The ammunition question

Its something that's been kicked around before, so I cant claim originality, just added to the theory is all.
The Durnford question really revolves around the time and space. When Durnford came back down the Quabe Valley a big piece of the left horn was chasing him, the reserve was behind on top of the hill to the west ( along the plateau ). So Everything happened after Durnford had passed with the exception that the beggings of the left horn/left chest was coming down the notch and running over the rocket Battery.
They, the left had a ways to travel and also got delayed by Durnford, possibly this would account for the statement ( cant recall by whom at this stage) that the chest was sitting down and waiting, I will look that quote up tomorrow unless anyone finds it first.

Congrats on USA getting to the last 16.

Cheers

Just out of interest. How long didi it take Durnford to retreat back to the camp. He was roughly 6km out and taking into consideration the terrain posted by Springbok along with the firing at the advancing Zulus.

Hi OH
Curling says that around 12 he heard firing from Colonel Durnford. I need to do some research but I think he got back to the donga around 1 so the retreat would be an hour plus the length of time it took him to turn arounf after spotting the left horn, riding back a few hundred yards and getting into position for the first delaying volley. Call it around 70 to 80 minutes. He was slowed down on the return by the progressive volleys to delay the impi and also rescuing the RB survivors.
Interesting thing about that timing is that Essex also reports that he heard firing from the ridge at 12 oclock. So the two Horns were around an hour apart in arrival.
The plot thickens   

Looking at the Little Bighorn video posted by Admin on another thread, its a pity the men were not buried where they fell. We could have a better picture of what took place.

springbok9 wrote:

So the two Horns were around an hour apart in arrival.

Oh they did, did they? Surprise, surprise, not all the timelines agree...   

Springbok

Sorry to have had to wait a few days - a mad time working away from home I'm afraid.  Still, at odd moments it gave me the opportunity to reflect on what's been written.  There are two aspects to what you wrote.

The first is that the Loins came round to the western side of the mountain on the outside of the Zulu left horn as opposed to the outside of the right horn.  I have nothing against this in principle as a concept.  It may be just as valid as the opposing view.  I wrote earlier that the whole argument relating to Zulu regiments' positioning (even presence) is fraught.  I am as aware as anyone of the Henderson/Wood maps showing the reserve's route, more so, because it was David Jackson and I who found them.  We didn't highlight it at the time because the content of the Durnford Papers was, we felt, more important.  Eclipsing that was the famous 'X' marking the spot where the impi was allegedly found.  It seemed to us at the time that Henderson would know which regiments were in front of him; he might not have been so sure of those hidden behind the left horn and therefore that that part of the map might be supposition (especially as it went so much against an accepted [professionally] historical viewpoint going back to Coupland and beyond).  The maps are of course open to interpretation.  The Zulu participants' statements can also often be interpreted, as you say, in two ways.  For example, let's look at Uguku's remark:
"On our left we were supported by the Umbonambi, half the Undi, Ngobamakosi, and Uve."
Might not "half the Undi" be referring to the iNdluyengwe (part of that corps) despite the fact that at least some of them rejoined the corps and joined in with the RD attack?
Uguku also says:
"Behind us were the other half of the Undi and uDloko, who never came into action at Sandhlwana but formed the reserve (which passed on and attacked RD)."
Does "behind us" mean that they were behind them in the attack and that they followed them into the camp or does it mean that they were behind them in the bivouac or in the advance but that was all?
What we have in the accounts and in the map is ambiguity not clarification.  That said, I do not dispute that it is perfectly possible that the reserve did, as you say, sweep round to the east of Isandhlwana.  If so, then it gives rise to many new questions.  Why do so many of the European survivors say that they were constantly pushed to the left in their flight on the Fugitives' Trail?  If the Zulu reserve was approaching them from over Stony Koppie they would have been pushed to the right and might even have made their way circuitously back to the RD road.  
The whole question is an interesting one and deserves a thorough exploration (in more space and with more clarity than can be done within the restrictions of the forum).  In fact, as 'Cetewayo' mentioned, I am updating my original article on the Zulu army at Isandhlwana for inclusion in volume 3 of Studies in the Zulu War and so was intrigued when this very question came up on the forum as I've been going over it in my mind, so I joined in.  I honestly believe that this is not something one has to come down on one side or the other of.  It is an open question still with no certain answer.  I would want to do, and indeed am doing, much further in-depth examination of ALL the sources relating to it.

The second aspect of what you have proposed is that the left horn was over-inflated in size by including within it the uNdi and uDhloko (if they indeed did proceed in that direction).  This I believe will not hold water.  Following behind and in the same direction as the left horn does not mean that the reserve was PART of the left horn.  It WAS the loins and had a specific task to perform.  Sources, British and Zulu, are unanimous in stating that those two regiments had taken no part in Isandhlwana and was one of the reasons they moved on to RD to wash their spears.  
The one exception to this (apart from the aforementioned iNdluyengwe) might be the 2-300 men of the uThulwane I mentioned previously.  They may or may not have existed.  It is Donald Morris in TWOTS (1965), page 363, who mentions that a small number of them under Qetuka joined in the attack of the left horn, without having been so ordered.  I wrote to Morris back in the late 60s to ask him for his source and was told that he thought Qetuka's statement was in KCAL.  A request to KCAL brought forth a negative response - not surprising because at that time much of its contents were unindexed and in disarray.  Asking Morris for a copy of the statement got the response that all his research was packed away in his attic and he was not going to revisit them.  I tried the KCAL again in the 90s after the end of apartheid (a transition time in which chaos reigned for a while and things could go missing) only to be told that it held no such account.  Morris got his information from somewhere (though we know that he was not above creative elaboration when it suited him) so there might just be a Qetuka account floating about (perhaps it wasn't in KCAL but somewhere else).  No-one else mentions(-ed) this small group of uThulwane - why would Morris have bothered to do so if it were not genuine?  I can't answer this but I can't ignore it either.  (P.S.  Ransford's fictitious Zabange account which also mentions Qetuka's men was published in 1970 and was obviously lifted from Morris, so it can safely be ignored).  So, apart from this little question mark over Qetuka's small group of uThulwane there would have to be definite evidence that the whole uNdi/uDhloko participated in the actual left horn attack for your proposition to hold water and I don't think you've shown it (yet).

I am interested still.  I am still exploring these matters myself.  Sometimes in history it's all right to say I don't know or it's not yet possible to know the right answer and it's all right to say this is the evidence for A and this is the evidence for B - one or the other is true.  I have a strong feeling that this point about the loins will fit into this category.

If it took so long for the horns to meet, why was it not apparent to all, that the camp was being surrounded. I can't beleive out of all the officers there, they couldn't see it. They knew the traditional formation of the Zulus. Yet they stood oblivious to what was happening before their very eyes. I take it the Zulus seen disappering behind Isandlwana by Chard, Time approximately 0930 hrs by estimation. on his way back to RD we're the ones that killed Stepstone and co.

Gents the document TMFH. Are we saying the maps are incorrect.

CTSG
In my opinion the original maps are correct, possibly/probably some of the deductions from the maps are subject to debate. I do believe portions of the TMFHT are correct, the positions of the impis etc, other portions are not so believable.
In terms of where the various regiments/amabuthu were that's really what Julian and I are chatting about at present and as you see from the various comments its pretty much open to speculation.

John
If your talking about the possibility of the reserve killing Shepstone I would say an emphatic no. IF I am right and the reserve was out on the plain they would not have gone near that area of the mountain. If tradition is right then again the reserve would have exited the ridge much further to the west so again no.

Julian

Thank you for the response, lots to consider there, I will get back to you later in the day.

Cheers

Julian
Ive spent some time going through the National Data Base and found this reference to Qetuka.

Document 4 of 8
DEPOT NAB
SOURCE SNA
TYPE LEER
VOLUME_NO I/1/313
SYSTEM 01
REFERENCE 1781/1904
PART 1
DESCRIPTION CIVIL COMMISSIONER ESHOWE CHIEFS DEATH OF CHIEF QETUKA.
STARTING 1904
ENDING 1904
REMARKS ZK894/1904, PB1083/1904, GH434/1904.


DEPOT KAB
SOURCE MOOC
TYPE LEER
VOLUME_NO 6/9/642
SYSTEM 01
REFERENCE 1259
PART 1
DESCRIPTION NOBANDA, JOHN QETUKA. DEATH NOTICE.
STARTING 19100000
ENDING 19100000

Document 6 of 8
DEPOT NAB
SOURCE 1/MEL
TYPE LEER
VOLUME_NO III/2/6
SYSTEM 01
REFERENCE PB453/1895
PART 1
DESCRIPTION ARTHUR SHEPSTONE, ENTONJANENI: RE- INTERVIEW BETWEEN CHIEF QETUKA
AND RESIDENT COMMISSIONER.
STARTING 18950000
ENDING 18950000

Let me see what I can do.

Cheers

Hi Julian
I fully agree every statement and the maps are wide open to interpretation with lots of grey areas so yes there are three options, yes, no and maybe.
If it was all so simple we would have given up talking about it years ago.
A case in point is your comment on why weren't the fugitives pushed towards the road by the reserve, if in fact they moved up to the South of Mahlabamkosi, I would suggest that Looking at Harry Davies account, when he was pushed back onto the saddle by the left horn and chest he witnessed the right horns movements and at the same time noted the 'reserve' still 2 miles away. That suggests to me that the two horns in fact did what they were supposed to do, almost, and were followed up much later by the reserve.

There are a few bits of information Im trying to get out of NAM at present and unfortunately Im not able to leave Cape Town for a while, there is the one reference to an interview with Arthur Shepstone I shall see if its possible for a local contact to try and obtain it for me.

Cheers

CTSG
Whoever drew the maps believed they were correct (otherwise he wouldn't have drawn them). Whether they ARE (fully or partially) correct is another matter.

Springbok
Very well done with Qetuka. It'll be interesting to see what results.

For getting the capabilities of the MH rifle it's self! What about the capabilities of the men firing them.
Sergeant Major Davies reported to the conference on Martini-Henry rifles in 1873 that he ‘finds considerable recoil’ and that although he ‘has not seen men cut about the face, hands have been injured." The increased kick can certainly lead to inaccurate shooting, particularly amongst new recruits or nervous men and this was brought up by Lieutenant Sharp. ‘The recruits and bad shots complain but the men get used to it. Nervous men also complain.’The recoil is not shoulder breaking and the soldiers would have got used to it quickly. The recoil was perhaps a factor behind John Dunn’s remarks about the shooting of the British infantrymen at Gingindlovu explaining that ‘they were firing wildly in any direction.’ He goes further;

"I was much disappointed at the shooting of the soldiers. Their sole object seemed to be to get rid of ammunition or firing so many rounds a minute at anything, it didn’t matter what."

Somewhat confused.

We have accounts form SD, stating he was handing out ammuntion from wagons and then claiming to be taking ammuntion to the firing lines. Yet reading through his other accounts, he then states.

Smith Dorrient wrote:

"Smith Dorrient. 
After the War the Zulus, who were delightfully naive and truthful people, told us that the fire was too hot for them and they were on the verge of retreat, when suddenly the fire slackened and on they came again. The reader will ask why the fire slackened, and the answer is, alas! because, with thousands of rounds in the wagons 400 yards in rear, there was none in the firing line ; all those had been used up"

"There was none in the firing lines, all those had been used up" I find this is some what a contradictory remark and more so how would he know?
Plus it verifies that ammuntion wasn't getting to the firing lines.

Ulundi wrote:

I find this is some what a contradictory remark and more so how would he know?
Plus it verifies that ammuntion wasn't getting to the firing lines.

AFAIK -- but happy to be corrected -- there are only 2 sources of comment by SD. One is a letter he wrote home directly after the battle from Helpmakaar and the other is his memoirs/autobiography written decades later. The letter home is very sketchy about the battle prior to his escape to safety, whereupon it becomes more vivid.

I believe what you are quoting is in the latter. I agree that SD's accounts are confusing. [Springbok has said the account of his progress to Fugitive's drift does not fit along with the others.] During the battle it's hard to pinpoint his movements. Horace claims to have both dispensed ammunition at a wagon AND brought it it to firing line...or was it just TOWARDS the firing line? Or did the firing line retreat back to where he was located? And was that location the ammunition wagon for the 2/24th (Bloomfield) or the 1/24th (Pullen)? Both possibly?

According to Lock & Quantrill his boss contradicts his timeline: "Yet, according to Essex, by this time Bloomfield had been shot dead. After twenty-eight years perhaps Smith-Dorrien had got Bloomfield mixed up with Quartermaster James Pullen of the 1/24th?...If that were the case, though, Smith-Dorrien would not have seen the end of the 'firing line,' having already made his escape." (p.326 of ZULU VICTORY)

And then we have the whole ammunition box controversy which pretty much begins and ends with his claim that they were maddeningly difficult to open. There is very little independent corroboration for that claim.

28 years is a long time when it comes to remembering...especially if you are living with survivor's guilt I would think.

Ulundi his name is Smith - Dorrien , not Smith - Dorrient    . I dont have Smith - Dorrien's Memoirs , but it seems his letter , which 6pdr mentioned , written just after the Battle does vary with his account of 40 odd years later , Ian Knight for one , has mentioned this in his books , also Ian has mentioned in his publications that S-D is not the only one to have a differing account when asked many years later .
90th

What I posted from SD was not written to his father. If you read it correctly, it was aimed at the readers of his memoirs. Us!!

Ulundi YOU were the one who said you were confused !!    , I was merely attempting to say that S-D's recollection of events had changed from what he originally wrote , compared to his memoirs 40 or 50 years later ! . And that his name was Smith Dorrien not Smith Dorrient as you wrote ! .   

90th is quite correct in what he wrote. It only serve to show the extent to which modern-day researchers have to be careful when treating primary sources written decades after the event.

" When i left the camp Colonel Durnford was still alive, as well
as a small remnant of the regulars, but they were so
hemmed in, that escape was impossible, and their ammunition
seemed expended, for Artillerymen were trying to break open
the cases on the wagons to supply them, but it was too late".

It's possible that SD was witnessing these certain events as he made is way around various locations of the battlefield. Seeing the remnants of the last stands, at which point there isn't really an ammuntion question to be asked.

And it's pure speculation that SD had memory problems in later life. Unless some one can show us medical records to suggest otherwise?

Chard1879 wrote:

And it's pure speculation that SD had memory problems in later life. Unless some one can show us medical records to suggest otherwise?

"Among the many officers who established a great name in the period of small warfare before 1899, few had survived to participate in the Great War.   Some were well stricken in years; others had grown too senior in rank; several dropped out of the circle which was to staff the Army of 1914.   Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien was an exception.   With his still youthful physique, his personal qualities, technical knowledge, and experience, all claimed recognition.   He was a man of the Army who had lived with it and for it; he always knew the temper of his men in a manner that was given to few.   Moreover, he was not of those who had sat in Whitehall; apart from the short time he spent in India as Adjutant-General he had never been an "office soldier."   It is true that he had his weaknesses; his direct manner may have lacked grace; he may have been hot tempered; he could think of nothing but his troops except perhaps, of his racing ponies; he was no courtier; he did not aspire to figure as a heaven-sent soldier or administrator. But his soldierly merits were such that his name will surely live in the history of the British Army"

Taken from SD's obituary, posted By LH in another thread!

Here is a portion of a letter from Frere to
Queen Vic, where he states LC's intention
to go out and attack the main Zulu army!.

Photo's courtesy of the 90th..

[You must be registered and logged in to see this image.]

But again i say LC did not take the
Ammunition, now i think that beyond
' fishy ' if he was going to confront
the main Zulu Army, what was he
going to fight with?....

Chard1879 wrote:

And it's pure speculation that SD had memory problems in later life.

Yes, but it's also true that aspects of his two accounts contradicted many others and even himself to little discernible purpose. It is also a fact that eyewitness accounts are notoriously unreliable to begin with. It is also a fact that people in general tend to show significant memory deterioration as they age. So, raising the POSSIBILITY that he mistaken in some details decades later is an entirely reasonable line of inquiry.

xhosa2000 wrote:

But again i say LC did not take the
Ammunition, now i think that beyond
' fishy ' if he was going to confront
the main Zulu Army, what was he
going to fight with?....

Oh, this is even LESS credible than most things Frere said and did. He was clearly willing to say whatever was necessary to save his skin after the disaster. Mostly this is an attempt to pin the tail on a donkey named Durnford. If you don't credit that (and I certainly don't) then why would you take seriously Frere's contention that Chelmsford EXPECTED a 15-20K Zulu army? Either LC didn't expect it or he couldn't do simple maths. What motive had he to get himself and his entire command potentially wiped out?

i offered the above without prejudice!
merely to point out 1. Chelmsford's stated intention to confront
the whole of the Zulu Army at the first opportunity, and 2, the
bottom line ties in with the ammunition thread! again i have to
say to you STOP trying to second guess my intentions, who said
he was trying to get himself and his entire command wiped out!
stop being so literal.....i'm merely adding to the mix in order for
people to think and then question this campaign more closely!!

on the S-D thread re the photograph, stop going on.... this is not a
COMPETITION!!! just post the thing. s..t or get off the pot. last thing
6pdr. Step off me! i'm really not as interested as you seem to be!.

OK, so I have a question. For those (colonials etc...) not seeking Martini Henry ammo (because they were armed with carbines or what have you) would the battalion ammunition wagons have any useful rounds?

And, if they did have bullets useful for rifles other than the MH, would those rounds even be stored in British Army mahogony/teak boxes?

I think this has been asked before, and the answer was no, the British wagons contain MH rounds only. Durfords wagons would have held their own supplies. Happy to be corrected.

But no doubt during the course of the Battle, colonials may have picked up the odd MH rifle that had been lost to a dead soldier.

I posted that old footage for those not familiar with a
close view of an ammunition box! please look carefully
at the box, the Sandhurst geezer tells us that it came
straight off the battlefield! and then proceeded to show
the difficulty of accessing the contents...dramatically
pointing out the ' bayonet ' marks?.

And now consider where these boxes were to be found,
certainly not on the firing line! so then please consider
the range of tools readily available to hand in camp!
the list becomes very long, forgetting the pioneers..
there were. pickaxes, axes, jemmys, crowbars, steel
levering bars?, rifle butts, steel shod ammunition boots.
and of course the ' screwdrivers '.

the ' historian ' makes a big deal about the bayonet thrust
marks ( incidentaly from the wrong side ) and goes on to
show that by removing ONE screw the sliding panel can
be easily accessed! again a big deal is made out of the
QM's role in this battle, stressing the professionalism of
that breed of men, accounting for every round and indeed
every spent cartridge case...

Now note the various timings! all was good as long as the front
line held and Durnford was doing his thing out on the right,
springbok contends that there was no sudden collapse
( despite the the blame shifted immediately to the poor
maligned NNC..) NO! this was an orderly withdrawal back onto
the camp, which must be why so many of the lasts stands held
out as long as they did because they had ammunition......

The Zulu were paused and laid down under the intense fire of
the Martinis, we know after the bravest of rallying calls the Zulu
rose up and came on with even more fanatical determination and
bravery...what was the high command doing at this point, i'm
thinking of Pulleine with Melvill as his eyes and ears..they were
watching the battle unfold, they had noted the way the Zulu
were coming on! ( unlike any thing they had seen all their time in
Africa! ) and at some point sounded the recall! ( once, twice?.
What did they actually see to make that decision? they saw up
to fifteen thousand highly disciplined and motivated troops ( yes
they were troop's!) advancing and it seemed like nothing could stop
them! if they could see that! who else could..and how many were
actual effective's in camp, how many actual fighting men, my own
estimate is a very generous 750 to 800..i cannot believe the QM's
were not acutely aware of the situation at this time as those with
no business with the actual fighting were not so quietly making
good their preparations for flight. i sincerely believe that there was
No Ammunition shortage..but the 24th and colonials were
simply ground down by overwhelming force!.. but the british could
not stomach the fact that an indigenous force had out general'd
and outfought them! so the ' spin began ' ammunition shortage at
Isandhlwana? err no! there was a tactic and ultimately troop
shortage. this is of course just my own opinion! i wont be about
to change it any time soon..

"springbok contends that there was no sudden collapse
( despite the the blame shifted immediately to the poor
maligned NNC..) "
  

Julian Cetshwayo
A couple of pages back we were discussing uniforms and numbers.
Possibly this may assist
[You must be registered and logged in to see this image.]

littlehand wrote:

I think this has been asked before, and the answer was no, the British wagons contain MH rounds only. Durfords wagons would have held their own supplies.

Well the reason I ask is that much is made of the couriers (for lack of a better word) that Durnford dispatched back to secure more ammunition were supposed to have been refused rounds at the battalion wagons, but it wasn't there for them anyway as their men were armed with Sniders or what have you...

In other words, much has been made of the refusal (this is separate from Smith-Dorrien's story now,) to issue ammunition for the men in the donga but without knowledge of where their wagon was located (for it arrived late to the battlefield,) that was pretty much academic anyway?

This Ulundi, but it perfectly illustrates how the Zulu
' Came On ' in battle..

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6pdr wrote:

littlehand wrote:

I think this has been asked before, and the answer was no, the British wagons contain MH rounds only. Durfords wagons would have held their own supplies.

Well the reason I ask is that much is made of the couriers (for lack of a better word) that Durnford dispatched back to secure more information were supposed to have been refused rounds at the battalion wagons, but it wasn't there for them anyway as their men were armed with Sniders or what have you...

In other words, much has been made of the refusal (this is separate from Smith-Dorrien's story now,) to issue ammunition for the men in the donga but without knowledge of where their wagon was located (for it arrived late to the battlefield,) that was pretty much academic anyway?

I'm not sure Durnfords troops were replenished, can't think of his name of hand, but one of the Coloinals rode in, to find the ammuntion boxes had not been opened. But in-hind sight the Coloinals still could have supplied MH ammo to the firing lines albeit for British, quicker being on horseback.

Springbok, came across this!
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springbok9 wrote:

Julian Cetshwayo
A couple of pages back we were discussing uniforms and numbers.
Possibly this may assist
[You must be registered and logged in to see this image.]

Thanks Springbok.

Aren't these lists the ones compiled by Fynney?

Hi Springy
These lists you posted are also in ' The Zulu Army And Zulu Headmen ' . Inside the front cover it states ' Compiled from Information obtained from the most reliable sources ' ; and Published ' By Direction Of The Lieut - Gen Commanding ' -
For the Information Of Those Under His Command ; Which I'm certain was compiled with help from Fynney , it's also as it states , the book handed to the Column commanders before the invasion , from memory these were distributed in Dec 78 ? .
90th

These are the original lists drawn up by I believe Fynney. There were donated to the archives by C Faye who was head of Natal Bantu Affairs Department.
I know they have been incorporated into all sorts of books but on occasion its nice to see the original documents. In terms of research its always better to go back to the source documents rather than relying on authors interpretations.

Cheers

Hi Springy
Yes agreed , it's always best to get your hands on the Originals , they would take on a persona of their own , due to my lack of a better word !   . It seems it's also the Originals which are indeed in the book I mentioned    
Cheers 90th