What could Col Pulliene have done? To secure the camp and all of its provisions, with the men and equipment available to him.

I lived in SA for many years, with my interest in the Zulu War being sparked in 1977, when I took six weeks off university studies to be an "extra" in the making of the film "Zulu Dawn". That six weeks was immense fun, and I and the small group of fellow students who'd taken time-out to be in the film, became acquainted with Bob Hoskins, Denholm Elliot and Simon Ward - with whom we had several drinking sessions in the Babanango Hotel Bar - the only "watering hole" within 50 miles of the movie set. I'll post some pics of all of this at some point, but to answer Ray's query...

I visited the battlefield for the first time in late 1977 - about six months after movie shooting had finished. The film was not shot on the actual battlefield, but on a farm called "Hindenberg", about 25 miles to the south-east, against the backdrop of a hill that looked vaguely like Isandlwhana. On the movie set, I was regularly charged with the task of "climbing the hill" as part of a few scene takes, along with other extras, and we were kitted out as were the soldiers of the 24th, with rifle, shoulder bag and what was quite a "stifling" uniform. It took quite a bit of effort to reach the top of the hill on the movie set, and that hill's slope was a lot gentler than the real Isandlwhana.

When I visited Isandlwhana for the first time (late 1977) I decided to climb the hill in the same way I had done on the movie set, and it was considerably more challenging. The steepness for a start required a lot more attention being paid to the terrain, than to any attacking warriors. In parts, I would have had to put my gun (had I had one) up on an available ledge, while I used both hands and feet to scramble up after it.

The route I took would have been a more probable route taken by any of the defenders who were in retreat, so I did not tackle the slightly gentler northern ridge... besides, by the time the retreat had begun, that area was awash with Zulus anyway. It was not possible for any redcoat to use it as a means of ascent. The only path(s) up the hill that were available to the retreating redcoats would have been along the eastern ridge, and possibly closer to the southern summit area, where the slopes are extremely steep and rugged.

About half-way up the hill is a sort of "plateau" which is probably not an accurate description, because the slope here is between 30 and 40 degrees anyway - but it's a bit "flatter" than what lies both below and above it. But it's narrow in most parts, and no place to conduct a meaningful defence - which is difficult even on flat ground.

I concluded that even if it could have been co-ordinated as a manoeuvre at the time, it would have been to no avail. Getting to any meaningful height rapidly enough, and then having appropriate cover for a large number of men, would not have been possible. Lugging up large quantities of ammo boxes would also have slowed down the proceedings and would have required large numbers of men to put down their guns (or at least sling them out of use) while they concentrated on lifting and shoving the ammo boxes.

I visited the battle field several times after that - each visit looking at a different perspective - from the position of the ill-fated rocket battery, to Durnford's donga, to traversing the entire route of Fugitive's trail Down to the Buffalo river.

My last visit was in 1999 - 20 years after my first and I decided to try the climb once again, to see what some of the "older" soldiers may have felt if pressured to ascend. It was really quite a challenge - and in those days I was very fit, running regular standard marathons and participating annually in South Africa's Comrades marathon - a 56-mile slog over terrain not unlike that in which this famous battle took place.

For large numbers of redcoats to climb, then assemble, on that hill would have been very challenging, and probably not had much influence on the ultimate outcome of the battle.

Mr M. Cooper wrote:

Hi Gary me old wombat.

I was only being hypothetical about a couple of hundred getting up there mate, just to show that even if they had been able to get up there with their ammo, they would have been overwhelmed in a very short time by the very angry zulu's, and don't forget that the reserve had not been used, so they would have been very eager to get at the Red Coats, as they felt left out not being used in the main attack.

The "summit" of Isandlwhana is precipitously narrow - more of a very scree-ridden ridge a few yards wide, with very steep drops at the southern end. Also, there's not an awful lot to this "summit" - no vast wide-open plain... It's more of a knife-edge in most places. Its "defence" attributes (like large boulders and vertical faces) suit individual defenders, who can back against these features and only have to concentrate any fire to their front, across an arc of just a few degrees. But each defendable feature would be sufficient for two, possibly three individuals - not more! This would have (as is the case of the poor soul who "held out") simply prolonged the agony. These pockets of redcoats would have either run out of ammo sooner or later, or would have been "picked off" by Zulus - many of whom had taken up the guns of the fallen and were now using them as their own weapons - even considering that their "firing skills" were very poor. There could be no co-ordination in any defence "strategy" on the hill top, with isolated pockets simply reacting to any immediate threat, rather than exercising a plan to keep everyone alive long enough to tire the Zulus and encourage a retreat.

Dave wrote:

Dave wrote:

Lord Chelmsford left Isandlwana between 04:00-04:30hrs. Disregarding the waiting of Col Durnford to arrive at Isandlwana.

What could Col Pulliene have done? To secure the camp and all of its provisions, with the men and equipment available to him.

First report is made by Trooper Barker of the Natal Carbineers recorded at 05:22hrs

Brickhill states 12:00hrs they heard heavy firing so I’m taking that time as when the Battle started.

I recall someone saying there was 100 + wagons on the field, would it really have been impossible to have formed a Laggar? He was quick enough to remind Durnford that his orders were to defend the camp.?

Fairestcape Thanks for an interesting insight into your time on the film set and Battle field tour. Looking forward to the photographs.

If you read my first post, that kick started this topic, we are talking between the hours mentioned above from when the first report came in until the battle commenced some 6 hrs. So there wouldn't have been a lot going on, which would have given time to get some men on the top, again not to concerned about get ammuntion boxes up there as the men could carry as many rounds as possible on their person.
What I think people are forgetting is that the Zulu's would have the same problems going up as the British Soldiers before them, difference being the British wasn't getting shot at.
The British going up in single file could operate as a human chain each helping the man behind him. And I'm sure those on top could have caused quite a bit of damage.

Bear in mind that the British - largely through arrogance and complacency, were prepared neither to defend nor attack. In the hours leading up to the eventual climax of the battle, there were a number of lengthy hiatus, where neither side moved much. The Zulus did not swarm over the Nqutu Ridge and continue non-stop until they had slaughtered every redcoat. When Durnford arrived, he and Pulleine (along with other officers) were far more interested in having a good breakfast than getting concerned about the Zulus - and this was quite some time after the initial reports of the Zulu army's position had come in.
The camp at Isandlwhana was little more than an "overnight stop", and not in their wildest dreams did Chelmsford and his officers think that the Zulus would be "dumb" enough to attack it. So confident were all of these commanders, that Chelmsford saw no weaknesses in his decision to both split the force, and to not bother to entrench the camp in any way whatsoever. To laager the considerable number of wagons would have taken the better part of 2 or 3 days and Chelmsford was already champing at the bit hours after the camp was set. He was off with half his army on a wild goose-chase to look for the Zulus. Pulleine - little more than a competent administrator with no battle experience - did not have either the acumen, nor the perceptive skills - to properly evaluate the pending threat, or to formulate a plan to deal with it. He was far more interested in finishing his breakfast - possiby in the mistaken belief that the Zulus would reciprocate with the expected Victorian politeness - "Let him finish his meal first, only then do we attack... to attack while he's eating is not cricket!"
In short, the Brits were simply not prepared for the event, and they completely underestimated the bravery, determination, tenacity, exceptional discipline and voracity of their enemy.