Exactly what was Chelmsford guilty of?

Sorry for this facility but in the army you give instructions to cover your back and you do otherwise.
Cheers
Frédéric

As I mentioned a long way back in this discussion , there was in my mind , never much doubt that Frere & LC hatched their plan together , well before it was even thought it would be going ahead in the minds of the Hometown Colonials , or the powers to be back in the UK . Frere and LC were basically throwing up scaremongering tactics to put the Colony on edge , there is no doubt those two were wanting to get at the Zulu army , the sooner the better they thought . As for LC in his note to Wood saying they may be attacked and need to fortify , then why wasn't Isandlwana fortified , let's not forget that they didn't think for a moment Isandlwana was gong to be attacked , also LC when first questioned on fortifying the camp his reply from memory was something along the lines of .... '' It's to difficult , it would take a week to do so , we are only here for a couple of days , the ground is to rocky ''. As for Glyn not being forceful enough , what else could he do but what he did , he did say they should entrench , once the Overseer , who just happens to be LC trotted out his reply , do you really think Glyn would have the audacity to answer him back ? , think about it , it's Victorian times , promotion is hard to come by etc etc , your hardly going to endear yourself to the top brass by criticising their defensive strategy , it just goes to prove LC had little belief that he was to be attacked .
90th

Frere sent this enclosure to Hicks Beach on 23 December 1878 (arrived in London 23 January1879).

Summary of Instructions for Officers Commanding Columns in the event of Cetywayo not giving up the Sons of Usirayo and paying the fine of cattle called for on or before the 1 January 1879.
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Chelmsford couldn't be clearer with regard to entrenching, but perhaps this is not the Isandlwana camp unless that was to be the advanced depot.

Steve

The books about Isandhlwana suggest that many officers were shocked that the camp was not fortified (Dunbar, Melvill, Duncombe, Glyn, Hamilton-Browne...).
Actually, I think it does not match the general feeling. There is a letter in this sense from HARNESS, an honest man. The British felt no fear of the Zulus (read the many letters written before Isandhlwana (Coghill, CURLING, DURNFORD, Chelmsford, anonymous ...)
MAINWARING went hunting on the night of the 20 January (see his book) other officers took their cricket equipment....
It was a ballad for the British.

Cheers

Still believe that Glyn should have grown a pair. As Snook points out "junior officers have a way of dressing down senior officers ". Melvill did it with Durnford. Hell Dunbar went even further, it could have been done with the right approach. This whole concept of Glyn being the downtrodden and getting a solid case of the mumbles just doesn't sit well with me im afraid. I have to lay a solid piece of the blame with Glyn in this instance. So a divided error would be my vote.
Frederic
Just different parts of the Victorian officer class mentality I would suppose.

Cheers

Hi Frank
I know what you are saying , but Durnford isn't LC , and neither was Crealock  ! . It's a bit harder when you are contradicting the man who is leading the invasion ! . Although he wasn't there to do so , he just took over ,  and Glyn couldn't do much about it . I don't think it's a case of Glyn growing a pair to be honest , Glyn would also be dealing not only with LC ,  but his right hand man Crealock as well ! , not a good career move to go up against them , no matter which way you want to look at it ! .
90th

PS . It got to 43.8 in my suburb today , no air con at work due to the company filming TV Ad's there today , to much background noise was their complaint , so off it went !

rusteze wrote:

Frere sent this enclosure to Hicks Beach on 23 December 1878 (arrived in London 23 January1879).

Summary of Instructions for Officers Commanding Columns in the event of Cetywayo not giving up the Sons of Usirayo and paying the fine of cattle called for on or before the 1 January 1879.
[You must be registered and logged in to see this image.]

Chelmsford couldn't be clearer with regard to entrenching, but perhaps this is not the Isandlwana camp unless that was to be the advanced depot.

Steve

Maybe the "little itala" to be occupied by Durnford
Cheers

Evening/Morning Gary
I do agree and ive used the same argument, still doesnt sit right though. As a matter of interest who was senior Glyn or Crealock? Cant remember coming across that before.

Cheers

Not to sure with the protocols but I assume Glyn , after all he was supposed to be in command until LC and Probably Crealock decided differently 1.27 am , cooling down a bit , been to hot to go to bed . . I'm about to go now .
90th

Yeah weve been sitting on the high 30s. Kruger Park was mid 40s.
In terms of who was senior I assume someone has the army list and can tell us.
Bottom line I suppose is 'What would John Wayne have done'.

Cheers mate grab a cold beer on the way to the bedroom.

When the Zulus attacked the camp, the English were not afraid because the camp was not fortified Their only fear was that the Zulus fled!(Pulleine, Curling, soldiers who were chatting while shooting).
Ditto for the men who were with Chelmsford and watched the camp (Banister).
Cheers

Does Chelmsford's instructions give another clue about how he regarded entrenching? He says the depot must be strongly entrenched because the garrison will be small. He did not regard the Isandhlwana garrison as small, so no need to entrench. 

I agree that Glyn would have found it difficult to raise this when they first arrived. But when Chelmsford takes out half the force it was Glyn's opportunity to leave instructions to 
entrench .

Steve

"Still believe that Glyn should have grown a pair". No Frank, that will not do at all
Col Richard Thomas Glyn was a fine Regimental officer, his personal courage was
beyond impeachment..you have the clarke book the text below is from..funny you
should even think that of Glyn.

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Evening Xhosa
Don't you think that, to a degree, tends to prove my point?
Cleary indicates a total withdrawl by Glyn.
90th and I were discussing earlier, do you know who was senior on the Army list?

Afternoon Frank, and no i don't agree with you on this!
the total withdrawl was forced apon him! he was usurped
and his regiment was effectively taken from his immediate
control..leaving him marginalized and sidelined. yes i have
Harts for both 1879 and 1880.." who was senior on the army
list". what do you mean.

Who was senior, Crealock or Glyn?

The last two sentences of the quote from Clery really make the point for me. Clery feels that it is a mistake to leave the camp without leaving orders to defend it. He hesitates to do this himself, but Chelmsford cannot be found and he regards asking Glyn as "out of the question". So he makes something up himself and later on Chelmsford is very grateful that he did. Would not Chelmsford have been equally grateful had Glyn issued those orders? But Glyn has cut himself off from any decision making in the face of Chelmsford's attitude towards him. You might say he is sulking (not without cause - but not what was required). So Clery takes the risk and displays the gumption to act that should have come from Glyn. I don't in any way absolve Chelmsford but I don't believe Glyn acted in the best interests of the remainder of the column.

Steve

evening Frank, and no i don't agree with you on this!
the total withdrawl was forced apon him! he was usurped
and his regiment was effectively taken from his immediate
control..leaving him marginalized and sidelined. not a
matter of who was senior, crealock's orders emanated
from god!.

Bonsoir,
It seems that there is no real wish to debate.
Only one door is in realty offered.
i am not surprised that the silence on this forum is now often deafining.

I am not offensive and see no offense. It 's just my humble opinion.
With respect.
Frédéric

Frank

Glyn was senior. You can download a copy of the 1878/79 Army List from the National Archives. It is free.
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Steve

Curtesy of Chelmsford, the 24th before and after.

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Morning Steve
I would agree Glyn had a duty to his men and he abrogated that, for whatever reason, his fit of sulks could be regarded as a contributory cause of the disaster. The history of the British army is littered with men of character who stood up for their troops against superior officers. Glyn didn't.
My ex CO did in the middle East in the early 60s. Saved a lot of lives but lost his majority because of it, he had a pair and showed it. His mens lives and welfare were more important than his career.
SD was a prime example of a mans man, so talk of Glyn being a fine officer is misplaced in connection with the 3rd Column. Thanks for the info on the seniority.

Cheers

I still maintain it was the Zulus who were guilty for the loss of the camp.

Just out of interest what do members think the government should have done to Sir Bartle Frere and Lord Chelmsford.

It has become clear that there is a real lack of understanding
about Glyns role in the third column, Lord Chelmsford and his
Staff had attached itself to it!. this staff was an entirely
different entity and superceded Glyns command,all command
decisions flowed down from the top! Chelmsford had a real
problem with delegation, and Glyn knew his place.. he was
under no illusion that his was not to be an independent command.

I have heard people time and time again equating their own army
experiences...they cannot be compared to the victorian officer
class of the late nineteenth century, they were a different breed
entirely, and who themself's were swept away in the second Boer
war and the remainder in the great war. Glyn is being grossly and
unfairly maligned and this cannot stand! he was a fine regimental
officer who loved his men dearly..later, when time allows i aim to
show just why there was no recourse for glyn as his regiment was
taken over by the ' Chelmsford show '.

But had no back bone to stand up to LC, which he could have done, instead of moaning to the likes of Brown around a camp fire out of ear shot of LC and other officers. Glyn was in command of the 3rd Column end of. Your looking a Glyn with a sympathic eye,which of course is not a bad think on a personal level. As for members talking of their military back grounds, I quite enjoy it.

There is no lack of understanding of the relative positions and the 'pecking order' of the 3rd Column. Its incomprehensible that a regimental commander, in any situation apart from near death, could leave a camp behind with close to 50% of his force without a backward glance. Without an enquiry as to there status or to their orders or their potential well being. Clery is very explicit in his letters to Allison and various statements of the minutae of the morning, there is not one suggestion of an enquiry from Glyn as to any of the above.

One may be tempted to ask why Chelmsford thought it necessary to appoint a staff officer to assist Glynn, he had his whole command structure to turn to. Laband tends to point towards the lethargic approach of Glyn and his 'laid back attitude' bordering on laziness. Clery emphasises those attributes on a number of occasions: "He had been transferred at Lord Chelmsford’s request, probably to ensure that the easy-going Glyn kept to his task."
Clery, ever critical of his superiors, described Glyn as “a guileless, unsuspicious man, very upright and scrupulously truthful, yet a slow, not to say lethargic temperament.”
Brian Best describes his thus: He had a steady and unflappable temperament, though somewhat unimaginative and lethargic
There was obviously more to the issue than Chelmsfords well known reluctance to designate responsibility. From that appointment of Clery, much to Woods disgust and chagrin, and to Chelmsfords statement of wanting to get rid of Glyn as soon as possible, it just doesn't fit together. They did serve together on the Eastern frontier, I have to wonder if this reticence of Chelmsford to relate to Glyn didn't stem from there.

In light of the fact that this thread appears to be a tad quiet, I wondered if I could ask a question with regards to LC's planning of the campaign. It seems to me that because this was his first command (from the outset) he would have recognised that he had to get this right and if you consider what a logistical nightmare it was he actually managed that side of things pretty well, at least when you consider the obstacles that he was up against. His general order in November 1878 with regards to Waggon officers shows that he had a reasonably good grasp on the situation, logistics were planned as well as they could be especially because there was a shortage of experienced men and a shortage of wagons. I don't think that I have read anywhere any real criticism on this side of his planning. His plan for the three columns to enter at Lower Thukela Drift, Rorke's Drift and towards Utrecht all seem to make sense, they presented the path of least resistance with regards to terrain and show that LC was thinking about the speed and movement of his troops.
Each column was issued specific orders and as Ian Knight points out 'it is clear that Chelmsford conceived his plans as a central thrust with flanking columns in support.' I haven't read any criticism of that part of his plan either. If you think about his original plan with five columns and the fact that he wanted to invade on a wider front shows that he had even given consideration to a Zulu Counter strike, his planning shows that he was preparing for a number of scenarios including sweeping up any resistance from the Zulus on route. As the person in command and the one who had the responsibility for the planning of the invasion, his planning was in my opinion pretty sensible, at least when you consider the limited resources at his disposal. The conclusion that I have come to at the moment, especially after following this thread and reading the information that I have available to me, is that Lord Chelmsford's biggest mistake was that he was never entirely clear and concise with his orders , but I don't necessarily think that he should be held accountable for the mistakes or indecisions made by the officers under his command. Like everyone else here I have read the arguments over the problems with his orders or lack of orders in situations like Durnford and Pulleine but I'm beginning to believe that they also share some of the blame. I'm not entirely sure, and this is a guess but even by todays standards the man at the top of the pyramid wouldn't be expected to know absolutely every single problem that his men are running into, he would rely on his officers to use their initiative and their skills to resolve issues, that's what officers do.
anyway my question is, do you think that LC's plan with the three columns was sound in principle?

The reason I'm asking is because I haven't actually read anything on here that definitively proves that he was guilty of anything.

"There is no lack of understanding of the relative positions and the 'pecking order' of the 3rd Column. Its incomprehensible that a regimental commander, in any situation apart from near death, could leave a camp behind with close to 50% of his force without a backward glance". said Frank..what does
that even mean?....

Clery, ever critical of his superiors, described Glyn as “a guileless, unsuspicious man, very upright and scrupulously truthful, yet a slow, not to say lethargic temperament.”..again said Frank.. when in point of fact Clery was being at his most brilliant protective best! to ' cherry pick ' segments of
testimony is not and has never been the way forward..

I say again Glyn was an honest upright man, i have skimmed through this evening works by Cope,
Clarke, ( both ) Dominy and Ballard..but have chosen as my opening salvo the work of Keith Smith, first is Chelmsfords misleading report, followed by Glyns prepared by Clery, a brilliant
riposte that leaves Chelmsford in no doubt that Glyn is ' having none of it '. the prose is heavy
going couched in the language of the day, but please read it all carefully and you will see the
truth staring you in the face..

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"Your looking a Glyn with a sympathic eye,which of course is not a bad think on a personal level".

very perceptive john.

My comments on Glyn still stand. Its immaterial who was in command of the column, or who was perceived to be in command of the column, my post is reflective on Glyns position with his own regiment, and posting relative to the over all situation has no bearing on that. The accusation Ive made that Glyn effectively abandoned his responsibility is born out by Clery having to issue orders that should have come from Glyn. Again I repeat, there is no record from the morning of the 22nd that indicates Glyn was in any way prepared to become involved in the welfare of HIS regiment. Chelmsford, in spite of his protestations to the contrary, did take control of the column, as was his right to do so, a fact Clery seems to agree with. But Clery Chelmsford and Crealock all concur that the running of the regiment was in the hands of Glyn.

Hi Waterloo
The original invasion plan formulated in July 1878 actually started with 5 columns. That included Rowlands from the North and Durnford from the middle ( in July they weren't named as such) The concept of the plan was both defensive and attacking. The 5 columns would have cut of the ingress points into Natal and prevented a Zulu invasion at the same time having a multi pronged attack. Pretty sound tactics really.
Unfortunatly the Zulus really buggered up the plan by not rolling over and accepting defeat ( South Africans have a habit of that behaviour). Eventually as we know it all came down to a flying column heading to the final battle at Ulundi. But the question will never be answered of would that flying column have been successful without the 1st invasions battles and softening up the Impi?
As to your final comment there is no doubt what so ever that Chelmsford has a lot to answer for, the idea of this thread though was to try and isolate from the volumes of castigation and blame exactly what he did wrong and try and put reasons to that. Effectivly to remove the emotion and hyperboly that is the norm when blame is mentioned.
Don't think its working but I tried.

Cheers

Frank back of the net with those observations.

And let's not forget, it was Glyn who remonstrated with LC with regards to assisting Dartnell, whatever he said changed LC mind and camp was split.
So if Glyn stood up to LC at that point why could he not have remonstrated before.

Hi Chard
Ive seen that mentioned before on the forum and never manage to chase down a source. All Ive found is in a letter from Clery to Colonel Harman in which he says: "...now when word came in that they were going to bivouac out I could not help speaking strongly to Colonel Glyn on the possibility of this sort of thing dragging the rest of the force into any sort of compromising enterprise that these people get messed up in." No mention of Glyn speaking to Chelmsford.
Would be more than happy if you could poin t me in the right direction.

Cheers

"My comments on Glyn still stand. Its immaterial who was in command of the column, or who was perceived to be in command of the column, my post is reflective on Glyns position with his own regiment, and posting relative to the over all situation has no bearing on that. The accusation Ive made that Glyn effectively abandoned his responsibility is born out by Clery having to issue orders that should have come from Glyn. Again I repeat, there is no record from the morning of the 22nd that indicates Glyn was in any way prepared to become involved in the welfare of HIS regiment. Chelmsford, in spite of his protestations to the contrary, did take control of the column, as was his right to do so, a fact Clery seems to agree with. But Clery Chelmsford and Crealock all concur that the running of the regiment was in the hands of Glyn."

Again Frank, not good enough! meaningless double talk..could you please outline in detail your
charges against Glyn..

The accusation Ive made that Glyn effectively abandoned his responsibility.
Although English is not my prime language at present Im sure Ive made my position abundantly clear

"The accusation Ive made that Glyn effectively abandoned his responsibility."

Just cannot get my head around that! if i had to ' hammer ' over the point that
Glyns command was usurped and taken over completely, i can, and i would, but
i'm afraid there would be no point! the charge you make that Glyn was somehow
indifferent to the fate of his men is to me ludicrous..remember this is the man
who quietly had a complete breakdown in the following months whilst being shut
up at the drift..who was so effected by the unnecessary slaughter of his battalion
that he refused to put the men in any more harms way..and many years later
who was that lonely bent old man standing sadly on the platform waving goodbye
to his battalion as they embarked on their journey to South Africa in 1899, he died
not long after. to say he was without personal courage is of course an insult.. we
will never agree on this, so i will leave it there. Richard Thomas Glyn
was a fine man. and to think you had so many real villains to choose from.. Frere,
Chelmsford, Crealock.

"Although English is not my prime language at present Im sure Ive made my position abundantly clear".. i thought you came from Sheffield Frank, what language are you in now. cheers.

If we debate this at the level of "good guys and bad guys" we are not going to get anywhere. For me this is about degrees of culpability for the events of January 1879. My feeling that Glyn could have influenced events more than he did is, if anything, reinforced by the extract from Keith Smith's book. There is no contradiction between him being an "honest and upright man" and the analysis of his character provided by Clery. He says in response to Chelmsford "As regards outposts and the ordinary precautions for the safety of the camp I consider for all these arrangements I was solely responsible." That simply does not square with him leaving no instructions whatsoever when he left the camp with Chelmsford. Clery also tells us that, left to his own devices, Glyn would probably never have got around to answering Chelmsford's points because of his lethargy. Echoes of Glyn's demeanor in the camp to my mind.

Steve

Chard there was never any confrontation between Glyn and LC in regard to the Dartnell message ! , which resulted in LC splitting his forces , where and how do you come by this fanciful statement ? , I for one posted the transcript of Clery in the tent with LC , Glyn was not there , it was Clery who went to Glyn's tent , Glyn sent Clery to LC's tent , Crealock was in the adjoining tent to LC , and heard the conversation , Glyn is never mentioned as being there ! . From memory several other members have also discounted this theory ( of yours ? ) more than happy to be corrected ! .
90th

Bonjour,

Most of the accusations in this threat against the character of GLYN are based on letters from CLERY.
So the question: CLERY, a reliable witness?
I have not the answer to this question, but I oberve about CLERY's character these comments:
-From the editor (Daphne CHILD) of "Zululand at war" (I.E: after the study of his letters): "Vain, able, critical of friend and foe, egostistical and amusing";

-From J.F. MAURICE: "Tendancy to belittle the services of good men...he is the last man I should rely on to say a good word of me behind my back".

First point: CLERY's comments about others men don't seem to be the "divine scriptures".
2nd point: It would have been maybe useful to study the behavior of GLYN during the war of 1877-1878: to confirm or refute the adjective lethargic and other pleasantries revealed by the always well-intentioned CLERY.

Effectively it's not a threat about the "good guys and bad guys" but it's the "anti-Glyn" members (I.E: I know it is not really the case) who used the first arguments on GLYN's character to exonerate partially CHELMSFORD's responsability.

Just a thought.



Cheers

littlehand wrote:

Frank, I'm not sure you going to get away from the Battle of Isandlwana. I see members have posted the normal stuff when it comes to LC. Good attempt to start what could have been a decent debate. I think members think the only Battle that was fought in the Zulu War was Isandlwana.

Frank as I posted Sat Jan 09, 2016 5:27 pm

Now we have Anti Glyn Members

It seems to me that I have not really wrote that !

Hi Frederic

The problem with assessing Glyn is that he is a shadowy figure during this first invasion. It is inevitable that we largely rely on Clery's comments, but I agree with you that we need to be careful because of Clery's own predilections. However, what little we know of Glyn during those few days seems to me to fit Clery's description. I think in my first post on this aspect of Chelmsford's culpability I said that Glyn's actions (or more accurately inactions) contributed to the disaster. In no way am I anti-Glyn, what I am saying is that he had a flaw. Neither am I saying that his inaction partially exonerates Chelmsford - but I do believe that an active input from him might have made things better.

Steve

Littlehand who are the Anti Glyn members
90th