Isandlwana, Last Stands

There are many intermingled points from a variety of people to answer here.

First, scotch carts. Better than photographic research for scotch carts, it would be much easier to read Essex's account in which he describes sending some men off with one (and ammo in it). Each scotch cart could carry 30 ammo boxes.

Secondly, Knight, Zulu, pp. 81-2: “since the whole question of ammunition has become part of the popular mythology of Isandlwana, it is important to consider what arrangements the 24th had made to resupply their men in action. Unfortunately the Quartermasters of both battalions were killed in the battle, but it seems quite clear that they had fulfilled their duties properly. [My underlining.] According to the Field Force Regulations a supply was “to be constantly in possession of regiments and detached companies in the field…at a rate of 270 rounds per man, viz. 70 in possession of each soldier, with a reserve of 200 rounds”
The 200 rounds per man were transported in the second of the two company waggons which each company possessed. These were parked behind the tents of each unit in camp. [Note this is entirely separate from the regimental reserve housed in the waggons in the waggon park.]
“Smith-Dorrien described breaking them [the ammunition boxes] open ‘as fast as we could’ and keeping ‘sending the packets out to the firing line’, there seems no reason believe that he had any difficulty in opening them – with or without a screwdriver.”
“There is, in short, no evidence to suggest that shortage of ammunition was responsible for any tactical decisions taken by the officers of the 24th.”
Knight, Zulu Rising, p. 380: "It is absurd to suppose a battalion as experienced in field service as the 1/24th could not open its own ammunition boxes." "The 2000 archaeological survey uncovered a number of discarded lining handles along the firing positions to the the north of the camp, confirming that some of [the ammo] boxes had been opened there."
That's from your reputable Knight.

Thirdly, the ammo pouches had not arrived in time for the war. Paton wrote lamenting their absence in December 1878. Nevertheless these could be easily improvised and Essex, Williams, Smith-Dorrien, et al. variously describe men 'carrying' ammunition to the line.

Barry is utterly wrong in his statement that one of the 24th’s QMs ‘did a runner’. He is also wrong in stating that Knight wrote such a thing. He is also wrong in attributing various statements to Troopers Doig and Shannon. Neither man left any written account. These remarks are provocative but without any basis in truth. Evidence cannot simply be invented in this way. If the debate continues in this vein it means anyone can write anything he likes and the gullible or those unable to check statements will swallow it hook, line, and sinker. If Barry cannot come up with the primary sources he keeps claiming he has available, he should say so. And we all know he can’t because they do not exist. I’m not prepared to participate if debate is being made a mockery of. It’s a thorough waste of readers’ time.

Drummer boy is quite correct in stating that the BBG’s QM survived. But he did not ‘do a runner’. He was out with the mounted men in the donga and retreated with them when the time came. At that time it was a sauve qui peut. Some decided (or were obliged because they were cut off) to stay with Durnford; some were ‘pushed out’ eventually seeing their only chance of escape as the saddle and beyond. Davies and Henderson’s men’s ammo waggon was to the south of the waggon park and separated from it. Molife said they replenished their pouches but couldn’t get back in to Durnford. They were shut out. To describe these men as ‘runners’ is disgraceful.

Drummer boy is correct in stating that the 24th had Pioneers. It certainly did and the Pioneers’ station in a battle was by the ammunition waggons which is where they would have been at Isandhlwana. I think a pioneer could open an ammo box, no trouble.

Lastly, Jackson is at pains to show that ammunition supply was NOT a problem. Barry has been selective in the words he has highlighted. So, I'll counter his highlights. If Barry had read Jackson I would not have to do this.
‘Running short’ does not mean ‘running out’. Cavaye and Mostyn were experienced officers – they were simply ensuring ammo supply would commence so that there'd be no problem. Smith-Dorrien resupplied them, then Essex did.
‘Lt Vause called for more ammo having used their 50, but was refused ( resupply) by the 1/24.’ They blazed away up on the plaeau retreating steadily. The 1/24th could not resupply them – they had different ammunition. Vause says that Shepstone resupplied them.
‘Durnford's men were also running short....’ – again, not running out and he sent back to the camp for more.
‘....he obtained 200 rounds form a tent ( not from a QM on a wagon?)’ Of course not, again, different ammunition. Davies and Henderson arrived with ammunition just before Durnford’s line retired – see Davies’s account.

Julain i have never said

that the 24th had no Pioneers.

I have never, ever, met a soldier who thought he had sufficient ammunition during a contact or on a patrol.
Is too much being read into phrases such as "running low" on ammunition? Unless there is hard evidence from a reliabe source to prove that men ran out of ammunition forcing them to fall back, I would be dismissive of the stories told by soldiers.
It is inevitable that men would have begun to run out of ammo or had been unable to use what they had left in the final last stand phases of the battle, but by then the damage had been done by the speed of the assault by overwhelming numbers of Zulus, on exposed lines of infantrymen out in the open.

Drummer Boy
Apologies. In my haste, I miswrote. I've now corrected the line.
Tasker
You have a valid point.

At the court of enquiry Essex says " Mule Cart" is this another name for a scotch cart.

Barry

No real need for the burning properties, unless we can get the original data on Waltham Abbey RFG2 or Curtis and Harveys Composition No6, modern BP cannot be accurately compared. Waltham Abbey RFG2 was mesh 12-20, C & H No6 was mesh 14-20., The Gunpowder Mills museum at Waltham Abbey has some very interesting data, which I hope to get when we gig there next.

For more accurate data, the report published by The Royal Laboratories Woolwich 22.12.1884 lists the shooting deviation between each shot, I have a copy of the original report from Leeds Royal Armouries, an abridged version appears in Temples "the Boxer Cartridge in British Service" ISBN 0959667709.


Twenty rounds were fired from fixed rest, at 500 yards, 78 degrees of Humidity, barometer 30.284, wind N.E. Wind NNE strength moderate. Trail Cartridges was a standard Mk111 Service round from the R^L. Woolwich.

Hits 20, misses NIl, absolute mean deviation of hits 9.25". As a fellow shooter I don't need to tell you that degree of accuracy at 500 yards is exceptional by the standards of the day, even then they were still striving for more accuracy, culminating in the .402" Round trials of 1881-82. Further reading of this can be found in Vol 2 of Skennertons treatises.

Hi Julian,

Indeed, there are many intermingled points, not all central to the discussion in hand , but partly contributing however and very usefull background information. I can say too that what has been said by myself and others with similar thinking, : the actual supply never ever ran out, until the Zulus captured it.
By all account the battalion reserves were well kept. But the problem was non consistent delivery to ALL the links in the defensive chain, not just some of them.


Now taking up on the Scotch cart issue.
Is there any certainty whether they were put to general use in the supply of ammuntion on the field. If you have something on this other than Essex's report please quote your sources. More importantly however is how long during the course of the battle were they in use. My checks reveal nothing about that but they may well have been in the area in the hands of civilan contractors. As someone else has said on the forum there may be a little confusion here between a Scotch cart and a mule cart. I am quite dubious ,particularly for the more outlying firing lines about their efficacy as they would be far too heavy and cumbersome ( with 30 cases of .450/577 rounds ( total 18,000 rounds) ) to neogiate gradients, donga's, ant bear holes large rocks and other natural obstacles.

Another is is the preopening of ammunition boxes by the QM and thus the control of issues to the field. Now, I dont think there is any question , by anybody, about the regulations concerning what should have happened, ie the procedure, as these are well documented, but is there any provenance on what actually happened, not only to the men of the 1/2 24th,...... but for the other links in the defensive chain as well, ie, NC, NMP, NNC etc.

I note too that the 400 round canvas carrier referred to by Neil was issued too late to be used there.


barry

Hi Neil,

Thanks for your post on some firing tests done on the MH.
The testers however omitted to mention either direction of fire vis-a-vis wind direction, or temperature. The altitude where the test was done was likely very low, as I dont thing there would have been a test range at the elevation of the Isandlwana battleground or a means to replicate the +- 34 deg C ambient.
So, not too germane to the discussion, but very interesting nonethless, particulary the 9.25 moa @ 500m which was indeed good for the time.

regards

baarry

Hi Barry
Your request for source material on the presence of scotch carts.

Talana museum ref AZW 16200/587 Lt C Penrose

In responce to their operating capacity to get to the front line, between Durnford and the camp was one donga, it is slightly behind his line of defence and is a watershed for the ridge so its depth is not great, it would at that time of the year be wet and boggy. Any traffic could have got within 100 meters of his line though. Also bare in mind that the road/traders track ran right through his defence point and so a firm surface was available. Chelmsford used this track in his advance, Anstey had been working on the track the day before ( Coghills diary referers)

To get from the wagons to the front line would have been straight forward, the gun carriages got to the furthest point after all. Pope would have been the most difficult to supply initially untill he fell back to the mountain side of the donga. I would assume that with his firing control his ammo expenditure before getting back to the west of the donga would not have been excesive. From that revised position carts would have easy access. The balance of the line from Younghusband down to the 'knuckle' would have been extremely easy. Younghusband would be a stones throw from the supplies, and Porteus, cavaye et al not to much distant.

As a point of interest, many years back whilst camped on the battlefield, approx where Chelmsford tent would have been, I took a bet on how long it would take me to get from Popes position to the wagon area and back carrying two 6 packs of beer, took 24 minutes. That was wearing running shoes and shorts.
I lost the bet and had to drink the beer.

Julian

There are accounts, cant quite get there at present but I shall, of Cannabis being used at the battle. my point about this is: If indeed the regimenst were only going to attack on the 23rd then its highly unlikely that the store would have been depleted in issuing it a day early. Therefore IF it was issued it would be a pointer for the battle to have been planned for the 22nd. Does that make sense?


Regards

impi
There are different types of scotch cart all pulled by mules - the 24th used ones very similar (locally purchased and not in the hands of civilian contractors) to the standard issue. Knight (Zulu Rising) suggests they wouldn't have been fully loaded for taking ammo to the line - what would be the point - so much ammo was not needed in one place and it would travel more slowly/carefully. Anyway, to all intents and purposes, mule cart = scotch cart.

Bonjour Julian

Je suis super content de ton retour...

Julian wrote :

“Formation in laager would have been possible if it had been implemented before the arrival of Durnford.”
No not possible, there was insufficient time and manpower to do it round a camp as large as Isandhlwana. Doing so would have meant abandonment of stores, transport, etc.

Pascal answer :

1 - Dear Julian, I had long debated this with DB14, last year, the laager was not possible before the battle, as Chelmsford had not prescribed that.

Pulleine is too obedient to take this kind of 'innitiatives.

2 - Also, Pulleine has not enough imagination to imagine the Zulu attack before it is started, so no laager.

3 - The square is also impossible, unless they are formed before the arrival of Dunrford, which impossible because Pulleine has not enough imagination to imagine the Zulu attack before it is started, so no square.

4 - Note that the square do more use in the British formations since the advent of rifled guns Iin mass in the british army (MLR of the Crimean war ) and he'll be back in fashion in the colonial wars, in front of the natives, after Isandhlwana.

5 - Even if Pulleine have had enough imagination to imagine the Zulu attack before it is started, and it is actually formed a laager or square before the arrival of Durford, Durford would have done break ...

For evidence, the behavior of Durnford who found that while the Zulu movements are detected since 8.00am are for Chelmsford ...

Julian wrote :

But there was scotch carts at Isandhlwana.

Pascal answer :

No evidence that there were some scotch carts at Isandhlwana.

If there were had, they would not have used mules to services bringing munitons at 24 th companies as they do.

In conclusion, as neither Chelkmsford nor Pulleine nor Durnsford could not imagine a mass attack of the camp and saw the troop movements ordered by Pullene and especially by Durnford the January 22 at the beginning of the battle, all was lost to advance ...

Quand aux equipements et tout ce qu'il y avait dans le camp,c'était moins prioritaire que le vie des soldats,il aurait vraiment fallut être stupide pour s'en inquieter devant l'ampleur du danger...

Cheers

Pascal

Barry.

Thermometer was 43 deg, wind strength 1/2 to 11/2 lb.

I don't know where you intent to lead this sub topic, the deviance of Mk111 ammunition in Zululand would be nominal, and have no significant effect, it doesn't come up as an issue in any other battles, so why it needs to have specific relevance to Isandlwana? and what do you intend to prove with it?

Apart from the companies on the Telehane Ridge opening volleys at 800 yards, from the onset, the bulk ranges would have not been much beyond that, in most cases 500 yards max, Considering the fields of fire, from the fixed first position. With the Zulu's in skirmishing order, at 800 yards plus, the firing for effect would have little or no effect.

I know first hand the accuracy of a MH in Zululand so I do not need to suppose. I fired 50 live rounds on the high ground overlooking the Buffalo, between RD and Isandlwana, for the Warriors TV Programme, my only variable was I fired Sanadex (BP substitue) powder as I could not get BP. The results were interestng, My Mk1/2 upgrade actually became more accurate, at point of aim, not the usual 100 yard over-sighting, so why was this?, my normal POA is low and left to achieve central point of a target at 100 yards.

So what to glean from that?, well only two things could be certain, 1) that Sanadex is less powerful than my normal 2FG, hence no need for lower sight elevation or 2) the air density (there had been a classic violent afternoon thunderstorm, the type I marvel at in SA) was causing more significant resistance to the bullets flight, hence I did not need to compensate.

Sorry to bore any of the memebrs who have fallen asleep by now, what would the effect be, to me firing at a Zulu? well, I hit him in the chest not the stomach!! , add adrenalin, hyper ventalting, and my accuracy drops. Its a fact of life of any of the soldiers, in Scarlet, Rifle Green or Navy Blue, and my position on a map be it the Grassy Hills of Zululand or the Martian landscape of Abu Klea has exactly the same effect.

My conclusion from this, in respect to trying to find and angle on its effecting the outcome is not relevant.

Trying not to go over my old posts, but relevant to this discussion, and possibly not something you have read before is the following report, written by Inspector of the RSAF Enfield 5.10.1880. It was written for inclusion in a memorandum on ammuniton on rifle and machine gun ammuniton. I have a copy from Leeds, but can be found abridged on P249 Vol 2 of Skennertons' treatise. Items in {brackets} are my notes

"A cartridge picked up from the field of isandlwana had been sent to him, {at lest a year and a half on the ground?} it had been tried in the proof M-H of the RGF. {Waltham abbey}. though it had been knocked out of shape, it entered the chamber without diffculty and gave a muzzle velocity of 1315 feet per second".

Also " Some MH cartridges returned from the Cape, which had a very bad appearance externally, and had discs so covered in rust as to prevent the loading of the cartridge, contained powder in excellent order".

Interesting point indeed.

Barry please don't think I pick your post out for criticism, but I learned from Julians post years ago on the RDVC site, statements without factual backup are... opinions.

Julian, thank you for the info on the Canvas Sling, the date of acceptance, very much like the rifles, ammo and all other ordnance parts take time to filter out to the ranks. Where do I find the Paton report?.

regs

Hi Neil,

Thanks for your further posts on the MH.
Indeed, this technical stuff is not too interesting to most, and as I have an interest in the results you obtained in Zululand as well as headspacing questions and tests done by Stanford Arsenal, I will pm you.

regards

barry

Neil
Re slings, it was either Jackson (Hill of the Sphinx) or Knight (Zulu Rising) who mentioned the fact that they hadn't arrived - I'll have to dig it out.

Hello Neil

Simply with your expert opinion.

In your opinion, what is the average rate of fire in combat with the MH with a average soldier in 1879?

- With volley fire?

- With independent fire?

Best regards

Pascal

Pascal
The average rate of fire at Khambula was 33 rounds per man over 4 hours - fighting would have been similar to Isandhlwana without the final climax. At the absolute maximum a soldier could fire 12 times per minute if necessary. Do you agree Neil?
By the way, Pascal, there were scotch (mule) carts at Isandhlwana. They had been bought locally in lieu of the absent regimental ones. Each company had one. Essex records one being used. Bloomfield was shot through the head whilst loading one. When the call to arms came, the men would have gone 'on automatic' to their assigned posts, pioneers to the battalion waggons, bandsmen to the company carts. If required, they would have been used.

Bonjour Julian

D'aprés Michael Barthorp,the MH was sighted 1450 yards and had an improved rate of fire of 12 round per minutes ( independent fire ,I suppose...But I bet they are some who were better...)

After IK,independent fire could be twice as lethal as volley fire,bu uses up three times as much ammunitions.

Also ,volley fire is of 4 round per minutes,I suppose... ( But I bet they are some who were better...)

The problem is that I no longer have confidence in what I read out the forum ...

I do believe that in the opinion of experts like you, Neil, Barry , Sprinbok per example ,and any others on the forum,everyone in your area ...

Cheers (look yours pm ,please)

Pascal

Of course you shouldn't have confidence in what you read on the forum. There is far too much opinion and unverified speculation on it.

Dear julian

There who know their subjects very well on the forum and are ultra documented or professional historians...

And as we talk it's easier duty is right ... There are usually only two opinions on the forum...

Whereas with a book, impossible to know the truth because there is a author by opinion...

Cheers

Pascal

barry wrote:

Hi Neil,

Thanks for your further posts on the MH.
Indeed, this technical stuff is not too interesting to most, and as I have an interest in the results you obtained in Zululand as well as headspacing questions and tests done by Stanford Arsenal, I will pm you.

regards

barry

I disagree Barry. You and Neil - keep on posting. I very much enjoy reading Neil's posts and particularly the technical stuff - I find it fascinating!

Where would this location be at Isandlwana.

Information received from Umtegolalo, a Zulu well known to Mr. Longeast, Interpreter to the Lieutenant-General, found wounded at Rorke's
Drift on the 23rd January. Statement made by Natives regarding the Action of the 22nd January, at the Sandhlwana Hill.

"Two companies of the 24th Regiment and all the mounted Europeans being sent to the extreme right of the camp, at the spot where the road cuts through it."

Never heard of that before

All the wounded Zulu's were killed by the 24th and the NNC

Hi 24th,

Thanks for a very useful post. This statement corroborates reports by Doig and Shannon, both Mounted men, who survived to recount their actions.
They too were sent around to the nek to block the right horn of the impi which was menacing the camp from that quarter.
It is exactly this sort of imformation which will serve to dispel many of the myths around this battle.

regards

barry

Hi DB.
All the badly wounded who couldnt move were indeed killed , many would've crawled away , others may have decided to '' come in later '' . The 23rd may be the wrong date , or possibly have been found in the evening when tempers had died down . Whatever it is , the information is correct ! . Isnt it ??.
cheers 90th.

PS. Did you have any luck at DP&G Publishing ? .

Hi 90th,
Very correct, Many of those less seriously injured at RD crawled away into the darkness and hid until safe to come out.

regards

barry

24th
It can only refer to the Durnford location and the Donga.

Barry 90th

Are you not getting mixed up between isandlwana and RD?

Regards

Hi All.
I'm hoping this is my last post on the ammo subject .
Julian .
I doubt I've ever mentioned or implied '' Running Short '' meant '' Running Out '' . It means what it says running short !.
Unfortunately all my '' Source Witnesses '' are dead , so its difficult to uncover any other source evidence ! . Except for
Williams and Bickley who were there and did say that the troops were running out ( Their words , not mine ! ) I'll stick with short .
Also you mentioned , I cant remember who , saying that they saw Mules Laden with Ammo tearing about the camp !, your reply was something like '' No Doubt as their handlers were probably Dead '' . My point exactly , if the handlers were dead of course
the ammo wouldn't / couldnt get to the firing line or what was left of it . As for the carts how many boxes were in the carts ? , 10,
20 or much less ? . I know you deal in facts and I agree wholeheartedly , but I am willing to have an open mind on the subject .
The only people who have mentioned that there was a semi problem with the Ammunition , you have basically dismissed their evidence as '' out of context '' or along the lines of '' they were to far away to know what was happening on the firing line '' .
I think an open mind , is to me the best way to approach this subject . One last point in regard to the boxes being opened
pre battle , none of the survivors has ever mentioned that fact . With the camp being expected to move on at any time it would have been a brave Qtrmstr to take it upon himself to prepare the boxes without a direct order , which as far as I'm aware has never surfaced either . Also we have the mentality of those in command who didnt think for one minute that the zulu would attack the camp at all , let alone with the ferocity that they unleashed upon it . Agreed ? . I did and do enjoy a spirited debate , but that's exactly what it is , a debate and nothing more . For the simple fact you , me and all others involved dont know with 100 % accuracy what transpired that day one way or another .
cheers 90th.

I dont wish to come across as condescending .

Hi Sprinbok.
Only replying to DB's earlier post from 24th .
24th what you quoted mentions R.Drift so I'm not sure what you mean ? .
cheers 90th.

Hi

Garry, we could discuss 1000 year, we will never know what really happened ...

This applies to any historical fact and the worst is that you can not even trust the eyewitnesses ...

It's the same today, in the affairs of police, many different stories as there are witnesses ...

For ammunition, they did not missed even if they had disposed all the ammunition you want, the secret to a longer resistance than does a better deployment.

All units in close order at the foot of Mount ...

Durnford and Pulleine but never would have ordered such a thing in time, they thought they were too safe before the outbreak of the battle ...

In a honest wargame, if Durnford back, Pulleine is obliged to recall the other units and it's over ...

Obviously, knowing what we let us, they could wreak havoc ...


Cheers


Pascal

Hi springbok9,

What is coming out of 24th's post is that a Zulu who had fought at Isandlwana on 22/01, also saw action at RD, on the 23rd, the following day. He was wounded there, as were hundreds of others and survived by moving away once injured, into the night.
He gave that report when he and many many other Zulu's including Mehlogazulu, made statements concerning their involvement , to police and other officials post the actions.

regards


barry

Hello Barry

Sorry, but no amaviyo of Isandhlwana have fought at RD ...

Cheers

Pascal

barry wrote:

Hi springbok9,

What is coming out of 24th's post is that a Zulu who had fought at Isandlwana on 22/01, also saw action at RD, on the 23rd, the following day. He was wounded there, as were hundreds of others and survived by moving away once injured, into the night.
He gave that report when he and many many other Zulu's including Mehlogazulu, made statements concerning their involvement , to police and other officials post the actions.

No Zulu fourght at Isandlwana and Rorke's Drift.

HI Db14

This is what I have to explain

Cheers

Pascal

Hi Pascal,

I see you raised a query a few days ago about the Impi's taking cannabis. (Afrik: dagga, Zulu: lnsangu, sl; ( marijuana/grass/the weed )

Now, as this plant cannabis sativa grows in great profusion to this day across the eastern seaboard of S. Africa and is available to all who want it by merely walking through the stands of the plant ,picking some dry leaves from dead and dried growth and smoking it, "on the hoof". The suggestion that that there was no time to smoke is clearly very false , and misleading. This plant thrives in all the moist hot and wet ravines and valleys of Zululand and was within very easy reach of everybody who wanted it.

Where a time frame may have applied would be if the "blessed" version of this weed was required. But even that too is easily dispensed with as the Zulu's did not plan to attack the British on 22/01, but rather 23/01 , when the moon was right..The blessing ceremony involves an insangoma (witch doctor or shaman), smoke, fire, dances and incantations.

These blessings were supposed to give the impi protection against the white man's bullets, and because the drug was hallucinogenic and temporarily boosted energy levels it's use was widespread and many believed it was the answer to everything.......in their sublime ignorance of course.

However, not all Zulus believed in this stuff because they saw that in it's use that it led to addiction and interpersonal problems, violence , crime etc. ( not much has changed)

Those Zulus who did not take it used to refer scathingly to those, ( behind a cupped hand in a whisper) who did as ( ibema insangu yshlati). Roughly translated this means " be warned he who smokes cannabis in the bush" ( ie furtively).

Now , this plant cannabis sativa grows to a height of between 2,5-4,5 metres and has a long narrow mid to dark green leaf, and is not be confused in name with the "wild dagga" plant ( leonotis leonus), which grows to about 2m height, bears an orange flower and grows prolifficaly in the same region from the warm and humid coastal dune forests to over 4000 metres, on the eastern slopes of the berg.

I hope this satisfies your curiosity

regards

barry

Hello my dear Garry

I completely agree with you.

Very good post ...

What I meant is that the Battle of Isandhlwana, this is not 2000 alcoholic killed by 26,000 drug addicts ...

The Zulu they had also alcohol ?

Cheers

Pascal

barry wrote:

Hi 24th,

Thanks for a very useful post. This statement corroborates reports by Doig and Shannon, both Mounted men, who survived to recount their actions. They too were sent around to the nek to block the right horn of the impi which was menacing the camp from that quarter. It is exactly this sort of imformation which will serve to dispel many of the myths around this battle.

Were is there report please

Right horn


Cheers

DB14
I believe 24th post was part of a Statement used at the official court of enquiry.

Hi Pascal,
You do have a sense of humour.
No, I do not think all the enemy was stoked up. Those who were less courageous probably were.
An amusing incident occurred regarding a contractor/dealer of alcohol who was following Chelmsford's column and doing some business along the way.The matter was reported to Chelmsford at Helpmekaar, who then warned the dealer to clear out immediately otherwise all of his wares would be tipped into the mZinyathi. The man was gone with his wagon within the hour.


barry

DB14
It is actually feasable that someone fought at both battles.
Consider that the uVe and the iNgobamakhosi ( Left Horn) fougt through and around the saddle ( moving to the south of Mahlabamkhosi) and then down through the dongas and ravines.
The iNdluyengwe cut around Mpethe to the drift, so the persuit across Mpethe itself would have been elements from the left horn.
Would you not consider it possible then that those elements joined up with the iNluyegwe and worked their way along the river banks ( we do know that farms along the banks were sacked ) before joining the battle at RD.

Its probably a stretch of the imagination but certainly within the realms of possibility.

Regards

Pascal
Although I blush at the accolade of 'expert', I make no claims for that status whatsoever.
Enthusiastic amateur with a penchance for source and fact would be a more fitting lable.

Or really handsome sod.............. :lol:

Neil
Ammunition appliances see Paton p. 245.

Tasker
I agree – I find Neil’s posts interesting.

Pascal
Yes, that’s true but a good professional historian will present both sides of an argument (in the form of a discussion) and arrive at a balanced conclusion based on the evidence. He will also provide sources for his arguments.

24th
The quotation must be taken in the context of the rest of the account which is a summary of several NNC and Umtegolalo of the Undi corps.

Drummer boy
The account is genuine. It’s in the Blue Books C2260, Enc 2 in No. 12, pp. 102-3. Umtegolalo can only have been slightly wounded.

Barry
I don’t know how many times I have to repeat this. Doig and Shannon did NOT leave any account.

90th
Neither man says ‘running out’. Bickley says ‘getting short’; Williams says ‘ got short’. Their words, not mine! However, I do not disagree with your basic premise that after the line collapsed no more ammunition in any great quantity could have reached the isolated pockets of surviving companies – that’s self-evident – although Pte. Williams indicates that some got through even at that late stage.
At the time the mules were seen running about, the perimeter had gone. There was no firing line. And the mule-handlers would have been dead or running for their lives. Saying that mules were running about at that stage of the battle however does NOT indicate that the line had not been replenished with ammunition when the line was intact. In fact, it indicates that an ammunition supply had been well and truly up and running.
As for how many boxes were in the carts, no-one knows (except that it could easily accommodate 30). For me, the point is no-one says thereafter ‘but it was not enough’. Cavaye’s coy had been firing longest and it was already being resupplied when it retired to the foot of the spur (Essex). The army would not have bought ONE cart. It didn’t have its own; it bought local ones in Natal. Where there was one there would have been several (one for each coy at least) to fulfil the intended function.
Now I too always have an open mind where new evidence is brought to light which questions the prevailing view. However, nothing of the kind has been presented.
Instead…
(1) individual lines from survivors’ accounts have been selectively quoted (out of context) similar to ‘ammunition was running short’ but hardly anyone has then continued the survivors’ quotations which say something like ‘and it was carried out to them’. For the 24th, Essex, Smith-Dorrien, Bickley, Williams; for the NNC Malindi, Higginson; for the NNH Davies, Vause ; for the Carbineers Barker. So, while there was a firing line it was being supplied and all the above are witnesses to the fact. There are no accounts which state that while the perimeter existed no ammunition was brought out. There are no accounts which state that the firing line ran out of ammunition.
I have said that both Bickley and Williams were in camp and were not witnesses to events on the firing line. They did both witness ammunition going out to that firing line.
No-one has mentioned that the men of the 24th Regt. MAY have gone out with 100 rounds each as per Field Force Regulations of November 1878 and not 70 rounds apiece. Why ignore this?
Re QMs and advance loosening of the locking screw on the ammunition box (not ‘opening’, I didn't say that). Once a battalion goes into action, any soldier will tell you that certain things become automatic. At the Column Call and Fall In soldiers get their equipment and behave as rehearsed ready for action. Pioneers go to the ammunition reserve. Bandsmen (according to prepared instruction) get stretchers and fall in behind their companies or go to the company ammo waggons with carts/pouches, etc. Spare Artillerymen also fall in as ammunition runners. QMs go to their assigned station and prepare themselves in readiness. This would include ensuring ammo boxes were in easy reach and ammunition would be readily available. No order was required to do this. It was implicit in their job. This was not a raw unit just out from England as Bartle Frere said ‘but a seasoned battalion with very good young officers’. Loosening a screw to ensure swift access is within their remit.
Instead…
(2) lines have been misquoted from accounts or collated or invented. One cannot put two lines referring to different times of the battle from different survivors (Bickley-Williams) and relate them to one particular point. One cannot invent an account (Doig-Shannon) and expect to be taken seriously.
Instead…
(3) we have had repeated promises of primary source quotations to support opinions and, despite numerous calls for them to appear, nothing has been posted. Any refutations of these opinions have been either ignored or met with assurances that the refutations will be dealt with and nothing has been posted. In fact nothing has appeared that’s not already in the public domain that presents any new evidence whatsoever.
You don’t come across as condescending.

springbok
The Zulu was with the Undi corps, i.e. behind Isandhlwana. He probably did not see much, if any, fighting, and went off down the track to RD. His report was intermingled with NNC natives’ accounts.

Julian

Thank you, I went straight for Jackson last night and got it.

I'm amazed the amounts of time I have read HOTS that I did not spot it before, The description was not far off, it was actually a one piece canvas throw, with a central head hole so you wore it like a "tabbard" or "bib" you'd wear in sport, the pockets were front and rear for 200 rounds.

I was actually pleased my research has proven the existed in use, and by the sounds of it were sorely needed.

Regards
Neil

DB. Here's the whole statement.

Information received from Umtegolalo, a Zulu well known to Mr. Longeast, Interpreter to the Lieutenant-General, found wounded at Rorke's
Drift on the 23rd January.
Statement made by Natives regarding the Action of the 22nd January, at the Sandhlwana Hill.

"THE Zulu army had, on the day of the 21st January, been bivouacked between the Upindo and Babmango Hills, from which position a portion of them were able to see our mounted men, viz., the Natal Carabineers and the Mounted Police, on the Ndhlaza Kazi Hill, and were seen by them.
The army consisted of the Undi Corps, the Nokenke and Umcityu Regiments, and the Nkobamakosi and Inbonambi Regiments, who were severally about 3000, 7000, and 10,000 strong, being the picked troops of the Zulu army.
During the night of the 21st January, they were ordered to move in small detached bodies to a position about a mile and a half to the east of the camp at Sandhlwana, on a stony table-land about 1000 yards distant from and within view of the spot visited by Lord Chelmsford and Colonel Glyn on the afternoon of the 21st January.
On arriving at this position, they were ordered to remain quiet, not showing themselves or lighting fires. Their formation was as follows:—The centre was occupied by the Undi Corps ; the right wing by the Nokenke and Umcityu ; and the left by the Inbonambi and the Nkobama Kosi Regiments.
Their orders from the King were to attack Colonel Glyn and No. 3 Column, and to drive it back across the boundary river. They had, however, no intention whatever of making any attack on the 22nd January, owing to the state of the moon being unfavourable from a superstitious point of view. The usual sprinkling of the warriors with medicine previous to an engagement had not taken place, nor had the war song been sung, or the religious ceremonies accompanying been performed. They were going to make their attack either during the night of the 22nd or at daylight on the 23rd, and, trusting in their number, felt quite secure of victory.
When, on the morning of the 22nd January the mounted Basutos, under the command of Colonel Durnford, R.E., discovered their position and fired at a portion of the Umcityu Regiment, that regiment immediately sprung up without orders, and charged. It was at once followed by the Nokenke, Inbonambi, and Nkobamakosi Regiments, the Undi Corps holding its ground.
Up to this point in the day there had been no fighting. Early in the morning, soon after the departure of Colonel Glyn and the troops with him, a bod (probably a company of the Natal Native Contingent) had been ordered to scout on the left, but do riot seem to have come upon the enemy. About nine A.M. (approximately), Colonel Durnford arrived with 250 mounted men and 250 Native Infantry, who were at once divided into three bodies, one being sent to the left, east (who came into contact with the Umcityu Regiment), one to the left front, and one to the rear, along the wagon-road (which is supposed to have gone after the baggage wagons brought up by Colonel Durnford,R.E).
At this period of the day the position of the troops was as follows. They were drawn up to the left of the Native Contingent Camp, with the guns facing the left. A message was now brought by a Natal Native Contingent officer, probably one of Colonel Durnford's mounted men, that the Zulus were advancing in great force, and firing was heard towards the left (the firing of the mounted Basutos against the Umcityu Regiment).
It is stated by a wagon driver that a consultation now took place between Colonel Durnford and Colonel Pulleine, during which he imagined there was a difference of opinion, Colonel Pulleine ultimately, however, giving way to his superior officer.
A Company of the 1st Battalion 24th were then moved up to the neck between the Sandhlwana Hill and the position occupied by the Zulus, where they at once became engaged with the Umcityu Regiment whose advance they completely checked for the time. The distance of this neck is about a mile and a half from camp.
Meanwhile the Zulus had advanced in the following order. The Umcityu Regiment formed the right Centre, and was engaged with one company 1st Battalion 24th Regiment, and about 200 of Colonel Durnford's natives; the left centre was composed of the Nokenke Regiment who were being shelled by the two guns as they advanced. Next to them on the left, came the Inbonambi Regiment with the Nkobamakosi Regiment outside of it) both making a turning movement and
threatening the front of the camp, while driving before them a body of Colonel Durnford's mounted men, supported by a patrol of Volunteers. The Undi Corps, on seeing that the other four regiments had commenced the attack, as above, inarched off to their right, and, without fighting, made for the north side of the Sandhlwana Hill, being concealed by it until, their turning movement being completed, they made their appearance to the west of the Sandhlwana at the spot were the wagon road crosses the neck. Meanwhile the Nkobaroakosi Regiment had become engaged on the left front of the camp with our infantry, and Buffered very severely, being repulsed three times, Until the arrival of the Inbonambi Regiment enabled them to push forward, along the south front of the camp and complete their turning movement. This produced an alteration in the position held by those defending the camp. Two companies of the 24th Regiment and all the mounted Europeans being sent to the extreme right of the camp, at the spot where the road cuts through it. The guns were moved to the right of the Native Contingent camp, having the nullah below them to their left lined by the Native Contingent; three companies of the 1st Battalion 24th Regiment remained on the left of the camp, supported on their left by the body of Mounted Basutos, who had been driven back by the Umcityu Regiment. The one company of the 1st Battalion 24th Regiment which had been thrown out to the neck, was now retiring, fighting.
By this time the attack of the enemy extended along the whole front of the camp, a distance of not less than 800 yards, and along the whole left, a distance of about 600 yards, and although they were still held in check by our fire, they were advancing rapidly towards the gaps between the troops. Up to this point their advance had been steady, and made without noise, but now they began to double and to call to one another. The camp followers and the Native Contingent began to fly, making for the right, and in a few minutes more the troops were forced to retire upon the tents to avoid being cut off, as the Zulus had now burst through the gaps. So far, very few men had fallen on our side, the fire of the enemy being far from good, but as the men fell back the Zulus came with a rush, and in a very few minutes it became a hand to hand conflict. About this time also the Undi corps, made its appearance on the right rear of the camp, completely cutting off any retreat towards Rorke's Drift. Fortunately the Nkobamakosi, instead of attempting to completely surround the camp by making a junction with the Undi, followed the retreating natives, thus leaving a narrow passage open for escape, which was taken advantage of by such as were able to escape out of the camp. A few were met and killed by the Uudi, but that corps, believing that the camp was already plundered, decided to make the best of their way to Rorke's Drift, and plunder it, never dreaming that any opposition could be offered by the few men they knew to be there.
The loss of the Zulus must have been exceedingly heavy. The Umcityu were frightfully cut up by the single company of the 1st Battalion 24th Regiment, which was sent out of camp, and never returned; the Nkobamakosi fell in heaps ; the hill down which the Nokenke came was covered with slain; and the loss of the Undi at Rorke's Drift cannot be less than 500; they killed all their own wounded who were unable to get away.
Much astonishment was expressed by the Zulus at the behaviour of our soldiers, firstly, regarding their death dealing powers considering their numbers; secondly, because they did not run away before the enormous numerical superiority of the enemy.
(Signed).
W. DRUMMOND,
Head-quarter Staff."
Source: Northeast Medals

Here's another account

"By Bertram Mitford.

Meaning of * Isandhlwana.

The site of the camp is along the eastern base of Isandhlwana,^ which rises immediately above it in the rear ; fronting it the country is all open to Isipezi mountain, some fourteen miles off, where Lord Chelmsford was engaging Matyana at the time of the attack. On the left, but at right angles to Isandhlwana, which lies north and south, runs the Nqutu range, over which the Zulu army first appeared. At the foot of this range, about two miles from camp, is a conical eminence where the rocket battery was stationed. The actual scene of operations, then, was an oblong plain about three miles in extent, whence, in the event of defeat, escape would only be possible by making for the The meaning- of Isandhlwana, or more correctly Tsandhlwane, is neither * little hand,' nor * little house,' nor any other of the hundred and one interpretations which were devised at the time of the disaster, but refers to a portion of bovine intestinal anatomy. The spelling of the word which I shall observe throughout these pages will be that which is now universally employed, though ' Isandhlwane ' is the more correct. The pronunciation of the word is exactly according to its orthography, every letter being distinctly sounded.


Zulu narratives of the battle.

The following narrative is that of a warrior of the Umbonambi regiment, who was present at the battle ; I give it as nearly as possible in his own words :

Several days before the fight we started from Undini, eight regiments strong (about 25,000 men). The King said, " The white soldiers have crossed into Zululand and are coming further in, soon they will be here (at Undini) ; go and drive them across Umzinyati (the Buffalo) right back into Natal." The impi ^ was commanded by Tyingwayo ; under him were Mavumengwane, Mundiila, and Yumandaba, the induna (chief) of the Kandam- pemvu regiment ; this regiment is also called Umcityu, but Kandampemvu is the oldest name. Matyana-ka-Mondisi was not present, nor was Dabulamanzi. Untuswa, brother of Seketwayo, is the induna of my regiment ; he took part in the fight, so did Mehlo-ka-zulu and Sirayo's other son. The chief Sibepu also fought.

We were lying in the hills up there, when one of our scouting parties came back followed by a number of mounted men ; they were most of them natives, but some were whites. They fired upon us. Then the whole imjpi became very excited and sprang up. When the horsemen saw how numerous we were they began to retreat. We formed up in rank and marched towards the camp. At the top of the last hill we were met by more horsemen, but we were too many for them and they retreated. Here, where we are standing (my informant's kraal was situated close to the rocket hill before mentioned), there were some parties of soldiers in red coats who kept up a heavy fire upon us as we came over. My regiment was here and lost a lot of men ; they kept tumbling over one upon another. (The narrator became quite excited, and indulged in much gesticulation, illustrating the volleys by cracking his fingers like pistol-shots.) Then the Ngobamakosi regiment, which formed the left horn of the impi, extended and swept round on the south of the rocket hill so as to outflank the soldiers, who, seeing this, fell back and took cover in that donga (pointing to a donga) insects the field about a mile from camp), and fired upon us from there. By that time the Ngobamakosi had got among the " paraffin " (rockets) and killed the horses, and were circling round so as to shut in the camp on the side of the river, but we could not advance, the fire from the donga was too heavy. The great indunas were on the hill over there (pointing to an eminence commanding
the north side of the camp, above where the mission-house now stands), and just below them a number of soldiers were engaging the Kandam- pemvu regiment, which was being driven back, but one of the sub-chiefs of the Kandampemvu ran down from the hill and rallied them, calling out that they would get the whole impi beaten and must
come on. Then they all shouted " Usiitu ! " and waving their shields charged the soldiers with great fury. The chief was shot through the forehead and dropped down dead, but the Kandampemvu rushed over his body and fell upon the soldiers, stabbing them with their assegais and driving them right in among the tents.

My regiment and the Umpunga formed the centre of the impi. When the soldiers in the donga saw that the Kandampemvu were getting behind them, they retreated upon the camp, firing at us all the time. As they retreated we followed them. I saw several white men on horseback galloping towards the " neck," which was the only point open ; then the Nokenke and Nodwengu regiments, which had formed the right horn of the im'pi^ joined with the Ngobamakosi on the " neck." After that there was so much smoke that I could not see whether the white men had got through or not. The tumult and the firing was wonderful ; every warrior shouted " Usiitu ! " as he killed anyone, and the sun got very dark,^ like night, with the smoke. The English fought long and hard ; there were so many of our people in front of me that I did not get into the thick of the fight until the end. The warriors called out that all the white men had been killed, and then we began to plunder the camp. The Undi and Udhloko regiments, which had been in reserve, then went on " kwa Jim "^ to take the post there. We found " tywala"^ in the camp, and some of our men got very drunk.
We were so hot and thirsty that we drank everything liquid we found, without waiting to see what it was. Some of them found some black stuff in bottles (probably ink) ; it did not look good, so they did not drink it ; but one or two who drank some.

He is referring to an annular eclipse, which, it is not a little
curious, should have taken place while the frightful conflict was at its height.

Literally, * at Jim's.' Rorke's Drift is so called by the Zulus after
one ' Jim ' Rorke, who formerly lived there.

Native beer. Tlie word is also applied to ardent spirits or any
sort of intoxicating beverage.


paraffin oil, thinking it was " tywala," were poisoned. We took as mucli plunder as we could carry, and went away home to our kraals. We did not reassemble and march back to Ulundi.

At first we had not intended attacking the camp that day, as the moon w^as " wrong " (in an unfavourable quarter — a superstition), but as the whites had discovered our presence the indunas said we had better go on. Only six regiments took part in the fight — the Nodwengu, Nokenke, Umbonambi, Umpunga, Kandampemvu, and Ngobamakosi. The Uve is part of the Ngobamakosi, and not a separate corps ; it is the boys' regiment.'

The above seems a plain unvarnished version of those events of the day which came within the narrator's actual observation ; the following account is that of a Zulu belonging to the Nokenke regiment, which, with the Nodwengu, formed the right horn of the attacking force, and operated at the back of Isandhlwana mountain. The first portion of the narrative, as to how the afiair began, tallies exactly with that of the Umbonambi warrior, albeit the men were unknown to each other, for I picked up this story in a different part of the country. After describing the earlier movements, he went on.

While the Kandampemvu were driving back the horsemen over the hill north of the camp, we worked round behind Isandhlwana under cover of the long grass and dongas, intending to join with the Ngobamakosi on the " neck" and sweep in upon the camp. Then we saw white men beginning to run away along the road " kwa Jim ; " many of these were cut off and killed, down in the stream which flows through the bottom of the valley. More and more came over, some mounted and some on foot. When they saw that the valley was full of our warriors, they turned to the left and ran off along the side of the hill towards Umzinyati (the Buffalo) ;those who had not got horses were soon overtaken. The Nodwengu pursued the mounted men, numbers of whom were killed among the thorns and dongas, but I heard that some escaped. Our regiment went over into the camp. The ground is high and full of dongas and stones, and the soldiers did not see us till we were right upon them. They fought well a lot of them got up on the steep slope under the cliff behind the camp, and the Zulus could not get at them at all ; they were shot or bayoneted as fast as they came up. At last the soldiers gave a shout and charged down upon us. There was an induna in front of them with a long flashing sword, which he whirled round his head as he ran it must have been made of fire.

Supposed to be Captain Youughusband.

Wheiigh ! (Here the speaker made an expressive gesture of shading the eyes.) They killed themselves by running down, for our people got above them and quite surrounded them ; these, and a group of white men on the " neck," were the last to fall.

The sun turned black in the middle of the battle ; we could still see it over us, or should have thought we had been fighting till evening.
Then we got into the camp, and there was a great deal of smoke and firing. Afterwards the sun came out bright again ' Were there any prisoners taken ? ' I asked. — ' No ; all were killed on the field, and at once ; no white men w^ere tortured : it is the Zulu custom to kill everyone on the spot ; prisoners are never taken.'

There seems no reason for doubting this statement, which may be taken as scattering to the winds the numerous absurd and sensational ' yarns ' which got about at the time, and are still credited. Several Zulus whom I questioned on the subject all agreed in saying that it was not the custom to torture prisoners of war, though it was sometimes done in cases of ' umtagati ' (witchcraft). Hence it is comforting to know that our unfortunate countrymen who fell on that fatal day were spared the most horrible side of savage warfare, and met their deaths as soldiers, in the thick of battle, at the hands of a foe in every respect worthy of their steel."

The passage quoted in Umtegolalo's statement may well refer the movement of Pope's coy to the right front ie. the east, the volunteers, and Durnford's mounted natives. The interpreter was trying to interpret what the natives were saying without the benefit of any insider knowledge or the benefit of hindsight.

On Ansteys battlefield map he notes: " Large quantity of spent cartridges found here". That position is where H company retired to and then relinquished leaving Wolff behind. They fought a rear guard action to thier eventual end in the region of the 2/24 tent area.
So having covered the guns with fire, advanced to clean out the donga, retired to the rocky ridge then all the way diagonally across the face of the mountain. They had to have ammunition, there really is no question about it. They were close to the knuckle and would have born the brunt of the attack from the regiments coming through the notch.

Interesting to note that they were in line on the right flank of A company, yet on the retreat H company skirted across the battlefield, almost behind G company whilst A company moved virtually straight back to the mountain for there last stand.

For those members that cant picture this movement, log onto Google Earth and see that battlefield, the cairns are clearly visible.

Also marked on Ansteys map are the wagons on the saddle, the battalion reserves. Just in front is marked the position of the Pioneers.
That leads to the question, would the ammunition being opened come from the companies wagons behind the tents, or would it be from the battalion reserves on the saddle?
Logic tells me each regiment QM would have been with their particular reserves.

So a fall back by A, E, F and C would have lead them directly to those reserves. We do know that A company fell in that area, Conjecturally C companys shortest route to the faimed Younghusbands last stand would be straight passed the 1/24th wagons.

C and E would have had a similar path and must have been replenished to retreat the distance they did. ( Pistols, very few, and bayonets could not have carried them that far)

Durnford/Pullen and the NMP,s stand was behind the 2/24th tents amongst their wagons, again spitting distance to Ammunition. Eventually they did run out of ammunition, but definitly not at the early stages. Incidently with this stand were a number of 24th men, again conjecture but they would have had to come from some place, the camp super numeries were engaged in supplying ammo to the front so who were they? If C company finished on the side of the mountain, it wasnt them. E and F fought below C and over the neck, has to be either portion of H or G.

Just a few thoughts for debate

Regards

springbok
Really good posting, thank you! (Not meant to be condescending but it was good; it makes a change!).
I can answer one point for you and that is that ammunition would first have come from the coy waggons. The regimental reserve was exactly that - a reserve. Indeed, Chelsmford's was being kept ready, as ordered, to go out at a moment's notice if needed.

A further thought or repudiation of any theories of there being no/little ammunition. There is Zulu testimony, quoted earlier in this string, that the fighting on the Manzimyama was finished BEFORE the fighting in the camp. So Anstey would not have been last man standing, on the contrary it would have to have been one of Durnford, Younghusband or even Pullein.
Durnfords watch stops at 3:40, no proof, it could have just run down, but surely a fair intimation given the circumstance. Other Zulu testimoney seems to place Younghusband as the last. That probably works for me, he would have had ample oportunity to replenish from his waggons en passant and then eked out whilst on the shoulder of the mountain, finally leading to his eventual charge to glory.
Therefore It would, in theory, be after 3.40.
Pulleine I mention because Im a strong believer that he joined up with E or F company and fought with them over the saddle to the stone kraal ( Ansteys map shows 2 of them). To try and prove my theory, there are remains of an old kraal on the backslope, adjacent to a series of cairns in an L shape. I would theorise that these cairns would be the last remains of E or F company. They are very close to the old track and so its possible that when his body was seen ( Charles Tatum and Hamilton Brown) it could only have been in a travelled area as Brown states he passed the body on the way back from his tent area to join the column.

All of those stands took a lot of ammunition.

Some more ramblings

regards

Bonsoir mon cher Barry

Cette affaire du marchand d'alcool est dans le bouquin sur la police...n'est ce pas...


Cheers

Pascal