Hidden Ground at Isandlwana

Julian Whybra wrote:

AUSSIE - re your 7.36 and 11.59 posts:
I don't quite see how Barker's location on 'Itusi' confirms your findings that "it's the same location as the missing 5 hours".  I'm not quite sure that that 'confirms' anything.
Scott was on Itusi for most of the time.  What Scott saw, Barker saw, what was reported to Scott, Barker would have known about.  From Itusi there is a fine view northwards.  Are you really suggesting that the Zulu army was lying unseen and unknown, just "one kilometre from his vedette post " on Itusi?

Scott was on Itusi for most of the time. Not So Scott was on Amatushane for most of the morning First light who knows but if you read Barker its clear he is not on Itusi

What Scott saw, Barker saw.  Not So read Barker he is reporting to Scott all morning they are not both in the same location.  Plus you can not see over the notch from the top of Amutushane, impossible.

Are you really suggesting that the Zulu army was lying unseen and unknown, just "one kilometre from his vedette post " on Itusi?  Yes only 2 regiments maybe 3 no more from about 9am onwards all those sightings by the survivors that saw Zulus on Itusi came from that hidden ground that is why they continaully removed Barker from his vidette position continually that morning  There is a hill directly above that dead ground you can not see anything behind Barkers Discovery hill from Itusi you need to be directly over the ridge to see what is at its base

You need to walk the ground I am still learning a lot and I have been there 4 times only.

Hi Kate
Where do you believe Raw and Roberts where when they first sighted the Cattle ? for the historical location to be true that is only possible once they climbed Mabaso. Those cattle was sighted near Mkwene the Majors X is around 1 mile from Mkwene So it happend before then. My question is where did those cattle come from so close to Mkwene ?

That rocky hill Higginson saw those Zulus can only be Barkers Hill the reason their is no rocks presently is because there is a village there presently that is the only hill between Mabaso and Mkwene otherwise I am wrong.

True Frank but lets have a gander at this.
Raw's account in February fits with the aaaa position, as does Hamer and Nyanda's.
"The whole army showing itself from behind the hill in front"
Hamer says there were 12000 on the other side of that 'ridge'
Nyanda says 15000 sprung up from the other side of the ridge.

(You know this already Frank, I have just quoted the above for others who might be following this thread.)

The only 'ridge' or 'rocky hill' between Mkwene and the Ngwebini that looks down on an area capable of holding the entire Zulu army has to be Mabaso.
If Raw did look at a map afterwards and confer with Penrose and Anstey, the Ngwebini is pretty obvious as a large geographical feature as is Mabaso looking down on it. Hence the 4 'a's where they are.

Could the dead ground in front of Mabaso that is the current hot topic hold 12 to 15000 warriors and could they deploy there without being seen?
If what you say is right though Frank and the Zulus WANTED to be seen in order scare the cobblers off the British why then did no one see the 12 to 15000 warriors deploying that far forward of the Ngwebini that morning ?

If they had wanted to be seen surely someone would have seen that many men moving and if they had I can't imagine 100 men then riding towards them. However I can imagine 100 men going after a few herd boys and 'steak on the hoof'
Kate

Kate
for what it's worth I totally agree with your last para.

Mike
Re your enquiry about Scott. I really don't think I should 'rain on Frank's parade' so decline to offer a response (for the moment) though I may do so after Frank's work has hit the limelight.

I just had a good look at those Missing 5 hours Maps and they place the umCityu and the Nokenke regiments in the dead ground just as I concluded and Barker confirms it.

Morning all.
Kate
I appreciate your points BUT, sorry there's always a but.

The only 'ridge' or 'rocky hill' between Mkwene and the Ngwebini that looks down on an area capable of holding the entire Zulu army has to be Mabaso.
If Raw did look at a map afterwards and confer with Penrose and Anstey, the Ngwebini is pretty obvious as a large geographical feature as is Mabaso looking down on it. Hence the 4 'a's where they are.

I dont recall ever saying that I believed the entire army was deployed there. I do believe the army were in the process of deploying and as Ive said certain evidence seems to point to some regiments moving out of the mouth and around the western end of Mabaso. As the reserve were arguably deployed behind the iThusi ridge the numbers of men 'tucked away' in front of Mabaso could be in the region of 6 to 7000, or maybe Nyanda and Hamer were right.
The ridge thats in my original photos is just that, a ridge, and that does fit in with the statements you mention.We, meaning you and i and the other members that have been there, generally jump in the car and drive down the dirt road towards Mabaso looking straight ahead and most probably muttering about the 'silly bloody ridge'. But again we, this time meaning you and I, have walked down in the valley next to the donga and along the route to the 'ridge' that was taken by Raw. Its a significant difference that shows the actuallity of that 'ridge' of being a significant feature.
One thing that we all seem to be guilty of is conflation. The times of the sightings started from early morning whilst the 'go forth' command from Durnford to his 2 troops was around 11 oclock. By which time the large......ish groups had settled down for a day of rest after their long march from Ulundi.
The point Im making is that when Raw, Roberts, Shepstone etc set of across the plateau they had no clue of the bodies busy sharpening their knives pointy sticks etc behind the concealing 'ridge'.

If what you say is right though Frank and the Zulus WANTED to be seen in order scare the cobblers off the British why then did no one see the 12 to 15000 warriors deploying that far forward of the Ngwebini that morning

There is quite a list of numbers of people that did see rather large groups of Zulu.
That list starts with Chard, Pope, and you know all the rest.

An interesting point that I dont recall being mentioned is the intended path of Bartons merry men. Their orders were to proceed over the plateau in a large area sweep, Roberts moved more to the west and Raw to the east to accomplish that. Just before the zulu were sighted Roberts closed in to Raws position (Nyanda) riding to the east.
Higginson had been sent with a message from Durnford confirming his instructions to Shepstone/Barton to travel along the plateau in order to meet up with his ride along the Qwabe. Kate youve spent more time than most walking that area, if Raw was to meet up with Durnford climbing the south slope of Mabaso, a significant climb, was not on the cards. In order to meet up with Durnford he would have moved to the east over the iThusi ridge ( The direction Roberts was heading for) so arriving in the Qwabe valley at the point on the maps marked with a D.H. ( Davis and Henderson).
Im not saying that I am 100% convinced of where the initial confrontation took place, merely saying there is evidence for it to have occured in front of Mabaso whilst the evidence of it happening in the valley is pretty scant when a careful look is taken.
Aussie has some good points that do need a very subjective look, again I dont believe he is correct, BUT just because he cant articulate his position very well does'nt mean its without merit.

Cheers all have a great day, we have the wonderfully named 'Load Shedding' the whole bloody day.

Frank, so basically you think the attack was planned for the 23rd but initial maneuvers, staging and posturing had already begun?

Do you think the masses of Zulus on the Nyoni around 10:00 were in response to firing from the GOC's Flying Column or alternatively an intimidation move? Seems a rather terrible idea frankly, at least from the European side of warfare that emphasizes surprise as a key offensive element.

The parties moving west towards the Manzimnyama River valley seen by Chard, Higginson etc are certainly indicative of a planned offensive move but again several hours passed before the main assault materialized. Why such a slow onset?

Morning/Evening Mike.
As I pointed out our biggest enemy is 'conflation'.
There are many instances from the 22nd that are being lumped together as all part of the same situation.
Those very early morning sightings had very little to do with the army taking up an advanced position.Quite possibly they were the Matyana men returning from the confrontations with Dartnell and later Chelmsford, and in the process trying to locate the main army.
Shaka was a great general who knew the full value of scaring the hell out of his oponents. It was fear that drove the Mfecane, all the tribes desperatly getting out of his way.
A part of that approach was the tactic of his men advancing in two rows, the second behind the man in front. At a given signal the back row stepped forward and magically doubled the strength of the advancing army. Then at a second signal the shields, held ege on at their side, was brought to the front and faced forward. The opposing forces were terrified and 9 times out of 10 ran like hell at this zulu magic.
In his early battles with Zwide he advertied his presence hours before with the noise, thudding of spear shafts on shields etc.
The zulus were not european in outlook, they were diametrically opposed in virtually everything.

Morning Frank
Hope you are not reading this by candle light.
I do find all of this fascinating and love hearing everyones different ideas and theories. It really does get the old grey matter whirring and gives me an excuse to cover the dining room table in maps and books.

Inky in answer to your questions and statement above. The  herd boys, I believe, were rounding up cattle from the surrounding area for the main army. This involved moving around the plateau  in small groups so its difficult with such a fluid group of individuals to pin down their exact location. Reading the early part of Raw's account though he does seem to indicate that they encountered them as soon as he moved up onto the plateau and then chased after them only stopping when the encountered 12 to 15000 Zulus!!!

You wonder why no one, in 142 years, has ever discovered the exact location. I think this is because no one has placed so much faith and importance in Barker's account or used it purely in isolation for the discovery. Historians over the years will have looked at it and walked the ground but have been wary about its validity for the reasons I posted way back somewhere in this thread.

Frank sorry I only used the term 'whole Zulu army' based on Raw.
I have looked at and studied your ideas in great depth and know you never placed the whole army that far forward on the plateau. Also as an ex cavalryman ( a dashing Hussar at that) and someone who has walked the ground far more times than I, I really do respect your views and ideas.
But (there it is again) I am still struggling to make them fit, sorry. There is dead ground on the plateau, I agree. It is capable of holding a sizable force, once again I agree.
But if the Zulus didn't mind being seen why were they positioned in dead ground so they errr.... could not be seen

Also to get to the 'big' (my word) ridge/hill as Raw, Hamer and Nyanda describe capable of shielding 12 to 15000 Zulus surely they  would have had to have gone over the 'small' ridge where your 6 to 7000 were hiding or not hiding as the case may be.

One idea you have touched on in your above post that has really got me thinking though is what was Robert, Raw, Shepstone etc plan had they not ran into the army. What route would they have used to get back down to meet up with Durnford.
Time for a brew and some more time at the dining room table.
Quick Frank light another candle.
Kate:D

Sorry all but based on the last couple of posts I couldn't resist this

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Kate

To Drafty for a candle............ sorry Elton.
Just looking at the plateau Kate, when you drive down towards the Nqutu road there is a village on the right hand side, just as that village ends and the open veld opens up, if you were to take a short walk you would look over the hill and down into the Qwabe valley just as the valley narrows with the small spur projecting into it. Thats the spur I believe the reserve charged over to get to Durnford. Theres a small dam just there, as I said earlier its where the 'map' shows D.H. I also many years ago had the misfortune to walk into that dam whilst walking back to my car in the dark.
So thats the route I would anticipate that Barton et al would have been aiming for to meet up with Durnford. The pincer movement conclusion.
Thats always bugged me as to why they wold go so far out of their way to climb Mabaso, would they do that for a couple of Steaks, and risk Durnfords displeasure after all there would have been a considerable time issue to have done so.
PS its not just the bloody candles, its cooking ( Lots of Braais), its the batteries on the gates motors going flat, being locked out of the garage because the auto doors wont work, damn lifes tough. Not to mention the chardonnay getting warm!

Possibly these may help

This is the view from the Ithusi ridge close to Ithusi itself
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Looking due north from above positio is the village, access down to the Qwabe on the northern end, visible to the right of the photo
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The view as you descend down into the Qwabe valley with my infamous dam to the left.
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This is the ridge I believe the reserve came over and caused the goo Col. Durnford to require an urgent change of trousers.
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I hope that puts things into persective for those members that havent had the good fortune to visit the battlefields.

Cheers

Got it Frank.
Cracking pictures and comparing them to map No2 I see the route you mean and your reasoning about going up onto Mabaso.
I've walked along the Ngwebini and climbed up onto Mabaso from that end as well going onto Mabaso from the plateau side but I've never walked from the foot of Mabaso down to the DH position.
If its possible then its another 'To Do' on my list when I come back over.
Tell your publisher to get a grip so I can read your entire theory in glorious technicolour.
More tea is needed.
Kate

Frank
I agree with your assessment. Can I add that Durnford, Davies and Henderson were warned by horsemen of approaching Zulus. They came from D's left. They could only have been two of Scott's vedettes who descended by the route you indicate above, obviously some distance in advance of the Zulu reserve, and were sent by Scott specifically to warn him that he would be cut off if he proceeded. That can only have happened if there had been a vedette on Itusi which had seen the impending danger.
I also believe that there are elements of what happened in aussie's posts but misplaced both in terms of time and place and that overall it is incorrect.
VERY nice photos by the way. In fact, the best I've ever seen of the area of the descent into the Qwabe valley.

I agree Julian they are smashing pictures.
Picking up on what you have said, I'm assuming the vedettes who rode down to D did so quite early on in the Zulu movement timeline as they had time to get down there and then report to Durnford before he was attacked.
That ground looks rocky and I can't imagine them galloping down there.

The only sticking point is Davie's says they were 'overtaken' by 2 carbineers and Molife says when a man came "galloping after us" both suggest they came up from behind.

Frank its difficult to see in the pictures but is there space, between the entrant onto the Qwabe and the ridge the Zulus appeared on, for Durnford to have been moving in, thus allowing the Carbineers to come down from the plateau and then up from behind?

Kate

Yes there is Kate. I'm not at home at present adding an ice cream to a grandson at McDonald's. When I get back I will show you a shot from the valley of the ridge. Have a cuppa in the meanwhile.

Sorry Kate I should have added that there is a very good route down for a rider. I've done it, had to test the route.

Kate,
Yes, true, from behind according to Molife BUT Cochrane wrote that they came down "from the hills on our left" from Scott.  And Durnford sent them off with a flea in their ear and a message for Scott to support him(!) just before the Zulus appeared in his front and on his left on the heights.
Given the content and import of the message the two men carried, they can only have come from a great height, Itusi (Conical Koppie would be out of the question) and that can only be where Scott was.

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This is a shot from the eastern side of Qwabe. to the left is iThusi with the iThusi ridge stretching of to the right. Its my belief that Scott was positioned on this ridge ( for proof buy the book) from that position, first photo above, he could see not only all the activity on the plateau and the aproaching impi and retreating Native Horse but also the reserve staring to spill onto the tail of the iThusi ridge. Down below he had a perfect view of Durnfords advance and could see exactly what was about to happen. From here he sent Whitelaw plus one other, down to warn Durnford. Durnford was to the left, photo 1, and so the carbineers riding down from the ridge, this photo would be on a diagonal route left to right, there is a traditional track that follows that course. So yes they would have aproached Durnford from the rear, left.
In terms of the timeline and more details......................

Now Available
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Frank
good write-up.
Excuse me for being daft but I thought that it was old hat, i.e. everyone already knew, that Durnford was informed by someone from the up on the heights to his left. It's not new is it?

Frank
And, excuse me for not mentioning the elephant, many congratulations on the book (at last). It's a difficult and frustrating journey you have made.

Admin
For some strange reason the top two posts at the top of page 3 have just appeared on my screen for the first time. I missed out on aussie's replies and was unaware of them - sorry aussie! Did anyone else have this glitch?
aussie
By way of belated reply for which I apologize...I have long been of the opinion that Scott fairly quickly shifted his position from conical Koppie to Itusi.
And...I do not believe that it can be inferred from any source that 2 or 3 regiments were within 1 km of Scott's position on Itusi.

So does this work:-
1/ Robert's and Raw discover the army who then rise up and attack.
2/ This is seen by Scott on Itusi who sends down Whitelaw and a.n.other to warn Durnford.
3/ They use Franks route to get down.
4/ As they travel down the route shown above, they could have been seen by Cochrane as he rode past, hence his statement about being to  the left, however by the time they get to the bottom Durnford has ridden past and they have to overtake the troop to get to Durnford.

Now I can quite imagine Whitelaw and his mate were quite relieved to be instructed off the plateau after seeing what was coming but not too keen on going back which could explain their defiant reply to Durnford about Scott not abandoning his position.

However looking at the maps and using the photographs of the route described above, if we assume  Scott and his men are on Itusi this would mean that, as the Zulus were spilling over Mabaso (or closer if we believe the Zulu army was  already deploying before encountered by Raw and Robert's), that the two despatch riders had to ride towards the enemy to get to that route down.
Is it possible to get down Frank straight from Itusi without going near Mabaso. Its difficult to see in the pictures?

An alternative is Cochrane saw the riders coming down the historical notch to his left as they passed and then Whitelaw and his mate caught them up as they rounded Itusi and delivered the message.
I to don't believe Scott was fixed on Amatutshane but was moving around with some of his men as per the Victorians down on the coast.
Kate

Could we just say that the two Carbineers approached Durnford's column from the left rear?
If it assumed that Scott didn't sit still on Itusi but went out himself to reconnoitre to a position in advance of Itusi then he would have been in a position to send out warning troopers to Durnford (as well as to Pulleine) BEFORE he returned to Itusi or more likely BEFORE beginning to gather his men for a gradual and tactical withdrawal to the camp.

Kate there is an entrance into the Ngwebine valley from the East. That entrance leads directly onto the Qwabe Valley across the acres of dead ground I have allocated as the holding area for the reserve. That area opens up onto the base of Mabaso as well as over the small ridge into the path of Durnford.
Cheers

Good Morning Kate

You wonder why no one, in 142 years, has ever discovered the exact location. I think this is because no one has placed so much faith and importance in Barker's account or used it purely in isolation for the discovery. Historians over the years will have looked at it and walked the ground but have been wary about its validity for the reasons I posted way back somewhere in this thread.


Yes your correct my theory relies on Barker, but thats because I know where he is. Even from the testimony's of those who witnessed the discovery you can not determine the location but from the following statement we know Barker is near to his vidette location the following location can only be once he has climb the Nqutu escarpment
 . As Hawkins and I were returning to the vidette outpost we noticed the mounted Basutos to the extreme left of the camp in skirmishing order, and masses of the Zulus on all the hills. Firing was then heard for the first time, as although we had been within two hundred yards of the Zulus, we had strict orders not to fire the first shot, and no shot, up to then, had been fired on either side. We reported ourselves to our officer, who immediately advanced us (the videttes having all retired to where Lieut. Scott was stationed) against some Zulus who were coming on slowly. Heavy firing was then heard on our left, and being fired on we returned the fire, posting ourselves in a donga. (It was from this donga we saw the rocket battery cut up).


 Historians over the years has interpreted the previous testimony as after the discovery returning from Mabaso. Which do you say before or after the discovery ?  It is clearly just minutes before the discovery notice he spots Raw and Roberts just before the gunfire and then he says to place more importance 

 Firing was then heard for the first time, as although we had been within two hundred yards of the Zulus
Notice he says first shots this is coming from his extreme left from Raw and Roberts this is the very moment the discovery takes place. If the discovery happend in the historical location gunfire would have been heard all the way back when they were at Mabaso 15 minutes earlier this is not the case. Also notice Barker sees masses of Zulus only 200 meters from him these are screens screening the same army he discovered less than 1 hour before

 The below official  map has it correct dated 11/11/1879 also notice the right horn pre deployed behind Isandlwana just as Higginson mentioned in his testimony 

W[You must be registered and logged in to see this image.]                                We have maps drawn up { Not by Barker or Higginson } confirming the eye witness testimony.

I guess then if you place little credit on the testimony of Barker and Higginson then the same will apply to the maps confirming their testimony.

The map above is not an 'official' map.  It was not published by HMSO.

The passage from Barker you quote above is (with the passing of time) a conflation.  It does not fit timewise with the sequence of events you're trying to describe.  To take just one example, how do you suggest Barker was able to witness the destruction of the Rocket Battery from a position on top of the Nqutu plateau?

Julian

You are completely wrong on your second paragraph

So lets go to Trooper Barker

. As Hawkins and I were returning to the vidette outpost we noticed the mounted Basutos to the extreme left of the camp in skirmishing order, and masses of the Zulus on all the hills. Firing was then heard for the first time, as although we had been within two hundred yards of the Zulus, we had strict orders not to fire the first shot, and no shot, up to then, had been fired on either side. We reported ourselves to our officer, who immediately advanced us (the videttes having all retired to where Lieut. Scott was stationed) against some Zulus who were coming on slowly. Heavy firing was then heard on our left, and being fired on we returned the fire, posting ourselves in a donga. (It was from this donga we saw the rocket battery cut up). 


Barkers leaves his  location  "We reported ourselves to our officer, who immediately  advanced us"   Barker even indirectly tells us Scott is on Amatushane     posting ourselves in a donga   . This donga is directly north of Amatushane  this is where he sights the destruction of the rocket battery. Julian you have your locations and times all wrong. What is your source concerning Scott being on Itusi. 


Here is a photo marking all the locations for you I have included the locations for the discovery also. I will email you a copy in case you can not see my annotations [You must be registered and logged in to see this image.]

AUSSIE
Simply quoting the same para. back to me without explanation of your thoughts does not help me understand your reasoning.
Your 5.58 post puts Barker's vedette post where he met Scott on the Nqutu plateau: "from the following statement we know Barker is near to his vidette location the following location can only be once he has climbed the Nqutu escarpment."
Your 9.19 post puts the vedette on Conical Koppie: "Barker even indirectly tells us Scott is on Amatushane."
Which one do you think it is?
My own thoughts are that Scott may have begun the day on Conical Koppie but then moved to Itusi.
Look at my 12.27 post.
Thank you for the photo.

Julian 

There seems to be some confusion.

Go to Lieutenant Davies testimony he places Scott on the pointed hill during this period also latter on he mentions that Scott had strict orders from Pulliene not to leave his post

Scott was on Amatushane mate Barker and Davies confirm it

Morning Frank. Hope your power is back on.
Re your last post.
I appreciate the Zulus came up over the ridge from the east side of Ngwebini, (the ridge shown in the superb photograph of yours above) and attacked Durnford.

What I was wondering though was if the chest has been stung into action by Robert's and Raw and are now rising up and charging forward, (either from the Ngwebini or your advanced position) which then causes Scott to send Whitelaw and his mate to warn Durnford, how far north from Itusi would they have to ride to gain access to your route down into the Qwabe vally to deliver their message?

The reason I ask as looking at map no2 the route down seems quite close to Mabaso and the advancing Zulus.
Can you ride down the northern side of Itusi to join your route?
Hope that makes sense. (the wine was flowing last night)

Morning Inky

Quote :

Yes your correct my theory relies on Barker, but thats because I know where he is.

I'm glad you do Inky, perhaps you can tell Barker.

Morning Julian

Quote :

Could we just say that the two Carbineers approached Durnford's column from the left rear?

You can say anything you like ducky. Just one thing, what do you regard as an 'official map'?

Kate

Aussie,
I feel we’ve reached an impasse which will result endlessly in the ping-pong ball being sent back and forth. The game isn’t worth the candle.
The reason is you have based your thoughts on the assumption that Barker’s account is Gospel and both reliable as a source and contemporary (or near-contemporary) and are trying to fit a narrative which will sit neatly alongside it.
I on the other hand am working with the only date I know for it (1912) and see in it only confusion and collation of times, places and events (although I don’t doubt that he witnessed what he claims he saw). All my training and experience tells me that it’s inaccurate and unreliable as a source and should be treated in the same way as I would the late accounts from the 50th commemoration of the battle: useful as a corroborative source but unuseable as a source on which to base anything.
We are therefore fundamentally at odds and nothing can result. It is better we simply agree to disagree, I think.

Hi Kate
the access from the iThusi ridge down onto the valley floor is within metres of iThusi itself. There would have been quite some time available for Scott to see the advance of the impi and shoot of his warnings, Barker to camp and Whitelaw to Qwabe. Earlier there was mention of Scott moving around, Im pretty certain that he would have been angling for the best view of the events unfolding and quite possibly moved to the west and in doing so started to pick up the balance of the vedettes ready for a dash back to the camp, and that would explain why he didnt see/be seen the rocket battery starting their climb upwards.
Hope that helps, sorry got some chest paine this morning.

Kate
Official as in issued by or emanating from the government/army to explain or describe what happened or as a source received on which it took action...as in HMSO Narrative, Blue Books, etc.  OED: "Of or relating to an office, post, position of trust, or service; belonging or relating to the discharge of duties; connected with the tenure of office."
And not therefore a map found over 100 years later not (as far as is known) made use of, referred to in an official source, or published at the time.
I did not first use the word 'official'.  AUSSIE used it to give credence to a point he was trying to make, which was in that instance unjustified.  Perhaps you should ask him what he regards as 'official'.
As for left and rear, Cochrane was an officer writing an official report (note the use of the word 'official') and therefore careful in his choice of language; Molife was not.  Left...from the hills. I'd go with Cochrane every time.

Its a Military survey Map

Who do you think draw it up.

it is signed, dated and have its reference number on the top right hand side

At the bottom it says
Surveyed by Captain Anstey R.E. and Lieut Penrose R.E.
its official

Aussie /Kate
With all due deference I think the point Julian is making is that although the map itself can be regarded as an 'official' document in that it was created by two Serving Officers and printed by HMSO the additions to it are done at a later time and period and were added in a private capacity, hence not official.
Hope that makes sense.

Frank
Of course that's what I meant.  Sorry, all, I took it for granted that that was obvious.

aussie
Confining myself purely to matters of fact you said that both DAVIES and BARKER wrote that Scott was on Amatutshane.
Nowhere does Barker specifically state this.
Neither does Davies say this.  In fact he wrote: “two men came up from Lieutenant Scott, who had been doing picket duty on the same ridge where the Zulus were first seen” in other words: Itusi.  
(Report, Times of Natal, 27th January 1879 [reprinted in (Ai) Natal Mercury, 31st January 1879; partly reprinted in (Aii) Illustrated London News, 29th March 1879 (wrongly ascribed to Lieut. Newnham Davis, IMI) and (Aiii) Irish Times, 8th March 1879]. )
I do not doubt, as I said before, that Scott began the day on Amatutshane but at the critical time of the impi's discovery and the sending off of messages to Pulleine and Durnford, he was on Itusi or its eastward ridge.

Julian
It is a bit confusing, in one statement by Davies he says: "We were here overtaken by 2 carbineers, who had been sent with a message from Lieutenant Scott of the Native Contingent, who was on piquet duty on the pointed hill to the left front of the camp."
Its debatable really because he also mentions the same pointed hill that they passed on way to the valley. I say debatable because Scott could not possibly have seen any portion of the zulu from Amatutshane.
My personal belief is that Scott could have been on Amatutshane and moved up to the ridge at the urging of possibly Barker. At that point realising what was happening sent the carbineers down into the valley.
Just my thoughts.

Julian
I knew what was meant by your post regarding the map Inky posted up.

"Office, post, position of trust, service"  could encompass a wide range of sources depending on how we ourselves define an 'office, post or service' or how we regard a position of trust.
For example to some a high court judge is a position of trust, to others he is a corrupt lacky of a controlling state. To some the government sources are correct to others they are merely propaganda manipulated by the victors and those in power. Do you see what I mean?

My question was asking what you personally regarded as 'official'.
You answered my question at 11.21am. Thank you    
No further clarification was necessary thanks Frank.

Sorry for the delay I had to check the dictionary to see what OED meant.
Kate

Frank
and the date of that other Davies account is?

Kate. With Apologies I had'nt intended that to come across as 'Mansplaning'.

Julian I have it listed as just 'Statement of Lieutenant H. Davies, Commanding Edendale Troop, Natal Native Horse.'
I would need to check with Mike on the date.

Sounds like it might be TNA from 1880.

Its a Military map drawn up by officers, it seems the militay then came up with different conlusion compared to the present historians.

Frank you can see Bazinini hill from Amutashane I have a Pan confirming it.

Julian when I get home I will confirm Davies testimony Barker confirms it with my previous statements

Julian  the testimony you wanted found in Select Documents of the Zulu war source book by Keith Smith

TNA, WO 33/34  Inclosure 2. No 96  Statement H D. Davies, commanding the Edendale troop Natal Mounted contingent  February 1879

" We then  proceeded round the pointed hill on the left front of camp, and were about 2 miles beyond the ridge on the left front of the camp { we could not see the camp } and very near to the other ridge that you cannot see at all from the camp, this would make us about three and a half from the camp. We were then overtaken by 2 Carbineers, who had been sent with the message from Lieutenant Scott of the Native Contingent who was on picquet duty on the pointed hill to the left front of the camp. The message was to the effect that we had better return as the enemy were that surrounding us. Colonel Durnford remarked. " The enemy cant surround us, and if they do, we will cut through them". He asked me where the rocket battery was.  I told him a very long way behind.  He then told the two Carbineers return and tell Lieutenant Scott to support him with his picquet. The Natal Carbineers replied that Lieutenant Scott would not leave his post on any account whatever, as he had strict instructions from Colonel Pulleine not to leave his post on any pretence whatever "

It seems to me at one stage he left his post and was rebuked by Colonel Pulleine you may interpret it differently.

Frank here is part of my pan from Amutshane.  You can even see Nyezi Scott would have had no trouble sighting the Left Horn, remember he would off had his field glasses with him
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AUSSIE
We have to be careful with language here.  The map was not a 'military' map drawn up by officers, though it was drawn by Henderson, and it certainly wasn't 'official' (there's that word again).  Its purpose is unknown and it certainly wasn't common knowledge at the time. It is likely that it was drawn up for private reasons. Remember it ended up in a bundle of papers in possession of Frances Colenso donated to the RE Museum in Chatham probably after her death.
It's interesting that Davies on 27th January should have written that Scott was on Itusi ridge and then in February have written that he was on the "pointed hill".  Combined with Cochrane's testimony it doesn't alter my general opinion though.  Logic speaks against it.
Davies doesn't mention that he had field glasses.  Again, one can't assume automatically that he had.
I'm impressed that you managed to scramble to the top of Amatutshane.  It must have taken you a good half hour with all those large-ish loose rocks?  I don't think that someone could see down the valley beyond Qwabe from there though, could he?

Julian the map is not a Military Map very well and its not drawn up by officers I must be blind then is it signed by Thomas Anstey ?  Did you read the very bottom line on the right hand side 
" Intelligence Branch Quarf  Mas  Gen Dep Horse Guards " I look at other official maps and their all very similar  and then you say Henderson Drawn it up for private reasons, please provide the proof. You dont believe Barker because you think even though it can not be proven he wrote it down 1910 then you have a map signed by  Thomas Anstey in 1879 the brother of Edgar Anstey one of the life's lost in the battle it seems you pick and choose what you believe.

Lieutenant Mainwaring map dated 2 days later is accepted as official and this is not complete Nonsense they probably slept in the same tent.

Know to Davies because he did not say it on the 27th his  testimony dated February is not valid believe what you like but Scott was on pointed hill at the time of the arrival of Durnfords column and he did see the left horn from there. Does any other account mention he had strict orders from Pulliene to stay put  and Barker mentions on more than one occasion indirectly the location of Scott you just need to work it out for yourself.

What Scott would have seen advancing would off look like a big black shadow advancing if I recall correctly all officers were issued Field glasses and seeing he was  commanding the Carbineers he would have been issued one. If he didn't then it was a mistake.

Inky,

...if I recall correctly all officers were issued Field glasses...

Field-glasses would have been private purchased, rather than issued.

JY

Hi John

My mistake then concerning Field  glasses being issued. Then would it be required item ?

Is the Mainwaring map official or another Fake ?

Thanks John for your correction what other items would have been under private purchase.

Anthony,

Officers would have to supply their own personal weapons, as well as their own uniforms and equipment. It would depend on how deep their pockets were as to what else they would purchase.

In my opinion if an officer endorses a map with his signature it would become an official document.

JY