Chelmsford the scape goat will not like this

Sorry CTSP

Found this site, worth a visit [You must be registered and logged in to see this link.]

Probably opening up a can of worms.

Regards

Springbok. I will have to print off the pages has it jumping all over the place on my P.C. I can’t see a title of the book. Do you know who the author, I'm thinking one of Rider Haggard’s fictioninal books. I have saved a copy to memory stick will print off tomorrow.

Thanks for the link..

Very interesting read. CTSG you will love it. :lol:

Why would Pearson say Poor Durnford's defeat. ? Surly it should have been Pulleines defeat.

Ekowe, February 2, 1879, Sunday.
DEAR LORD CHELMSFORD,

"YOUR letter of 27th January reached me this morning,[/color] also telegram of 30th, apparently to some one at Lower Drift, asking what ammunition I have got, and detailing position of Nos. 3 and 4 Column , also your telegram to me of 28th, informing me of "Boadicea" men joining my column, asking what you can do for me, and telling me Wood has beaten 5,000 Zulus ; also telegram of 23rd, detailing poor Durnford's defeat, and the losses sustained. It is all most sad ; and no doubt the arms and ammunition taken will be used against us."

From dispatches 1879

CTSG

Mine was a bit unstable as well, I left the site and went back, seemed to work. I cant get to the front page though to get the title or author. The really interesting page. ( you need to search ) is the map showing the distribution of the bodies. Never seen or heard of it before. Seems the omly thing inaccurate is a high pointed hill ( Sugar Loaf style ) entitled Rorkes Drift Signal Hill.
Still trying to wade through the text.

Regards

hi spingbok9.
A while ago I sent a request to P'MARITZBURG ARCHIVE REPOSITORY , for a copy of the Alfred Boast report
in which he detals his work burying the bodies at Isandlwana , I"m not sure if pete ( admin ) posted it on the forum.
But hopefully he will read this and post the report and the sketch showing the grave locations . As I havent got any
idea how to do so.
cheers 90th.

90th

I saw the Boast map on the web some time back. It wasnt really that useful, it was almost childlike in its simplicity. I would be interested in the report however to see if it refers to the two cairns on the ridge.
The interesting thing about this new site is it is almost like an official report and inquest, I have no idea where its from or the author.

Did you log onto the Killie Campbell Museum at all?

Ok managed to find out the details.
I should have guessed really, the report is so biased against Chelmsford it could have only have been written by one person. Francis Ellen Colenso, with the help of Edward Durnford. The book was written in defence of Durnford in 1881, title "The History of the Zulu War and its Origins.
Still well worth the read.
The site is the University of Pretoria
Regards

hi springbok9
In answer to your question I did go the Killie Campbell site and really enjoyed it.
cheers 90th. :)

90th I have checked the book you mentioned, History of the Zulu war and its origin; and the page numbers on Springboks link. They are not the same, so I wonder just what book its from.

hi Mrg.
I have no idea what book it is , Didnt springbok9 say it was " HISTORY OF THE ZULU WAR AND ITS ORIGINS ".
The page numbers may not match as they may be different editions .
cheers 90th.

I couldnt get the front page to pop up on that link so went straight to the U P web site and searched there. That gave me the same content and the front page

Regards

After receiving a message from a European officer who was with about 1000 troops from Browne’s contingent, which read, “Come in every man fro god sake! The camp is surrounded and will be taken unless helped at once” Captain Church rode back as fast as he could and found Colonel Harness in conversation with Major Gosset and Major Black.

Harness said “We will march back to camp” but Gosset ridiculed the idea and advised him to carryout his orders. Harness asked Church and Black for their opinion they both agreed they should return to camp. Gosset rode off in another direction.
Harness had covered about two miles of ground when Gosset overtook him, with orders from the General to march back to the Rendezvous. Harness obeyed the order.

Gosset must have told Chelmsford about the message received from the European officer. So why did Chelmsford not go to the aid of the camp along with Browne’s contingent and Harness’s lot that would have been quite a force.

G.

Of course this will lead to what it says in the link that Springbok posted. Regarding the messages received by Chelmsford. And this particular message was not mentioned in the court of enquiry. Before I get drawn fully it to this I would really like to know the title of the book this came from. If Francis Ellen Colenso wrote it, then obviously this information would have to be taken with a pinch of salt.

Extract from "A lost legionary in South Africa" Colonel HAMILTON-BROWNE


I could now see the troops lying down and firing volleys, while the guns kept up a steady fire. The Zulus did not seem able to advance. They were getting it hot, and as there was no cover they must have suffered very heavy losses, as they shortly afterwards fell back. The guns and troops also ceased firing. At about midday I was looking
back anxiously to see if the mounted men and guns were coming up, when I heard the guns in camp reopen again; and riding forward, we were then about four miles from the camp.

I saw a cloud of Zulus thrown out from their left and form the left horn of their army. These men swept round and attacked the front of the camp, and I saw the two right companies of the 24th and one gun thrown
back to resist them. There was also plenty of independent firing going on within the camp, as if all the wagon men, servants, and in fact everyone who could use a rifle was firing away to save his life. I at once sent another messenger with the following note :

" The camp is being attacked on the left and in front, and as yet is holding its own. Ground still good for the rapid advance of guns and horses. Am moving forward as fast as I can."

My second messenger joined me shortly after this and told me he had delivered my note to a staff officer and had received orders for me to push on to camp.

At 1 o'clock the camp was still holding its own and the Zulus were certainly checked. The guns were firing case and I could see the dense mass of natives writhe, sway and shrink back from the steady volleys of the gallant old 24th.

I had given orders to my men to deflect to their left so as to try to get into the right of the camp, and the officers and non-coms, were forcing the brutes on, when about half-past one I happened to glance to the right of the camp. Good God ! what a sight it was. By the road that runs between the hill and the kopje, came a huge mob of maddened cattle, followed by a dense swarm of Zulus. These poured into the undefended right and rear of the camp, and at the same time the left horn of the enemy and the chest of the army rushed in. Nothing could stand against this combined attack. All formation was broken in a minute, and the camp became a seething pandemonium of men and cattle struggling in dense clouds of dust and smoke.

The defenders fought desperately and I could see through the mist the flash of bayonet and spear together with the tossing heads and horns of the infuriated cattle, while above the bellowing of the latter and the sharp crack of the rifles could be heard the exulting yells of the savages and the cheers of our men gradually dying away. Of course I saw in a moment everything was lost and at once galloped back to my men.

There was no time to write, but I said to Captain Develin, a fine horseman and a finer fellow, " Ride as hard as you can, and tell every officer you meet, ' For God's sake come back, the camp is surrounded and must be taken/ ' Then getting my officers together, I said to them, " Our only chance is to retreat slowly, and ordered them to form their companies into rings, after the Zulu fashion, and retire, dismounting themselves and hiding all the white men among the natives. This we did, and although there were large parties of the enemy close to us, they took no notice of us, and we gradually retired out of their vicinity. When we had got to a place, about five miles from the camp, where I thought my white men and Zulus could put up a bit of a fight in case we were attacked, I halted and determined to await the course of events.

During the retreat I had often looked back and seen that the fighting was over in the camp, but that one company, in company square, was retreating slowly up the hill surrounded by a dense swarm of Zulus. This was Captain Younghusband's Company. They kept the enemy off as long as their ammunition lasted, then used the bayonet until at last overcome by
numbers they fell in a heap like the brave old British Tommy should.

Well here we were. The white men worn out and hungry, but most of them determined and I had the satisfaction to read on the grim, dirty faces of my roughs, that no matter what they had been in the past, they meant to stick to their work, do their duty like men and if necessary die game. Curses not loud but very deep, went up for a time, and one or two of Lord Chelmsford's staff must have felt their ears tingle.

We sat and lay where we were. There was nowhere to go, nothing to be done, we had no food, and very little ammunition, but we had some water and tepid and muddy as it was it was thankfully used as there was no shade and the sun shone like a ball of fire. As soon as I had made what few arrangements I could I told the men to get some rest, as I was convinced that later on, we should be called upon to retake the camp, as through that camp was the only possible retreat for the General's party and ourselves.

After a time Captain Develin rode up to me. " Well," said I, " who did you see? " " I first saw Major Black with the second 24th and repeated your message he at once turned back. Then I saw Colonel Harness with the guns he at once turned back. Then I saw the mounted men, and they turned back." " Well," said I, " where are they? " " Why, sir," he replied, " as we were marching back we met the staff and the troops were ordered to go back again,so I came on alone."

Why had this been done? Those who want to know had better get the book Miss Colenso wrote in defence of Colonel Durnford, and if they study the evidences recapitulated in that book, especially that of Captain Church, they may find out. I am only writing of what I actually saw myself, and have no wish to throw mud at anyone.

The last two lines tells us something was not quite right, Hey CTSG. I Guess HAMILTON-BROWNE knew someting was not quite right either.

S.D

And here where the text came from the Springbok posted

Like he says the (History of the Zulu war and its origin;) This link will take you to the page.

[You must be registered and logged in to see this link.]

As we thought !!!

'Fanny' Colenso had a close private relationship with Anthony Durnford, who as we know died in action for not obeying direct orders at Isandlwana. Colenso as always claimed Durnford had become one of Lord Chelmsford's scapegoats for the disaster. Colenso shown her hand when she wrote this book, she was totally prejudice against Lord Chelmsford. So it would be unfair to take what she wrote as factual. And for those that didn’t know Colenso had help with the military matters in this book, but no other than Durnford's brother, Edward.

The point is, that a message was issued regarding the camp being in danger. Harness made the right decision to return to the camp, but was stopped from doing so by Chelmsford. Maybe the out come would have been different if Harness had been allowed to continue.

Old H.
I would be interested to know how the out-come would have been different if Harness had returned to the camp.

CTSG. Like its says. Lives would have still be lost but the camp could have been saved. So not a total lost.

What's the point of risking more lives to save a camp, the camp had been over run and completely destroyed? Can someone give me a good reason as to why the camp should have been saved? Chelmsford took the camp back on his return that night.

Harness should thank Chelmsford for saving his life.

If this happen has Colenso imagined it did why did Harness sit on the committee at the court of enquiry.If Harness has anything to say he would have given evidence not obtained it.

hi ctsg.
If I remember rightly , the good lord chelmsford decided who was on the court of inquiry and by placing Harness
on the panel he effectively gagged him from submitting any evidence or statements he may have wished to make.
I read the make up of the inquiry in Lock and Quantrill"s book, ZULU VICTORY - THE EPIC OF ISANDLWANA AND
THE COVER UP.
CHEERS 90TH.

That's just my point. Do you think Harness would have accepted the place on the committee? If the message event had taken place. He would have been in contempt of court, knowingly withholding information that prevents a court of the enquiry from establishing the truth.

hi ctsg.
This is straight from ZULU VICTORY. " The choice of Harness was to cause great controversy , for he was a witness to
many of Chelmfords actions on the 22nd and , by being appointed to the court of inquiry , was PRECLUDED from giving
EVIDENCE . His appointment was made DELIBERATELY BY CHELMSFORD AND CREALOCK and justifiablly recieved
CRITICISM from both PRESS and PARLIAMENT. The report goes on to say officers and men with Harness plainly heard
the firing from the camp and inexplicably they were ordered to return . This incident was NEVER REVEALED and was
EXCLUDED from subsequent dispatches .it was UNDOUBTEDLY the reason that Harness was made a member of the
court of inquiry, for he would be UNABLE TO GIVE EVIDENCE ON THIS OR ANY OTHER MATTER.
The mandate of the court was to inquire into the "loss of the camp". THE COURT WAS NOT ASKED TO GIVE AN
OPINION , as such it merely took statements and DECLINED to QUESTION or INTERROGATE WITNESSES
Harness writes in Fraser's Magazine April 1880 " The duties of the court were , I hold to be , to ascertain what orders
were given for the DEFENCE OF THE CAMP, and how these orders were carried out . It was assembled SOLELY for
the purpose of ASSISTING THE GENERAL COMMANDING IN FORMING AN OPINION ".
cheers 90th.

SOUTH AFRICA—THE ZULU WAR— THE DEFEAT AT ISANDLANA—THE COURT OF INQUIRY.—QUESTION.
HL Deb 18 July 1879 vol 248 c730 730

LORD TRURO
Asked, Why Colonel Harness, who could give very full information with regard to the Isandlana disaster, was put upon the Court of Inquiry—a course which deprived the Court of the assistance of a most important witness?

VISCOUNT BURY
In reply, said, the suggestion that Colonel Harness was put upon the Court of Inquiry to deprive it of a material witness was a presumption which the noble Lord was not justified in putting forward.

LORD TRURO
Explained, that what he said was that that was the effect of the appointment. He did not say it was done for that purpose.

VISCOUNT BURY
The noble Lord who commands in South Africa is a Member of your Lordships' House, and he is not here to defend himself. The War Office is not in possession of the information which would enable you to come to a conclusion. In these circumstances I think we are bound to suspend our judgment.

If we are going to quote Hansard's. Lets look at Chelmsford take on things.

Extract from OBSERVATIONS.
HL Deb 02 September 1880 vol 256 cc1025-35

The noble and gallant Lord had referred to the statement in an article by Mr. Archibald Forbes in The Nineteenth Century. But to show how fallacious some of the statements were, he need only point out the inaccuracy of the story related in reference to Colonel Harness. Colonel Harness had himself referred to the incident in an article in Frazer's Magazine, and had given quite a different account; and, as a matter of fact, the statement that he was in a position to afford relief to the camp was quite incorrect. He (Lord Chelmsford) was on his way to the camp—it must have been between 3 and half-past, the whole affair being over at 1 o'clock—when he saw Colonel Harness about 500 yards from him, moving off in the direction of the camp, being then 10 miles distant from Isandlana. Major Cosset, his aide-de-camp, asked him if he should go and stop the battery, and he said—"Yes; he could not understand why they were moving." And yet in the public prints there had been an accusation that Major, now Lieutenant Colonel, Gosset, prevented valuable reinforcements going on to the camp, and was almost accountable for the disaster. There was not a particle of truth in the story. Another important statement made by the noble and gallant Lord had reference to the number of messages which he asserted he had received from the camp on the day in question. In point of fact, he only received one message from the camp in the course of that day, which was that mentioned in his despatch, which had been sent to him at 8 o'clock in the morning, and which was received by him at 9.30, which merely gave the information that a body of the enemy had been noticed in a north-westerly direction. From half-past 9 o'clock until he reached the camp on his return not a single message, if any were despatched, had reached him. His statement on this point was fully corroborated by Lieutenant Colonel Croalock, his Military Secretary, in his letter recently sent to a London newspaper, in which he gave a distinct denial to the story that several messages had been received

hi all.
Harness couldnt have saved the camp , but he may have driven the zulus off before the camp was fully ransacked.
Hamilton - Brown says he dispatched several messages , but we dont know if the good lord recieved them or not !.
As for Crealock it is stating the obvious he was going to side with Cford , for all we know he may be partly to blame.
Also we must remember the court of inquiry was a far differant set up than what would normally have taken place.
As Harness said himself . Please refer to my previous post where you can see what Harness said in Fraser"s Magazine
in april of 1880.
cheers 90th.

I have not read what Harness,said to Frasers magazine, but what ever it was it did not warrent, re-opening the case.

LORD CHELMSFORD
"
Said, that it was so stated in the evidence. They were ordered back to take up a final position under the hill, which they ought never to have left, and they endeavoured to do so.

That was the reason they turned their backs to the enemy; not that they ran, or attempted to run. In self-defence, he was compelled to refer in detail to the six mistakes which it was alleged by the noble and gallant Lord had led to the disaster at Isandlana. In the first place, he denied that the invading columns were too far apart to render each other mutual support.
A reference to the map would show that the position taken up by the columns, having regard to the long frontier line, was the only one that could be properly adopted. With reference to the position of the camp, he defied the noble and gallant Lord to show that the account he had given of its position was inaccurate in any particular. The map which had been placed in the Library of the House, and which accurately described the ground near Isandlana, corroborated that account. With regard to the charge that the ground occupied by the enemy on the day in question had not been sufficiently reconnoitred previously, as a matter of fact, it had been carefully reconnoitred on the day before without the Zulus being discovered. Lieutenant Browne, 24th Regiment, and a party of mounted Infantry, went out by his (Lord Chelmsford's) orders in the direction from which the Zulus advanced, and he must have passed close to the spot where they bivouacked that night.

He saw, however, no traces of a large force, simply because they were not there till after dark that evening. On the morning of the attack the vedette was placed, as usual, three miles in advance; and he gave notice of the approach of the enemy long before the actual attack was made, and which, therefore, could not be characterized as a surprise. The enemy did not advance from the direction of the mountains to the north of Isandlana; but from the eastward two of their columns, however, moved along the top of these mountains and came down upon the camp that way. In reference to the statement that the camp should have been intrenched, he had already stated that the ground in the neighbourhood of the camp was so rocky that it was absolutely impossible to make even shelter-trenches round the tents.

When the party subsequently came to bury the poor men who had fallen in the battle, they found it almost impossible to dig a shallow grave, owing to the small amount of earth. Nor were there any trees with which to make abattis. The troops had, in fact, to carry their fuel with them. With regard to the assertion that on receiving the message that the camp was attacked, he should at once have returned with his force to its assistance, he had already explained that, by some extraordinary fatality, he never received such a message, if it had ever been sent.

All he could say, standing before their Lordships, who, he believed, would give him credit for telling the truth faithfully, was, that neither he nor any of his staff received more than the one to which he had referred at half-past 9 in the morning; and the fact that he immediately sent a messenger back to Colonel Pulleine was a refutation of the charge brought against him.

The sixth mistake alleged was that it would have been better if he had allowed Colonel Durnford to continue to discharge his special duties of superintending the fortification of the camp. In reply to this, he could only say that the fact of his sending for Colonel Durnford was evidence that he wished to have him close at hand in order that his advice might be available on engineering questions. Furthermore, he was much indebted to Colonel Durnford for the organization of the force of mounted Natives, which was entirely due to the personal influence which the gallant officer had with the Native Tribes.

As far as the formation of the columns of invasion was concerned, the question was a purely technical one, which could not be satisfactorily discussed in their Lordships' House. To justify the strategy which he had adopted, it would be necessary to have a large map; and he would, in fact, have to give a lecture. He would only say that in his view a division of the force into three bodies was absolutely necessary, and was not too much to cover a line of close upon 300 miles.

He would, however, be perfectly prepared to discuss the point with anybody who was interested in the subject. He looked back to the campaign with mixed feelings—regret at the loss of the gallant men who fell, and for that sad day of Isandlana, but with pride at what had been accomplished. When the nature of the country in which the troops were operating—the fact that, for military purposes, it may be said to have been a terra incognita—and the numerous difficulties of supply and transport which had to be overcome, were taken into consideration, the six months from January 11 to July 5 could not, he contended, be considered but a short time for the campaign to be brought to a close, and would contrast very favourably with the duration of former Kaffir Wars.

He could not but think it unreasonable to say that undue delay had arisen in consequence of the steps which he thought it necessary to take in order to secure the completeness of the expedition. In conclusion, he thanked their Lordships for their attention, but regretted that he should have been called upon to make this explanation. "

Chelmsfords orders to Colonel Durnford were disingenuous. Chelmsford held responsible Durnford for the loss of the camp and profess he had ordered Durnford to take command of the camp. The orders are very clear, he gave no such order.

There is an immense amount of primary source material that details Durnford’s actual orders, discovered in the last few years, which justify his known actions at Isandlwana.

E.H

CTSG. There was only ever one winner.

The British captured King Cetshwayo in August 1879, and the war, to all intents and purposes, was over. But few emerged on the British side with any credit, nor did ordinary Zulus benefit. Cetshwayo was exiled, Zululand was broken up and eventually annexed. Frere never achieved his ambition to confederate South Africa. That would have to wait until the aftermath of an even bloodier conflict, that of the Boer War.

Disraeli lost the 1880 election and died the following year. James Dalton died in 1887, a broken man. Many of the lower-rank VC winners from Rorke's Drift were also forgotten when the media circus moved on.

But one man prospered - Lord Chelmsford. The Queen showered honours on him, promoting him to full general, awarding him the Gold Stick at Court and appointing him Lieutenant of the Tower of London. He died in 1905, at the age of 78, playing billiards at his club.

S.D