Durnford was he capable. 3

Japanese as well mate eh!

What, me worry?

Nec Aspera Terrent.   

Cheers Frank mate.   

So well put Martin! you have it exact, but more importantly
you have it right! so no need to question this phase
any further!.

Martin ya gotta do it without google translator.
This one must have been Chelmsfords family motto( That is if he could speak Russian)

Chto,ja nadojedat

          

Ha ha, yes Frank, correct, it should have been his motto.

Could have also had it in French,; Quoi je, m'inquiete.

Or Esperanto,; Kio, mi malkvietighu.

Or Spanish,; Que, yo me preocupe.

Maybe this would have been even better,; Cor enim mauris.   

  

Love it   

Hi Les.

Thanks mate.   

  

LOL, Fits him well Frank don't it   

Still look on the bright side what ever we think on this forum Durnford will always go down in Histroy as DTSG. That's just the way it is he was in the wrong place and the wrong time. Lord Chelmsford faired somewhat better!

It would have been interesting, to have seen what would have happen if Durford hadn't been ordered to advance to Isandlwana. ?

Hiya 24th,

he was in the wrong place and the wrong time.

Maybe, if you think about it slightly differently, he was in the right place,
at the right time!. and when you consider his actions actually saved a lot
of lives...

Well 24th, considering that LC had not carried out his own orders to laager or fortify the camp, and that Pulleine had done next to nothing about all the reports coming in about Zulu activity in the area, then I think that the camp would have been wiped out a darn sight quicker than it was, and maybe no one would have escaped the carnage. Also with the Zulu's having a quicker and easier victory at the camp, then maybe they would have turned to attack LC whilst he was taking lunch at Mangeni, and he and the whole column might have got the chop.

Hang on chaps. 24th is saying that Durnford will always go down in history as a scapegoat - thats surely right, it means people understand he was unfairly blamed . Who is the recognised source of the scapegoating? Why Chelmsford of course.  That was was understood at the time and he was quietly sidelined. History still places the responsibilty on Chelmsford. That's not to say that Durnford might have acted differently with hindsight - but that he was unfairly scapegoated is pretty much agreed by all is it not?

Steve

Hi Steve.

I think most people would act differently with the benefit of hindsight, and you never know, maybe even LC would have laagered the camp, and not gone off on a wild goose chase taking over half the column with him, with the benefit of hindsight.

Yes, Col Durnford was unfairly scapegoated, but not just by LC, there was also 'the wasp' Crealock (or Creeplock if you like), and others who went along with the lies and corruption, and helped to blacken the name of an honourable and brave officer, in an effort to save the backside of LC.

Take a look at some of the posts on the forum Steve regarding Col Durnford, I think you will find that not everyone agrees that he was scapegoated, but I won't name names, they know who they are.

Cheers.   

Hi Martin

Oh I know there are a few on the forum who don't believe he was scapegoated - thats their right. But historically speaking Chelmsford is pretty universally blamed - and my feeling is that, despite the efforts of a small group around him at the time, the press, the public, the senior military and the politicians were pretty clear where the blame lay. They did it diplomatically as always, but they moved him to one side. I think his brother was particularly irked at the Inquiry findings and felt the need to refute it. But I don't believe many people believed it anyway.

Steve

But in hind-sight, it was Durnford who instigated the attack on tne camp, by his actions and his actions alone. He took the fight to the Zulu. As he stated, if Zulus are seen we should attack them.

And please stop saying he held the gates open so others could escape, he and the men with him were fighting for thier life's, others took advantage of the fact and took the opertunity to leave!

But in hind-sight, it was Durnford who instigated the attack on tne camp, by his actions and his actions alone. He took the fight to the Zulu. As he stated, if Zulus are seen we should attack them.

And please stop saying he held the gates open so others could escape, he and the men with him were fighting for thier life's, others took advantage of the fact and took the opertunity to leave!


1. The camp was already!!! under attack. what is it you don't understand about that!
2. Again in an effort to try and make you understand! i wont stop saying that, because it is
fact...whether he was fighting for his life or not! whether it was intentional or not! the
fact is....by holding up the left horn he gained time! for others!. surely you must see that!

So who sent Raw and co out on patrol?

I expected other companies actions out in the field also contributed to others escaping not just Durnford. Durnfords actions sealed the fate of many men, the rocket battery being a fine example!

So bloody frustrating when after typing a reply this machine just dumps it. No wonder it’s called FRED.
Anyway, start again
Steve to quote you:
“Hang on chaps. 24th is saying that Durnford will always go down in history as a scapegoat - that surely right, it means people understand he was unfairly blamed.
I am by no means a Chelmsford supporter and have argued these self same points, plus many others over the last few years and over many pages with CTSG.
He does make good points but in the rush to castigate Chelmsford and glorify Durnford we become in danger of losing sight of the actual occurrences of the day.
There are a number of officers, Glyn, Gosset, Pulleine, Dartnell etc that also need to be questioned and their actions held to account. Chelmsford is nowhere near alone in his culpability.
From my glorified position finely balanced on the fence I would ask a number of questions about Colonel Anthony Durnfords actions of the 22nd.

1) He rode of looking for a fight, lots of evidence to support that from Essex to Cochrane to Davies et al, in doing so he left behind the Rocket Battery. The longer he would have ridden the further behind that battery would have become. And he didn’t appear to be at all concerned leaving them in uncharted territory getting deeper and deeper into territory known to have bands of Zulus roaming.
2) He knew before he left the camp what he would be facing. Having had lunch with the rest of the officers he would have been informed of the 4000 plus that Pope had seen. He would have been told by Chard earlier of the thousands that had streamed across the ridge. So riding of to battle he had a pretty good idea of the strength of his opposition. He knew the approximate direction those Zulus would be located in, hence his sending the other patrols towards a similar point.
3) He met that exact force half way along the Quabe Valley, exactly what he wanted in the quantity he had to have accepted. He did not do what he had told Pulleine he was going to do. He didn’t attack them. He retreated.
4) In his retreat, stop start as it was he didn’t manage to slow down or stop the Left Horn, and because of the size of it didn’t manage to do much damage either. So why on earth didn’t he do what was logical and get back to camp at the gallop. If he had he would have gained breathing space and would have been able set up a more able defence line. Also he could possibly have arrived early at the Rocket Battery and prevented that massacre.
5) When he eventually arrived in the donga he had a defence point already established by Bradstreet/Gardner. At that point he knew that he had expended ammunition on the retreat and could see the size of the force coming at him plus in riding across the plain he would have been able to see the chest coming over the ridge. So he was aware of the situation. Surely any junior officer would have been able to do a bit of forward planning/situation review? Instead according to Molife and Davis he grandstands in the donga. Why didn’t he leave that defence in the hands of Bradstreet and ride across to take control ‘instantly’ of the front line? Instead he spent his time unjamming guns and cajoling his men.
6) When he did eventually elect to try and take charge of the situation it was too late. That combat experience advantage he had over Pulleine should have allowed him to take control and marshal the defences.
7) For sure Durnford fought of the left horn, how successfully we don’t know, the only people that could tell us are dead. I believe he did make a valiant stand but I also believe the left horn bypassed him behind the ridge and attacked the fugitives over the back of the koppie. There is ample testimony from survivors that tells of the left horn crashing down on them and forcing them down towards the river.
8) I don’t believe that there is any doubt he personally was a brave man, but a hero?


Cheers

Bonjour Springbok,

On the point 2:
Pulleine was "wait and see" before the arrival of Durnford.
The reports on the Zulus movments were contradictory.
DURNFORD was right to send patrols.


Cheers

Morning Frank

I don't disagree with your assessment of Durnford's actions on the day, but my point is a more basic one. 24th had commented on how "history" viewed Durnford (ie as a scapegoat) and I think 24th is right (although I am not sure that was what he was trying to say). In most historical accounts Durnford is seen as having been unfairly blamed, and at the time the feeling was much the same, because people saw through the so called Inquiry.

None of that is to do with the detail, it is because Chelmsford failed to order the defence of the camp, split his force and afterwards attempted to pass the buck at all costs. Everyone else's errors and failings were then exposed by Chelmsford's cavalier approach.

I agree that Durnford was brave, but he was not the best when it came to tactics. He had shown just those characteristics many years before in the Drakensberg passes.

I would go back to that short press cutting I posted on the other thread which, I think, had it right. Durnford could have interpreted Chelmsford's vague orders in a different way and sought to make some sort of defence of the camp (even in the short time available that many pairs of hands and that amount of concentrated firepower, might have made a difference).

But the man was dead and he was scapegoated by the Chelmsford clique. The British public doesn't like live commanders blaming dead subordinates.

Steve

Hi Steve
Its always been the way, blame the dead one, happened from time immemorial. I would love to have had a hidden microphone in that scotch cart taking Chelmsford and Crealock from RD to PMB. That's when it was all hatched Im sure of it. Why take such an uncomfortable transport over those terrible roads when a horse would have been better and quicker? Quite time maybe?
The one thing Ive never figured out was considering the friction between Glyn/Clery and the Chelmsford/Crealock factions why on earth did Clery give Chelmsford his out by telling him of the orders given to Pulleine.
If that order was buried, Chelmsford would have been hunh drawn and quartered.
I would agree with 24th and your assessment but the point I was attempting to make was that Durnford shouldn't be seen in the light of a crispy clean, there is a bit of mud there, as on all of the main players.

Cheers

Springbok wrote:

1) He rode of looking for a fight, lots of evidence to support that from Essex to Cochrane to Davies et al, in doing so he left behind the Rocket Battery. The longer he would have ridden the further behind that battery would have become. And he didn’t appear to be at all concerned leaving them in uncharted territory getting deeper and deeper into territory known to have bands of Zulus roaming.
2) He knew before he left the camp what he would be facing. Having had lunch with the rest of the officers he would have been informed of the 4000 plus that Pope had seen. He would have been told by Chard earlier of the thousands that had streamed across the ridge. So riding of to battle he had a pretty good idea of the strength of his opposition. He knew the approximate direction those Zulus would be located in, hence his sending the other patrols towards a similar point.

1) Bares out, his statement, "If we see Zulus we should attack them"


2) A wee bit worrying, in that he had a pretty good idea of the strength of his opposition, yet still took his his men to fight them in the open, where the Zulus preferred to fight. No thought of the consequences, should he fail to stop them. Did he really believe, he could beat the Zulus when he rode off??

It would have be far more sensible if he had dispatched messagers to warn LC of the situation. Not take on 30,000 plus Zulus on his own. In everybodies eyes back in the day, he was seen to have Disobayed orders by leaving the camp. Pearson makes reference to Dunfords actions in a letter to LC. Can't remember where I saw it.

Yeah, I agree with that as well CTSG. He was not a good judge, but he should never have been put in that position. They all seem very reluctant to second guess Chelmsford and his staff, particularly Glynn, which is a problem because Chelmsford was so vague and unpredictable. The results might have been better had Chelmsford distanced himself more from the command of the central column.

Steve

Quote :

It would have be far more sensible if he had dispatched messagers to warn LC of the situation.

In fact, it seems that DURNFORD had sent messagers (basutos) to warn Lord CHELSMFORD of the situation...but when? (source: Jackson? and Fred Symons?).
Cheers

ymob
I agree, the point of 2) though was to show that Durnford wasn't just riding blind. He had a pretty good idea what he was going to face.
CTSG
Quote: "In everybodies eyes back in the day, he was seen to have Disobayed orders by leaving the camp."
Yes but that to a great degree was caused by the misinformation provided by Crealock on the contents of the orders he sent.
But yes that was the common thought, even in letters from Frere to London.
Rusteez
Without a doubt he should have left the column to Glyn. To hands on as they say.

Cheers

ymob
I don't recall any messengers from Durnford? I have two from Pulleine, one from Gardner and four from Browne.
  

1) He rode of looking for a fight...springbok.
1) Bares out, his statement, "If we see Zulus we should attack them" ..ctsg.

Got a busy day today. and i will crack the book's later, cant believe what i'm
reading, that and independent commander used his own initiative! and a
well seasoned one at that!!! decided to fight! good gracious. whatever next!.
' imagine a fighting colonel...fighting! '

springbok9 wrote:

ymob
He had a pretty good idea what he was going to face.
Cheers

Yes.I agree on the ennemy strenghts (Pope journal)
But Nobody in the camp Knew (at that moment) the intention of the Zulus.
Nobody in the camp thought really that Zulus were going to attack the camp, so CHELSMFORD and his staff (war againt the Xhosa, Abyssinian campaign...) 
On this point  all the (senior) British officiers of the column are guilty as DURNFORD (under estimation of the enemy)
Cheers

Hi Les
You've taken that out of context. Read the whole post. The point Im trying to make is that Durnford was not on a scouting mission, he was looking to 'engage the enemy', he knew the enemy force, he knew their direction.
Quote:
that and independent commander used his own initiative! and a
well seasoned one at that!!! decided to fight! good gracious. whatever next!.
' imagine a fighting colonel...fighting

Then why didn't he fight?

xhosa2000 wrote:

1) He rode of looking for a fight...springbok.
1) Bares out, his statement, "If we see Zulus we should attack them" ..ctsg.

Got a busy day today. and i will crack the book's later, cant believe what i'm
reading, that and independent commander used his own initiative! and  a
well seasoned one at that!!! decided to fight! good gracious. whatever next!.
' imagine a fighting colonel...fighting! '

I have wrote "it seems.."  
In reality, it's historian supposition (Jackson?).
Basutos were seen in the Mangeni area (in particular by Fred Symons and Clery or Crelock from memory).
I am not at home actually  (i can't check the source).
I have only at hand "Zulu rising".
Cheers

Ymob
In my earlier posts I took pains to point out that various other officers should also be examined and that I didn't put blame on one source.
The point that no one in the camp knew they were going to be attacked is irrelevant. IF Durnford knew the camp was going to be attacked I have no doubt he would not have left. What remains however is that Durnford expressly stated he was going to try and engage an enemy that he had a good idea as to, its size, its position and because they were massed within the area of the camp, its intent. So as Ive said to Les above, why didn't he attack?

ymob
One of the messages sent by Browne was by 'a mounted African'. That's the only reference I have.

Cheers

Hi springy mate.

I often agree with you on most things, however, I think you may be wrong on a few of your points regarding Durnford, lets take a look at them.

1) I don't think he went off looking for a fight, but I understand why you might interpret it like that. It is because he is reputed to have said that 'wherever you see zulu's you should attack them', but in this instance he was informed of zulu's heading in the direction of LC, and he said "If they are heading for the general we must stop them at all hazards". And if you recall, he had sent patrols out in an attempt to get better information about all the earlier reports coming in to Pulleine about zulu's in the area, which Pulleine had done little about.
2)Come on Frank, how on earth could he have known what he would be facing before he left the camp? No one knew the size of the zulu army that was hidden out of sight, there was only the reports of zulu movements in the area to go off, and they were only a rough estimate of around 4000, so I doubt that he would have had a good idea of the strength of the opposition. Don't forget that he had sent Raw etc, over to the left to see what he could find, then reports started coming in of the zulu's splitting into three groups, then reports of them retiring, then reports of them heading in LC's direction, to Durnford's mind this may have been interpreted as Raw etc, disturbing them and the zulu's now moving away from Raw and heading towards LC, to which Durnford said that they must stop them at all hazards. Now, he could have seen a chance to trap the zulu's in a sort of pincer movement, ie; Raw moving from the left and Durnford getting around on moving in from the right. He had asked Pulleine for the loan of 2 coy's of the 24th (2nd Warwickshire) regiment, which Pulleine had refused. I really believe that Durnford wanted to use them in a plan he had in mind. This plan was to stop the zulu's from heading towards LC, and force them between himself and Raw and drive them towards the rocket battery with its escort and the 2 coy's of infantry, the zulu's would have been under fire from both flanks ie; Raw etc, and Durnford, they would be driven towards the RB and the infantry who would have also brought them under fire, and gradually they would have made a fighting withdrawal back towards the camp where the waiting troops would have also brought them under fire, and with the estimated 4000 zulu's being hit from both flanks and the front, they would have been brought to heel and made to surrender. However, this estimate of 4000 proved to be well underestimated, and when Durnford was confronted by the left horn he realised that the zulu army was much larger than what had been estimated.
3) I doubt very much that he met with exact force he had expected, I rather think he would have been shocked at the size of the force in front of him. I also think that he would have realised that it would be suicide to attack such a large group of zulu's, who would no doubt have let them come on and formed their horns around them and that would have been the end of that, so he did the right thing and made a fighting retreat back towards the camp.
4) I think that he did slow down the left horn and also inflict some damage on it. What may seem logical to us today, might have looked totally different in that particular circumstance back then. Don't forget that the RB was lead astray by carbineers who thought they would show them a short cut to get to get to a certain point, but which turned out to be a death trap, and they were ambushed by the zulu's. They were left in the lurch by their escort who fired one round and fled, and Durnford and his men rescued them on their way back to the donga.
5) & 6) This is a little tricky, but I think that Durnford thought he could depend on Pulleine to organise the defence of the camp, and decided to try hold back the left horn (thereby giving Pulleine more time back at the camp), but when he realised that he was running low on ammo, and that he was also being outflanked, and also that Pulleine was not doing what he expected, he decided to try to get back to the camp to organise some better defences, but however, it was now too late.
7) & 8) Yes, he did fight off the left horn, however, he did have to leave his position before he was outflanked and over run by the zulu's. And yes, he did hold up the left horn which allowed others to escape and he was a brave and honourable man, he gave his horse away and stayed with his men, a very heroic and noble thing to do.

We all have our faults, and no doubt Col Durnford had his, however, I think that Col Durnford was a most gallant and honourable officer, and one who has been wrongly blamed and scapegoated for the loss at iSandlwana.

Cheers.   

springbok9 wrote:

ymob
One of the messages sent by Browne was by 'a mounted African'. That's the only reference I have.

Cheers

I will check the source this evening.
Cheers

Hi Martin
dear oh dear I do seem to have been put under the hammer for daring to question Durnford.
However I stand fully by the questions I have asked.
1) He made numerous comments, to Pulleine etc on his views that the Zulus should be attacked when ever the opportunity arose. He proved his thoughts earlier when he was chastised by Chelmsford, so no I cant agree that he had no intention to attack. This has to beget the question: If he wasn't going to attack why did he leave the camp?
2) From the time he met Chard in the morning he was informed of the numbers around the camp area, ranging in sightings from 4000 to 7000. It would be really questioning his thought process to deny that he could expect to face that sort of opposition. He is reputed to have taken the route he did in order to protect Chelmsford rear, surly he wouldn't have been drawn out of camp to do that if he expected a small bunch to be faced? A small element could hardly be described as a threat to the amount of force Chelmsford had available. Sorry Martin but no he had to have expected a large force and been prepared to do battle with that level of enemy. Anything less in terms of size or in terms of his intentions makes an absolute mockery of his reasons for leaving camp
3) He did then run into that size of force and I believe he could have been exhibiting the same level of arrogance that Chelmsford displayed and fully expected them to turn tail and run. They didn't and that I believe came as a shock and possibly put him in mind of Bushmans Pass.
If what you say did go through his mind then the fighting retreat becomes a non entity.
4)The impi didn't slow down and didn't go to ground, they did effectively ignore the Horsemen in front of them so the stop start retreat was a total waste of time. That time he could have gained, possibly up to 20 to 25 minutes could have been really valuable in organising the camp defences.
5 and 6) Definitly not. He knew, as any team leader knows, what ordinance was carried, he knew what had been expended one of the first, not the last things that should have been sorted out was a supply chain. He didn't simply put.
As I pointed out his decision to then get back into the camp was just to little to late.
7 8) he slowed down the left horn for a maximum of 20minutes and because there was no communication back to the main camp they were 20 useless minutes that could have been utilised so effectively by him being in the camp. That left horn by the way then moved of to the South and along the back of the ridge leading up to the Koppie, virtually out of sight.

Yes he was a brave man and yes he was scapegoated ( is that a word?) but and here is my point he wasn't the paragon of virtue being claimed, he did make mistakes, as costly as Chelmsford or any of the other line up? I don't know. But we cannot gloss over hard history to suite our idealistic views. Hell Martin if that were to be the rule then the South Wales Borderers would be the heroes of the day, and we know that's not true !   

springbok9 wrote:

Hi Martin
dear oh dear I do seem to have been put under the hammer for daring to question Durnford.

..as your "friend" Mike SNOOK  on the other site few years ago!!!     

Frederic
    
Truth hurts unfortunately.   

springbok9 wrote:

Ymob
In my earlier posts I took pains to point out that various other officers should also be examined and that I didn't put blame on one source.
The point that no one in the camp knew they were going to be attacked is irrelevant. IF Durnford knew the camp was going to be attacked I have no doubt he would not have left. What remains however is that Durnford expressly stated he was going to try and engage an enemy that he had a good idea as to, its size, its position and because they were massed within the area of the camp, its intent. So as Ive said to Les above, why didn't he attack?

Springbok,
I am agree with you on the others points, not totally on the point 2.

On the point 2:
Yes, DURNFORD is guilty of arrogance (underestimation of the enemy) and rashness (his intention to attack the enemy)
But his intention to attack the enemy is not really the problem in ths case (except for the rocket battery).
His decision to recognize the area was a good decision in theory as i have said previously.
With other intention in mind (only to scout the area not to fight) the result would have been the same: the discover of the zulu army and the attack of the camp.
He leaves the camp but he was not in the command of the camp (in his mind), it was Pulleine.

Cheers

The Command.

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springbok9 wrote:

The one thing Ive never figured out was considering the friction between Glyn/Clery and the Chelmsford/Crealock factions why on earth did Clery give Chelmsford his out by telling him of the orders given to Pulleine.
If that order was buried, Chelmsford would have been hunh drawn and quartered.

Mon ami,
It's easy to understand.
Because, he was Bristish, a subject of his Graceful Majesty the Queen, a perfect gentleman.      
Cheers

xhosa2000 wrote:

The Command.

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Bonjour Xhosa,
Extract from Drooglever thesis?
Cheers

Oui mon ami. more following, with sources and footnotes,as
and when required.   

xhosa2000 wrote:

Oui mon ami. more following, with sources and footnotes,as
and when required.   

Good new, mate!

Ha ha, no Frank mate, no hammers, mallets, pliers, pincers or Nora Batty brushes or mops   

But I do think you have it wrong about his intentions. Don't forget that he had orders to support LC along with Bengough in an attack on the Matyanas, these orders had not changed when he was instructed to move up to the camp. If LC had wanted Durnford to do something else, then LC should have left clear orders with Pulleine to hand to Durnford on his arrival at the camp, but there were no such orders waiting for him, therefor as far as Durnford was concerned he was to carry out his earlier orders in supporting LC. He made it clear to Pulleine that he was not staying at the camp, however, on hearing all the reports coming in about zulu activity in the area, and of course with Chard informing him earlier, he could see that Pulleine had done next to nothing to find out what was going on around the area. He sent lookouts to various positions to see if they could spot anything, he also arranged for men from his own column (Raw, etc), to patrol the hights to see if they could get some better information about this zulu activity. Yes, he had made comments about attacking zulu's when the opportunity arose, however, like you say, he had been rebuked by LC before on this, so I hink he would have that on his mind. Now when the report came in about zulu's heading in LC's direction, what was he supposed to do? Suppose that they were trying to cut LC off or even attack him by joining up with the zulu's that LC was supposed to be doing battle with, if Durnford had remained in camp and done nothing about it, he would have been up for the high jump for not going to the assistance of LC, besides, he had no orders to remain in camp, his orders were to assist LC, and that is what he was trying to do. He did say that if the zulu's were heading towards the general, then we must stop them at all hazards, so he set off to try to do just that, by finding out what they were up to and where they were going. Little did he (or anyone else) know the real size of the zulu army, however, if he could stop them from cutting LC off or attacking him, then he had done what his orders said, and that was to assist LC. However, when he realised that this estimated force of 4000/7000 was a lot more than he bargained for, he would realise that it was the camp that was to be attacked and he made a fighting retreat back towards the camp, in the hope that this would slow down the left horn and gain time for Pulleine to organise the camp defences, after all, it was Pulleine who was in command of the camp not Durnford, he was in command of his own independent column and had orders to assist LC not nurse maid Pulleine at the camp. Knowing that the zulu's could move very quickly over the land, he most likely thought it best to try to delay the zulu left horn rather than make a dash back to the camp, as this would give Pulleine the chance to organise some defenses, and when he made a stand in the donga, he did give Pulleine some time to do this, however, it seems that the inept Pulleine did not see his chance to do this and let the opportunity slip away, and of course when Durnford was forced to move from the donga the opportunty had gone. He did try to look for Pulleine, but I don't think he found him, and by now it was far too late to do much about any sort of defences, and it would appear that Durnford knew the game was up. He could have got away, but gave his horse to someone, and stayed with his men, others gathered around him and made a last stand, and by doing this (and whether or not they did it by choice or by fighting for their lives), they enabled others to escape, so all respect to them for that.

Hi Martin/Les/Ymob
This is why these discussions tend to drift away.
What I did was post a deliberate set of questions for debate.
Les
The orders issued to Durnford have absolutely nothing to do with any of the questions posed. I don't dispute in any way Durnfords rite to operate independently. Likewise I don't believe any order exists that compelled him to remain in the camp.
My idiosyncratic, probably the right way to describe them, rambles are of his behaviour away from the camp, on his own with his own command and making his own decisions.
Martin.
As my reply to Les.
In addition
There were no sightings at all, and I defy you to find one, that says the impi was heading towards Chelmsford.
If the excuse is being used that he was obeying a prievious order to support Chelmsford against the Matanyas then he was going in the wrong direction.
I have made no criticism of Durnford leaving the camp, he was independent and perfectly entitled to do so.
So back to my original points.
He did know that there was a large amount of Zulus around the camp, all available intelligence suggested that. If he ignored that then he condemned the Rocket Battery to death. He couldn't ignore it, it was the very reason he left the camp.
If he had a thought that it was a small party of Zulus then why did he bother leaving at all?
All my other points stand.
He did want to attack. If he didn't want to attack why did he leave That was his very reason for being there according to your post.
He did know the copious amount of Zulus in the area. If he didn't know the volume of the Zulu around the camp he is guilty of ignoring everything he was told.
He did abandon the Rocket Battery. The Rocket battery were left alone with minimum support. it doesn't wash that they were diverted, your talking a couple of hundred metres, around 15 seconds away from a flat out Zulu warrior
He did waste time and effort in retreating
He did not react fast enough when he returned to the camp.

In essence those are the points that haven't been addressed with any conviction.

Frederic
Ahhh, the English spirit of fair play, pity Crealock didn't believe in though.     

Martin wrote:

Don't forget that he had orders to support LC along with Bengough in an attack on the Matyanas, these orders had not changed when he was instructed to move up to the camp. If LC had wanted Durnford to do something else, then LC should have left clear orders with Pulleine to hand to Durnford on his arrival at the camp, but there were no such orders waiting for him, therefor as far as Durnford was concerned he was to carry out his earlier orders in supporting LC.

Martin we know what orders were issued to Durnford prior to Isandlwana, but you can't see to grasp that fresh orders were issued on the 22nd Jan. If Chelmsford had wanted Durnford to act on prior orders he would have said so. ie (Move to Isandlwana and carryout prior orders from there)
All LC was asking, is for him to move to Isandlwana to bolster the numbers. What orders were left for Pulleine were binding on Durnford defend the camp. That's why most of the History books to do with this subject mentioned Durnford who disobeyed orders by leaving the camp. He was not required to leave the camp. If Durnford mis-understood what was required of him that day, then he was more stupid than I thought he was.

hi impi
Theres that lovely old saying something about 'Many a slip between cup etc etc' and that's really what happened at iSandlwana. Chelmsford issued an order very clearly to Clery. Crealock interfered and screwed it up with the wrong wording. Suppose at 4 oclock in the morning it happens.   

Cheers

Chelmsfordthescapegoat wrote:

Springbok wrote:

1) He rode of looking for a fight, lots of evidence to support that from Essex to Cochrane to Davies et al, in doing so he left behind the Rocket Battery. The longer he would have ridden the further behind that battery would have become. And he didn’t appear to be at all concerned leaving them in uncharted territory getting deeper and deeper into territory known to have bands of Zulus roaming.
2) He knew before he left the camp what he would be facing. Having had lunch with the rest of the officers he would have been informed of the 4000 plus that Pope had seen. He would have been told by Chard earlier of the thousands that had streamed across the ridge. So riding of to battle he had a pretty good idea of the strength of his opposition. He knew the approximate direction those Zulus would be located in, hence his sending the other patrols towards a similar point.

1) Bares out, his statement, "If we see Zulus we should attack them"


2) A wee bit worrying, in that he had a pretty good idea of the strength of his opposition, yet still took his his men to fight them in the open, where the Zulus preferred to fight. No thought of the consequences, should he fail to stop them. Did he really believe, he could beat the Zulus when he rode off??

It would have be far more sensible if he had dispatched messagers to warn LC of the situation. Not take on 30,000 plus Zulus on his own. In everybodies eyes back in the day, he was seen to have Disobayed orders by leaving the camp. Pearson makes reference to Dunfords actions in a letter to LC. Can't remember where I saw it.

CTSG.
"In the 2nd Regiment, scarcely one could do so, and I could never get anything done I wanted. The men were always grumbling at doing fatigue work, notwithstanding that they saw the soldiers working alongside them, and said they were enlisted to fight, and not to work. Yet, when they had the chance, they did not do over well.
We should be very glad of a newspaper or two giving an account of No. 3 Column. About what number of Zulus did poor Durnford's party kill before they were overpowered and slaughtered ? Did the two guns fall into the hands of the Zulus ? Did the plucky company of the 2nd Battalion 24th at Rorke's Drift (I suppose it was guarding the Depot) beat off the 2,500 Zulus whom they fought for twelve hours ? How very foolish of poor Durnford's detachment to scatter about so far from the camps. Has any raid been made on Natal ? The men here are very savage at the thoughts of so many of their wounded comrades being butchered, for, of course, as all were found dead, the wounded must have been murdered."

Ekowe, February 6, J 879.
. K. PEARSON

springbok9 wrote:

Hi Martin/Les/Ymob
This is why these discussions tend to drift away.
What I did was post a deliberate set of questions for debate.
Les
The orders issued to Durnford have absolutely nothing to do with any of the questions posed. I don't dispute in any way Durnfords rite to operate independently. Likewise I don't believe any order exists that compelled him to remain in the camp.
My idiosyncratic, probably the right way to describe them, rambles are of his behaviour away from the camp, on his own with his own command and making his own decisions.
Martin.
As my reply to Les.
In addition
There were no sightings at all, and I defy you to find one, that says the impi was heading towards Chelmsford.
If the excuse is being used that he was obeying a prievious order to support Chelmsford against the Matanyas then he was going in the wrong direction.
I have made no criticism of Durnford leaving the camp, he was independent and perfectly entitled to do so.
So back to my original points.
He did know that there was a large amount of Zulus around the camp, all available intelligence suggested that. If he ignored that then he condemned the Rocket Battery to death. He couldn't ignore it, it was the very reason he left the camp.
If he had a thought that it was a small party of Zulus then why did he bother leaving at all?
All my other points stand.
He did want to attack. If he didn't want to attack why did he leave That was his very reason for being there according to your post.
He did know the copious amount of Zulus in the area. If he didn't know the volume of the Zulu around the camp he is guilty of ignoring everything he was told.
He did abandon the Rocket Battery. The Rocket battery were left alone with minimum support. it doesn't wash that they were diverted, your talking a couple of hundred metres, around 15 seconds away from a flat out Zulu warrior
He did waste time and effort in retreating
He did not react fast enough when he returned to the camp.

In essence those are the points that haven't been addressed with any conviction.

Frederic
Ahhh, the English spirit of fair play, pity Crealock didn't believe in though.     

It makes sense   

That comes from a man, barricaded in to a compound surrounded by Zulus and is gleaned from a letter written by Chelmsford that was transmitted by mirrors.
Really impi you don't expect it to be taken seriously??????  

Cheers