The missing five hours.

"The two Matyana" as Chelmsford called them....
Thank you very much Mr Whybra.
The author wrote also in his thesis (p.9): "
(...) "See UCT, BC 67 (I.E: Dr K. Campbell Papers), Report by Sir William Beaumont, Isandhlwana could have been averted. Fateful message that was never delivered".

You are right of course.


Ian Knight in "Zulu Rising" (from memory in the chapter "The King's day"/ first page ) gave an another analysis than the author of the thesis about the information given by Woodroffe (i don't have actually the book at hand).
About the "timing", Knight wrote that Beaumont received information from Woodroffe in the evening of the 21 January and sent a special messenger to RD with the mission to find LC.
Knight is less "tragic" than the author of the thesis about the information...
From memory again, it's also the case with Lock and Quantrill in "Zulu Victory" (Comment about Bengough / Beaumont).
As you wrote, I have "unwittingly put together two pieces of evidence which actually don't align".
Sorry.
Cheers
Frédéric

Frederic
It's all right.  It's easy to do especially with two persons named Matshana involved significantly in the same event on the same day and Beaumont doesn't say which he's referring to.
I could have been worse - they might have been called 'Smith' or 'Lebrun'!

I'll not be flogged today...
Merci encore.
Frédéric

Bonjour Frederic
If not today , possibly tomorrow mon ami ?
90th

Then there's always the guillotine...

Mr Whybra,
Fortunately for me, the "death penalty" (and therefore the guillotine) was abolished in France in 1981  
Unfortunately, it means that the death penalty was also abolished for my anglo-saxons "friends"....
Gary,
Tomorrow, I will not send message on the forum: this will prevent me from writing... bullshit (and thus suffer the whip!).

Amitiés.

Frédéric

Frederic
Once the Paris mob - the sans culottes - gets hold of us, there's no telling what they'd do. I learnt a long time ago NOT to turn right at the top of the steps up to Montmartre!

Frank Allewell wrote:

John
My only problem with a pre planned attack is: Who amongst the Zulu high command would have the guts to openly defy Cetswayo? His orders were not to attack without first consulting.
So to deliberately go against the orders of a man who would have no hesitation about hammering very sharp wooden poles up your rear end and enjoy watching you squirm a tad........... plus of course he had some other interesting ways of amusing himself.

Cheers

"Zulu! The battle for Rorke's Drift 1879"("Tempus" / 2005) par Edmund Yorke:
p. 196: "One report from a Zulu witness  printed in the Natal Colonist and Mercury even claimed that some of the Rorke's Drift Zulu commanders had been put to death for 'attacking in the open'". note 31

Note 31 page 228: "Lock and Quantrill "Red Book" p. 102 See also Laband "Kingdom and Colony" p.110

The indications given for Laband and Lock are unfortunately wrong.
Does anyone knows the source of this (alleged) Zulu testimony? Is it authentic?

Cheers

Frédéric

Hi Frederic
I checked back on that Edmund York quote and cant find anything to back it up. In James Stuart there is a verbatim report of when the indunas returned to Ondini, no mention of any one being put to death. Even though the Indunas were blamed for the carnage.

Cheers

I know of no such incident. Yorke is simply recording the newspaper report of a wild rumour. It doesn't make it a fact.

The account of the impi return and the induna meeting with Cetshwayo is in JS volume 4 pp147 and is by Mshayankomo. No mention of any retribution.

Cheers

Indeed it seems to be a wild rumor..
I've never read anything like this statement.
But i wanted to be sure by reading the newspapers.
With luck the author of the information is maybe cited (a border agent, an officer...)
Unfortunately, I have no acces to the South African newspapers.
The site on line "The British library newspapers library" seems to have only British newspapers.

Cheers
Frédéric

I.E: Mr Whybra and Frank thank you for your answers.

I also searched in the database of Australian and New Zealander newspapers but they mainly publish articles previously published in British newspapers and not from South African newspapers.
Cheers
Frédéric

Answer given today by the team of The British newspaper archive:

"We only hold Newspapers for Britain therefore we do not have newspapers for South Africa.

You may want to try a general internet search to find more information.


With kind regards,"


Y F
The British Newspaper Archive Support Team

The photo's sent by Aussie Inkosi were to large and wouldn't be accepted bythe photo host. I done the best I can to get the detail.

"Its been a while since my last post but on my last trip to Isandlwana  back in January I wanted to take some photos of this spot from the position troop Commander Raw and co would of viewed on that occasion.

To start I believe in the point of view that the Zulu army moved forward in 3 distinctive and separate portions the left horn the Right Horn and the Chest and these separate segments were in 3 different positions when the chest was discovered

By Raw the above photo was taken about 500 metres from the Donga the Chest was discovered behind the hill Raw said he crossed in his words “ The enemy in small clumps retiring before us for some time drawing us four to five miles from the camp

When they turned and fell upon us , the whole army showing itself behind a hill where they have been waiting”.

This statement is very important it gives the distance and the description from where they discovered the Zulu Chest being 4 to 5 miles from the camp and directly behind a hill .  My next step was to measure the distance from the camp to this hill I used Google maps and the distance measured 4.5 miles Raw being a good judge of distances unlike Barker measure of distanced lets hear from a Zulu named Uguku being from the Umcijo Regiment which ended up being positioned as one of the chest regiments when the fighting began

“ It was our intention to have rested for a day in the valley where we arrived the night before the battle, but having on the morning of the battle heard firing of the English advance guard who had engaged Matshana’s men and it being reportrd that the Ngobamakosi were engaged, we went from the valley to the top of the Ingqutu which was between us and the camp, we then found that the Ngobamakosi were not engaged, but were quietly encamped lower down the valley.  We saw a body of horse coming up the hill towards us from the Isandlwana side. We opened fire on them the whole of our army rose up the hill. The enemy returned our fire, but retired down the hill leaving one man dead {a black } and a horse on the field. The Uve and Ngobamakosi then became engaged on our left with the enemy”

So the Zulu confirming they left the Ngbweni valley and proceeded to the Ingqutu upon the belief the Ngobamakosi being fired upon them being to there left in our around Nyezi hill and even mentions this same hill not once but twice first being Raw crossing to discover the Zulu and then the Zulu  rising up the hill to advance upon the camp.

The photo above was taken about three quarters up the hill Raw and Uguku mentions which is about 500 metres from the donga the Umcijo were hiding in to cut the line of sight of the British horsemen from the Umcijo regiment in my next post I will post you a photo

taken 250 metres from the Donga and stupid me when I was there I did not take one from 50 to 100 metres which I will do on my next trip this goes to show you how close Raw would have been to the Zulu when firing started which led to one black on the British side either from Raws troop or from Roberts troop being killed which gives the idea the two forces where quite close to each other seeing the Zulu had only old muzzle loaders with a range of only 100 metres

This spot the missing five hours claims fits perfectly with the eye witness reports on the day.

[You must be registered and logged in to see this image.]

This Photo was taken about 250 from the Donga at the bottom of the hill you can see the donga to the right  behind the white  cow, which needs to be magnified

There is a dirt road that leeds to the freeway to Isandlwana and that dirt road is behind the Zulu village on the far right of the photo



Sorry but you will need to wait until I take my next photo from 100 metres from the donga.



The Locations of the 3 portions of the Zulu army



Left Horn :  In or around Nyezi Hill to the left of the Chest which consist of the Uve Regiment and the Ngobamakosi as mentioned by Uguku was sighted by Troopers Barker and Hawkins at 6am



Chest :  At this spot my two photos were taken the UmCijo Regiment the other chest regiments being in or close by to the donga



Right Horn :  Was Sighted by Chard which he states he saw behind Isandlwana at 9am he states he thought they may be going for the ponts which he then decided to return to Rorkes Drift were he made contact with Durnford upon his approach to Isandlwana



I need to thank Major Paul Naish which was my tour guide on all my trips to the Anglo Zulu War battle sights and was the first person who told me of the missing Five hours I hope these photos help in describing Rons Thesis on my second entitled  photo of the Zulu

Viewpoint from the donga"


Posted on behalf of Aussie Inkosi

Thanks for the photos Aussi. Interesting comments on the validity of point X as the place where Raw first encountered the Zulu. As I understand it, you are in good company alongside Snook (back in 2010) and Knight (as recently as April) who both recognise it as the likely location, although they do not seem to agree with the bigger proposition in TMFH that the entire Zulu army had advanced from the Ngwbeni to that position. You seem to be saying that the chest and two horns moved independently, while popular opinion now seems to say that just the younger and inexperienced Umcityo were spooked by the firing at Mangeni and were in process of being withdrawn when Raw came upon them.  With so many publications on related subjects in the pipeline it may not be the ideal time for others who have walked the ground to comment. I for one though, am still intrigued by why Wood gave his maps (including the point X notation) to Edward Durnford to study.

Steve Reinstadtler

Hi Steve
I can tell you in all confidence that IK is certainly not a proponent of TM5H scenario , I've been to the supposed point x , I can't have it either , there is no cover in the saucer type valley described as the x spot , if they were indeed in that saucer shaped depression , Barry could've or would've seen them before Raw , and Raw would've seen them before he did so , it's very hard to explain unless you are on the ground .
90th

Hi Garry

I can only go on what Knight has put into print. I agree that he does not go along with TMFH proposition as a whole, and I said as much. He does though seem to agree with Zulu sources that "a couple of amabutho pushed forward to the escarpment but then withdrew due to over exuberance at the sound of gunfire".

He then points out that Wood's point X is approximate (and described as such by Wood himself). Knight says "The 'x marks the spot' map which suggests that Raw's encounter was nearer to the camp than the bivouac site in the Ngwebeni is unreliable. (Wood, who marked the X, hedges his bets even on the map itself - 'I think this is about where it happened' - and his informants were not in any case present at the encounter). Moreover, Higginson talks about seeing the Zulu army emerge from behind a rocky hill - which doesn't fit the X spot, but does fit the mouth of the Ngwebeni."

I do not know how "approximate" that is, or whether it invalidates Aussies groundwork to any great degree.

Steve Reinstadtler

Hi Steve
Cheers mate , thanks for the clarification .
90th

rusteze wrote:

Thanks for the photos Aussi. Interesting comments on the validity of point X as the place where Raw first encountered the Zulu. As I understand it, you are in good company alongside Snook (back in 2010) and Knight (as recently as April) who both recognise it as the likely location, although they do not seem to agree with the bigger proposition in TMFH that the entire Zulu army had advanced from the Ngwbeni to that position. You seem to be saying that the chest and two horns moved independently, while popular opinion now seems to say that just the younger and inexperienced Umcityo were spooked by the firing at Mangeni and were in process of being withdrawn when Raw came upon them.  With so many publications on related subjects in the pipeline it may not be the ideal time for others who have walked the ground to comment. I for one though, am still intrigued by why Wood gave his maps (including the point X notation) to Edward Durnford to study.

Steve Reinstadtler

Thanks for your post Steve

There seems to also be testimony from Mehlokazulu after his morning scouting job on the 22nd to the camp and on return reporting to the Zulu commander Tsingwayo
he heard him call up the regiments to assemble and advance on the camp this explains all these large Zulu sightings all over the place from the far left to the far right of the camp all from English eyes Troopers Barker, Whitelaw and also Chard they all saw thousands these all came out of the Ngbweni valley in the early morning hours.

This topic is one that makes this battle full of mystery one of my questions would be how early did Tsingwayo know that Chelmsford left the camp with half the force
things seemed to be moving very fast hence could this be the reason he ordered his regiments to assemble and advance to the camp.

thanks again Steve

Hi

One thing that I can't quite get my head round is the movements of Zulu reported at various times before AWDs arrival in camp - the Zulus apparently rushed to the escarpment (in some thousands) had a shuftie at the camp, some shimmied around the hill of Isandlwana and the rest went back to their 'happy valley' - in the process revealing themselves to the British.

The common reasoning for this has always been that the sound of Lord C's skirmishing made some Zulu regiments believe that battle had been joined, and they went off half cocked.

Did the Zulus really believe that the British would not send out scouts - maybe following a trail of trampled grass (which surely then Zulus must have left on their journey to and from the valley?

Where were the Zulu outposts around the bivouac - would they really encamp so close to the British without deploying defensive outposts?

Could the cattle have been a deliberate ploy, to decoy the British in....they had 'form' for this kind of strategy (at Ulundi was it?)?

I personally believe that the Zulu army was already deploying (or deployed) at its 'jump off point'. Whilst I am not fully committed to all aspects of the MFH (not being familiar with the lie of the land), I think there is more to it than the 'Zulu Dawn' discovery scenario.

Cheers

Sime

how early did Tsingwayo know that Chelmsford left the camp with half the force.

As i have alway's said The Zulu had an excellent spy and scouting system.. they watched Chelmsford
leave the camp and could'nt believe their luck. Chelmsford had split his command.. before knowing
the disposition's of the enemy. he marched to Mangeni fully expecting to encounter the whole Zulu
army.. ( so it is said?. ) then why did he leave his ammunition behind. there is something very rotten
about the whole Isandhlwana affair.

Well then that explains it Xhosa I always believed the Zulu command knew early on that morning Chelmsford split his force and just to prove it the Zulu lookouts were all over the place remember when Maori Brown started his journey back to the camp he saw 2 Zulu youths sittting on the rocks when hechased after them killing one and the other even gave him the location of the Zulu army I guarantee
you those and many other look outs covered the whole area. Also remember those two to three thousand Zulus taunting Dartnell all night long they did not stay why because they saw Chelmsford coming up the dirt road and they would of notified Tsingwayo ASAP the zulu where always one step ahead of the British in this battle

I am not sufficiently aufait with the Zulu oral histories to be categorical about how well planned the Zulu strategy was. But I think it was more luck than judgement. It was the afternoon of 17 January (according to FWD Jackson) when Cetshwayo sent his impis against Chelmsford. At that time, Chelmsford's force was at the Batshe and they did not advance to Isandhlwana until 20th, arriving in full force on 21st. On the 20th the Zulu army lay by iSiphezi and late on the 21st in the Ngwebeni Valley (possibly with some amabutho pushing forward as previously discussed). It seems to me that when the Zulu army left Ulundi it could have had no idea where Chelmsford was going to camp - and even when the impis rested at iSiphezi they could not know that Isandhlwana was going to be its target. It is also generally agreed that the Zulu army intended to attack on 23rd - had it done so it would have found the bulk of Chelmsford's force much further forward. Isandhlwana was always going to be a temporary resting place, hence the little regard for defence. I cannot think of another instance where the Zulu attacked a moving column (I am happy to be corrected) so do not believe this was their intention. Add to that the relative inability of the Zulu commanders to control events once the start button had been pushed and I reach my conclusion that they were far from being the all seeing opponents some believe. It was sheer happenstance that they caught the undefended half column near enough to the Zulu resting place at Nwegbeni in the few hours when they could be most effective.

Steve Reinstadtler

Hi Steve,

I am not a fan of the decoy theory - that Lord C was deliberately lured out on his 'picnic'.

I do believe that the Zulus knew that the British were encamped at Isandlwana and intended to attack there - they had quite a good system of 'aggressive' scouting, additionally the locals would have informed them of the British camp location (maybe?)

At what point they knew that Lord C had left, I am not sure but I find it hard to believe that they did not learn at some point.

Would they have attacked anyway, (had they not known Lord C was gone) - I believe so but perhaps a reason they still went for the camp was the knowledge that the British could not live off the land, would they have been strategically aware as to work out if they took/destroyed the camp - it would cripple the column?

Cheers

Simon

I cannot think of another instance where the Zulu attacked a moving column (I am happy to be corrected) .... Inyezane....... on the same day. as for luck, it is said a great
commander ' create's and then exploit's... Tshingwayo recognised what was happening and used
the event's as they presented them self's with great effect. your post has the same air of complacency
that pervaded the invader's mind set. yes there was initial confusion, as the Zulu attack fully
developed the intention was to ' eat up ' the enemy and stamp that camp flat.. which is precisely
what happened.

Hi Guys
A couple of comments 'live' from the scene. I'm actually on the balcony of the RD Hotel having spent the last couple of weeks doing some recuperative work.
I walked the entire area in question yesterday and this morning.
If you going to believe that the army was in the Ngwebini valley then you have to 100% discount the 'Woods' maps ( Some would say the Henderson maps ). Those maps very clearly indicate the various regiments out of the valley and laying along the upper reaches of the Ngwebini stream.
Point X is really neither here nor there. If the regiments were out of the valley they were seen. Simple.
Gary/Ian are correct...........to a degree. Barry would have seen them, no question about it. IF he was still on piquet. Surely thats actually a starting point.
Barker was back and forward and quite probably stationed to the North of Ithusi, on the hump. Its debatable from there what he would have seen.
Then into the argument throw in the early morning mist, I saw it this morning amongst other times. that whole basin was enshrouded. Winston Churchill could have wallowed around there with the 7th Armoured Division and you wouldn't have seen them. IF there fore Raw dragged Barry away from the piquet point at say 10.30 ish the mist would just be clearing. once down on the plain he would not have seen into that basin as his route was all downhill into another 'basin'
So I would advise you take in all conditions before judging.
The entrance to the Ngwebini is around half way along that supposed line of regiments and to my mind would have been the logical route out of the valley, so why the hell struggle climbing a really steep rock covered slopw when you could have gone around? That aint the African way.

Les
.Nyezane and also Hlobane maybe?



Now that really bad news, Work has commenced on the 'Palace' at iSandlwana. I say commenced, the site is surrounded with a cloth covered fence, builders huts are erected a Digger loader is on site but according to the chap I chatted to this morning they haven't been paid yet so they are waiting

Great post Frank, make's perfect sense to me. i thought about Hlobane, but that
was a pre planned assault by wood, diversion for his lordship.. Intombe whilst not
technically on the march.. the 80th were still surprised in the open.

Hi All
We know for a fact that the valley was covered in fog , believe me , when it's thick fog you cant see anything , I couldnt see anymore than 10 feet in front of me ...on several occasions whilst on my balcony at the Lodge , this has happened several times over the years , the Lodge is basically situated where the zulu lookouts may well have been , no way they saw the plain , and it can take a while to burn off , no way could the zulu scouts know LC had left unless they were in the camp , which we know didnt happen , as for the zulu decoying LC out of the camp , sorry , I don't buy it , how would the zulu know that LC would split his force in the first place , I believe the attack was planned for dawn on the 23rd as mentioned in several sources , the attack was no doubt instigated when Raw came across them , as Frank said , if the zulu were at point X , Barry would've seen them from his picquet position , Raw would've seen them much earlier , and Raw's eyewitness statement of the zulu's appearing from two rocky hills certainly fits the entrance to the Ngwebini Valley , not point x which is a shallow saucer shaped dip ! . In haste
90th

Good stuff gentlemen, we appear to have some traction on the forum again. I am not sufficiently ground aware to appreciate the difference between the Nwegbeni Valley and its upper reaches, so to that extent I go along with Frank's description of the deployment - I agree that the precise point X is relatively unimportant in this context. But my argument is a much wider one (to be quite honest I cannot see how my supposed "complacency" comes into it). My question is how soon did Chelmsford know that the interim camp was going to be at Isandhlwana? Because for sure the Zulu could not have known before he did. Of course Tshingwayo realised what was happening and exploited it, ,but late in the day, and he couldn't have known it when he headed with the Zulu army to Nwegbeni could he? Hence it was happenstance. I don't think he knew that Chelmsford had left with half the force either - but we can't really prove it one way or the other.

Steve Reinstadtler

Two wonderful shot's from the 90th.

[You must be registered and logged in to see this image.]

Thanks Les , that shows how thick the fog can be , no way the zulu could see what LC doing , and these were taken as it was lifting !!
90th

Hi Steve
I think it might be wise to put on hold the chasing down of First Editions and the like , save the funds to get to SA !
90th

Hi

The thing that springs to my mind - if it was that foggy (and the fog took time to burn off), how could the Zulu movements have been noted on the surrounding hills - early in the morning (as Pope mentioned in his diary)

Cheers

Sime

The Fog was over the camp in the very early morning , LC left about 4.30am from memory , he would've been well out of sight by 8am if not earlier , no doubt the fog had lifted at that time , first reports were from memory about or 8am ?.
90th

Cheer's mate , the British had been in Zululand for the
proverbial 2 minute's.... they knew Nothing of the country including
ten mile's to their immediate front at any given time!. Zulu's had an
extremely efficient system of transmitting complicated messages..
with great speed and accuracy, the notion that some early morning
mist would throw them into some kind of disarray and confusion i
find highly unlikely.. they were intimate with their country they had
complete control of their communication's through out, sure the
the ultimate tipping point was not of the Zulu command's choosing,
but when the do hit the fan, the Zulu set the agenda.. the british did
not even know a meeting had been called.

Great Photos Gary when I was there in Janaurary for two mornings it was fogy I have been there two other times and there was no fog.  On the morning of the 22nd it was foggy but Barker had no problem sighting thousands of Zulus from a distance and he was in the Itusi, Qwabi area only 2 to 3 ks from the camp so the fog must have been in patches otherwise Barker would not have seen them.  But another quick thought just imagine if it was that foggy and Tsingwayo knew Chelmsford split his army then he could of literally moved his army straight under the camps noses without them even seeing it

Hi Gary

Brickhill mentions sightings between 6 and 7 O'clock and Barker spots them from his position (on the plateau) 'about sunrise' - though it was not probably as foggy up there - but presumably the fog would have been in other dips & valleys. Following Keith Smith - times about Isandlwana are dodgy but Barker references 'sunrise'.

I am not sure that we can look at Isandlwana today and say because fog was mentioned on 22nd Jan 1879 - it was the same 'class' of fog.

I am not sure in my mind if the Zulus knew Lord C's force had gone or not. I am not sure it would have mattered or not.

Just out of interest if it was that foggy when Lord C left, to me it compounds his error in splitting his forces......he did not actually know where the enemy where and wandered off into the fog.......not only would he have to contend with the poor track and dongas but also fog as thick as the proverbial bag.

I know its a few miles away but did Dartnell mention fog?

Cheers

Sime

A key question that crops up in trying to disabuse TMFHT is as Gary has pointed out Barry should have seen them in the basin. Other areas are that the Piquet on top of the ridge would also have seen them so using these as a starting point.
How do we know that Barry didn't see them? Reports had been sent back to the camp (Cochrane), 'The enemy were in force to the hills on our left:The enemy are in three columns: The columns are separating: The Enemy are retiring in every direction.'
All those reports came down of the plateau, we have no way of telling that they didn't come from Barry.
So look at those reports and put them into the context of this;
The enemy has spilled out of the Ngwebini valley, is moving in three columns, one to the right, one to the centre and one to the left. All to their holding station along the front of Mabaso ( incidently aound 800 metres from the small ridge that Raw would have to ride over. Then the sounds of gunfire are heard from the Column and a portion of that Zulu line moves forward and then retreats. Lastly one regiment moves of towards the Qwabe valley and eventually meets up with Durnford.
So the potential is that all those repots 'could' substantiate the Zulus moving out of the valley to take up a forward position.
That's also reinforced by Mehlokazulu having had a look at the camp, in doing so scaring the hell out of Barker and Hawkins, he was just settling down for breakfast when he heard the order given for the units to advance.
Critically as well the times all fit together. And those movements could have all been witnessed by the NNC on Mkweni.
I disagree with position 'X' but not the premise behind it. When Durnford set of up the Qwabe valley he was expecting to meet up with his troops from the plateau at some point. That would leave me to believe that the Raw/Roberts/Shepstone cabal where not traveling from Nyone in a direct line but working towards the North East, towards the high ground that extends from iThusi to the North. The ols army maxim applies, seek the high ground.
From that higher elevation all those folds in the plateau flatten out. That is fact not speculation. Raw would then negotiate the last of the folds/hills and be looking straight down the throat of the army, at around 800 yards away.
The above of course is all speculation but based on putting the jigsaw together in a way that works.
There remains the early morning sightings on the ridge. Pope and Chard are probably the most reliable for that in putting the numbers at around 4000. Could that amount of men just conceivable be Matyanas men returning from the Mangeni after keeping Dartnell awake? Again the time fits and there is no other obvious explanation as to what happened to that force. The could have left Mangeni at dawn and crossed the plain out of site of Chelmsfords force way to the South and hit the top of the Qwabe crossing onto the plateau and looked down onto the camp. Chard says they went behind the Lion hill. He was at the HQ tent looking for orders, didn't see any staff officers because they were all on parade, masked from his view way to the North of the camp. In similar vein he couldn possibly have seen the Zulus moving behind iSandlwana. What he would have seen is those regiments until the bulk of the mountain hid them from view, or as the passed the bottom of Mkweni. From there they cold have turned right and headed across the plain towards the Ngwebini, seen by Barry and reported as such.

All grist for the mill and just some thoughts from the deck of the RD looking down at the mist shrouded river, listening to the noise of silence, spoilt by the sound of Bacon sizzling in the kitchen for my breakfast.
Damn I love my country.

PS: Why search for the illogical when the logical works.

Gary
"Raw would've seen them much earlier , and Raw's eyewitness statement of the zulu's appearing from two rocky hills certainly fits the entrance to the Ngwebini Valley , not point x which is a shallow saucer shaped dip ! . "

I cant find any mention of this in Raws statement, Please let me have a copy if there was a later statement.

Cheers

Gary

I think twice before going to the newsagents these days, let alone KZN!

Frank

Who is this shallow saucer shaped drip?

Steve

Hi Steve
'Drip' ?
Steve go onto Google earth, the cameras have been along the Nqutu road and there is a great view of this area.. Go to 29 degree 19'56.18 S and 30degree 43'53.92 E.
Put the little man on the road and scan to the left from NNW to SW. That's the 'Drip' with the top end of the ngwebini stream. Pan around to the east and South East and that's Mabaso hill. If you move slightly North there is a track leading to the East along the line of the stream that is the access into the valley.
Give it a go.

Cheers

Sorry Google playing up. Try 28 Degree 18'50.14 S and 30degree 43'02.02 E and scan as above

I will give it a go. Thought you were referring to a forum member!

Steve

Now that's just plain nasty.

Was Tshingwayo lucky to pull it off?

This was just a thought I had earlier – and not a criticism of the Zulus in their stunning victory, I'm just playing devils advocate

In my view – on  the evidence to counter the M5H:-


He encamped close to an enemy without leaving out posts or piquets (else how come the British surprised him)

He attacked a defensive position without fully assessing the strength of the enemy (if he did not know that Lord C had gone – he must have assumed his full force was at Isandlwana – 12 companies, + full battery etc etc) – that is if he had any idea what strength the column had when it entered Zululand.

I do not believe he had knowledge of the dead ground by the rocky ridge – it would have been very hard to see its true cover from the heights, given its ground cover.

He lost control of a portion of his army – which ‘swanned’ across the land – revealing themselves to the British and presumably left  a trail, my granny could follow (I must admit one of her weakness was tracking)

His offensive scouting seemed fairly poor

You can argue he attacked against orders


I spose Napoleon said something along the lines of “Don’t give me a good general, give me a lucky one” However most of the above actions seem - counter to the actions of a good general - regardless of technology & period in history.

Now regardless of the scenario (much argued between myself and 90th/Gary) about the outcome of Isandlwana with Lord C’s force there – given the above evidence/reasoning – Tshingwayo was no better than Lord C – just luckier.....

You could argue that Isandlwana was a 'soldiers battle' on both sides (as I believe most battles are - but that's just me) and that it was won by the PBI.....

Cheers

Sime

Frank

Does this work?

The saucer. Where Raw came across the forward amabuthos.
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Looking towards Mabaso and the original location of the Zulu army in the valley.
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Steve

Well done Steve
That's exactly the positions but the 'saucer' is better viewed from a couple of hundred metre South, by the iSandlwana sign.
Sime
best way to do this.
He encamped close to an enemy without leaving out posts or piquets (else how come the British surprised him)
Pretty confidant that he wouldn't be seen I suppose would be the answer. Or didn't care. One needs to realise that most Zulu battles were fought when the enemy knew the Zulu were coming. It was generally an important facet of the Zulu tactic that they were seen approaching, shields held to their sides and the at the critical moment flashed to the front, significantly increasing the breadth of the force. At the same time the horns ran out. So vision was very important

He attacked a defensive position without fully assessing the strength of the enemy (if he did not know that Lord C had gone – he must have assumed his full force was at Isandlwana – 12 companies, + full battery etc etc) – that is if he had any idea what strength the column had when it entered Zululand.
Don't forget, attack was a second choice. He was ordered to 'chat' first. I would assume he would have taken the army up to the ridge en mass and then taken a stroll down to the camp with the various headmen and spoke to Chelmsford.

I do not believe he had knowledge of the dead ground by the rocky ridge – it would have been very hard to see its true cover from the heights, given its ground cover.
Quite possible

He lost control of a portion of his army – which ‘swanned’ across the land – revealing themselves to the British and presumably left  a trail, my granny could follow (I must admit one of her weakness was tracking)
I would agree he lost control for the initial advance. But as above the reveal wasn't critical

His offensive scouting seemed fairly poor
Definitly not agreed he had the best Zulu general available, look how they kept secret for the whole advance up to Ngwebini, moving Lt Browne out of the way etc. Brilliant covering.

You can argue he attacked against orders
Yes he did

Hi Frank
Just sent you a pm .
90th