Durnford was he capable.2

Martin.

Quote :

The statements were made AFTER the loss at iSandlwana, and Clery covered his own backside

.

That could be said of all the statements that were made after the war. Difference being in this case Pulliene could have denied he was told to send the original order. He claimes to have lost his note book.

Quote :

If Chelmsford had changed his mind about what he wanted Durnford to do, ie; (the orders of the 19th to support him in his attack on the zulus), then he should have made this absolutely clear in the orders sent on the 22nd, and should personally have seen to it that the correct wording in the orders were sent to Durnford, but he didn't. So as far as Durnford is concerned, when he receives the orders on the 22nd, he is moving forward to the camp (where he would no doubt be expecting further orders), then he would be moving on to support Chelmsford against the zulus.

Martin, not meaning tI sound rude, but your not understanding what's being said.

Chelmsford told Clery to send the order with the word "Strengthen" The only change Chelmsford made was asking Crealock to send the message. But Crealock didn't send an order with the word "Strengthen" in it.

If he had sent the original order, Durnford would have known he was to go to the camp, to "Strengthen" it
But he didn't know he was to "Strengthen" the camp because Crealock missed out the word "Strengthen"

CREALOCK'S ORDER TO DURNFORD WAS THE CAUSE OF DURNFORD, NOT KNOWING WHY HE WAS BEING SENT TO ISANDLWANA.

CTSG#1
1 Can you tell me what was the point Chard was trying to make from the Colenso quotation?
2 Manoeuvring on the 22nd does make sense. They can't manoeuvre at night but they were doing it to be ready for a dawn attack with surprise and British sleepiness in their favour.
3 Zulu reconnaissances often involved large numbers.

Tasker#1
A feint on this sort of scale implies tremendous risk. Matshana's group were not on the track ahead, they were in the hills, off piste for the British. There was no guarantee the British would mount a reconnaissance in that direction, no guarantee they would be discovered nor when, no guarantee the British would respond the way they did, and no guarantee the British would not have detected the main impi. It is not a foolproof plan.
As for the denial of TMFH, I'm writing it.

Oldhistorian#2
Undoubtedly...but for an attack timed for when?

Pascal
I will reply to your questions privately.

Tasker#2
You wrote that everything else defies logic, accounts would be written and preserved - or discarded- by the eventual victors. This is not the case. All the accounts mentioning the time of the attack are Zulu ones. Many of them appear in the James Stuart Archive which contains dozens and dozens of accounts. The British govt had no control over what was written, what was recorded, and Stuart seems to have rejected nothing - he kept everything. This conspiratorial picture you paint so vividly does not concur with what's 'on the ground'.

Ulundi
The defence described by Chelmsford you refer to was superseded by his Instructions to Column commanders of 28.12.78.

Littlehand
Re TMFH I happen to agree with L&Q totally on the subject of X. I even assisted them in their deliberations. I also agree that it is a valuable and thought-provoking work. I have a footnote to amend (and I think correct) what they say about authorship and I totally disagree with their feint theory. The total absence of evidence destroys their argument and, for me, contrasts heavily with the excellent, well-sourced, and painstaking work on X. All this they know. Professional disagreement is perfectly acceptable. Unprofessionalism involves something like accusing someone without evidence of fabricating a document, and then, once their remark is exposed as an obvious lie and a deliberate attempt to slur, refusing to apologize whilst hiding behind a pseudonym.
I said there were no primary sources to support the feint theory - but you blame me for not finding them - is that not putting the cart before the horse - should you not be blaming L&Q for not providing them!

Impi
As I said above, I do not disagree with X. The authorship is excellent work and takes things further. But the feint theory spoils it.

90th
Don't forget that Crealock overheard the original order as given by Chelmsford to Clery. He was in the next tent and interrupted their conversation.

Martin
You were right - 5 days it took. I hope none of you get the bug - it's really draining.

All
I came across the blue-plaque house that Cetshwayo lived in in 1882 near Holland Park recently. Never seen it before. Good to see it's commemorated.

I thought it might be helpful to post my response to the argument on the other forum, for the record, before I am misquoted, as it's extremely pertinent to thie present discussion. It would also save a lot of repetition. The points are self-evident:

"I have kept off this topic till now largely because I felt I had lent my support to The Missing Five Hours in terms of agreeing that Raw discovered the impi at ‘X’. In the course of the article and the subsequent postings some other questions have arisen which I feel need addressing – there are a lot of them – so I’ll take them as they occur.

Way back, when David Jackson and I found the Durnford Papers we were worried by that ‘X’ on the map and what it actually signified and I feel Ron and Peter have done a good job in establishing its significance and its origin. Mike S has a point though. The impi or a portion of it may well have been discovered at ‘X’ but that doesn’t mean that all of it was not out of the Ngwebeni. Several Zulus stated that the amabutho became mixed up in the process of the general advance and were not where they should have been; the disorderly nature of the attack precludes the notion of an orderly prescribed advance. There is no evidence to suggest that the impi was discovered “already configured for a deliberate attack”.

I do not support the notion that the impi were attacking on the 22nd (though I do feel that they were discovered whilst manouevring). Manoeuvring in full view of the enemy for a day or two does not seem to have put the Zulus off at Ulundi – why should it have bothered them at Isandhlwana?

First, there’s the question of exactly where Wood got his information from for the annotations on the maps. My problem is setting various bits of information I’m aware of side by side and making sense of them. The maps at Chatham were received in the same incoming parcel of docs as Brickhill’s article which was annotated and initialled by Henderson (it is also in Henderson’s handwriting). The entry showing receipt into the RE Museum shows both maps and Brickhill article as being annotated by Henderson. The maps’ annotations may well have been proved to be in Wood’s hand BUT beneath those annotations are pencilled and erased annotations in another hand. Henderson’s? I don’t know. And this requires further research. But Wood got his information from someone that was in close proximity to him in the aftermath of Isandhlwana. It could have been Raw; it could have been Henderson; it could have been Mehlokazulu; it could have been a 4th person whose name I won’t reveal just yet as I’m still ‘digging’ (but he is a genuine possibility); it could have been a Wood’s-own mixture of all these sources. As for the RSA maps I have not seen the originals but on the photocopies I have in my possession (c/o Paul Bryant-Quinn) there are faint pencilled and erased annotations on those too – and they have the appearance of a different hand. Whose hand that is needs to be settled and I don’t believe that they were included in Peter’s graphological investigation. That discovery would have a bearing on who precisely was the source for that ‘X’ – Raw would speak from first-hand eye-witness knowledge; Henderson would know second-hand.

As for the decoy theory I can have no truck with it. The Zulus did not have second sight. They could not know that Chelmsford would respond as he did early on the morning of the 22nd. Matshana’s own (and he was on the Mangeni) and others’ evidence indicate that the Mangeni Zulus were not part of a decoy programme. British references to the apparent decoying of Chelmsford are just that – apparent decoying; and they were made by those not in a position to know. Inadvertently, the idea of a decoy takes some of the blame/guilt away from Chelmsford, which I’m sure he was not averse to.
Ron made the point clear in his own post that he does not believe this either. His idea that the Mangeni Zulus then led Chelmsford away requires that they would know what was going on at Isandhlwana at the time and I can’t necessarily go along with that.

Mike S is wrong that it is Ian Knight and John Laband that have to be convinced by Peter’s paper. These two do not have a monopoly on the truth, nor on what is valid research; they are not gatekeepers of knowledge or guardians of the accepted truth; neither of them would admit same either. When you use the phrase “above us sit serious professional historians”, this is not so either. There is probably no-one on the planet who has a more encyclopaedic knowledge of Isandhlwana than David Jackson – this is something Ian would freely admit – and he’s not a professional historian. No-one has to be convinced for something to become accepted. Historical facts simply have to be proven; historical theories simply have to be demonstrated. As a basis for further research they can then be taken further.

Last point – a general one - the landscape of 2010 is not the same as the landscape of 1879. The impact of time has a tremendous effect on landscape – much more than people realize. Compare OS maps from the Victorian period with contemporary ones – the changes are incredible. I’m speaking here of valley slopes, elevations, escarpments, contour lines, even measurable distances, such that trying to superimpose the 1879 maps on to modern ones doesn’t easily work. Some of the precise measurements and routes given in the postings cannot be taken as given."

I wrote this response in 2010. It is also worth stating that producing a theory without any evidence at all other than apparent logic is just not historically acceptable or viable and it's why L&Q's theory has not been and is still not accepted by academics.

Julian
I'm aware Crealock was in the next tent and did indeed hear and interupt the conversation . Your point being ? .
Cheers 90th.

90th
Sorry, perhaps I misunderstood, but you wrote
"Crealock never issued ' Strengthen the camp ' because he was never told to do so !. So those above , should have told Crealock to say so"
and from this I wanted to remind you that though Crealock was never told to do so, he had Clery being told to do so.

In conclusion " Durnford was he capable "

littlehand wrote:

You say that there is no primary sources to support these issues, but maybe that's because you can't find them.

LH



Why don't L and Q provide them ?

So Durnford was he capable ? And capable of anything already ?

Julian .
I have said the same thing , Crealock never told Durnford he was to Strengthen the camp because he ( Crealock ) wasnt told to do so !. Did he hear Clery being told by C'ford to Strengthen the camp ??? . I think Clery made up '' Strengthen the camp '' after the battle to cover his own backside ! . I'm not home so I cant check any of the books . I had a quick look through Chelmesford's papers in the Laband publication and C'ford himself doesnt mention that Durnford was ordered to Strengthen the camp ! . If he ( C'ford ) did indeed tell Clery and therefore Crealock overhearing the statement I'm certain it would be in Chelmesford's papers / notes etc . Agreed ? .
90th.

Durnford was a incapable , no ?

90th wrote:

Julian .
I have said the same thing , Crealock never told Durnford he was to Strengthen the camp because he ( Crealock ) wasnt told to do so !. Did he hear Clery being told by C'ford to Strengthen the camp ??? . I think Clery made up '' Strengthen the camp '' after the battle to cover his own backside !

Agreed 90th.
I have posted on here previously.
STATEMENTS MADE AFTER THE BATTLE BY CHELMSFORD'S STAFF OR OFFICERS OF THE 24TH CAN NOT BE DEEMED COMPLETELY TRUSTWORTHY.
(Not shouting, sorry for the caps, just for emphasis).

The clue to the whole point of this thread is in its title. Post iSandlwana, Durnford was scapegoated for the loss of the camp/

Was Durnford capable. Yes. Durnford was a more than adequate, honourable officer who looked out for others and executed his duty bravely, without fleeing, to the last.
Was he to blame for the loss. No. Clearly, LC, Clery and Crealock were. To cover their backsides, they colluded in the scapegoating of Durnford back then and it is high time the record was put straight.

Julian, you are succeeding in convincing me with enough plausible arguments, that the Mangeni affair was not a deliberate Zulu feint. Just seems like another piece of jolly bad luck then to befall the 3rd column. Or, as Pascal implies, did Dartnell over state the size of the situation? Or did LC over estimate the importance of the Dartnell reports?

Hi John.

I don't think that you have ever sounded rude in any of your posts my friend, it is, after all, a forum of debate between people who share the same interest in the AZW, but who also have different opinions on what happened. So it is therefor inevitable that at times some debate can get a little heated, however, I cannot recall you ever being rude to anyone on the forum, in fact, you seem to be very fair in your posts, so no my friend, I don't think that you are sounding rude.

90th has hit the nail on the head, Clery says that Chelmsford told him to write 'strengthen the camp', yet Chelmsford himself does not mention this in any of his papers, and like 90th says, Clery made up this 'strengthen the camp' after the loss to cover his own backside. And if Crealock overheard this 'strengthen the camp', then why did he not write that in the order? He only wrote what Chelmsford said to him, but later (to cover his and Chelmsford's backsides), he tried to con people by adding the words 'take command', but it was later proved that he did not write these words in the order.

Durnford's orders of the 19th were to support Chelmsford in his attack on the zulus, the orders he received on the 22nd did not alter these orders, they just told him to move up to the camp, he would have expected further instructions at the camp if there was any alteration to the plans, but there were no other orders at the camp, so as far as Durnford is concerned, he is to follow his orders of the 19th and support Chelmsford in his attack on the zulus.

Like I say John, if Chelmsford had changed his mind about Durnford supporting him, and wanted Durnford to either strengthen the camp, or indeed take command of the camp, then he should have made certain that the correct wording was written in the orders, but he didn't.

After the loss at iSandlwana, they all realised their mistakes, and covered their own backsides, and tried to cover for each other, and they found the perfect scapegoat in Durnford.

Hi tasker.

The zulus that Dartnell confronted at Mangeni lit lots of camp fires during the darkness, and Dartnell assumed that there were a lot more zulus than there actually were. He informed Chelmsford of this and Chelmsford also assumed that Dartnell had found the main zulu army, split his force, and set off to confront them.

Was this 'fire lighting' a ploy I wonder? even if it wasn't, it certainly worked a treat for the zulus.

littlehand wrote:

Julian I notice some members who at the time of publication, they supported TMFH, but after a few comments from yourself. They now doubt TMFH. It's just ashame they can't provide the reasons why. I also feel this discussion is going no where, as some members now rely on you to " straighten things out" when they can't find and answer to a question, or can't work out a reasoning for themselves.

Well said LH! I wasn't going to mention this myself, but given that you have brought this up, I have to agree with you. I have noticed this too. Members who I had previously respected as free and original thinkers have now started to snap into line and have apparently lost the ability to question and debate, simply parrotting out the old platitudes and chestnuts like, "where are the primary sources?"
That being said, this forum and we members are incredibly lucky to have an historian of Julian Whybra's standing, posting on this forum and long may he continue doing so. I very much appreciate it and thank him publicly for doing so. I have learned far, far more about this topic that we all love by thinking through and questioning traditional, offficial versions of events and theories to which Julian has come back and challenged me, than by simply agreeing with them.

Tasker and all
Can I correct something here? Clery wrote (in April) that Chelmsford told him to "order up" Durnford to "reinforce the camp". The word 'strengthen" does not appear. He also wrote that Crealock overheard this. As you know, Crealock did not use these words in the written order to Durnford. It might seem as though Clery was landing Crealock in it. But Crealock never denied that these were the words he had overheard (despite having plenty of opportunities to) so we have to assume he DID overhear them exactly as Clery stated. For whatever reason, laxness, casuality, he did not incorporate them into the text of the order.
I agree that certain things by Clery and Crealock cannot be accepted at face value. But where they cannot be contradicted and where they were not contradicted at the time, even though they landed one of them (Crealock) in hot water, they must be taken seriously.
I'd also like to clarify remarks someone made about what Dartnell's message contained and the sequence of events that followed. Dartnell stated in his message that he could not mount an attack on the morning of the 22nd without infantry reinforcements. This message was taken to Glyn FIRST by Clery. Glyn's response to Clery was that he should take it to the general, whose IMMEDIATE response was to order out half the column in support of Dartnell.
Little hand and tasker
Re your remarks about questioning and debate, my perspective was on entering the forum that far too many members were shooting wildly from the hip, making outrageous remarks and comments without any justification or evidence whatsoever as if it were a social network. Frankly, I was already fed up to the back teeth of hearing this sort of mouth-and-no-trousers approach in popular histories and in education generally but to hear it in what was supposed to be a serious forum on the AZW disheartened me. So, I decided to limit myself to injecting purely factual comments to support or negate what was being said, a sort of roving footnote, to allow members to steer themselves into decent discussions. Look at the grand way members like Martin have synthesized the Crealock-Clery orders to Durnford and stimulated a really good discussion! I also decided not to give opinions or reveal my own ideas (I still try not to). I decided to continue to do this until genuine debate and creative-thinking began to become the norm and then I would be a proper part of it. You may think this arrogant or cocky. I can't help that. I thought there was a lot of potential among members on the site that many were dismissing.
I see what has happened not as members falling into line but as members being able to debate in a valid way and reaching solutions and opinions through historically-justifiable mechanisms - widening their knowledge-base such that they CAN engage in free thinking! Having the latter without the former is meaningless and has no validity at all.
Personally I think the debates have become better, with more informed comments, and understanding of how historical viewpoints have been reached, and may lead to genuinely novel and interesting ideas. The Brave Fugitive was one such - it led me to a lengthy piece of research. I know others are involved in similar explorations. The AZW is not the preserve of Knight, etc.; everyone can contribute but it has to be reasoned argument not wild speculation. Before you can go anywhere you have to know where you are and why you are and where you've been. You can't just walk blindfold into an assegai or a bayonet!

Hi Julian.

Glad that you are feeling a lot better and back in the land of the living (so to speak). Yes, my friend had the bug for a good 5 days, it did knock the wind out of his sails, his wife says she has never known him to be so quiet. :lol:

As I mentioned to tasker, the zulus that Dartnell confronted near Mangeni lit lots of camp fires, and Dartnell assumed that there were a lot more zulus than he thought, could this not have been a ploy on their part? because if it wasn't, it certainly worked like a dream for them.

The sole responsable of a victory or a defeat on the battlefield is the commander in chief on the battlefield

Durnford was the commander in chief on the battlefield of Issandhlwana so it is responsible for the defeat, it is a fact

Upon his arrival, he knows the presence of mass Zulu by various reports

What's he doing? He abandoned the camp to rescue LC!???

What a lack of imagination and what stupidity !

For the poor Pulleine, it remains tense with the instructions that LC has left for the defense of the camp in case of attack ...

What a lack of imagination and what stupidity !

The third responsible is LC, which takes money glad everything tells him by Dartnell ...

The fourth is Dartnell, who took vaissies for lanterns ...

With these four characters has their head, the poor guys of the column n° 2 & n° 3 were in danger as soon as they entered the Zululand


Cheers

Pascal

As mentioned before, When the request for assistance came through, Chelmsford said " No " it was Glyn who made representation to Chelmsford, so whatever was dscuss certainly changed Chelmsford's mind.

Good, because this by one more on the list of imbeciles, namely Glyn ...

Quote :

Like I say John, if Chelmsford had changed his mind about Durnford supporting him, and wanted Durnford to either strengthen the camp, or indeed take command of the camp, then he should have made certain that the correct wording was written in the orders, but he didn't.

Its annoying that we move the discussion forward, but it alway come back to the order issued on the 19th. The situation at the time, changed on the 22nd. The order to support, reinforce, Strenthen, or whatever what's the key issue if Durnford had received it, the fact he was ordered to the camp was neither here or there. The activty up until his arrival was clear, that all was not right.

Julian I was just saying that his ideas of defence, may have worked.

LH. Been going some of your posts in connection with this thread. Am I correct in saying you don't !! think Durnford was responsible for the lost of the camp.

Quote by Ulundi regarding Durnford's arrival at the camp.

"The activity up until his arrival was clear, that all was not right"

Correct, and Pulleine had hours to do something about it, but didn't.

You may find it annoying about Durnford's orders of the 19th which ordered him to support Chelmsford, however, as far as Durnford was concerned the orders of the 22nd did not alter that fact, so the orders of the 19th were the orders that he had to obey because there were no further instructions to the contrary waiting for him at the camp.

Question: we're the oxen inspanned dring the Battle.

Martin. He was also told he would receive fresh order when he was issued the orders on the 19th. He did receive fresh orders on the 22nd.

And I think we all agree after reading TMFH Pulliene could have done more.. Based on the active around the camp.

Old Historian2

I don't think they were, just tied to thier yokes.? Could be wrong.

Ulundi wrote:

As mentioned before, When the request for assistance came through, Chelmsford said " No " it was Glyn who made representation to Chelmsford, so whatever was dscuss certainly changed Chelmsford's mind.

No.
Read Julian's post of 13.51 today, containing,
"I'd also like to clarify remarks someone made about what Dartnell's message contained and the sequence of events that followed. Dartnell stated in his message that he could not mount an attack on the morning of the 22nd without infantry reinforcements. This message was taken to Glyn FIRST by Clery. Glyn's response to Clery was that he should take it to the general, whose IMMEDIATE response was to order out half the column in support of Dartnell."

Ulundi.

Yes, the orders of the 19th said that Chelmsford wanted Durnford to operate against the Mayanas and he would send fresh instructions on the subject. The orders he received on the 22nd did not have any fresh instructions about this, they just informed him to move up to the camp with his No2 column, he would therefor be under the impression that he still had to operate against the Matyanas, and that if there was any change to this, he would have further orders waiting for him at the camp, but there were none.

TMFH is a great read, Ron and Peter did a very good job with that, but like anything else in this conumdrum that is iSandlwana, people have their own opinions of it, as there could be some flaws in it that have been overlooked, but it is very convincing and well worth reading.

Agree with Martin. TMFH is largely military theory, circumstantial evidence and logic
It does have weaknesses (if this bothers you) in terms of the fact that not every claim and proposal is backed up by "primary source" evidence that so many people on here have become obsessed with, but the logic that L and Q apply to what IS known certainly makes a lot of sense and chimes with me .

In this case, Durnford had only to go back after LC, immediately after his interview with Pulleine and with all the troops he had taken him in the camp and not just 2 NNH troops, the battery of rocket and her NNC company support ..

Quote :

No.
Read Julian's post of 13.51 today, containing,
"I'd also like to clarify remarks someone made about what Dartnell's message contained and the sequence of events that followed. Dartnell stated in his message that he could not mount an attack on the morning of the 22nd without infantry reinforcements. This message was taken to Glyn FIRST by Clery. Glyn's response to Clery was that he should take it to the general, whose IMMEDIATE response was to order out half the column in support of Dartnell."

Correct, but then another message was received, when it appears the Zulu force was larger than first anticipated so the request for 3 companies of the 24th came in, Chelmsford said no. But then Glyn spoke to him and he had a change if heart.....

Thanks Ulundi.

That's what I thought, came across this..

"20th May 1879
After a delay of several days in camp in tall grass near Durban, during which men and horses were tormented by ticks, Marter marched his wing independently to Pietermaritzberg, where the two wings were joined. After marching on to Dundee, General Marshall, commanding the Cavalry Brigade, decided on making a reconnaissance over the Isandhlwana battlefield, and breaking the spell that seemed to hang over it. This was well planned and carried out, a forced march was made, the King’s Dragoon Guards and the 17th Lancers arriving at Rorke’s Drift after dark and bivouacking. Before daylight next morning they forded Buffalo River and made their way along a track between hills covered with scrub jungle, in which it was very difficult to keep a look out. As daylight broke the wagons of the ill-fated force could be clearly seen in the distance against the sky. They were ranged across the Isandhlwana neck, having a weird appearance, for it was well known that some 1200 Englishmen lay dead about them. On arrival there was the camp, the oxen inspanned in the wagons, the horse at their picket posts, the officers mess and their baggage, the Quartermasters Stores and supplies, and officers and men lying about in their uniforms-dead-but singularly lifelike, as from the state of the climate the bodies had only dried. Many were recognisable, they had not been mutilated. Birds and beasts seem not to have molested them, and the Zulus had removed nothing but arms and ammunition, and part of the canvas of the tents. With such light tools as they had the Cavalry Brigade buried some of the bodies, Colonel Durnford among them, and having brought every spare horse and tackle, dragged about 40 wagons back to Rorke’s Drift It was now decided that the King’s Dragoon Guards should remain on the frontier, whilst the 17th Lancers accompany the column advancing into Zululand. In vain did General Marshall remonstrate, but he was not on good terms with Lord Chelmsford and his argument were disregarded. In vain did Marter endeavour to persuade his colonel to make a stand against the heart of the regiment being thus broken. At length almost beside himself he went to Lord Chelmsford’s tent, and not withstanding repeated rebuffs, did not leave until he had brought him reluctantly to agree the he with one Squadron should accompany the column. 
Source: Lt Colonel RJC Marter."

I think it was Brickhill who say they weren't in spanned but tied at the yolks. I think...

Quote :

Yes, the orders of the 19th said that Chelmsford wanted Durnford to operate against the Mayanas and he would send fresh instructions on the subject. The orders he received on the 22nd did not have any fresh instructions about this, they just informed him to move up to the camp with his No2 column, he would therefor be under the impression that he still had to operate against the Matyanas, and that if there was any change to this, he would have further orders waiting for him at the camp, but there were none.

"The orders he received on the 22nd did not have any fresh instructions about this, they just informed him to move up to the camp with his No2 column"

That's because he was no longer required to operate against the Mayanas, He wanted him to move to the camp. Possibly because half the force had left. Don't forget what was in the camp,supplies ect. And we know that Pulliene had received a message to pack up the camp. Durnford would have move towards Chelmsford with the rest.

Quote :

TMFH is a great read, Ron and Peter did a very good job with that, but like anything else in this conumdrum that is iSandlwana, people have their own opinions of it, as there could be some flaws in it that have been overlooked, but it is very convincing and well worth reading.

It's Ok to say people have their own opinions, but they should say why and show why they don't agree if that is the case. All I'm saying is look at the evidence that supports TMFH. Then show Evidence to show its in-correct...

[quote="impi"]

Quote :

Correct, but then another message was received, when it appears the Zulu force was larger than first anticipated so the request for 3 companies of the 24th came in, Chelmsford said no. But then Glyn spoke to him and he had a change if heart.....

Didn't the message asked for 2 companies not 3, and wasn't it was just shown to Gyln, who told Clery to take
it to Chelsmford ?



Cheers

impi wrote:

Quote :

No.
Read Julian's post of 13.51 today, containing,
"I'd also like to clarify remarks someone made about what Dartnell's message contained and the sequence of events that followed. Dartnell stated in his message that he could not mount an attack on the morning of the 22nd without infantry reinforcements. This message was taken to Glyn FIRST by Clery. Glyn's response to Clery was that he should take it to the general, whose IMMEDIATE response was to order out half the column in support of Dartnell."

Correct, but then another message was received, when it appears the Zulu force was larger than first anticipated so the request for 3 companies of the 24th came in, Chelmsford said no. But then Glyn spoke to him and he had a change if heart.....

Thanks impi, I will look into this second message. But the significant decision, the first one, to split the force had already been made by Chelmsford.

Ulundi.

You say that Durnford was no longer required to operate against the Matyanas, where is your evidence for this?

Hi All .
In regard to the oxen fairly certain they were grazing in the morning and when there were sightings of zulus they were brought in and yoked to the wagons , fairly certain they werent in-spanned .
90th.

Using this again. Confirms what Marter witness regarding the oxen.


"I called the indunas and started off at a good pace. We were all mounted. When we got to the range of hills looking on to Isandhlwana, we could see the English outposts [mounted men] quite close to us, and could also see the position of their camp. The outposts evidently saw us, for they commenced to move about, and there seemed to be a bustle in the camp, as some were inspanning the wagons, and others were getting in the oxen. We immediately went back, and I reported to our commander Tsingwayo, who said, ‘All right, we will see what they are going to do. I went away and had something to eat, as I had no food that morning. Presently I heard Tsingwayo give orders for the Tulwana and Ngyaza regiments to assemble. When they had done so he gave orders for the others to assemble and advance in the direction of the English camp. We were fired on first by the mounted men, who checked our advance for some little time.” 

There is not also a story saying that Zulus sometimes used the british oxens as a living shield to invade the camp ?

Yes!!

Good !

Is it possible that the Zulu's that were keeping Dartnell occupied, had know idea that half of the camp from Isandlwana would arrive to reinforce him. But when they did, used there tatics to drawn them even further from the camp. The Zulu's at Isandlwana could attack without the fear of LC returning.

Ray63 wrote:

Is it possible that the Zulu's that were keeping Dartnell occupied, had know idea that half of the camp from Isandlwana would arrive to reinforce him. But when they did, used there tatics to drawn them even further from the camp. The Zulu's at Isandlwana could attack without the fear of LC returning.

I would not discount that possibility Ray. The Zulus were excellent at seeing opportunities when they presented themselves.

Thanks Tasker. Not that clued up on this subject, so try to fit in where I can...

Julian wrote.

Quote :

I am not convinced that the Zulus up at Mangeni which Dartnell reported and LC chased after was not a feint to wrongfoot the 3rd column. It worked a treat, with LC splitting his force as he did, in a hurry

.

Perhaps the feint only came about once LC and reached Dartnell.

Now its my head, might as well say what I think. I suppose it the only way, join in and learn.

We're the Zulus that were annoying Dartnell hoping to push him back to Isandlwana. That would make sense why they wanted to attack on the 23rd have the lot in the camp at the same time.

However they didn't not anticipate that Dartnell would make camp for the night. They also didn't anticipate that Dartnell would send messengers back to the camp.

When the Zulu's at Isandlwana saw LC leaving the camp, is it possible they were followed, messengers relaying messages to the Zulus at Dartnell's location, and the Zulu's at Isandlwana. The Zulus at Dartnell's location were instructed to draw them further from the camp, giving the Zulus the go ahead for the attack at Isandwana.

Ray. Very good post mate. Your right say wants on your mind. If your wrong, someone will post the correct answer. Your ready to come off the sideline with post like that.

LH. Thanks for the moral boost, its not easy to join in. It does take some bottle.

Ray

I don't think a message could have been passed between the Dartnell Zulu and the Army at Isandlwana very quickly.