed of 7.5 miles per hour, the estimated speed of the NNH on their outward trip. However, the ground on that part of the plateau is vile. Wetlands are interspersed with rocks, boulders and dongas and it became difficult to maintain the said speed of 7.5 mph, hence arriving at Mabaso in excess of the estimated 1 hour. Thus their actual e.t.a. at Mabaso , having left at 1100hrs, was approximately 1230 hrs. How then could the impi have possibly arrived, overlooking the camp at 1200 hrs? Approximately 1.5 hours for the NNH to contact the impi in the Mabaso ravine, having left the camp at 1100h and for the impi to present themselves overlooking the camp at 1200 hrs?
Clearly mission impossible, and equally clear to argue with any conviction, that the impi was located in the Ngwebeni valley/ravine, at the time of discovery by the NNH.
Wood has, in our opinion, got the precise location on the contact right. It matches and satisfies the time/space issue and accounts for the speed of the attack, more particularly the destruction of the Rocket Battery by the Umbonambi down the ‘Notch.’
Read the primary source evidence of those who survived the battle.

RAW: “......drawing us four or five miles from the camp.” [Mabaso is 7.5 miles. Wood’s spot X is four miles!]
Nyanda “....Mr. Shepstone joined me on the crest of a ridge, the army of Zulus sprung up.” [Hardly a description of the northern edge of Mabaso looking down on the impi.]
Hamer: “ ...they disappeared over a ridge , and on coming up we saw the Zulus, like ants in front of us...” This primary source description simply cannot be a description of Mabaso because Hamer states that the Zulus we in front of us, not ‘beneath’ or ‘below.’
But Wood’s spot X meets all the criteria of the above primary source reports.

You have also acknowledged that TMFH has established, beyond reasonable doubt, that the annotations are in the hand of Evelyn Wood. Clearly therefore, you do not agree with Wood’s assessment or the evidence advanced by us explained above. The question must be asked, why?
You are also aware that Keith Smith, established historian on matters AZW, also places the contact outside the Ngwebeni valley, as does Major [Retd] Paul Naish, established battlefield guide and Rob Gerrard, (ex-military) who has conducted near-daily tours over the battlefield for the last 18 years. His knowledge of the Isandlwana ground and surrounds is, not even arguably, matchless.
We have already established (TMFH) that Wood spent time, at least two days, at Isandlwana when escorting Empress Eugenie. During this time we have conjectured that he met Mehlokazulu (TMFH) and in addition we have also conjectured that Raw was present. (TMFH.) We have speculated, not unreasonably, that it was Raw who took Wood to spot marked X. Wood also spent additional time (not recorded in TMFH) to show Redvers Buller over the battlefield in November 1881. How did he collate sufficient information to accurately annotate the Anstey/Penrose maps? Quote Wood’s From Midshipman to Field Marshal, page 143.
Next morning I conducted Sir Redvers Buller over the battlefield of Isandlwana, which he had never seen and we had the story told by combatants who took part in the side, and by two or three mounted officers of Cetewayo’s [sic] army, which overwhelmed our forces. Their respective accounts tally exactly; indeed, it seems s if uneducated men who cannot write are more accurate in their description of events than are Western nations.

Wood’s version of the battle, as annotated, is difficult to dispute, not only the discovery of the Zulu army from a time perspective, but also his disposition (garnered from Zulu izinduna sources) that reflects the reason for the overall speed of the advance to contact. In our view it is derogatory to dismiss Wood’s annotations and refer to them as the accursed X Place.
Not to mention strange marks on maps( made we are told by men who were not at the battle of Isandlwana.) Both observations, (in view of Wood’s interest and detail showed in collating the reports using source material, that in turn throw a different version on certain aspects of the battle,) are not called for.

Look at the annotated map and you will see that the regiments facing Durnford, namely the Undi, Uve and Udhloke (the left horn) were nowhere near X. They were already deployed south and south east of Mabaso. So how are they going backwards from X?
And, quote:
12 regiments, 20,000 men in a piece of ground like the lower plateau.
Quite easy, my dear Watson, walk the ground as we have, accompanied by others who have studied the AZW and conduct battlefield tours on the subject and bingo, no wriggle room, no wet towels; just follow the designated map positions, and 4 regiments not 12 fit in easily. The four are: Nodwengu, Nokonke, Umcityu and the Umbonambi. The Ngobamakosi, Uve, Undi and Udhloke are all positioned west of the current existing road to Isandlwana Lodge, off the existing Babanango main road. 12 regiments ? Smoke and mirrors!

The slowest deliberate attack ever mounted.
Wrong. No doubt the slowest deliberate attack was that of Shaka’s impi who marched for three days, described by Harry Frances Fynn Senior.
....when looked at from a distance nothing could be seen but a cloud of dust. Shaka’s forces marched slowly and with much caution, in regiments, each regiment divided into companies till within twenty yards of the enemy.
How does that reconcile with shock action and rapid deployment by Africa’s greatest warrior host?

Three further points.
First we are lead to ask if, during your reconnaissance, you actually located the “accursed X?” We ask because you state in your last post, quote:
What is interesting about the donga at X.
What donga? There is no donga at X. (And does that make it doubly accursed!)
X is the proximity of a ridge that looks down to the north and north east at dongas in which most of the designated regiments were located. (See Wood’s map again.)
Second: You refer to a book containing the assertion that sodomy was unofficially encouraged in the British Army of the mid-nineteenth century. Please amplify. What book and which authors?
Third: A point on which I know that we agree to disagree. You, in your excellent and well illustrated HCMDB, make the comment (page 157) Durnford had gone cowboy.
We feel that this is an uncalled for denigration of the man. Wood was certainly not of that opinion. Again, quote from his autobiography.
In the place where Durnford fell there was a heap of slain; the enemy lay thick about him, but your sons were as close, and the brave hearts of the best of your fighting men ceased to beat......he was fully worthy of their devotion, and history will narrate how the ring of dead White men that had encircled him, formed a halo round his, and their, renown.

Finally , (courtesy R.E. Museum Chatham) a quote from Recollections of Colonel T.R.Main, late R.E. (1850 – 1934) of the Zulu War.
I received a summons about July 1878 to proceed to P.M. burg in Natal and there report myself at once to CRE [ Commander Royal Engineers] Colonel A.W.Durnford, for whom I had the highest respect as a fighting soldier.

Mistakes he may have made, but a tad unkind to assert that he had ‘gone cowboy.’
There were others, of imperial ilk, who may well have qualified for the phrase, but best left unsaid.
And, perhaps in conclusion, one might ponder whether TMFH, together with a fresh slant on aspects of the battle may, by some, be viewed as an inconvenient truth?

A brace of Kanonkop still awaits at an inverted ‘High Port.’

As ever,
Peter

Still doesn't give a reason why the king and his warriors would lie about changing the plan.







Cheers

DB. You seemed to be the only one, who can't see that and opertunity was presented to the commander of Zulu Army. He made a choice and it was the right one.

I can't see how you cannot except the timeline in TMFH the times mentioned all come from primary sources. Unless you can prove the primary sources are incorrect you are flogging a dead horse so to say.

And being the time that it is, I'm off to me pit. Good night all. :sleep:

CTSG. A very good point indeed. We love that word.

" PRIMARY"

True , but even so it is always good to question if the author of said "primary" source had nothing to gain , nothing to loose , no axe to grind etc etc .

But is like CTSG says. Someone will have to prove the primary sources as being in-correct. Its not as though the author has tryed to hide the resources from where the information comes. It's all there plain and clear. Any attempts to argue against TMFH had better be good, with information from other primary sources to suggest otherwise. Anything else would be pure speculation.

Its as we have been discussing over the last few weeks.
Unfortunatly the theory on the positioning of the Impi, the crux of the matter, has been tainted by L and Q attaching the concept of Chelmsford being decoyed out of the camp, ergo the 'planned' attack on the 22nd.

Cheers

Peter & Ron would not have published TMFH if they wasn't sure of thier findings. That's why they are among the top Historians / Authors on the Anglo Zulu War of 1879.

I have one question.

Quote :

CTSG
I can't see how you cannot except the timeline in TMFH the times mentioned all come from primary sources. Unless you can prove the primary sources are incorrect you are flogging a dead horse so to say

Why did you not post this earlier in the discussion.

Littlehand

Because he was in his pit. :lol: :lol:

LH

The primary soucres from the zulus, at least 3 of them and the King of the zulus don't describe TMFH,
why would they lie ?





Cheers

Littlehand
Be wary of accepting the full thesis.
The maps are without doubt, to my mind at least, genuine and the positioning of the Impi like wise. I made a point on my recent walk about of strolling over the whole area and did point out my thoughts of the army being split around Mabaso hill.
That part of the concept works 100% for me as does the time line, fits in exactly with Keith Smith and when like minds think alike the rest of us should listen.

The section of the thesis on Chelmsford being decoyed away however is built very largely on supersition and forcing one and one to equal three. Something they have accused Mike Snook of doing. The jury is still firmly out on that issue.

Ive seen a couple of repudiations by Mike Snook, tends to rely on arrogance and sarcasm to much. He should have quit after that brilliant build up and analasis of the battle itself.

DB

Try to seperate the issues of the armies position from the attack. One cant discount the whole theory blindly because one part doesnt work. I agree, look at my debate with Aidan, the attack was scheduled for the 23rd.


Cheers

DB
Give me one primary source that puts the army behind Mabaso Hill. Even Cetshwayos description doesnt match it.

Regards

Hi springbok.

Well, I do think that there is 'something in the wind' (so to speak), about the concept of Chelmsford being decoyed out of the camp, and that once it was seen to be working, plans were put into action to attack the weakened camp, especially since Pulleine had done very little, if anything, to fortify it, even after many reports of Zulu activity in the area. So even if the plans were to attack on the 23rd, I don't think that the Zulu commanders could throw away a golden opportunity like this, and therefor decided to attack on the 22nd.

I also think that a similar plan was put into action to lure Durnford away from the camp when large bodies of Zulus were reported to be moving in the direction of Chelmsford. Col Durnford not having any written orders to take command of the camp was still in command of his own independent No2 column, and realised that if these Zulus were heading towards Chelmsford to cut him off, then he must do something about it and try to find out where they were going in an effort to defend his generals flank. So, it could be that the Zulus tried their ruse twice that day, and on both occasions it worked, giving them a great opportunity to attack and destroy the camp (with the unwitting help of the lackadaisical Pulleine).

Hope you are well mate.

Cheers, Martin.

Quote :

Pulleine had done very little, if anything, to fortify it

I not sure he felt it was necesssary. He was waiting for a message to pack up camp and join up with Chelmsford. I wonder if that was part of the ammuntion problem. Had most of it been packed away ready to move.

Martin

There is not a single peice of evidence to suggest Durnford was decoyed from the camp.

Hi Mr Greaves.

I understand what you mean, however, after all the reports of Zulu activity in the area, a good commander would have done something about it, read Aidans thesis on this and you will see what I mean.

Good point about the ammo, it is known that a wagon had been prepared ready to re-supply Chelmsford if needed, so like you say, the rest of the ammo could have been packed ready to move, and as a result no one knew where their own ammo wagons were, thus creating a problem.

Martin.

Ammo waggons were parked with flags, and the ammo waggons were in the diffrent camps.

Why would Pulleine think about fortifying the camp ?

It covered over 1,300 meters of ground, what defences could cover such a large amount of ground ?

Martin
Youre attributing almost super human poweres to Ntshingwayo, he was good but certainly not clairvoyant.
Look at the sequence,
Dartnell goes out on patrol.
Elects to camp out for the night, sends back for food. N o mention at all of staying out for the night.
Food is delivered by Lt Walsh.
The camp settles down.
The NNC get spooked and go walk about.
Its only then that Dartnell decides he doesnt trust his men to fight a zulu impi the next morning.
Lt Walsh is then sent back to ask for help
Chelmsford decides to leave camp.

For the Zulus to predict the outcome of that?

Next in line
Durnford was also decoyed out of camp?

This one just begs the question how?

Cant see the Zulu high command being that machiavelian Im afraid.

They didnt need to be, the Brits pretty much did there job for them.

Mr G

In terms of the ammo, the regimental reserves were already packed and ready to go, they had never been unpacked. In addition the 2/24th reerves were also on the regimental waggons. No repacking required.

Cheers Guys

springbok and DB.

The way I understood it, Dartnell thought he was being attacked by a large Zulu impi and sent for help, and as a result Chelmsford also assumed that it was the main Zulu force and set off to confront it with over half his force. OK, so maybe it might not have been the planned decoy move of a super human, but it could have been a plan of deception to see what would happen, and when Ntshingwayo saw or learned that Chelmsford had divided his force, could this not have prompted him to alter his plans and decide to attack the remaining troops in the camp a day earlier, especially since Pulleine didn't seem concerned even after many reports of Zulu activity.

DB, read Aidans post about what Pulleine should have done, and a commanders priority when fortifying his position, his first concern should be for his men.

Put yourself in Durnfords position, he gets reports that a large body of Zulus are heading in the direction of Chelmsford, what does he do? Ignore them and stay in the camp, or try to find out what is going on just in case they are trying to cut off Chelmsford. He is in command of his own column, he has no orders to remain or take command of the camp, he gets reports of Zulus moving in the direction of Chelmsford, he has to try to defend his general. Again, could this be a planned ruse to draw Durnford out of the camp, or just a coincidence of circumstances? Again, ok, it might have all been just circumstantial, but then again, who can say for certain, Ntshingwayo is reputed to have been a very good tactician.

Cheers, Martin.

If it was a planned decoy, would the Zulus not have been expecting the whole column, to moved, there is no way theory could have predicted only half the column would move. The next question would have to be, what would the Zulu have done next.

Hi Mr G.

This is what I mean by saying "a plan of deception to see what would happen", then when Chelmsford moved from the camp with over half his force and the Zulu spies saw that Pulleine was doing very little back at the camp, they decided to attack the camp whilst it was so vulnerable, and who knows, if they had not suffered so many losses themselves, and had not the reserve gone off to attack RD, they might even have made an attempt to attack Chelmsfords part of the column whilst it was on the move. However, with the reserve going off to RD, and also with having many losses, and with being worn out and hungry, and also with rampaging through the camp, drinking, looting, etc, they decided to head off back home with the spoils.

Maybe if all of the column had moved from the camp, the Zulus may well have attacked it while it was on the move and vulnerable, but there were a lot of Zulus assembled close to iSandlwana, and with Chelmsford splitting his force, Ntshingwayo decided that the camp would be his better option.

Hi Martin.
Hope all is well , in respect to the Zulu attacking the column on the move , its always astounded me that they only did it once , and that was the same day as Isandlwana at Inyezane . I dont know why this never happened during the
Columns Movements throughout the war . The zulu intention according to the zulu primary sources was that they would attack the camp ( Isandwana ) at Dawn 23rd Jan. In respect to other posts on this thread ; We must remember that the whole camp issue of non fortification was due to the simple fact that none of the British command thought there was a '' snowflakes chance in hell '' that the camp was to be attacked at any stage , Hindsight is a wonderful thing . Over confidence and Complacency can be a killer - as Approx 1700 souls learnt on the 22nd .
Cheers 90th.

Hello mate.

Yes my friend all is ok (apart from this horrible weather).

You are right mate, I have often wondered what would have happened if they had attacked Chelmsfords part of the column rather than iSandlwana camp, but maybe they were intent on attacking the camp on the 23rd, and when Chelmsford moved off with over half of the column, they just could not resist the temptation of attacking a day earlier seeing that the camp was so open and unprepared for an attack.

You are right about over confidence and complacency, and also correct about hindsight.

Hope all is well with you down there Gary mate.

Best regards buddy.

Martin.

From what i can gather Durnford had already passed the Itusi and X and was proceeding down the Qwabe Valley
when the zulus appered in front of him.

The only way they could have done that is if they had gone backwards after being discovered by Raw ect.






Cheers

Quote :

From what i can gather

From where do you gather this.

One of Springboks posts

springbok9 wrote:

Durnford came around itusi from Quabe

and Snooks book




Cheers

Not Primary.

CTSG wrote.

Quote :

I can't see how you cannot except the timeline in TMFH the times mentioned all come from primary sources. Unless you can prove the primary sources are incorrect you are flogging a dead horse so to say.

I don't normally agree with CTSG. But he has hit the nail on the head. If other Authors/Historians can provide other primary sources to counter-argue the TMFH Then there would be a point to argue. But they haven't whatever else as been written in-connectIon with the time line can and will only ever be speculation.

littlehand wrote:

If other Authors/Historians can provide other primary sources to counter-argue the TMFH Then there would be a point to argue.

LH

The primary sources have already been posted on this thread that counter TMFH.





Cheers

Quote :

The primary sources have already been posted on this thread that counter TMFH

Whatever primary sources have been posted, obviously don't hold enough ground to prove TMFH as being incorrect if there had we wouldn't be at this point now. My own option is, people don't like change nd what ever they have read about the Battle of Isandlwana is the be and end all, and that's the way it happened. DB if you want to dismissed TMFH as being incorrect then show it, by posting what you think took place back up with these primary resources you mention. The fact that two historians have put together a document that had been highly researched backed up with maps, accounts and other primary source evidence is dismissed because other authors, historians ect don't agree because it puts whatever they have written on the back foot. So I would try reading TMFH completely along with all the documentation that backs it up, in-stead of trying to find fault with it.

TMFH says that Ntshingwayo decided to attack the camp at 5:30, but Melokazulu who led a scouting party that
morning stated that Ntshingwayo siad he would wait and see what the british did.

TMFH states that all the regiments were out of the valley and behind the itusi, but melokazulu says

"The Zulu regiments were all hidden in the valley"

TMFH says the all the zulus left the valley and were in the process of attacking when discovered, but the
zulus who were there says

"No orders were given at all. It was not our day. Our day was the following one; We had not planned to attack on the day of the new moon. Our intention was to attack the camp the following day at dawn, but the English forces came to attack us first."

"The Zulus did not intend to fight that day at all only some mounted natives from the camp rode up the mountain on which we stood and opened fire and the battle began."

"On the morning of the 22nd of January there was no intention whatever of making an attack...and we were sitting resting when firing was heard on our right, which we at first imagined was the iNgobamakhosi engaged. We armed and we armed and ran forward in the direction of the sound. We were however soon told that it was the white troops fighting with Matyana's people fighting some ten miles way to our left front, and returned to our original position."

TMFH does not cover why 3 regiments came into view by Barry's Coy of NNC, if it was a surprise attack and they
were driving off the verdetts, why would he give the game away ?


The king also makes no mention of TMFH in his letter, stating that the british brought the fight
on a day early. The king is sure to have debriefed his generals.



This is from Ian Knght

"However if so not one eyewitness source made clear and unambiguos statement to that effect, and there is a significant raft of evidence to the contray,for example Mehlokazulu's comment that the zulu high command were unaware of Chelmsford leaving the camp, and Ntshingwayo's remark that he would wait on the British movements. In fact the Zulu Sources gleamed over the years by many men from diffrent amabutho are remarkably consistent and reflect a general understanding that that the attack was not to be made on the 22nd, and they only reacted when fired upon by the British. While some of the Amabutho had clearly left the Ngwebeni earlier it seems equally clear to me that they had returned again, and the vast majority of the amabutho were still in the valley when the encounter took place. The man of the uNokhenke specifically states that his regiment had "returned to our original posistion" and "sat down again." While Mehlokazulu and Mhlahahla mention that they were attempting breakfast when the encounter took place. King Cetshwayo noted that his generals were in confrence when the encounter took place. Muziwento commented that the amabutho muntinated against against their officers attempt to restrain them. Raw, Nyanda, Hamer stress that only small groups of foragers could be seen on the heights and that the main body of the army was not discovered untill the patrols had acended a geographical feature - a ridge or a hill, and saw the army in valley beyond. The uNokhenke man says the British appeared on a hill to the west, Mhalhla commented on how his regiment first "advanced up a hill" and Cetshwayo said his troops " Then moved up a little hill " All these refrences imply a feature more significant than the undulations that lie along the upper reaches of the Ngwebeni in the direction of Isandlwana. I am firmly of the opinion that no attack had been deliberatly launched before the encounter with Raw and Roberts."




Cheers

Ntshingwayo was at liberty to attack whenever he presumed fit.

The fact that RD was attacked although the king had forbidden his army to attack a British fortified position shows that whatever the king had said should happen on the border didn't hold much water, the Zulu army did whatever it needed to do to prevent the British invading Zululand.

Melokazulu has said lots of things but as far as I'm concerned it's only what the British wanted to hear, no doubt reworded in parts.

What Melokazulu said is matched by over 6 other zulus who's statments were gathered by various people including Mitford and at diffrent times from diffrent regiments.






Cheers

The problem with quoting other primary accounts is we don't get to see them. So it ends up with people quoting what others say the primary sources say.

In TMFH it's there for all to see.

Whats being lost sight of here are a number of factors.

The THFHT is a broad based document covering a number of separate issues.

1) The validity of the maps annotations
2) The position of the main Zulu Army
3) The position and circumstance of its discovery
4) The circumstances being the attack on the 22nd.
5) The decoy of Chelmsford from the camp.

1) I think that the validity of the maps and annotations has been proved beyond a shadow of doubt. Therefore the question mark over the maps would be their content, where did Wood get his information and did he interpret it correctly.
L and Q have certainly backed up Woods claims with fact on his being on the battlefield with time to solicit information from PRIMARY sources. They have shown pretty well that those PRIMARY sources were integral to the mornings activities.

2) DB 14 you are attempting to counter this with an argument quoting sources that in term are talking about item 4.
None of the sources quoted by you or Mike Snook have discounted the POSITION of the army apart from a loose reference to the Ngwebeni Valley. Attempts have been made. not to provide proof of where the army was but rather to prove where they werent.
The time frames provided ( CTSG your wrong, not by Two historians ) by THREE historians, L and Q and also Keith Smith are pretty exact. Look at the timings carefully and provide for our benefit a counter argument that says how exactly Raw/Roberts/Shepstone and the Zulu Army could have traveled the distances they did within the known time frame.
This section has nothing what so ever to do with the testimony from the zulu indunas about when the battle SHOULD have taken place.
You need to take an extremely careful look at the terrain, there are so many maps available, apart from Google Earth. Your comments on the Zulu army being behind itusi do not match with any salient ground features, behind itusi would indicate one of two scenarios, that they were on the ridge or they were in the Quabe valley. Neither of which would work, Durnford would never have got the distance he did if they were in the Quabe mouth, eye witness accounts here point to the Left horn being 1500 yards in the front. And they cant have been on the ridge or close height, any one of a dozen people would have seen them that evening/ early morning.
No matter what you see and hear from Mike Snook there are two reverse slopes that could have hidden the three/four regiments.
The Ngwebeni runs around Mabaso These days its separated by the main Nqutu road and so locals refer to the valley as being to the North of the road but in 1879 there was no road and so the valley could by definition have continued.

3) Your published Zulu accounts tie in perfectly with Raws discovery. Just because L and Q have gone into the realms of speculation here on the timing of the battle does not mean the time, place and circumstance of the discovery are not as described in TMFHT.

4) I believe your right, battle was scheduled for the 23rd and was brought on by the armies discovery. Having said that, then surely the fact that we had impis swanning around all over the heights and ridge making no attempt to remain hidden should then mitigate that fact. Why bother showing your presence so openly and frankly blatantly and then attacking when you didnt want to just because you had been seen for the third/forth time that day. And if the 22nd was so sacred why not make a better attempt to hide those loose regiments wandering around in full view at 5.22 and 9.30. I believe that the position that history asserts the discovery took place is much to distant as a base to launch an attack. I further believe that if that discovery had not taken place the army would have moved onto the ridge that night and attacked the next morning before the piquets and vedettes had been placed, but that just an opinion.

5) We are crediting the Zulus with far to much. in 1879 we did not have the communications we have now. A message from the Mangeni area to the Impi and back again was at least 5 hours travelling time. For that amount of co ordination? Not very likely.
As Ive posted in a debate with Martin, the reason for any decoy working can only be judged in hind sight.
Did the zulu know where the scouting party of the 21st was going to go?
They could have headed of the track for Qudenei?
They could have stayed below the Falls?
They could have done a hang of a lot, if the NNC werent so skitish in the dark above Mangeni, Chelmsford would not have been called out.
If Lt Walsh hadnt been so brave/foolhardy to travel that route twice during darkness, Chelmsford would not have been called out.
How could the the zulus predict so acuratly without the benefit of good solid two way communication what was happening 16 MILES AWAY?

Ive used upper case purely to emphasize not to 'shout'.

Just my opinions so more than happy to be proved wrong.

Cheers

Read both accounts by Melokazulu

Your point?