The missing five hours.

TMFH perhaps adds to the "Durnford Blame Debate" in that what is now perhaps required, is detailed analysis of TMFH primary source material PRIOR to Durnford's arrival, and then ask if the battle was already lost?  
Just a thought.

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Is there another link to TMFH.

24th not sure if you have seen it. But you can print the TMFH from that link.

First:  Having conjecturally decoyed half of No 3 Column (and two thirds of its artillery) from the camp in order to join Major Dartnell in an effort to locate, engage and destroy a strong Zulu presence approximately ten miles east of the camp in the Mangeni Falls area and,

But if the Chelmsford had taken the Whole column,the decoy plan would have fell at the first fence.

Second: The reconnaissance of the Isandlwana Camp made by a mounted party that included Mehlokazulu kaSihayo, one of the commanders of the Nkobamakosi Regiment in the very early hours of 22nd January and,

I really cannot see how this can be confirmed at fact.

Third: In the knowledge that the camp strength was substantially reduced by observation of a strong column leaving in the early hours of the 22nd on the track leading to Mangeni Falls.

I can't see any reason why the Zulu couldn't of attacked on the 21st Jan. the 3rd option would have only succeeded if number one had gone to plan. Did the Zulu's.

How would TMFH hypothesis change the accusations against Col Durnford?
I have read through the document and all the discussion is about what happened prior to Durnford's arrival.

I have visited this spot and can see how the impi could have been concealed. The donga in question is relatively deep and with many twists and turns - very easy to hide a large body on men. What is also interesting is that there are a few gravesites there, on the hill where Raw's men apparently spotted the Zulus. No doubt they are post 1879, but very interesting none the less no signs of present or old umuzis at all.

Need a little help. The TMFH document is giving a very thorough overview of what transpired before Durnford arrived on the scene. And the question being asked "Was the Battle all ready lost" that's where I'm having the problem,what are we looking that's not already been written in the TMFH.

Old H. This is how I see TMFH.

The TMFH is showing through eyewitness accounts and maps that the Zulu
armies was both in and getting into position,during the five hours before Durnford's arrived at Isandlwana. The document is showing statements from both British and Zulu participants The maps showing the positions of the British and those of the Zulus. An attack on Isandlwana that morning was eminent and possibly not how we are led to believe from the History books that the attack on Isandlwana only come about because of Raw's discovery of the Impi.

With regards to Col: Durnford's orders.

Take command or reinforce (debatable) in view of the TMFH doe's it really matter which, either way the Battle was lost before he arrived.

"The British general was "out-generalled" by the Zulu general and that is the fact of this matter".

What would be really good is if an expert like perhaps our moderators could draw up a sort of table comparing the most prominent authors' assessment of the battle and how they differ from each other.
Points of agreement and points of disagreement. That would be really helpful to us newbies.
Thanks
Eric

Hi Eric. That is a very good point. However the only moderator is myself and I'm no expert. Hopefully one day some of the well known experts on this subject may join. However we do have our own little band of experts in their own right. If you go to another well known forum and look at the missing five hours topic. There are some replies from authors discussing their views.

Hope this helps.

Quote :

However we do have our own little band of experts in their own right.

And we do

And that means every single member who has joined this forum.

Personally, imo, I think the battle was lost when Pulleine failed to reorganise the camp's defences to HIS satisfaction, when Chelmsford's half of the column left in the early hours.
I think it is expecting a bit much of Durnford to think that he could turn up at the camp as the battle was commencing, seize command, appraise the deteriorating situation, formulate a plan of defence that was superior to the one (or lack of one) that was in place, brief the offcers of the 24th regarding new plan and issue them with their new orders and excute the plan successfully.

With reference to the Zulu movements, it's fairly clear that these were observed on many accounts. But this intelligence didn't seem to be getting through the lines of communication. Was Pulliene receiving these reports ?

With reference to Durnford, I believe the only report he received relating to Zulu movements was via Chard who was returning to R.D.

Admin. Is it not possible to add this to the essay section. ( it a master piece) shouldn't be lost in the discussions section.

Hi all

This is what time to what time, these famous missing five hours ?



Pascal

Pascal MAHE wrote:

Hi allThis is what time to what time, these famous missing five hours ?l

It is a theroy that the Zulu army was already attacking when discovered.

Pascal, it is well worth you reading it!
Anyone interested in the Zulu war should read it.

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The maps will give you a better understanding of what's being said.

Hi all

Ok ... this has been We'll talk about ...



Pascal

Pascal, looking forward to your comments on the missing 5 hours!

When you have read it, let us know what you think.
It should be obvious that Durnford's arrival and actions had nothing to do with the Zulus attacking the camp.

Lock and Quantrill's analysis of the primary source reports from 0530 onwards, on the 22nd January undermines the old theory that the Zulus were "discovered" by Raw's patrol. On the contrary, 3rd column patrols had observed movements of large numbers of Zulu warriors several hours prior to this.
In addition, the 3rd column had already been discovered by the Zulus days before, the camp had been put under surveillance, Chelmsford's column had been observed leaving for Mangeni Falls, a deliberate assault planned on the basis of this opportunity and by 0530 on the 22nd January, the camp was already being encircled by the main Zulu impi for a deliberate assault.

Well put tasker, good post.

Well put Tasker I You Sr.

Hi all

IK in person and others write it several times that the Zulus were not to attack that day ...

So there was an prepared attack but not for the 22, then the matter of missing 5 hours, it's ........ !



Pascal

Hi Pascal .
Controversial is the word that first springs to mind . .
cheers 90th.

Yes my friend, is why I had never heard of this, it is a controversy ... MORE



Pascal

Pascal. Have you read the Missing 5 hours yet? Yes or No?

Hi all

Here is my conclusion on the missing five hours:

1 - For me, there was no immediate intention of attack by the Zulu army when first located by Lieutenant Charles Raw of the Natal Native Horse. (NNH)

2 - The accepted convention is that the greater part of the Zulu army camped the night of the 21st January 1879 in the area of the Ngwebeni Valley, apparently with the intent of attacking the British camp on 23rd January , not the 22.

3 - The reasons are that the 22nd was not a propitious date to attack due to superstition surrounding the ‘unfavourable’ state of the moon. In addition, the time factor had prevented the ‘doctoring’ of the amabutho to prepare them for battle on the 22nd.

4 - The only reason that a Zulu attack was precipitated. result of Lieutenant Charles Raw, NNH, stumbling upon the Zulus at some point on Mabaso Hill, overlooking the deep Ngwebeni Valley...

5 - the ‘Missing Five Hours,’ is a invented term that describes the critical period immediately after daylight on 22nd , a excuse invented by the defenders of Durnford for Pulleine wear the hat...

6 - The Zulu army was ritually strengthened at kwaNodwengu. Once this had been done, the army was despatched and ready to do battle. There would have been no further rituals performed for either individual regiments or the army as a whole.But this does not mean that the Zulus would attack the 22.

7 - Nor was the state of the moon of itself a decisive factor. The battle of Nyezane, fought on the same day as Isandlwana, indicates a Zulu readiness to attack on the day of the ‘dead moon’ if driven to do so by a tactical opportunity.Attack of the Zulus to Nyezane is triggered exactly the same way as Isandhlwana, Zulu attack was precipitated ,result of a NNC coy, stumbling upon the Zulus

8 - Having conjecturally decoyed half of No 3 Column (and two thirds of its artillery) from the camp in order to join Major Dartnell in an effort to locate, engage and destroy a strong Zulu presence approximately ten miles east of the camp in the Mangeni Falls area ,the reconnaissance of the Isandlwana Camp made by a mounted party that included Mehlokazulu kaSihayo, one of the commanders of the Nkobamakosi Regiment in the very early hours of 22nd January and in the knowledge that the camp strength was substantially reduced by observation of a strong column leaving in the early hours of the 22nd on the track leading to Mangeni Falls , do not prove that the Zulus would attack on 22.

9 - Ntshingwayo kaMahole, overall commander of the Zulu Regiments, presented with a sudden and unexpected tactical opportunity, changed his battle plan from remaining concealed until 23rd, to one of mounting a deliberate attack as soon as possible on 22nd January. This is still an invention of Ron Lock and Peter Quantrill.


10 - Thus from both the Eastern and Western area reports, it may be concluded that significant elements of the amabutho were in the process of, or had already, deployed out of the Ngwebeni Valley. Within an hour or two of daylight, they were discernible from the camp and its remaining outposts, moving deliberately and in strength. It is logical to conclude that at the very least, some of the key preparatory moves for a deliberate attack on the camp were underway.It only indicates that they were taking to the 23.


11 - How then could Lieutenant’s Raw and Roberts, commanding two troops of the NNH who were yet to arrive at the camp with Durnford, ‘discover’ the main amabutho sitting quietly in the Ngwebeni ravine? This is a direct contradiction of the aforementioned primary source reports (and importantly not hearsay) that large numbers of Zulus were already deployed out of the valley area and positioned on the Nqutu Plateau.Large numbers of Zulus already deployed out of the valley area and positioned on the Nqutu Plateau indicates only that they were taking to the 23.

12 - a reconnaissance or fighting patrol, the numbers involved being well in excess of such definition.In addition such a move – except if linked to an already taken decision to attack - would have precipitated the Zulus into the tactically vulnerable situation of having disclosed the location of at least 5-7,000 warriors. This would have been a powerful indicator that the main army was indeed close to the Isandlwana Camp, rather than still opposite or near Chelmsford’s force in the Mangeni Falls area.

The Zulus confirmed that there was no intent to fight on the 22nd .Melokazulu further confirmed that the attack began when three mounted troops- black and white – attacked us first.

13 - Melokazulu [referring to Cetshwayo] then gave Tsingwayo orders to use his own discretion and attack the English wherever he thought proper [Indicating clearly that Ntsingwayo was at liberty to attack as and when he thought fit] and if he beat them he was to cross the Buffalo River and advance on Pietermaritzburg, devastating the whole country and to return with the spoil.It was a Melokazulu say, what they wanted in his two inrerrogatoires, given his situation, he had no choix.Cetshwayo forbade his troops to penetrate into Natal.

14 -This general narrative is corroborated by other independent British primary sources already quoted herein indicating that the amabutho had commenced deployment with battle intent, fairly soon after first light on 22nd January. The terminology ‘advance’ is also arguably indicative of preparation to ‘attack.’To deploy and take a stand, does not mean we will attack ... Forward does not mean to attack, especially with the distance between the two armies ...

:lol: :lol: :lol:

Pascal

Mike Snook also doesn't belive the Missing 5 Hours.

And you young historian?

I also disagree with it

So what I write in conclusion is false?

What i ment to say was i do not believe the Missing 5 Hours theory.


Cheers

Oh ok so you are in agreement with my conclusion, above ...

Drummer Boy 14 wrote:

Mike Snook also doesn't belive the Missing 5 Hours.

Well, he wouldn't of course! That would implicate Pulleine, a member of the 24th, one of the parent regiments of his own.
Mike Snook is an excellent author, but is not known to be completely objective in this.

"Pascal. Have you read the Missing 5 hours yet? Yes or No?"




That will be a "No" then.

Pascal, do read it and base your opinion on having done so. It is fine to read what Ian Knight thinks about it, but what do you think about it?

Lock & Quantrill have shown using primary sources that there was an awfull lot of enermy activity in the early hours of the 22nd Jan not long after the coloum had divided. It's not a case of individuals trying to work it out themselves it's written down for us in the " TMFH" the only thing to be done by the individual is to check out the resources used, if they doubt what has been written.

Other historians will try to pick holes in this remarkable piece of work, but I have not seen any yet that can dis-prove the "TMFH" they only ague what they think happen..

Pascal. The Zulus supposedly when to Isandlwana, to sue for peace. Their intention was to hand over Zulus that a committed offences and to give them cattle as a token of peace. If ths ad been the case, why send over 20,000 warriors.

I'm quite happy with Snooks argument in his book against it, very well written and it makes sence

DB. What book are you talking about.

How Can Man Die Better by Snook, he chalenges the TMFH very well

What date was that book published. ?

I have It down as being Published: 31 May 2010

The TMFH I believed was published in September 2010.

So how can "How Can Man Die Better by Snook, challenge the TMFH.
Surly the TMFH challenges HCMDB. Then again I could be wrong.

Littlehand
Your dates are indeed correct, there is no repudiation in HCMDB. It predates the theory. The only repudiation I have seen by Mike Snook was in responce to a question I gave him on the Victorian wars forum. That objection was long on reply short on fact. He hadnt, to be fair, had a chance to walk the ridge area that L and Q had identified and was pretty convinced there wasnt cover to hide the impi.
Ive walked it and believe me you could hide the Man U supporters club there ( oh please do someone ).

Arguments for the theory would be that it dots a lot of 'I's and crosses the 'T's. It makes a massive amount of sense if you look at the distances and time frames involved.

Arguments against are that it doesnt take into account Zulu evidence, and that really comes down to one statement from Mehlokazulu. Look carefully at that statement and you can see that he was absent from the impi on a scouting mission for quite some time so wasnt privy to decisions taken by the inner circle. From his scouting expedition he reported back then left to join his ammabuthu.

There could be some critical gaps there.

I dont know if its fact or great fiction, what i do know is that for many many years all Morrises' theories and mistakes were taken as gospel and its only the challenges of the later day historians that have debunked many of his comments and statements.

From that point of view I would suggest open minds, and wait for the next smattering of clues to reveal them selves.

Regards

HI all

Tasker I read what you HAD to read Asked me yesterday and my conclusion was posted yesterday ...



Pascal

Little Hand

my conclusion was posted yesterday ...



Pascal

springbok9 wrote:

Littlehand
Your dates are indeed correct, there is no repudiation in HCMDB. It predates the theory. The only repudiation I have seen by Mike Snook was in responce to a question I gave him on the Victorian wars forum. That objection was long on reply short on fact. He hadnt, to be fair, had a chance to walk the ridge area that L and Q had identified and was pretty convinced there wasnt cover to hide the impi.
Ive walked it and believe me you could hide the Man U supporters club there ( oh please do someone ).

Arguments for the theory would be that it dots a lot of 'I's and crosses the 'T's. It makes a massive amount of sense if you look at the distances and time frames involved.

Arguments against are that it doesnt take into account Zulu evidence, and that really comes down to one statement from Mehlokazulu. Look carefully at that statement and you can see that he was absent from the impi on a scouting mission for quite some time so wasnt privy to decisions taken by the inner circle. From his scouting expedition he reported back then left to join his ammabuthu.

There could be some critical gaps there.

I dont know if its fact or great fiction, what i do know is that for many many years all Morrises' theories and mistakes were taken as gospel and its only the challenges of the later day historians that have debunked many of his comments and statements.

From that point of view I would suggest open minds, and wait for the next smattering of clues to reveal them selves.

Regards

An excellent post

The more modern the theory, the further removed it is from Victorian spin, cover-up, prejudice and excuse.
TMFH is an outstanding piece of work by two outstanding historians.
Neither have an interest in defending the reputation of any individual or regiment, Imperial or Zulu.
Both have the most passionate interest in the Zulu war and have studied the primary source reports and walked the battle ground more than any other historian.
To appreciate the TMFH theory, one must :
i. be able to remove any pre-existing ideas that they have and open their mind, afresh.
ii. be able to appreciate that the Zulu were not a rabble of disorganised savages who got lucky against a blundering (but superior in every way) British lead force. The Zulu were an experienced and tactically astute military machine, capable of beating any modern army of the time.
iii. be willing to accept that maybe, no one officer in particular was to blame. Perhaps on that day, the best side won and was always going to!

What happened to " Mehlokazulu" after he war.

Hi all

Hi all

Julian's excellent too, like me, does not approve the thesis of the missing five hours ...

Why Zulu have not attacked at dawn, which was their usual custom, when they had the chance?

What day Pulleine should leave the camp?

No recognition of NNH, no battle of Isandhlwana.

No recognition of NNC, no battle of Nyezane.



Pascal

Moreover, nobody knows the conversation in the tent of Pulleine between Durnford and the brave Pulleine, at the arrival of Durnford in the camp ...

Everything is just speculation ... So nothing is proven ...



Pascal

We know part of the conversation, Pulliene had been told to draw in the camp which he had failed to do. Durnford brought this to his attention

Pascal
Not quite right.
Snippets of the conversation where recorded from Cochran, Smith Dorean, Gardiner and Essex. Mainly from Cochran who being effectivly Durnfords ADC was with him for a large part of the time.