Durnford was he capable. 3

Comparing RD with iSandlwana is a bit of a red herring. They knew what was coming at RD and through the good sense of Dalton they prepared for it. Chelmsford ignored his own orders regarding laagering even though he had the best part of two days to at least organise some sort of defences. He did not organise his patrols good enough, he even went out on some of the patrols but still didn't recognise the vulnerability of the situation of the camp, and his patrols did not discover the many thousands of zulu's just waiting for their opportunity to attack the camp. He then splits his force and goes off on a wild goose chase to support Dartnell, with the thought that he will confront the main impi and bring it to battle, and he does this without getting some definite proof of evidence that the main impi is there. Pulleine is getting reports from the early hours that there is zulu activity around the camp area, he does next to nothing about it for hours, then Durnford arrives and sees that there is something afoot. He sends out scouts and patrols to try to find out better information, he was only there for around an hour, and you think he should have done what Chelmsford had the best part of two days to do, and that what Pulleine had a number of hours to do. He didn't know what size the zulu impi was, they had no warning of an attack about to happen, however, when he got the report of zulu's heading in the direction of LC, he had to act to try to find out what they were up to, just in case they were trying to cut LC off or attack him. If Durnford was such a twit, then why did they rally round him at iSandlwana, and why did they turn out in droves to pay him their last respects at his funeral?

Glyn was in command! And didn't he put up an argument about the state of the camp? 

You cant be serious ....are you ? !! . You dont seem to remember , or possibly suffering from a case of selective memory , the troops were set out as per LC's instructions in his booklet which was given to Column commanders and other higher ranking officers ! . Feel free to explain to me and others how Isandlwana is a smaller area to defend than RD ? , enlighten me of your plans to fortify 1,000 men in a smaller area than RD where there was only 250 to start with then finished with 140 odd after the NNC bolted ! . The orders were to defend the camp , you cant do that from way back behind the camp on the side of the mountain ! . You cant have it your ( one ) way , the officers in both camps acted as they saw fit in regard to their orders and the state of the ground . Surely you can see this ??  
90th

Glyn was the commander of the 3rd Column. The only person he moaned too. Was Browne. He could have quite easily reminded Lord Chelmsford of his own standing orders. It was Glyn who convinced Lord Chelmsford to go to Dartnells assistance, thus causing Lord Chelmsford to split his force. Glyn had enough to say to Lord Chelmsford about Dartnell, but nothing about the camp and it's defences !

impi,later,av a gud kip,well dodged.
Gary,hiya test loser   agree with
all that. Les  

ctsg. what? err no. ( you ) what?.
you go bo bo's now with impi?.  

ctsg .
I see your attempts to wind people up , so I'll leave your misinformed / misguided posts on this topic alone after this prompt and somehow courteous reply ! . As for your ridiculous comment re - Glyn , it either proves you have no idea , or the wind up is the priority , I'm hoping it's the latter  . Glyn did indeed mention the lack of fortifications etc as did some others , but , as you may have forgotten , this was dismissed by your LC .
90th  

ctsg .
Sorry , I now think it's the former  . Preposterous ! .... comes to mind with the thinking and terminology of 1879 .
   

Glyn was the commander of the 3rd Column. The only person he moaned too. Was Browne. He could have quite easily reminded Lord Chelmsford of his own standing orders. It was Glyn who convinced Lord Chelmsford to go to Dartnells assistance, thus causing Lord Chelmsford to split his force. Glyn had enough to say to Lord Chelmsford about Dartnell, but nothing about the camp and it's defences !

no fact in that was correct, ie, the only one, on the face of it is your first assertion,but we know
who really commanded that column.

k, dream on,you usually do! you crazy
gang of four..or is it really one. for
petes sake. knock a bit off,leave a bit
on. 

Ha ha. I never know what your say!

" I was talking to some of my best officer's when, ( Lonsdale )
joined us, and his first word's were, ' my god ' Maori, what do
you think of this camp?. i replied, some one is mad! the
Colonial officer's were loud and long in complaint..and Duncome,
( a Captain in Browne's Battalion ) said, Do the staff think we
are going to meet an army of school-girl's, Why in the name of
all thats holy do we not laager?. [ Colonel Glyn ] did not seem to
be in good spirit's, but said nothing about the camp, and on my
remarking it looked very pretty, though rather extended, he looked
very hard at me, shook his head and said..very".

And later back at rorkes drift.. Glyn rather pathetically to LC..

On the 24th of January, Colonel Glyn wrote to Lord Chelmsford:
" The whole of the Native Contingent walked off this morning.
their rifles were taken from them; all the Hospital bearer's then
went, and now the Native Pioneer's are going. i am now left
without any Native's".

Chelmsfordthescapegoat wrote:

Glyn was the commander of the 3rd Column. The only person he moaned too. Was Browne. He could have quite easily reminded Lord Chelmsford of his own standing orders. It was Glyn who convinced Lord Chelmsford to go to Dartnells assistance, thus causing Lord Chelmsford to split his force. Glyn had enough to say to Lord Chelmsford about Dartnell, but nothing about the camp and it's defences !

If you really believe LC was influenced into making poor decisions by his junior officers, then surely, LC was a very poor and incompetent commander?

Glyn was in command of the 3rd colum. Define "Junior"

kopie, allow me,

Glyn was in command of the 3rd colum. Define "Junior" say's impi.

As in not being a baron, knight, gen, ergo..junior.  

Doe's this not place Durnford at fault? Is it not possible that Pulleine was just following Durnfords lead when it came to sending the men out of the camp?

"Before starting Colonel Durnford directed a company 1st battalion 24th to occupy the heights fifteen hundred yards to the north of the camp. This was the first fatal error, leading, as it ultimately did, to On the best hearsay authority, these "written instructions" were to the following effect : " You will be in command of the camp during the absence of Colonel Glyn ; draw in your line of defence while the force is out, and draw in your infantry outposts accordingly, but keep your cavalry videttes well advanced."

Historical records of the 24th regiment, from its formation, in 1689 Edited by George Paton, Farquhar Glennie [and] William Penn Symons. Published 1892.

"Before starting Colonel Durnford directed a company 1st battalion 24th to occupy the heights fifteen hundred yards to the north of the camp. This was the first fatal error, leading, as it ultimately did, to On the best hearsay authority.. On the best hearsay authority?. Ray63    do
you not detect even a hint if bias in that work?. none of that is actually correct..

Since when has 'hearsay' been prime source authorative evidence   

You are right Les, the bias against Col Durnford in that work sticks out like a sore thumb.

  yes Martin it does, but like you and me..
we understand that knowledge is just basicly
remembering stuff! and interpretation, is it
not interesting that the correct answer is
always the correct one! it can not be any-
thing else! some really should study more!
which of course includes me!   

Interpretation is the key word Les. Some people can understand the way things are meant to be taken, while others just have their own idea of what things mean (and to them, their ideas must be the truth), and nothing will then alter them from this because their mind becomes set, even if the truth stood up and gave then a right hook they would still be in denial.

yes Martin    and we know this because we
pay attention! denile, well i know for a fact
thats in egypt, seen what you did there! one
size fits all, thats it for me. nite mate you and
your little friend      

Hearsay    If you say so   

LOL, De Nile in Egypt, I like it Les.

Nite mate, my little pal is just finishing off his Ovaltine, then it's on with his jim jams and off to bed   


 

Dream about wrong numbers   

Ray63 wrote:

Doe's this not place Durnford at fault? Is it not possible that Pulleine was just following Durnfords lead when it came to sending the men out of the camp?

"Before starting Colonel Durnford directed a company 1st battalion 24th to occupy the heights fifteen hundred yards to the north of the camp. This was the first fatal error, leading, as it ultimately did, to On the best hearsay authority, these "written instructions" were to the following effect : " You will be in command of the camp during the absence of Colonel Glyn ; draw in your line of defence while the force is out, and draw in your infantry outposts accordingly, but keep your cavalry videttes well advanced."

Historical records of the 24th regiment, from its formation, in 1689 Edited by George Paton, Farquhar Glennie [and] William Penn Symons. Published 1892.

Considering the date of publication. possibly holds some weight! We also know from other sources this was the case!

Do you own this book Ray?

Ray, that's exactly what happened!  

"Before starting Colonel Durnford directed a company 1st battalion 24th to occupy the heights fifteen hundred yards to the north of the camp. This was the first fatal error, leading, as it ultimately did, to On the best hearsay authority, these "written instructions" were to the following effect : " You will be in command of the camp during the absence of Colonel Glyn ; draw in your line of defence while the force is out, and draw in your infantry outposts accordingly, but keep your cavalry videttes well advanced."

Historical records of the 24th regiment, from its formation, in 1689 Edited by George Paton, Farquhar Glennie [and] William Penn Symons. Published 1892.

The extract your quoting was penned by penn-symons..i do have the book..the above is not fact.
it was from penn-symons pen, when some get up to speed re the AZW and i accept that some are
further ' down the road ' than others..you can read the bias coming from that pen (symons )

You could say that, just about every author. History repeats it's self, authors repeat each other ? Now that's fact.

Now that's fact. What is?   

"Authors repeat each other".

Yes, some of them do, and that is the problem.

Someone starts off by writing something based on 'hearsay', and before you know it, lots of other so called 'authors' jump on the bandwagon and repeat the same garbage and state it as fact. However, in more modern times, there has been some better research carried out by leading historians who get to the roots of this 'hearsay' and prove it to be nothing but a load of rubbish, yet some easily persuaded and gullible folk still cling to this junk and keep on using it or quoting it as 'fact'.

It is out of date bunkum which has been disproved and should be disposed of, but even so, the anti-Durnford's keep on using it in an attempt to persuade others that he was to blame for iSandlwana, which is total nonsense.

Martin read the book in question. Then repeat the above. Most of the sources today come from the lines of that book. Read it first. Look for the Zulu War section.

Martin read the book in question. Then repeat the above. Most of the sources today come from the lines of that book. Read it first. Look for the Zulu War section.

24th i have read the book in question. and i dont mind echoing Martins
assessment. Penn-Symon's although a very good officer ( died after
wounds received at Talana ) was very biased in his writing of the dis-
aster which was Isandhlwana..he and his two brother officers were
reconstructing regimental history lost at Isandhlwana, i prefer the
work of Atkinson which is more complete, and then their was Jack
Addams book from 1968.

"Before starting Colonel Durnford directed a company 1st battalion 24th to occupy the heights fifteen hundred yards to the north of the camp. This was the first fatal error, leading, as it ultimately did, to On the best hearsay authority, these "written instructions" were to the following effect : " You will be in command of the camp during the absence of Colonel Glyn ; draw in your line of defence while the force is out, and draw in your infantry outposts accordingly, but keep your cavalry videttes well advanced." ....that is all factually incorrect..we know this. instead of quoting ' the records ' maybe
you should be reading David Jackson, the records is a nice little history but, not the wonder book you
would suggest   

Xhosa wrote:

You will be in command of the camp during the absence of Colonel Glyn ; draw in your line of defence while the force is out, and draw in your infantry outposts accordingly, but keep your cavalry videttes well advanced." ....that is all factually incorrect

.

Can you elaborate on this ?

Mr M. Cooper wrote:

Interpretation is the key word Les. Some people can understand the way things are meant to be taken, while others just have their own idea of what things mean (and to them, their ideas must be the truth), and nothing will then alter them from this because their mind becomes set, even if the truth stood up and gave then a right hook they would still be in denial.

Martin I find it odd, that you think that way considering the book is the Historical records of the 24th regiment, from its formation, in 1689 Edited by George Paton, Farquhar Glennie [and] William Penn Symons. Published 1892

Thought you would have read this book after all the harping on you do about the regiment not being Welsh.

" You will be in command of the camp during the absence of Colonel Glyn ; draw in your line of defence while the force is out, and draw in your infantry outposts accordingly, but keep your cavalry videttes well advanced."....

impi dont waste my time! we know who said that, and so
do you! challenge me with something more challenging!
keep in mind ' the official line, emanating from the cover up '.
and see where the bias flows from!   

You are aware that order was issued to Pulleine don't you! If not I haven't got a clue what your on about?

am i aware! me! well yes i am!    On the best hearsay authority,
but i will leave that with you.. cheers mate   

Les must admit, I'm getting confused with your response? Can't understand what your trying to say. Would like to get the correct understanding, so I can follow the discussion.

impi.

Interpreting something that has been written in such a way as to confuse can be a problem for some people, many of them jump to the wrong conclusions without even trying to attempt to understand what is being said.

As Les says, it was written in a very biased way after the loss at iSandlwana, the writers had their 'scapegoat' in Col Durnford, so why would they bother trying to clear his name, they just went along with the cover up to protect LC's backside.

I always try to read factual books on the various subjects that interest me, and that includes the AZW, I don't like reading fiction or propaganda, and I don't like being fed with all the lies and deceit that emitted from the cover up after the loss at iSandlwana just to protect Chelmsford's rear end.

Hiya you! please dont be confused, its a legitimate
strand from the original question, below was cited
as correct! its not..

"Before starting Colonel Durnford directed a company 1st battalion 24th to occupy the heights fifteen hundred yards to the north of the camp. This was the first fatal error, leading, as it ultimately did, to On the best hearsay authority, these "written instructions" were to the following effect : " You will be in command of the camp during the absence of Colonel Glyn ; draw in your line of defence while the force is out, and draw in your infantry outposts accordingly, but keep your cavalry videttes well advanced."

Historical records of the 24th regiment, from its formation, in 1689 Edited by George Paton, Farquhar Glennie [and] William Penn Symons. Published 1892.

The above was penned by William Penn-Symon's, and inserted
into the regimental History,it is a biased account which i'm
afraid reinforces the untruth that Durnford alone was respon-
sible for the Isandhlwana disaster.. we know who wrote the
order above and the sequences before and after..all i'm really
saying in essence is that people should not over rely on the
once source of information, the world has spun a bit since then.
other sources ' as they say ' are available..yes i suppose i can
be a bit cryptic at times, the impi post i abbreviated because it
bored me!

"Before starting Colonel Durnford DIRECTED a company 1st battalion 24th to occupy the heights fifteen hundred yards to the north of the camp. This was the FIRST fatal error, leading, as it ultimately did, to On the best HEARSAY authority, these "written instructions" were to the following effect : " You will be in COMMAND of the camp during the absence of Colonel Glyn ; draw in your line of defence while the force is out, and draw in your infantry outposts accordingly, but keep your cavalry videttes well advanced." obviously my capitals..

Okay, but what's you point!

Okay, but what's you point!

okay but what's your's?
i thought my post quite explanatory!
do you have something that you wish
to communicate to me..

No not really, better things to do!!! Perhaps someone else can work out what your saying!!!

then why ask! but thank you for
your usual insight, i always value
your input!   

Durnford had posted a lookout on top of Isandlwana who had reported that the Zulus were retiring and some appeared to be moving eastwards.which might have inferred that this force could turn south and attack Chelmsford in the flank. This is what caused Durnford to advance eastwards past the Conical Kop with two troops of the N.N.H., the rocket battery and one company of the 1st N.N.C. Is it possible that the Zulu had anticipated Durnfords actions, thus weaking the camp defences. Just a thought.

John wrote:

Durnford had posted a lookout on top of Isandlwana who had reported that the Zulus were retiring and some appeared to be moving eastwards.which might have inferred that this force could turn south and attack Chelmsford in the flank. This is what caused Durnford to advance eastwards past the Conical Kop with two troops of the N.N.H., the rocket battery and one company of the 1st N.N.C. Is it possible that the Zulu had anticipated Durnfords actions, thus weaking the camp defences. Just a thought.

Is it possible? Just about anything is. Is it probable? Well, ask yourself first -- isn't it MORE probable that they were reacting to Chelmsford taking half the force in the camp out with him to chase will geese? I actually doubt they anticipated either one and Mehlokazulu says they didn't even notice that anybody left.

Of course. It's very possible that Zulu spies were in the camp, posing as NNC feeding information back to the Zulu commanders. Still if 20,000 Zulu warriors could get to a valley 5 miles from the camp without be seen or heard, then it's possible The Good Lord Chelmsford could have got his small band of brothers away. But I doubt it. The Zulu's would have been well aware of British movements.

Springbok, who would you say was in-command during the Battle! Durford took command, on arrival, then I assume handed it back when he left. So to me that puts Pulliene firmly in command during the battle. Or did it fall back to Durnford at any point during his fall back to the camp?

springbok9 wrote:

1) Pulleine, Durnford wasn't in the camp at that time. When you mention Chelmsford/Durnford I think you are confusing the statement by Chelmsford that he was informed by Essex that the order to go onto the ridge was issued  by Durnford. And that's still highly debatable.
2) None that we are aware of at the start of the battle, possibly at the end Shepstone.
a) We will never know, the last sighting of him was by Nyanda 'in the tents' so Shepstone retreated across the face of the mountain not the rear.
b) Stafford was on the ridge next to Essex. Next to him on his right was Barton. He also mentions Vause and Henderson as being in line and comments that Roberts was in a kraal.
So that would mean 1 troop NNH, 3 troop NNH, Hlubi and E Company 1/1 NNC
c) Not a thing

Happy to have that list amplified.

Cheers

Bonsoir Springbok,
Many thanks for your help.
I am going to study your answers, in particular the troops with SHEPSTONE-
as you know, a subject highly debatable between the authors on Isandhlwana-.  

I can't understand the decision of PULLEINE / DURNFORD: The right horn was apparing in the rear and no attempt (that we are aware) was made at that moment to try to hold the Zulu force???
Mister JACKSON says  (Hill of the Sphinx): "according to Bandsman WILSON there were still four companies of the 24th on the parade ground"
Maybe, because  "the true strength of the enemy was not apparent"? (Jackson p.31)
Then PULLEINE deplayed his force... without placing troops at the rear.   

Cheers
Frédéric

I.E:Point 1: You are right, i have made a mistake...which was not debatable !!!. :  :