Durnford was he capable. 3

Mr M. Cooper wrote:

CTSG.

"Martins whole argument is based on this letter!"

Please show me where I have ever stated this?

My argument is based on the interpretation of the instructions and orders that were sent to Col Durnford, and all the web of lies and deceit that Chelmsford and his cronies used to place the blame on Col Durnford, and the 'rigged' enquiry that was arranged by Chelmsford to get him off the hook and lay the blame at the dead Col Durnford's feet.

Gullible people, reporters, writers etc, believed all this garbage, and it has been used against Col Durnford ever since. And it does appear that some of the members on here still believe in all that these gullible people wrote, however, there were, and there still are, many people who can see through this web of deceit.

Martin, you Talk the Talk, but you don't come up with goods. i am too looking forward to your replys to Rays comments.But i doubt that will happen.

Sas1/ Impi. Martin is not obligated to reply to my posts, he has his opinion and I have mine. All I would say it’s that we are looking at Durnford’s situation in a completely different light; he is passionate about Durnford being cleared of causing the disaster at Isandlwana. I just try to understand the facts, and look for holes in those facts.

However, I do have one more question, If we consider what Martin says regarding Durnford leaving the camp to assist Chelmsford, how far would Durnford had needed to travel from the camp to accomplish this.?

Mr M. Cooper wrote:

CTSG.

"Martins whole argument is based on this letter!"

Please show me where I have ever stated this?

My argument is based on the interpretation of the instructions and orders that were sent to Col Durnford, and all the web of lies and deceit that Chelmsford and his cronies used to place the blame on Col Durnford, and the 'rigged' enquiry that was arranged by Chelmsford to get him off the hook and lay the blame at the dead Col Durnford's feet.

Gullible people, reporters, writers etc, believed all this garbage, and it has been used against Col Durnford ever since. And it does appear that some of the members on here still believe in all that these gullible people wrote, however, there were, and there still are, many people who can see through this web of deceit.

Martin. I won't insult your intelligence by suggesting that you really believe what you just said.

Ray
Despite CTSG,s attempts to foist things of onto Edward Durnford. The source of those comments is William Cochrane

' Colonel Pulleine said, "Im sorry you have come, as you are senior to me and will of course take command." Durnford replied"Im not going to interfere with you. Im not going to remain in camp."

In terms of distance to Chelmsford: The mangeni Gorge is around 12 miles from isandlwana. The Chelmsford force though was split up from the Gorge through to the rear of Siphezi, Chelmsford himself was between Silutshane and Magogo. if Durnford had continued on his path he would have had to do an almighty circle to get back towards the Gorge area via Siphezi.

The theory of a link between the various issued orders by the way is not the property of any one on this forum, its been kicked around and refined by virtually every author and historian for a number of years and is pretty much an accepted fact by all and sundry.

Hope that helps.

24th - yes agreed, the order to go to the camp was very simplistic. Durnford obeyed the order and went to the camp with his column. It is the lack of further orders from LC to tell Durnford what to do on arrival at the camp, which was the root cause of Durnford then having the freedom to do as he pleased once there. The rest is history.

Springbok - thanks for that. I knew I'd read it somewhere.

Part of Cochrane's written report (WO32/7726/079/1472) of 8 February 1879:
".....I complied with these instructions, and arrived at the Sandlwana Camp, with Colonel Durnford, about 10 or 10.30 a.m. Having made all the necessary arrangements for his Column Col. Durnford took over the command from Colonel Pulleine 1/24th Regt. When Colonel Durnford reached the camp, he received from Colonel Pulleine all the information he could give, when Colonel Pulleine said, “I’m sorry you have come, as you are senior to me, and will of course take command.” Colonel Durnford replied, “I’m not going to interfere with you. I’m not going to remain in camp,” or words to that effect."

This explains the fact that Durnford assumed de facto control as per protocol on entering the camp, but also makes it clear he had no intention of staying, giving Pulleine the freedom to continue his preparations unhindered.

Whether Durnford was in command or not is not the the root cause of the disaster anyway. If Bromhead had been in control at RD instead of Chard, the outcome would have been no different and the same is true for iSandlwana.

Admin wrote:

Certain members spend more time telling other members to re-read the posts, instead of giving them an answer or posting a link to a previous post that would help answer the question.
In the "Durnford was he capable" discussion there are 1,148 replies. I personally would not have the time to go over that lot, nor would anyone else I suspect. If you can’t reply to a post, that will help move the discussion along please don’t contribute, it’s a waste of your time and others.

"Lieutenant Cochrane’s Narrative (unabridged with original spelling)
On the morning of the 20th Jany. 1879, No. 2 Column, to which I had been appointed Transport Officer, was stationed as follows. Nos. 1 & 3 Battalions of the 1st Regt. Native Contingent and one Mounted troop under Captain Cherry 32nd L.I. at Kranz Kop; No. 2 Battalion of the same Regiment, under Major Bengough 77th Regt., near Sands (sic) Spruit; five Troops mounted men, Russell’s Rocket Battery and two Companies of the 1st Battalion 1st Regiment N.N.C. at Helpmakaar. Colonel Durnford was commanding the latter portion in person, Captain Shepstone and I were with Colonel Durnford.
Early on the 20th Colonel Durnford marched to Rorke’s Drift, crossing the river by means of the Pont, & establishing himself in a camp about half a mile from the river. Here we remained during the 21st; Captn. George Shepstone rode to Sandhlana* Camp & returned same day. Lieut. Smith-Dorrien rode also to the Camp, & returned with a dispatch on the morning of the 22nd Instant. Colonel Durnford was on the road to the Dutch Farms on the Biggarsberg for the purpose of commandeering the Dutchmen’s wagons when the dispatch reached him. I was with Colonel Durnford & he remarked to me “Just what I thought, we are to proceed at once to Sandlwana.* There is an Impi about 8 miles from the Camp, which the Colonel moves out to attack at daybreak.”
Colonel Durnford returned to Rorke’s Drift Camp at once, and marched for Sandlwana at about 7.30 or 8 a.m. My orders were to see all the wagons inspanned, start them all off, and hand them over to Conductor McCarthy & then join Colonel Durnford. I complied with these instructions, and arrived at the Sandlwana Camp, with Colonel Durnford, about 10 or 10.30 a.m. Having made all the necessary arrangements for his Column Col. Durnford took over the command from Colonel Pulleine 1/24th Regt. [When Colonel Durnford reached the camp, he received from Colonel Pulleine all the information he could give, when Colonel Pulleine said, “I’m sorry you have come, as you are senior to me, and will of course take command.” Colonel Durnford replied, “I’m not going to interfere with you. I’m not going to remain in camp,” or words to that effect.](a)
[Colonel Pulleine gave over to Colonel Durnford, a verbal state of the troops in camp at the time, and stated the orders he had received, viz., to defend the camp; these words were repeated two or three times in the conversation.](b)
The news was that a number of Zulus had been seen since an early hour on the top of the adjacent hills, and that an attack had been expected; and in consequence the following disposition of the troops had been made. [The Natives of Lonsdale’s Contingent were on outpost duty on the hills to the left] (d) of the Camp, [the guns were in position on the left of the Camp](d),the Infantry were turned out and formed in Column in the open space in front of the General’s tent. The Waggons &c were inspanned. Constant reports came in from the Scouts on the hills to the left, but never anything from the men on the top of the Sandlwana hill that I heard.(4) Some of the reports were: “The Enemy are in force behind the hills on the left” - “The Enemy are in three Columns” - “The Columns are separating, one moving to the left rear & one towards the General” - “The Enemy are retiring in every direction.” [The bearer of this was not dressed in any uniform](b)
Upon this latter report Colonel Durnford said he would go out and prevent the one column from joining the Impi, which was supposed at that time to be engaged with the troops under the General. Colonel Durnford on hearing that one Column of the Enemy was moving towards the left rear, had reinforced the Baggage Guard (which at that time consisted of one Company, Native Contingent) with one troop of mounted Natives; and I understand that Captain George Shepstone was sent back with this part. (5)
[Lt. Col. Durnford having decided to take out a force to attack the Zulus who were reported to be retiring in every direction said to Lieut. Col. Pulleine (6) “I will take out some of my own men if you will let me have a couple of Companies of Infantry to support them.” Lt. Col. Pulleine replied “I think I can hardly do that. My orders are to defend the Camp and we couldn’t spare the men.” ](c). [Colonel Durnford said, “Very well; perhaps I had better not take them. I will go with my own men.”](d) Lt. Col. Durnford (said) that the Zulus were retiring and urged in favour of taking the men so that after a while Lt. Col. Pulleine said “Oh very well of course if you order them I’ll give you them.” Lt. Col. Durnford said “That’s all right.”
Lt. Col. Pulleine consulted with his Officers and in a few minutes, Lieut. Melville (sic) came up and said “Colonel I really don’t think Col. Pulleine would be doing right to send any men out of Camp when his orders are to ‘defend the Camp.’ ” Lt. Col. Durnford replied - “Very well it doesn’t much matter we won’t take them.” His manner was persuasive not peremptory. There were no high words passed. Moreover the manner of the officers to one another was perfectly genial, and the conversation took place over some lunch which Lieut. Col. Pulleine was taking with Lieut. Col. Durnford.](c) Colonel Durnford now sent two troops on the hills to the left under Captain Barton N.N.C. and took with him to the front the remaining two troops, and Russell’s Rocket Battery with a Company of the N.N.C. under Captain Nourse as Escort to the Battery.(7) [On leaving the camp (he) said to Lt. Col. Pulleine “If you see us in difficulties you must send and support us.”(8) ](e)
Going at a canter the Rocket Battery & Escort were soon left behind. Having proceeded between 5 and 6 miles, a mounted man came down from the hills on the left, and reported that there was an immense “Impi” behind the hills to our left, and he had scarcely made the report when the Zulus appeared in force in front of us & to our left. They were in skirmishing order but 10 or 12 deep, with supports close behind. They opened fire at us at about 800 yards & advanced very rapidly.
We retired some little way, taking up a position in a “Donga” or water course, of which there are several across the plain in front of Sandlwana.
We retired steadily in skirmishing order, keeping up a steady fire for about 2 miles, when we came upon the remains of the Rocket Battery, which had been cut off & broken up. There was a hand to hand engagement going on with those that remained.
The left wing while returning was wheeled up to the right & drove the Zulus back who were not in very large numbers just there at that time. It appears that Captain Russell whilst following up with the Battery, perceived some of the Enemy on his left, he fired three Rockets with some effect; this was followed by a volley from the Zulus, the Native Contingent retired, the mules were frightened & disorder was caused. The Enemy seeing this ran down the hill and attacked the Battery. Captain Russell was killed. As the mounted men retired towards them, the Zulus ran back to their Cover. The retreat was continued until we arrived at a “Donga” about half a mile in front of the Camp.(9) Here a few mounted men, Carbineers, Natal Mounted Police &c - reinforced our right. A stand was made here, but we were eventually driven in, & the Camp was taken from the left. It appears that the mounted men on the left became engaged on the hills about the same time as we were engaged on the flat, and I was informed that they held the Zulus back; but my opinion is that the right of the Enemy were only engaging the troops, and did not intend to advance until their left had worked round; and I believe that Captn. Shepstone (who after the arrival of the baggage, took the troop of mounted natives he had used as escort on the hills to the left)(10) rode down to the Camp & asked in the name of Colonel Durnford for assistance.
This Colonel Pulleine gave him by detaching two Companies of the 24th a little to the left front. These together with the mounted men & Lonsdale’s Contingent, fell back into the Camp, & in spite of the Artillery fire and the steady musketry of the Infantry, who were in good position amongst the Stones & Boulders to the left & left centre of the Camp, and who stood their ground most gallantly the Enemy steadily advanced.(11) A general move was made towards the mountain to take up a last position, but it was too late. The Zulus were too quick & fleet of foot, they caught up the men on foot before they could reach the new position, completely overpowering them by numbers & assegaing right and left.
The Guns moved from left to right across the Camp and endeavoured to take the road to Rorke’s Drift, but finding this in the hands of the Enemy, turned off to the left, came to grief in a “Donga” & had to be abandoned. There was not time to spike them. Major Smith was wounded, but managed to get down to the Buffalo where I understand he was then shot. A few mounted men, and a good many natives managed to escape from the Camp, but had to ride hard over very rough country to the Buffalo River, a distance of about 5 miles, under fire from the enemy the whole way. The ground was so bad for horses that the Zulus on foot were able to run as fast as the horses could travel. I should judge that more than half the number that left the Camp were killed before they arrived at the Buffalo, and many were drowned, there being no drift, the water running rapidly with large boulders & deep water alternating. The officers who escaped consulted together on the road & decided to form a Laager at Helpmakaar. The fighting lasted from about 11.30 am till 1 pm, as near as I can judge. There must have been at least 15,000 Zulus, besides the reserves, and I should compute the numbers killed at from 2000 to 2500.
The Zulu system of attack, as represented in the Zulu pamphlet (12) is easily traceable. The main body being opposite the left centre of the Camp, the horns thrown out to the left rear & right front. Had the Zulus completed their scheme by sending a column to the Buffalo River to cut off the retreat not a man would have escaped to tell the tale.
As far as I am personally concerned, when I got back to the Camp with the mounted men who had now been driven out of the “Donga”(13), I found that the Enemy had rushed the Camp from the left and were engaged hand to hand with the Infantry who were completely overpowered with overwhelming numbers.
I saw that “all was over”. I made in the direction which I had seen taken by the mounted men, guns R.A. & the natives on foot. I was cut off by the Enemy who had now reached the line of retreat, but with a good horse, hard riding & good luck I managed to reach the Buffalo River. The Zulus seemed perfectly fearless, they followed alongside having desperate hand to hand fighting with those retreating, mostly our natives on foot. Many of the enemy were killed between the Camp & the River. On several occasions they were quite close to me but I was fortunate enough to escape whilst others dropped at my side; they fired at us the whole way from the Camp to the river, but having mounted the bank on the opposite side we were safe. I made for Helpmakaar by order of Captains Essex & Gardner & assisted in forming a laager.

Note different spellings. Other variations appear in military documents and especially writings of that time".

Source [You must be registered and logged in to see this link.]

Thanks Littlehand..

Seems odd, that Durnford should take command, and after tell Pulleine " I'm not going to interfere with you" " I'm not going to remain in the camp"

springbok9 wrote:

Ray
Despite CTSG,s attempts to foist things of onto Edward Durnford. The source of those comments is William Cochrane

' Colonel Pulleine said, "Im sorry you have come, as you are senior to me and will of course take command." Durnford replied"Im not going to interfere with you. Im not going to remain in camp."

In terms of distance to Chelmsford: The mangeni Gorge is around 12 miles from isandlwana. The Chelmsford force though was split up from the Gorge through to the rear of Siphezi, Chelmsford himself was between Silutshane and Magogo. if Durnford had continued on his path he would have had to do an almighty circle to get back towards the Gorge area via Siphezi.

The theory of a link between the various issued orders by the way is not the property of any one on this forum, its been kicked around and refined by virtually every author and historian for a number of years and is pretty much an accepted fact by all and sundry.

Hope that helps.

Thanks Springbok..

Durnford asked for two compaines. Its seems along way to take 2 compaines on foot. The lost of the RB Proved that?

This chap, Cochrane. Seemed to have been all over the battlefield, he witnessed so much!!

There were lots for reports ref: Zulu activity prior to Durnford leaving but still he chose to meet the enermy in the field.

Dave wrote:

Thanks Littlehand..

Seems odd, that Durnford should take command, and after tell Pulleine " I'm not going to interfere with you" " I'm not going to remain in the camp"

Dave has obviously never served and doesn't understand how it works.
Prince Charles on entering a field hospital in Iraq in 2003 was the most senior officer there by protocol, as colonel-in-chief, so technically was "in command".
However, he chose not to interfere and start running the show himself and he was not obliged to do so.

It matters not if he served or didn't serve. I'm sure there have been lots of changes in the Army between
1879 & 2003.

Ray
Spot on, considering he was theoretically mounting a fast rescue operation for his boss why would he want to be encombered with slow moving infantry and a rocket troop.
Again one of the things I have against Durnford he hung out the rocket battery to dry.

24th
Cohrane was Durnfords political officer and was with him most of the time so yes your right he witnessed quite a lot.

CHeers

Could Durnford not see that the Zulus were forming thier traditional formation around the camp. Going by the various reports it's seems farly obvious what was happening.

With all the reports coming in, would it not be possible that Durnford had changed his mind, and decided to stay at Isandlwana albeit to take the fight to the Zulu. I could be reading the reports wrong, but was Durnford fighting to prevent the chest of the formation getting near the camp, It woud make sense as to why he asked Pulleine for the two compaines and when refuse asked for help if he got in to difficulties. I don't think he would have asked for help if he knew he was going to be miles away knowing the 24th was a regiment of foot. A good point raised by Ray & Springbok.

Ulundi
I think the clincher was the last report that said the Zulu were retiring, Durnford took that to mean they were moving towards Chelmsford. His comment was: "we must stop them at all hazzards."
He did actually encounter the left horn in the Quabe valley.

Although I dont agree with Mike Snooks comment: "He went cowboy." His decision making seems to have gone astray. Wanting to take slow moving elements, going in a different direction ( Arguably to try and cut of the 'retreating impi), leaving the rocket battery to fend for itself plus the comments made to various messengers scouts etc. Pretty strange behaviour towards the end.

Cheers

Springbok. Did it not say " Zulus retiring in all directions" or words that effect.

Did the Zulu retire, knowing it would draw the British away from the camp. ( Along the lines of the Battle of Hastings)

Hi John
Its possible they were a decoy, unfortunatly we will never know and yes I believe the message was they were retiring in all directions but possibly Durnford took his direction from the fact that he had sent two compnies onto the ridge to sweep from west to North East and East
Again all speculation as to the reasons, the only fact we have is the direction he took.

Cheers

Deleted.

Runner2 I'm sure you do it on purpose. Anymore replys like that you will find yourself unwelcome on this forum. Last and final warning.

To be honest, it doesn't matter how much we debate, and drag in people that wasn't at Isandlwana. It still comes down to those who were in command on that day. 
Albeit Pulleine or Durnford or Durnford or Pulleine. Two officers who couldn't come to terms with the situation, and there wasn't anything, anybody could do. How i see it is Pulleine was wrong, by not doing anything prior to Durnford arrival,and knowing that he would be there at some point, he had been receiving reports from 05:00hrs on wards.

For Durnford's part, although he supposedly had his own agenda, he should never have left the camp, he had already received early indicates of enermy movements from Major Chard, which should have switched a light on.

On arriving at Isandlwana he was furnished with a state of affairs by Pulleine, including earlier reports. 
Was he right to send patrols into the hills possibly, but he should have been on alert until messages came back giving the all clear if that was the case.

Its believed he left the camp to prevent a Zulu column joining with those Zulu attacking Chelmsford, but as a professional officer with superior knowledge of the Zulu, he should never have taken his men out of the camp. His actions and his actions alone lost the rocket battery, caused the British firing lines to become over extended, and force from various Compaines to cover his retreat back to the camp. The place where he originally started from.

The court of enquiry after the event, along with Chelmsford standing orders, has no bearing what so ever on the outcome at Isandlwana. That was down to the two incompetent officers who were there that day. Their negligence sent over 1300 men to their graves. If they didn't have the common sense to react to the situation, outside of Chelmsfords orders, then they were not fit to be officers.

And as Chelmsford had told Durnford before.


""Dear Durnford,
Unless you carry out the instructions I give you, it will be my unpleasant duty to remove you from your command, and to substitute another officer for officer for the commander of No. 2 Column. When a column is acting SEPARATELY in an enemy's country I am quite ready to give its commander every latitude, and would certainly expect him to disobey any orders he might receive from me, if information which he obtained showed that it would be injurious to the interests of the column under his command. ."

Durnford had no excuse!!

So Major Durnford you took over command. The bottom line of command is taking care of soldiers. Set them up for success by ensuring that they can fight, win and survive on the battlefield. Do your part, do it well, do it with the interests of your soldiers first and foremost, and you will be successful.

CTSG
I would agree to a degree.
The biggest single arguement thats ever been put up by the pro Durnford group is that there was no indication that the zulu would attack. I believe that to be the case untill some one can prove different.
However the counter to that is then why where the companies forced to stand to for the whole morning if there was no threat.

Chard
Clear as mud.

Dave
Its Colonel Durnford. Unless you were attempting to be sarcastic?

General
Ive been trying to figure out why Bin Laden was killed by the Americans? He didnt commit any bombings, he wasnt there?
Hummmmmm??????

Cheers

springbok9 wrote:

CTSG
I would agree to a degree.
The biggest single arguement thats ever been put up by the pro Durnford group is that there was no indication that the zulu would attack. I believe that to be the case untill some one can prove different.
However the counter to that is then why where the companies forced to stand to for the whole morning if there was no threat.

And we still don't know if the Zulus were going to attack, it was Durnfords boys that found and engaged the Zulu. There were reports coming in of enermy movement, better to have the companies ready.

Chard

Quote :

Clear as mud.

When a column is acting SEPARATELY in an enemy's country I am quite ready to give its commander every latitude, and would certainly expect him to disobey any orders he might receive from me.
I think this does add some weight to the argument, it's was addressed to Durnford Alberti to do with something else.

Dave

Quote :

Its Colonel Durnford. Unless you were attempting to be sarcastic?

Let's face it, he didn't exactly have the mens welfare at heart.

Dave
They were going to attack, it was only a question of time. 22nd or 23rd.
You miss the point. the companies were on stand by precisely because there was a threat, that negates any argument that there was no perceived threat.
Chards comment seems to be a proof of condemnation of Durnford, its actually the oposite, if you take its full context as highlighted it deems the freedom to act as a seperate column therefore vindicating Durnfords actions, you cant have it both ways. He was wrong or right, you cant get a little bit pregnant.
As I posted earlier that communication from Chelmsford was a kick in the backside for going against his, helmsfords, master plan, rightly so, so how can you condemn Durnford and deny he had the right to act independently at isandlwana, theoretically trying to follow the master plan. To repeat, you cant have it both ways.
In what way didnt he have the mens welfare at heart? Because he caused them to do the job they were paid for? If you use that argument your going to have to condem every General from Lord Lucan down to Montgomery or indeed any commander thats ever made a mistake in battle.

Cheers

I was just looking at Durnford Order, as mentioned by Martin

Lieut. Colonel Durnford R.E
Camp Helpmakaar

1. You are requested to move the troops under your immediate command viz.: mounted men, rocket battery and Sikeli’s men to Rourke’s Drift tomorrow the 20th inst.; and to encamp on the left bank of the Buffalo (in Zululand).
2. No. 3 Column moves tomorrow to the Isandhlana (Sic) Hill.
3. Major Bengough with his battalion Native Contingent at Sand Spruit is to hold himself in readiness to cross the Buffalo at the shortest possible notice to operate against the chief Matyana &c. His wagons will cross at Rourke’s (Sic) Drift.
4. Information is requested as to the ford where the above battalion can best cross, so as to co-operate with No. 3 Column in clearing the country occupied by the chief Matyana.
By Order, H. Spalding. Major DAAG
Camp, Rourke’s Drift 19.1.79

All Durnford was required to do was to move his troops to Rorkes Drift. There were no further orders waiting for him there!
It was Major Bengough who was required to cooperate with No 3 column against the Matyanas.

And I think i'm right in saying the next order, he received on the 22nd Jan. Move to the camp at Isandlwana, Again no further orders left. Did he not make a comment about "I'm Being left behind" when based at Rorkes Drift. Couple that with the letter he received dated the 14th Jan 1879

"Dear Durnford,
Unless you carry out the instructions I give you, it will be my unpleasant duty to remove you from your command, and to substitute another officer for officer for the commander of No. 2 Column. When a column is acting SEPARATELY in an enemy's country I am quite ready to give its commander every latitude, and would certainly expect him to disobey any orders he might receive from me, if information which he obtained showed that it would be injurious to the interests of the column under his command."

He must have felt quite isolated, possibly keen to impress the General to get back in his good books.

Hi Ray you missed out this piece.
'Head Quarter camp near Rorke's Drift, zululand 19th January 1879.
No 3 column moves tomorrow to Insalwana Hill and from there, as soon as possible to a spot about 10 miles nearer to the Indeni Forest. From that point I intend to operate against the two Matyanas if they refuse to surrender. One is in the stronghold on or near the Mhlazakazi Mountain, the other is in the Indeni Forest. Bengough ought to be ready to cross the Buffalo R. at the gates of Natal in three days time, and ought to show himself there as soon as possible.
I have sent you an order to cross the river at Rorke's Drift tomorrow with the force you have at Vermaaks. I shall want you to operate against the Matyanas, but will send you fresh instructions on this subject. We shall be about 8 miles from Rorke's Drift tomorrow.
Chelmsford. L.G.
One of the key elements that we really have no idea at all about is that Cochran was sent by Durnford to isandlwana on the 21st for instructions. We know he was sent, we know he went but we have no idea what instructions Chelmsford gave him. So yet a few more missing pieces from the jig saw.

Cheers

Quote :

'Head Quarter camp near Rorke's Drift, zululand 19th January 1879.
No 3 column moves tomorrow to Insalwana Hill and from there, as soon as possible to a spot about 10 miles nearer to the Indeni Forest. From that point I intend to operate against the two Matyanas if they refuse to surrender. One is in the stronghold on or near the Mhlazakazi Mountain, the other is in the Indeni Forest. Bengough ought to be ready to cross the Buffalo R. at the gates of Natal in three days time, and ought to show himself there as soon as possible.
I have sent you an order to cross the river at Rorke's Drift tomorrow with the force you have at Vermaaks. I shall want you to operate against the Matyanas, but will send you fresh instructions on this subject. We shall be about 8 miles from Rorke's Drift tomorrow.
Chelmsford. L.G.

I could be wrong, but I'm sure what you have posted, is what Chelmsford recalled some years later, when in fact the order I posted was the original.

Hi Ray
The order in question was delivered to Durnford at Sandspruit on the morning of the 19th by Major Spalding. If you look at it carefully its actually not an order more a statement of intent as to what he, Chelmsford, was intending to do. He states pretty clearly that he has sent an order instructing him as to what to do. That would be the order you posted.
So yep that string seems to sit firmly in place, from the letter chastising him ( hell that must have hurt) then carefully telling him what will be happening, almost like to explaining to a child really. I dont believe after adopting that aproach and keeping Durnford on such a short leach he suddenly leaves him in a vacuum, its out of character. There has to have been more communication in between the 19th and the 21st . The only reference we have is that trip of Cochrane. And there is the frustrating element that could explain so much.

Cheers

It certainly looks like LC was keeping Durnford on a short lead. When you consider Durnford was acting on information received from a Bishop, plus it was well known Durnford was a Zulu cause sympathiser along with the Colenso clan, no wonder, LC was carefull where he wanted Durnford.

I wonder if it's possible, that Durnford left Isandlwana for the sole purpose of tracking down LC. To find out exactly what he wanted him to do.

And I wonder what LC would have done, if Durnford had turn up on his door step.?

Dave, you say information from a Bishop... Not sure what you mean, unless it's a nick name for someone..

Ulundi, he was referring to the letter Chelmsford sent to Durnford. This is the whole letter.

"Dear Durnford,
Unless you carry out the instructions I give you, it will be my unpleasant duty to remove you from your command, and to substitute another officer for officer for the commander of No. 2 Column. When a column is acting SEPARATELY in an enemy's country I am quite ready to give its commander every latitude, and would certainly expect him to disobey any orders he might receive from me, if information which he obtained showed that it would be injurious to the interests of the column under his command. Your neglecting to obey my instructions in the present instance has no excuse. You have simply received information in a letter from Bishop Schroeder[sic], which may or may not be true and which you have no means of verifying. If movements ordered are to be delayed because report hints at a chance of an invasion of Natal, it will be impossible for me to carry out my plan of campaign. I trust you will understand this plain speaking and not give me any further occasion to write in a style, which is distasteful to me."

Now it makes sense!!!!! Thanks LH

LC doe's have a point!

Quote :

"If movements ordered are to be delayed because report hints at a chance of an invasion of Natal, it will be impossible for me to carry out my plan of campaign"

Can anyone shed some light on what Durnfords views were!

"

Quote :

On 10.10.1875 he was replaced by a subordinate as Acting Colonial Engineer largely because of his outspoken views on native affairs and confederation."

Source: Julian Whybra.

Perhaps not his views in hs own words. But was he really trusted within the ranks.

Quote :

"One of the few exceptions to his critical assessment of the capital's society was the Anglican Bishop of Natal, the Rt Revd John Colenso and his family. The Colenso family's religious notoriety, its English social standards and its intellectual interests cut it off from much of the social life of the capital; but most new arrivals from England found their way to Bishopstowe, some six miles from the city, and the best of them including many officers from the garrison at Fort Napier, became steady visitors. Durnford's religious views, his sensitivity and sympathetic attitude towards Blacks soon made him welcome at the Colenso home. Not only did Mrs Colenso evince great motherly fondness towards him, but her second daughter; Frances Ellen (Fanny, or Nell, as she preferred to be called), a frail, beautiful girl, then 24 years old, was infatuated with the impressive Durnford, 19 years her senior. And he, lonely and inwardly sensitive, responded to her as he had never done to any other woman before - but the tragedy of the situation was that Durnford was already married."

Source: SAMHS.

I should imagine that if Durnford was alive today he would be voting Lib Dem. His views were pretty liberal in a country that was a bit more partisan.
He was not liked in certain circles because of his comments on the locals after the Bushmans pass incident.
Shepstone and his cronies did not trust him as an officer.

But having said all that Chelmsford obviously did trust him enough to give him a column command, and they were certainly not strangers.

No doubt he had a very individual streak, and that was to a great degree the cause of his demise. Probably a very proud man as well, smarting after having his backside kicked by Chelmsford he sounds rather depressed and needed to restore his self esteem.

Thats my take on his personality .

Cheers

Dave wrote:

I wonder if it's possible, that Durnford left Isandlwana for the sole purpose of tracking down LC. To find out exactly what he wanted him to do.

And I wonder what LC would have done, if Durnford had turn up on his door step.?

I would imagine that the Fergie hairdryer would pale in insignificance. :p;:

Cheers

Durnford was in an awkward situation, what with Fanny Colenso, and fighting against the people she defended. If he sympathised with the native cause, why would he take up arms against them. I read recently he felt sorry for Cetewayo. Funny old game this empire building.

springbok9 wrote:

There has to have been more communication in between the 19th and the 21st . The only reference we have is that trip of Cochrane. And there is the frustrating element that could explain so much.

Sorry, but I'm joining in the middle of this. Is there any likelihood of this being resolved in the near future? Is Julian or another historian currently in possession of new information?

24th wrote:

Durnford was in an awkward situation, what with Fanny Colenso, and fighting against the people she defended. If he sympathised with the native cause, why would he take up arms against them. I read recently he felt sorry for Cetewayo. Funny old game this empire building.

Indeed, Victorian colonial history is full of such ambiguities...making it ever easier to misinterpret from our typically more polemical society today. I think we need look no further than the checkered allegiances of John Dunn on that score.

But I do not believe Durnford was really so torn. He had an affinity for the Colensos -- and Fanny in particular -- but his military ambitions superseded that by a considerable margin. Things were scarcely much different during the trumped up situation that led to Bushman's Pass and Durnford always answered the bell. What I think goes unnoticed is that the man who died at Isandlwana had built from the ground up a sizable portion of the force that fought there. These are not the actions of a man who might swap sides at any moment. Chelmsford may have distrusted his tactical judgement but he no reason to question his intensions. Durnford was enlightened, but he died absolutely loyal to his commission.

Chelmsfordthescapegoat wrote:

Perhaps not his views in hs own words. But was he really trusted within the ranks.

What "ranks?"

Do you really think that the average private in the 24th sat around the campfire discussing Fanny Colenso's infatuation with Durnford, a man they seldom if ever came in contact with?
He would have been a distant rumor to all but a few officers in the 24th.

He would have been more notorious in colonial formations due to his role at Bushman's Pass, during the aftermath of which he suggested some of the scions of the prominent families of Natal had behaved with less valor than the black soldiers, a thing that most of colonial society simply could not stand to hear. Most accounts of that debacle suggest Durnford was given every reason to feel that way. But Durnford was never going to win an argument with T. Shepstone on the opposite side anyway. History has NOT come down on the side of Theo, but of the Major. Hell, T. Shepstone's son went to work as Durnford's chief of staff!

And then there were the "rankers" Durnford raised -- namely the colonial blacks of the Natal Native Contingent and associated cavalry. To them he was a straight-up hero, full stop.

So, a nuanced analysis of Durnford's reputation demands parsing the society he moved through. On the one extreme you have the Colensos and on the other you probably have T. Shepstone...but the man was trusted enough to be a major player in Natal during this period up to the moment of his death.

6pdr.

I agree that this issue needs resolving, and I know that all this has been discussed before, and that questions have been asked, mostly by the same members who keep asking the same questions over and over again. Julian and I have answered these questions on the original 'Durnford was he capable' thread, back in November 2012, the problem is however, I do not know how to post a link up on the site for you to click on, however, I have looked through the original 'Durnford was he capable' thread, and if you start from about the middle of page 11, Nov 8th/9th 2012, you will be able to read the replies that Julian gave to these questions. You will see that many of the questions being asked now, are more or less the same questions that were being asked then, and yet again, mostly by the very same askers.

It would appear that even when their questions are answered by an esteemed and renowned researcher and historian, that some folk will not, or just cannot, accept that Col Durnford was not to blame for iSandlwana, and will therefor refuse to accept Julian's findings with his splendid research, and would prefer to believe in all the lies and deceit that was put about at the time to save Chelmsford's backside, and they would rather make up their own theories at what they think Durnford should have done, and also make their own wild guesses at what the orders meant.

Mr M. Cooper wrote:

I agree that this issue needs resolving...

I appreciate your response Mr. Cooper, but I'm afraid my first question concerned springbok's posting at the bottom of page 9 of DWHC2: "There has to have been more communication in between the 19th and the 21st." I was asking whether Julian or any other reputable historian had research pending on the issue.

My following two comments strayed back into the same old "debate" you referred to...but that is a (somewhat) different matter.

6pdr. We don't know what was said around camp fires, I wasn't suggesting they were discussing the Colenso's you said that.

Durnford motivation had been kick out of him, he raise the unit he commanded, he had contacts outside the Millitary who gave him advise on what the Zulu were doing or weren't doing. But he was doing himself no favours especially when he took action on his own based on information received from a Bishop, it would have been better if he had spoken to Lord Chelmsford putting the ball in his court.

He may have been a brave man, but so were the other 1300 in the camp, difference of course was Durnford was of senior rank to all, his decision to leave the camp for whatever reason was the nail in the coffin. No body asked, requested or ordered Durnford to leave the camp.

It is thought that Durnford left the camp to protect Lord Chelmsford.

Springbok raised a good point. If that was the case, why did he go in the opposite direction.

Martin

Quote :

It would appear that even when their questions are answered by an esteemed and renowned researcher and historian, that some folk will not, or just cannot, accept that Col Durnford was not to blame for iSandlwana, and will therefor refuse to accept Julian's findings

Martin if you want to take everything that Julian says as gospel, that's up to you. But you cannot base your debates on what Julian says. He may well be a good researcher, but that doesnt make him right all the time. No one is saying Durnford was totally to blame, but he played the biggest part, closely followed by Pulleine. Whatever orders, instructions were issued prior to the Battle as no bearing on what took place at Isandlwana, no one knew the Zulus were going to attack and they certainly didn't prior to Durnfords arrival, the moment he stood on the ground at Isandlwana it was all down hill.

It was said that the Zulus didn't intend on attacking on the 22nd but who put pay to that! Dunford.

No matter how much you dilute the problems that day, the camp fell because Durford left the camp.

PS.
What officer would expect men on foot to keep up with a mounted unit. He left the rocket battery high and dry. Wiped out all bar a few! He left them, just as he did the men in the camp.

Chelmsfordthescapegoat wrote:

But he was doing himself no favours especially when he took action on his own based on information received from a Bishop, it would have been better if he had spoken to Lord Chelmsford putting the ball in his court.

I would not debate that. He did have a tendency to be "excitable" and I think this is a case in point. I understand completely why the General chastised him but I don't think the episode in any way decided what happened at Isandlwana. It was merely illustrative of Durnford's personality and the type of issue any command group would face. You made an unqualified assertion that Durnford would not have been trusted "in the ranks." The ranks usually mean the enlisted men and I think the regulars would hardly have taken notice of Col. Durnford...unless it was for his mustaches or apparel.

Chelmsfordthescapegoat wrote:

No matter how much you dilute the problems that day, the camp fell because Durford left the camp.

I didn't mean to bite off that entire debate. Suffice it to say, I am off a different opinion entirely and never the twain shall meet. - 6pdr

I Stand corrected, I should have said, within the ranks of the officers.

6pdr.

I did ask Julian a similar question about orders, please go to the original DWHC and on page 16, Thursday November 15th 2012, at 11.45, you will be able to read the question I put to Julian and his response to it. A discussion followed that may be of interest to you and others.

Sorry, I don't know how to post a link to this page for you to click on, but by my giving you the topic, date, time and page number, etc, you should be able to find it.

Hope this helps.