Lieut. Walsh and the Siphezi patrol of the 21st January

Julian,

Correct, I take your point, I was conflating, in my head as I wrote, Lonsdale with Dartnell. However, the salient point stands the expedition was in a cleft stick to return was to lose contact with the Zulu to stay was to be exposed. There was no right answer for the expedition, but it was a situation into which Chelmsford had placed them. He could hardly blame a reconnaisance force for finding the enemy and following procedure by staying in touch with them. Yet he did. I am probably not alone in thinking that he was delighted at the time, I cannot help thinking that the NNC were bait.

As to placement of the camp at Mangene. I think Chelmsford realised that he was not going all the way to Ondini with a 10 mile long wagon train. Mangene was as good a place as any to meet the main Zulu Impi such was his confidence in the outcome, it was a very poor location for an onward march with his wagons to Ondini given his constraints in logistics. He got his wish his force met the Zulu on the way to Ondini, his plan worked to that extent.

Have a look at LC's correspondence with Frere in the NAM's Chelmsford Papers - I think you'll find that LC was in agreement with you about the waggon train!
Also note that LC's instructions to Dartnell were distinct in that he should RETURN to camp once the reconnaissance was over. Even though Dartnell was in a cleft stick, should he not have returned? He had after all only reportedly seen a thousand or so Zulu? Hardly 25,000 plus-impi size!

Julian, A reconaisance is not over until the mission is complete, Dartnell supplied via Gossett intelligence to Chelmsford. Chelmsford is the person responsible for dealing with the consequences of it. Dartnell's problem was that his NNC NCO's were out on their feet, they had started at 4-40am. The Cavalry could have got back to camp but they were the firepower of the combined unit. The infantry alone and exposed at night if the Zulus decided to attack would be annihilated, even in laager all on the mountian agreed if the Zulus had attacked they would have destroyed the force. This situation could have been foreseen by Chelmsford and he probably did foresee it, he chanced it, if it went wrong he had an excuse as the order shows. If he did not foresee this situation given the NNC were only formed fours week earlier and had no training, with NCO's pretty much picked up off the street and not necessarily up to the rigours of military campaigning, why was he commanding?

Back to your point on Durnford and maps. I think I have the definitive answer, (Droogleever Road to Isandlwana p142) this was at the early stages of discussion with T Shepstone about the anexation of Zululand - august 12th 1877 "for the next two and a half months he travelled between Natal and the Transvaalin his two wheeled cart on what appears to be a military survey. It most likely was of a secret nature for there is no clue in his brothers biography nor in the Colenso correspondence to show what he was doing". These maps if there are such, as seems likely, are probably sitting in some military archive maybe Chatham or somewhere else? Would be interesting if they ever turned up.

Tig
I think you may well be right about the 1877 survey. I've never seen anything at Chatham which might correspond but it is a real rabbit warren underground and they may be hidden away somewhere. something for the 'to-do' list.
While your comments re the Dartnell-Chelmsford situation are true, and I cannot disagree with them, an order is still an order. Yes, Lonsdale's NNC were tired but Murray's NNC coy herded captured cattle back through the night to arrive at camp in the morning. Walsh's men worked through the night. All Dartnell had to do was point them in the direction of 'home'.

Julian,

If you look at Chelmsford's actions in response to Dartnell's position and actions, rather than his response to what seems to be a fairly peeved horseguards, it adds rather a lot more nuance to the debate, over and above "an order is an order".

In the afternoon of the 21st Dartnell was well aware of the position of the Zulu and or the NNC, the NNC were by then on the SE flank of Hlazikani having emerged from the valley. The mounted troops were some three miles away (according to Hamilton Browne) between Hlazikazi and the Magogo Hill, (I think accurate opographical nomenclature is probably somewhat unreliable), the Zulu were on the hill across the valley from the NE side of Hlazikazi.

At this point c.4pm Gerald French (Lord Chelmsford and the Zulu War 1939 p70) Gossett and Buller returned to Chelmsford to report the situation, with the "proposal"  albeit a secondary, source does present Chelmsford in a most favourable light. He adds "These arrangements being approved by the General rations and blankets were sent out...etc"

Out at Hlazikazi whilst Gossett is riding back, the NNC cross the Hlazikazi ridge to link up with the mounted troops and face off opposite the Zulu position about 3 miles away. The rations and blankets arrived (soon after dark NN p53). Walsh in command of detatchment from the camp carried the "approval" of the General to stay out. The orders therefore that Chelmsford refers to in his response to Horseguards were clearly changed in the light of the report of the reconnaissance party.

I have not seen the actual order that Chelmsford refers to. Given that Chelmsford has as they say "previous" in terms of recollecting the precise wording of orders I would find it useful to know.

That Chelmsford changed his strategy very late on, after the planning stage, but early in the execution phase of the invasion I think is not doubted. He was now looking for confrontation to his front and wanted to ensure pacification to his rear and flanks, rather than a set piece at Ondini. It is the only reasonable explanation of why he went down to Mangene at all. This is why I think this particular "minor" action is actually an extremely important to understanding why the strategy failed so utterly and disasterously.

Chelmsford was confident that if he followed this strategy then because he knew the main Impi had left Ondini on 19th Jan it would have to pass his front and could not threaten his lines of communication undetected. It failed because the Zulu moved faster than he expected and controlled the limits of his "visibility" by controlling the extent of his reconnaissance and the critical observation points along the iSipezi ridge and in particular the northern end which explains why Browne was confronted and driven off.

Chelmsford's strategy, which you describe in your penultimate paragraph, are precisely those posted by me yesterday at 3.37 which quoted from Chelmsford's three letters written just prior to the 22nd.

Julian,

Yes indeed, I re-read it in French's book and the letters. The salient points I am making in counter to Chelmsford's statement regarding the "return to camp" order are in this context spurious for the following reasons.

1, That Chelmsfords strategy was being changed "on the fly"
2, That Dartnell's expedition was ill thought out, being somewhere between reconnaissance and reconnaissance in force, having the advantages of neither and the disadvantages of both.
3, That the orders were orders "defence" he used vis a vis Horseguards was disingenuous, misleading, and seeking to place blame onto others.
4, That he underestimated the mobility of the Zulu Impi and failed to adequately reconnoitre the lines of the anticipated Zulu advance adequately, which was essential to any chance of success of his revised strategy.

If Chelmsford were alive today might he not say in response to your 4 points:
1) A good commander should be flexible enough to respond to situations as they develop.
2) And whose fault was that?  "I'm vexed!", remember!
3) And how do you think Horse Guards would react to an 'order' not being obeyed?
4) "I was expecting the impi to arrive about the time that it did - and it did!"  "That they could evade a professional European army just shows what a worthy foe and remarkable people the Zulu are."
Not being controversial here; just playing Devil's advocate.

Julian,

The world would be a far less interesting and more primitive place were it not for Devil's Advocates.

1, A good commander is defined by outcomes.
2, Elements of the mounted force at Hlazikazi tried a feint towards the Zulu at the close of the day and were forced to quickly retire when the Zulu deployed to outflank them. That illustrates the reason why the mounted infantry could not ascend to the ridge. The correct objective, inadequate forces.
3, Trying to get my head around the double negative there, I think it starts with determining what the order said and its unambiguity in any situation, then assess the actions taken. In the final analysis the commander should preserve a viable force unless extreme hazard demands otherwise.
4, The converse of course is how could a professional British Army not find 25,000 Zulus given notice of their approach and where they were coming from. Also in that circumstance of find itself split asunder and ill prepared for the equally well anticipated assault on the column. The Zulu achieved surprise, envelopment, and superior "firepower" at the critical point.

The Zulu seems to have had complete command of the battle zone, an order of magnitude better intelligence, a far better understanding of terrain and its use, and above all a simple plan, carried out by men well trained in the execution of the plan. A simple plan that nonetheless required very high levels of co-ordination and timing which was also executed to perfection.

They achieved what seems to me, when I look at my sketch of movements over the battle zone, it extends to something like 250 square miles, as near a perfect Battle of Annihilation as I am aware of. They achieved surprise when even though they were expected, that is quite an achievement. If the British thought they were good, and they were, the Zulus were better on the day.

In the brief period I have looked at posts on the forum here, the level of detailed information is almost overwhelming, but it is almost all focused on questions about why the British lost the battle so overwhelmingly despite high levels of discipline and equipment. Who ordered whom to where and why? Who followed orders or failed to, and so on.

The question seems to me better put the other way around. Why did the Zulu win? When I look at that it seems to me there is no conundrum at all for the reasons stated above.

2. The mounted force were not trying to ascend the ridge - they were coaxing the Zulus down to get an idea of their strength.
3. apologies. Should have written 'obeyed'.

Julian,

I was referring to Phindo hill on the iSipezi ridge not the hill on which the Zulu were established which was below the ridgeline. Hence my comment regarding topographical nomenclature. Phindo and the ridge would have given observation of the route of the Zulu Impi towards the iThusi and Nquto.

With poor maps Chelmsford was not in a good position to direct any reconnaisance, his focus seems to have been to determine where the Impi was not rather than where it was. I think he was confident that the Zulu in front of Dartnell was not the main Impi when he sent Walsh out with blankets. I think he may have changed his mind when Dartnell's second message came in much later on, after which he gave orders for the large force to be made ready to go ot on 22nd. In this he would have been correct, except that the Impi was not reinforcing Mangene, it was deploying towards Nqutu.

So poor old Dartnell got blamed by Chelmsford for the wild goose chase on the 22nd.

Julian regarding the Davey mystery and where he was during the patrols discussed here, I have just found an intreguing bit in Russell's 1st April account. He writes :-

"In this I was unsucessful, so I rejoined the squadron 'X' meeting a second mounted European, who also said that he was sent to inform the General that the camp was attacked. As soon as I approached the place where the movements of the morning began I sent out Lt. Walsh and Lt Day [and this is the intreguing bit. Lt Day is crossed out it looks like 'Captain Davy' has been written above] each with an escort to try and find His Excellency"

The X in the above passage refers to a side note that reads "The Officers of which informed me that they had seen the guns in the camp firing". This looks like Russell's handwriting and is not signed.

Now the scanner is working again I will send you a copy of the original and let me know what you think about the name.

I can tell you before you send it that it is Capt. Davey.

"The Officers...firing" is in Russell's own hand.
"Capt. Davy" is in neither Russell's nor Crealock's hand.

There were questions about the possible 'Durnford maps' being followed by chelmsford.
This is a boundary map, 1846,most probably in use before the war, the boundary is plotted in red

[You must be registered and logged in to see this image.]

Frank
So you think that the references to the 'Durnford maps' might relate to maps SUPPLIED by Durnford rather than DRAWN by him?

That could very easily be assumed. This is the map I believe that Durnford used to draw his boundary lines before producing this one.
[You must be registered and logged in to see this image.]

I can see the logic behind that.

I does not tie into what Chelmsford wrote according to French (Lord Chelmsford and his Critics p278 para c.) to "refute the calumnies of Archibald Forbes & Co." (according to Gossett) "The only map of Zululand was that contained in Jeppe's map of the South African Republic on the Scale of 30 miles to the inch"

I suspect LC was again dismembling; hard to imagine a man can remember the scale of a map and forget another which he reports as having in his possession. "vide Durnford"

The Jeppe map at that scale was worse than useless.
This one was also available at the time at 5 miles to the inch[You must be registered and logged in to see this image.]

Hi All
Like Tig I'd also read somewhere about the existence of a ' Durnford Map ' ... from page 215 ' A Soldiers Life And Work In South Africa ' by E. Durnford who draws on the correspondence of his brother Anthony .... This from the last letter written by Anthony Durnford at Rorke's Drift Jan 21st 1879 to his Mother . I quote ... '' I have sent on to ask for instructions from the General , who is about 10 Miles off , forming a camp at or near the Isandhlwana mountain ( see my map of Zululand ) '' . Well , it appears his mother had a copy of his Zululand Map ! , doubtful he'd word it that way if she had a military map ( Why ? ) or Jepp's map etc ? . as I'd expect did others who he thought pertinent ? .
90th

Hi 90th,

In fairness it is said (I forget where) that the Jeppe map was blown up and issued in that form. I see the date is March.

Maps are a great leveller in war, vide road signs being removed in Ukraine.

Chelmsford had better weapons but worse maps, the Zulu had better "maps" and worse weapons. On the day the Zulu delivered their poor weapons to the place where they had most effect. Chelmsford had dispersed his.

Luck, I think not.

Tig
Re the 'vide Durnford' comment, it does not necessarily mean that LC had one in his possession. It could be that he was recalling it or that there was a copy (for general use) in the HQ tent.

Julian, I agree to the extent that that is an outside chance.

If so that would lead me to the conclusion that the plan was based upon inadequate intelligence. This in itself could be compensated by better provision for reconnaissance in the execution, but as we know Chelmsford did not have enough mounted troops, he was probably also short of sappers.

I am re-visiting this thread after thinking some more on Lt Browne. It ties in with Lt Walsh, Hlazikazi and kicked off some other more contentious and very speculative thoughts and questions. I re-read Norris Newman p53 quoted below.

"A trying three hours brought daylight, during which we did have one more false alarm, but it was not taken much notice of this time. I should mention that just after dark Lieutenant Walsh, with twenty Mounted Infantry, arrived after a tedious and plucky journey from the camp, during which he met with small bodies of the enemy, and brought four packhorses with some few blankets, tea, sugar, biscuits, and tinned meat. This was distributed among us, as far as it would go, and did a little to make us more comfortable. This officer also brought the news that the General would be with us at daylight, and that reinforcements in strength were to come up in the morning, so as to assist in the attack on the body of Zulus we had seen that evening. He also stated that Captain Browne, of the Mounted Infantry, had been out reconnoitring towards the Isipezi hill on our left front, and had not only seen several large bodies moving in an easterly direction, but when returning had fallen in with eight mounted Zulus and thirty footmen, with whom, as they attempted to cut his party off, he had an engagement, ending in the death of two Zulus and two of their horses, without any casualty on our side. The Zulu firing was stated to be most erratic. Besides this, one or two mounted bodies of Zulus had been seen hovering about, particularly on our left front. So that altogether things looked cheering, and the chance of measuring our strength against the enemy seemed to be rapidly drawing near."

It is worth gving a timeline for some events of 21st Jan. Please clarify or correct if these are incorrect or requiremore clarity.

1, Browne's recon was in the morning, exactly whereabouts is moot, but what he saw, as recorded above is not in great dispute, that said I have not seen the original.

2, Chelmsford was perambulating around Malakatha in the morning on a failed attempt to meet Gamdama in his Kraal, he then went back to camp where eventually he met Gamdama, then on a recon late afternoon up to iThusi, thence back to camp c 7-00pm?

3, Dartnell was heading to Hlazikazi whilst the NNC were going to a nearby destination on the Malakatha side of Hlazikazi. By early afternoon Dartnell, all mounted, had made contact with the Zulu around Magogo. He sent word to the NNC companies to meet him, they had to cross the Hlazikazi ridge to do so and would have arrived by Dusk (Maori Browne p121). The NMP made a feint towards the Zulu position and retreated after the Zulus showed their force and attempted to surround the horsemen.

4, Dartnell sends word to LC via Gossett and Buller LC's Staff Officers of the situation and that he intends to Bivvy overnight and attack the Zulu positon in the morning "if there were no order to the contrary" comments Milne. The NMP History states that the attack would be made at 6-00am whetheror not the requested 2 companies arrived or not. Gossett reaches LC around 4-00pm. (Clery?) LC Approves (LC later says "Vexed") LC gives orders for "food to be sent2, (Milne) . LC Continues with his recon upto iThusi where he sees Zulu horsemen four miles distant. At this point in time the NNC were not in contact with the Zulu, only the mounted troops were, they could have withdrawn the 3 miles back to the NNC on the other side of Hlazikazi, thence to camp. (see Maori Browne on locations). The response to Dartnells question re the attack does not come to him until after dark with Walsh.

5, Sometime later around 6-00pm after a meeting between Major Lonsdale NNC and Dartnell, Dartnell had second thoughts possibly on understanding the condition of the NNC who according to MB were in no condition to fight. Reliable Infantry would be key to achieving objectives in the morning, horsemen alone were of no use. Dartnell sends to LC a request for blankets and reinforcements (NN p51) Dartnell and Lonsdale were keen to fight and it is by no means clear that they would not have fought in the morning even if the part column under LC had not arrived. In other words they probably did not consider themselves to be in danger and were keeping options open. The messenger was Capt Davey? What was his message? blankets were already in camp at this time and men resigned to a cold hungry night, it could only have been at RL & PQ suggest in Zulu Victory confirmation of the authorisation to attack in the morning. Davey leaves before Walsh arrives.

6, Lt Walsh arrives with supplies at Hlazikazi, (? around 8-00pm? he would have left by around 5 or 6-00pm ) NN makes his notes? Here is where accounts and recall of events really start to diverge. Maori Browne makes no note of this, though he says there were two separate formations in two squares, one of mounted troops the other of NNC it may be that Browne was unaware of the supplies. Which were intended only for the Mounted troops.

7, Davey would have arrived in Camp around 3 hours after leaving say 10-00pm, Clery says about 9-00pm. The message delivered Davey returned to the Bivvy, the NMP history records p55 "he returned late at night".

8, Lt Walsh at 1-30am on the 22nd returned to camp from the Bivvy, the message he carried according to Clery was that "the enemy seemed in much stronger numbers" and he would not attack them without 2 or three companies in support. The History of the NMP does not contain any reference I can see to this Lt Walsh message. RL & PQ refer to a "pencilled note" does it still exist? If Walsh had left the Bivvy 3 hours before his arrival in camp he would have left at c.10-30pm why wait so long after arriving @ 8-00 pm. Nowhere do I find any reference in the NMP history or Maori Browne any reference to an increase in Zulu numbers, in this period, perhaps I have missed it. I am also at a loss to understand how anybody in camp would know if there were greater numbers of Zulus in the hills around, it was after all dark, it was noted in the morning that the bivvy had not thrown out any patrols.

9, @2-00am LC meets with Clery and Milne he decides to split the column to go to the aid of Dartnell. LC arrives at the Bivvy @ 6-30am with the column 1hr behind. The "enemy" was "not in sight".

Why then does NN state unequivocably that "This officer (Lt Walsh) also brought the news that the General would be with us at daylight, and that reinforcements in strength were to come up in the morning, so as to assist in the attack on the body of Zulus we had seen that evening"? If true, then it questions the whole narrative of events. If untrue it is a very big failing of a very well thought of, and experienced correspondent.

Further he even sees to go out of his way to draw attention to this, in the way he adds all of this informaiton more as a footnote, than as part of a narrative?

Why is LC keen to point out in his dispatches, his actions on recon on the 20th Jan, but completely avoids any mention of what he was doing all day on the 21st, and the other intelligence reaching him. Why in this context is a senior officer pointing out that he has allowed himself to become a victim of circumstance and responding to events rather that driving them along on the basis of known intelligence and as Donald Rumsfeld would say the known unknowns. i.e where is the main Zulu Impi? Or perhaps he was convinced that is exactly what he thought was doing, and was building the narrative to justify it.

Anyway another rabbit hole looked down.

Hi Tig
If we assume that a lot of what is written, by all and sundry, on iSandlwana at the time could very well be second hand knowledge it could explain the disparities in timing. Noggs is plainly wrong with the statements from Walsh, possibly he is mixing him up with Davey?
Looking forward to wandering over the ground Browne covered and his engagement.

Cheers

Hi Frank, Yes I agree it is likely the Noggs had it wrong. But, there always is one, Noggs is very specific about the timing as well as the bearer, he was also a close to a first hand witness as we have. I do not think I would forget the bearer of good news in such circumstances, nor its import, the reinforcement by regular well armed troops by early morning. The other questions are also pertinent, why did no one who was there refer to the Walsh message? How did they know there were more Zulus overnight nothing written by the people who were there suggests this, at least that I have seen? For to believe Noggs was wrong is also to demand answers to these questions. Davey's return is noted in the NMP History but there is nothing of the news be brought recorded, given the circumstances of the force, this is also surprising.

"Plainly wrong, why? Presumably because the other interpretations and implications are I think scarcely believable?

The Browne engagement is interesting, Noggs report is also instructive here, this news probably did come from Walsh, His observations seem regarding "several large bodies" of Zulus "moving in an easterly direction" to be remote from the position of the engagement, which was on his return to camp from his OP. It is also clear that at this time Noggs and the force were in a very optomistic state of mind, this also suggests that Noggs may have been aware of reinforcement in the morning. Given the "error" of the identity bearer of news can this be believed, or is is some later conflation?

Tig
Rather than rely just on Noggs's record of what was message brought by Walsh, it is vital to look also at what LC's message was as recorded by those around him.
Much as I tend to agree with your general remarks about Noggs, I cannot but help side with Frank's view.
In response to your request for comments on a timeline...
4 pm  Gosset, etc. arrive from Dartnell to inform LC of Dartnell's willingness to attack in the morning but if no orders are sent he will bivouac and watch the enemy.
5 pm  LC by way of response sends Walsh + 20 IMI + 4 NMP packhorses laden with food to Dartnell plus the message that LC gives his full support for an attack in the morning.
6.30 pm Dartnell, having heard nothing from LC, sends Davey with message for LC to obtain authority for a dawn attack.
7.30 pm (suggested) Walsh arrives on the Mangeni and Dartnell, having received reports from a vedette on Hlazakazi, gets cold feet and so sends Walsh back to LC with a request for 2/3 coys of 24th, without which he will not attack.  Walsh leaves at 8.00 p.m. (suggested).
9 pm Davey arrives at Isandhlwana with his messsage and also reporting on the "large bodies of Zulus seen near Isipezi, moving northwards, from Hlazakazi" and is told to return to Dartnell reiterating his permission for Dartnell to attack in the morning.  Davey leaves (no record of time).
1.30 am Walsh arrives at Isandhlwana with Dartnell's request for a reinforcement of 2 Imperial coys.  Walsh is sent back to Dartnell saying LC is coming with half the army.
1.00 am (suggested) Davey returns to Dartnell.
4.30 am (suggested) Walsh returns to Dartnell.
Goodness knows how Davey and Walsh kept awake the next day.

Julian,

I agree with both you and Frank that it is likely that Noggs got it wrong. That does leave the possibility that he did not. Like you I looked at the circumstances of LC receiving the message, I also looked at the senders accounts of the situation. The records of the LC circumstances are recounted afterwards firstly in the Dispatch from LC written at PMB on 27th Jan with hindsight. Might LC not consider at this time his decision to split theforce needed some cast iron logic to it? The message itself to my knowledge has never been recorded, there is "previous" in the context of the Durnford order which may give some substance to this viewpoint.

The view from Dartnell at Hlazakazi was a little different if we regard the account in the History of the NMP as being a true account. The message carried by Gossett to Chelmsford was according to Page 54 "In many accounts of the Zulu war it is stated that he appealed for reinforcements, but this is incorrect. He had decided to attack the impi at dawn, adding that a company or two of the 24th Regiment might instil confidence in the Native Contingent, but whether they came or not the attackwould be made at 6 a.m." This message would have been generated not before 2-00pm to arrive with LC @ 4-00pm.

The "Narrative" p30 takes over here and reports that on receiving the message from Gossett, Buller and Drummond, asking for reinforcment LC "declined to accede to this request"..... Blankets and food were sent out to the mounted troops with Lt Walsh and some IMI. These were received by camp just before dark c 6-45pm". This suggests your timline of 7-30pm is not correct. The Narrative also states "the number of Zulus seen here ("the hills to the eastward 2) at sunset (c. 7-00pm) was so large that Major Dartnell sent in a note to camp, stating that he and Commandant Lonsdale did not consider the force at their disposal sufficient to attack, and requesting a reinforcement of two or three companies of the 24th be sent out to them the next morning." Who was the bearer of this note? Lt Walsh or Lt Davy? It conceivably could be either.

It does not seem reasonable to me that a massage of this import would be delayed in the sending, Lt Walsh would be in a position to both observe and discuss with Dartnell the Zulus on the hills. Consider also that the message, as reported, states that Dartnell does not consider he has sufficient force to attack the Zulu, he does not say that his position is overextended, at risk and unable to defend itself. For a message to reach camp by way of Lt Walsh it infers he left the bivvy no later than 11-00pm.

If carried by Davy who according to the History of the NMP "Captain Davy, adjutant of volunteers, had gone back to the camp, and it was anxiously hoped that he would return with some food. He returned late at night with a very inadequate supply of provisions, which quickly disappeared." This would probably read "early morning" if he returned past midnight, if he left camp @ 1-30 ish am, he would arrive back at the bivvy by c. 4-30am. If he was the bearer of news from LC regarding reinforcement, I would think that was significant enough for it to be recorded by at least one of the accounts of those present. Maori Brown records in his account p125 "To my unbounded surprise, the General, staff, four guns and I think six companies of the second 24th reached us". Is is conceivable that MB was not aware or the Capt Davy had brought these tidings hours earlier?

As to your points about the relative locations and vedettes, it was noted on the arrival of the General at the bivvy that patrols had not been sent out and the location of the Zulus was unknown. The narrative clearly sates the position of the large numbers on the Hills to the east, it did not it seems to me, require a vedette on the top of Hlazakazi to see this, though it might be so. Yet all this is irrelevant if it occurred after dark say by 7-15 m when both Lt Walsh and Capt Davy were likely still in camp or very close to it, the Zulu on the hills could not have been seen.

If the message of import from the bivvy to camp was about the large numbers of Zulus then it would have to be based upon intelligence received before 7-15pm, exactly the time about when Lt Walsh would be returning to camp or thinking about doing so, if that were his intention.

I agree with you that Capt Davy probably left camp before Lt Walsh arrived, this would explain why his trip to camp received scant comment from the commentators who were there.

It though does not explain the reason for Lt Walsh to return to camp so late from the bivvy. Perhaps an explanation is as follows, Lt Walsh and his detachment did not intend to return to camp at all, and only did so later, perhaps after the disturbances in and around the camp, (reported by both Noggs and MB) perhaps he had a message from Dartnell to LC, or perhaps not, perhaps he returned to camp preferring to risk the return journey rather than camped out in the Bivvy. If Capt Davy had returned "late at night" to the bivvy from camp perhaps he had some information from camp that inspired Lt Walsh to return or to carry a message? 11-00pm would allow Walsh to be the bearer of information to LC. Why though would critical information about the large numbers of Zulu be delayed in its transmission to LC? There is no logical reason I can think of, except that this was not thought in the bivvy to be critical. MB does not refer to large numbers, nor does the History of the NMP, neither does Noggs.

What I see are two very different accounts of the same events, all written after the events. The Narrative, Dispatches and Clery's report are all soon afterwards, as is Noggs's. The NMP History and MB account are both long afterwards. The "history" would be available to MB and the NMP author, it should be surprising that they do not tally with the Official accounts, unless it was both intentional and factual. There can be little doubt the LC needed to "spin" his version of events at the time, there was no such need on the part of Noggs, MB or the NMP History, (well maybe a little!) but careers were complete, reputations established in these cases.

If Lt Walsh had returned to camp @ 1-30am with a report about the flightiness of the NNC companies, reinforcing the earlier the report of 2000 Zulus (MB) and seemingly LC's own belief that this was the Zulu impi, it seems to me that it is a small step to misrepresent when he received information, informaiton critical to his decision to split his force, widely believed before and since to be a major reason for the defeat of the force left at the camp. There was time after all betwwen the battle and the draughting of his dispatch on the 27th Jan to think hard about such things. It also deflects from the more critical fact, that there at that time 20,000 Zulus camped not 8 miles from camp of which LC had no cognisance, but some intelligence of.

To summarise, I think there was a message but it did not have the same emphasis that Chelmsord and Clery embelish it with.

Tig
Thank you for the fulsome and interesting reply. Due to personal circumstances I'll need a day or three to take it all in and respond properly but I WILL reply.

Tig
You are right to think that LC’s 27th Jany. despatch might have been written with an eye to casting his actions in a favourable (logical) light i.e. splitting his force. However, many were party to the information received from Dartnell at the time and there were no questions raised subsequently, contemporaneously or later, to the factual accuracy surrounding the reasons for doing so.
Re the message carried by Gosset, etc. and LC’s response: the NMP History written, as you say, much later may have conflated the Gosset and Walsh messages’ content; the Narrative (published 1881, re-printed 1907, you quote from p. 30) would appear to have done the same, with the addition that it recorded LC’s refusal to accede to the’request’.
The c. 6.45 pm timing was not part of the “Blankets and provisions…just before dark” Narrative quotation. Nevertheless I accept that that time is about right (sunset was at 6.59 that day). I overestimated the time it would have taken Walsh to reach the Mangeni in the failing light.
The bearer of the post-sunset message request for 2/3 coys was definitely Lieut. Walsh and three IMI (Harford’s Diary p. 44). Probably he was selected because it was thought he stood the best chance of a successful journey since he had just navigated his way from there. Davey can only have been despatched before Walsh’s arrival on the Mangeni.
I agree there could have been no delay in sending this message and Harford confirms that there was discussion over it (p. 44 “A council of war was held” to which Walsh was party). Walsh must have left Dartnell’s bivouac certainly before 8 pm, got lost on the return to camp in the dark, arrived at Isandhlwana camp’s outermost picquets about 1 am, and, finally, reporting to Clery before 1.30 am.
Re Davey and the NMP History, I think it has again conflated two events. While it was hoped the Davey would return with provisions, he did not. It was Walsh and his 20 IMI who brought the provisions c. 6.45 pm., or as Norris-Newman wrote, “just after dark” (p. 53).
Davey had taken a message to LC for confirmation of permission to attack. This was presumably given and brought back by Davey.
So, it was definitely Walsh who took the message to LC requesting 2/3 coys of the 24th. Norris-Newman does confirm Walsh’s returning to Dartnell though he manages to conflate it with the circumstances of his first return (p. 53): “This officer also brought the news that the General would be with us at daylight, and that reinforcements in strength were to come up in the morning, so as to assist in the attack on the body of Zulus we had seen that evening.” The content of the message means it can only relate to Walsh’s much later second return to the Mangeni and must have been in the region of 4 to 4.30 am. and this would explain Maori Browne’s “unbounded surprise” at seeing Chelmsford’s forces arrive when he awoke.
Lieut. Maxwell recorded in his ’Reminiscences’, p. 1, Twentyman-Jones ed.,: “About this time, 9 pm, a detachment of Mounted Infantry arrived from the camp, (bye the bye from one of these men the writer obtained a biscuit). They brought orders that we were to remain where we were, and that the General would reinforce us in the early morning and appear himself on the scene. They also stated that they had been fired upon about half way from camp. They returned to camp the same night.” There is no indication of the officer i/c. Given the nature of the message it has to be Walsh rather than Davey and the timing of 9 p.m. has to be inaccurate (it may even be another conflation of events).

Julian,

Thanks for the response. It has certainly revealed a gap in my reading that I will seek to fill, which is the point of raising the subject. It has also revealed how imprecise is the analysis of these events. I have responded below point by point and numbered.

You are right to think that LC’s 27th Jany. despatch might have been written with an eye to casting his actions in a favourable (logical) light i.e. splitting his force. However, many were party to the information received from Dartnell at the time and there were no questions raised subsequently, contemporaneously or later, to the factual accuracy surrounding the reasons for doing so.

1, I agree with the proviso that only Clery and Chelmsford actually read the note and the implications were not it seems debated a decision was made immediately by Chelmsford in his tent with only Clery and possibly Milne present. To my knowledge the actual contents are not known. Any threat to the detached force could have necessitated support being given, it seems more likely to me that rather than a threat to the force it was confirmation by the note, at least in LC's mind, that the main imp's position was known. It does not therefore surprise me that no questions were raised contemporaneously, since only the Chelmsford Clery account of the message contents was on record. At the time the focus would be on going to Mangene not the exact contents of the message.

Re the message carried by Gosset, etc. and LC’s response: the NMP History written, as you say, much later may have conflated the Gosset and Walsh messages’ content; the Narrative (published 1881, re-printed 1907, you quote from p. 30) would appear to have done the same, with the addition that it recorded LC’s refusal to accede to the ’request’.

2, The language of the NMP history is very assertive as to the contents of Gossett’s report, there were two questions for LC to answer, firstly to paraphrase “can I attack tomorrow?” inferring a Bivvy overnight, secondly as you disposed to send me the additional confidence of reinforcements in the task?”. The answer to the first question, (if we believe the NMP history account of the contents of the message by Gossett) was yes to the first and no to the second. The interpretation I read from this is that no one believed at this time that there was a serious threat to the detached force.

The c. 6.45 pm timing was not part of the “Blankets and provisions…just before dark” Narrative quotation. Nevertheless I accept that that time is about right (sunset was at 6.59 that day). I overestimated the time it would have taken Walsh to reach the Mangeni in the failing light.

3, We can I think agree that the Gossett message implied the need for blankets and food, and this was duly sent and arrived c 6-45pm. This coincides exactly with the narrative record of large Zulu forces visible etc..

The bearer of the post-sunset message request for 2/3 coys was definitely Lieut. Walsh and three IMI (Harford’s Diary p. 44). Probably he was selected because it was thought he stood the best chance of a successful journey since he had just navigated his way from there. Davey can only have been despatched before Walsh’s arrival on the Mangeni.

4, On this I think we have no disagreement. (Though I was not aware or have read Harford’s diary account of the events)

I agree there could have been no delay in sending this message and Harford confirms that there was discussion over it (p. 44 “A council of war was held” to which Walsh was party). Walsh must have left Dartnell’s bivouac certainly before 8 pm, got lost on the return to camp in the dark, arrived at Isandhlwana camp’s outermost picquets about 1 am, and, finally, reporting to Clery before 1.30 am.

4, I agree Walsh carried the message, but how do you justify and assert “Walsh must have left Dartnell’s bivouac certainly before 8 pm, got lost on the return to camp in the dark,”? Also I would qualify your assertion that there “could” have been no delay, if that indeed were the contents of the message but this is the account only from LC & Clery there is no other corroboration. In this case I would use the word “should” have been no delay. But we know there was a delay, which you explain and suggest was due to Walsh getting lost.

Re Davey and the NMP History, I think it has again conflated two events. While it was hoped the Davey would return with provisions, he did not. It was Walsh and his 20 IMI who brought the provisions c. 6.45 pm., or as Norris-Newman wrote, “just after dark” (p. 53). Davey had taken a message to LC for confirmation of permission to attack. This was presumably given and brought back by Davey.

5, As to Davy I have seen precious little of his exploits from the record, there may be more that I am unaware of. Given that he left the camp at a time when there were no provisions, nor any sign of them, I think it highly likely that provisions were at least high on his agenda, if not his instruction. It is also I think likely that he was sent back with few provisions, in the knowledge that these had already been sent. I see no reason why he would not reinforce the earlier request we presume to have been sent by Gossett, though as we know, not specifically attributed to him by the Narrative. I also agree that he carried the request for confirmation of the first part of Gossett’s message, paraphrased by me as “can I attack”. As we know Davy, presumably alone, made a timeous return trip to camp in the dark and without incident, inferring of course that Walsh should have managed to retrace his steps in a similar manner.

So, it was definitely Walsh who took the message to LC requesting 2/3 coys of the 24th. Norris-Newman does confirm Walsh’s returning to Dartnell though he manages to conflate it with the circumstances of his first return (p. 53): “This officer also brought the news that the General would be with us at daylight, and that reinforcements in strength were to come up in the morning, so as to assist in the attack on the body of Zulus we had seen that evening.” The content of the message means it can only relate to Walsh’s much later second return to the Mangeni and must have been in the region of 4 to 4.30 am. and this would explain Maori Browne’s “unbounded surprise” at seeing Chelmsford’s forces arrive when he awoke.

6, I was not aware the Walsh returned again to Mangene. @ 4-00am ish, is there evidence for this? You also suggest the Noggs conflates this as well, the amount of conflation that Noggs seems to be indulging in is getting to a degree where one would question his credentials as a reporter or indeed his presence. If your point is true, of course all of my speculation above is rubbish.

Lieut. Maxwell recorded in his ’Reminiscences’, p. 1, Twentyman-Jones ed.,: “About this time, 9 pm, a detachment of Mounted Infantry arrived from the camp, (bye the bye from one of these men the writer obtained a biscuit). They brought orders that we were to remain where we were, and that the General would reinforce us in the early morning and appear himself on the scene. They also stated that they had been fired upon about half way from camp. They returned to camp the same night.” There is no indication of the officer i/c. Given the nature of the message it has to be Walsh rather than Davey and the timing of 9 p.m. has to be inaccurate (it may even be another conflation of events).

7, I have not seen this reference (Maxwell) before so it is new to me. This message also ties into the Noggs report of what it seems to me is the same event, suggesting that Maxwell and Noggs witnessed the same event. It also seems to me that this must be a record of Walsh earlier trip, for otherwise the poor man would have been serving a full day until 5-00 pm after which he made two return trips in the dark from camp to Dartnell, accompanied by his troopers, on one of which he got lost, if he returned to camp he would have met Chelmsford on his way out. I think this explanation unlikely unless there is corroboration. I think rather Walsh did not return to camp immediately rather his departure was delayed and his return was initiated by the disturbances overnight in the bivvy, this message probably included the references to the large number of Zulu on the hill to the east and the disturbances in the bivvy. If so this would allow LC just enough justification to use the reason of the large numbers to justify his move in the morning.

Tig
As before I'll need a day or two before I can respond. To avoid I post-you post ad infinitum I'll only reply to the parts above where there is no agreement (if I can!) - that should shorten the posts and make them more readily understandable.

Tig
Thanks for your patience.

4. How do you justify and assert “Walsh must have left Dartnell’s bivouac certainly before 8 pm, got lost on the return to camp in the dark,”?

‘Should’ or ‘could’, the very nature of Dartnell’s question – reinforcements of 2-3 coys or no attack – would indicate a certain importance to getting the message to LC and back before dawn. I can’t imagine Dartnell would have brooked any delay in Walsh’s leaving. Hence my suggestion of within 30 mins of his arrival.
Yet, since Walsh arrived at 1.30 am there WAS a delay, to which the only response can be that he got lost. I have also read somewhere that he did get lost but cannot find it yet. When I do so I’ll reply again.

6, I was not aware the Walsh returned again to Mangene. @ 4-00am ish, is there evidence for this?

Surely the evidence lies in the fact that Walsh brought the news that reinforcements in strength were coming in the morning, the answer to the message that he had delivered to LC at 1.30 am on the morning of the 22nd (corroborated by N-N and Maxwell). How else would Dartnell have known?

Julian,

Thanks for the response. I am away from my desk for the next two weeks, and accessing through a tablet. Typing is even more of a challenge. I will try to answer now briefly but will fill out if necessary when I return.

4, Should or could. My inference is that the urgency of the message to LC from Darnell, was contrary to Clery's assertion not about the numbers of Zulus, but was instead about the disturbances in camp. Just this morning I laid hands on a copy of 'Stalker Natal Carbineers, on P91 the author records this, I was not aware of this until I actually read the section. There may well out there be other accounts, of which I am unaware. If this is taken as true account, then Walsh if it were he that took the message, and think it probably was then he would have to leave the camp later, also confirmed by Stalker.

6, The case you make is a logical assertion but not a fact. Perhaps Noggs got it wrong about the troops, I think more likely than your proposed alternative that he found out from Walsh at 4am. The explanation to 4 answers your point about both Noggs and Maxwell seeing Walsh at least until 9.00pm in camp. Indeed Stalker also confirms the message whatever its contents left the bivvy late "during the night".

If further support is required P92 of Stalker reports that at 4am the Carbineers and NMP left Mangene and saw LC,s column approaching the 2 miles from the bivvy at Mangene.

From this account it is by no means clear or recorded other than by Noggs, at least I cannot think of one, that a message confirming LC was coming was ever sent to, or received by the bivvy, Indeed there are two accounts that state one did not.

With all the comings and goings being attributed to Walsh, he must have finished his rides at the main camp as he joined with Russell's company. He, Walsh and 'Davey' were sent with messengers to find Chelmsford.
Tig, great meeting yesterday, looking forward to exploring all these areas around the Mangeni next week.

Cheers

Tig and Frank
Feeling ghastly following my covid jab yesterday evening.  Aches and pains all over and all sore.  I can barely think to make sense.  Can’t find my Stalker so can’t reference it. However, Tig, your suggestion that Walsh stayed on the Mangeni till 9 p.m. (at least) makes sense - and I can go along with that – similarly re Stalker p. 92, it would seem that Walsh (and Davey? Why not?) left the bivouac at 4 a.m. on the 22nd and met LC en route to it.  Someone (anon.) then rode back to Dartnell to give the good news.  Walsh and Davey, as per Frank, then perhaps rode on to the column so that they could later be sent to track down LC’s whereabouts.
Going back to bed.

Julian,
My sympathies, I had exactly the same five days ago, 36hrs and hopefully you will feel fine.
The copy of Stalker I read was the "OC copy" of the Carbineers presumably their HQ copy.

Kate & Julian

I was re reading this thread.

The posts concerning LC's two patrols of mounted men seem to be an issue. Gardner1879 2/10/2022 3-19pm and onwards.

I have always believed these to be the two mounted elements of the recon force under the overall command of Dartnell, i.e. The Carbineers and the combined NMP and IMI. Each unit had different instructions The Carbineers to support the NNC on Hlazikazi, whilst Lonsdale and the NNC covered the Malakatha, and indeed they did link up on Hlazikazi late in the day, soon after the Carbineers ware called off to meet up with the IMI and NMP facing off the Zulu force on Magogo. The purpose of the IMI and NMP according to Noggs was via "Upindo and Isiluwane".

It also seems to me that the action at Mangene, also affects the movement of large numbers of Zulus as yet I have never seen explained anywhere.

That is where did the large numbers of Zulus seen by Dartnell move to? and when? This is critical to other timings as to movement of Zulu parties on the morning of the 22nd and it follows better understanding of events that day.

Hi Tig

Uguku does mention that  the Zulu high command released 6 mavio {6 companies / 600 warriors } to satisfy Matyana these 600 was part of the large Zulu force sighted on the Magago hills, and it just happened Dartnell interpreted them as being part of the main Zulu army, something quite unintentional proved to be the very reason for Chelmsford to divide his army the following morning. It also seems their was some rivalry between the Zulu high Command and Matyana.

"The army was under the joint command of Magumengwana, N’Tshingwayo, and Sirayo. It was intended that Matyana Ka Mondisa was to have been in supreme command of the army, but he having been a Natal Kaffir, the other three were jealous of him, and did not like him to be put over them. They, therefore, devised a plan of getting him out of the way on the day of the battle. They accomplished this plan by getting him to go forward to the Pindo range of hills and promising to follow. As soon as he had gone they took another road- viz, north of the Ibabarrango, while Matyana and Undwandwe went south of it, accompanied by six mavio."

Tig/AUSSIE
My impression from reading about the numbers inferred from British accounts has always been that there must have been 'more to it' and greater numbers of Zulu present than Uguku recorded. The sightings made by the NMP etc simply do not gel with 6 amaviyo.

Aussie,

Thanks for the reference, I have read it before but the section you draw my attention to had not registered in my memory. I think it it a very interesting footnote. From it the following can be implied.

If we go back to the night of the 21/22nd Jan Dartnell was being faced off by a "large body" of Zulus. Such large numbers that LC determined to take the most powerful part of his force to attack them or to rescue Dartnell (who did not regard himself in need of rescue, he only asked for reinforcement according to the NMP history).

If we take Uguku's record to be true, I see no reason not to, then we also know that this Zulu force was composed of Matyana and "Undwandwe" (I think this is a person, any information to this identity would be appreciated) and "Six amaviyo". Presumably Matyana would also have a personal following as may Undwandwe. We do know from European accounts that the combined force could have numbered up to 2000+. As I have written this, I see Julian's post, I think the above will explain the discrepancy in numbers, Matyana being close to his base.

The strategic importance of the Phindo ridge in terms of controlling reconnaissance over the approach of the main impi from Ulundi is clear, it may be that it was Matyana's force that intercepted Browne. The account says that Browne was scouting in the direction of iSipezi, but does not make clear if he got anywhere near to iSipezi, my own view is that he was probably intercepted around the northern foot of the Phindo ridgeline.

We also know from Russell's recon on the 22nd morning that there had been large numbers of Zulu bivouacing in the valley of the Nondwene stream. It was only close to dusk in the evening of 21st that Mansel and co determined the numbers and placement of the Zulus on Magogo.

So what could we draw out of this knowledge?

There were two components to Matyana's force, and possibly two commanders (??).

When Chelmsford arrived at dawn the next days there were far fewer Zulus on Magogo than expected.

To explain this.

The Matyana force was a recon force, its duty was to observe and report, and possibly in some circumstances to intervene, it is almost a mirror of the Dartnell force and its predicament. Neither on the evening of 21st Jan wanted to attack the other.

Whereas Dartnell stayed with his full force being unable to retreat, Matyana could afford to split his force, (this may not have been his choice he may not have had any actual span of control over the amaviyo or UNdwandwe). So what happend in the Zulu camp on Magogo that night?

The amaviyo probably bivouaced in the Nondwene valley shortly after dusk, leaving Matyana to watch over Dartnell, leaving trace for Russell to find later that day. Matyana knew the country well and his escape route if necessary was at his rear over difficult horse country, his pace of retreat was only marginally slower than horsemen.

At first light the amiviyo moved off to the north to link with the main impi on Ngwebeni. Matyana would have been cursing when he saw Chelmsford's troops arriving after dawn, retreat and dispersal shortly became his only option.

I also think contrary to almost everybody whose posts I have read, Barker and colleague where on Qwabe. "Undwandwe" and the amaviyo moved north at an early hour, the only logical direction and unintentionally displaced Barker and colleague from his Vedette. Almost everybody believes Barker to be on iThusi, then complain about his timings because the do not work. Well they do work if the amaviyo was moving north and Barker was on Qwabe.

If this was a jigsaw puzzle then everybody is looking for a missing piece unless these missing zulu troops are explained away. There is good reason to say "it did not happen" because there is no record, but as they say "absence of evidence is not evidence of absence" In order to support the "it did not happen" argument the question of the missing zulus must be answered.

Tig
If I read your post aright then you're assuming that early on the 22nd it was the 6 amaviyo that displaced Barker on Qwabe (your assuming he was on Qwabe - with which I disagree). If there were true however, Barker's description of the numbers of Zulu he saw does not tally with just 6 amaviyo.

Julian, What description of numbers by Barker are you referring to? Could you please quote the passage?

Tig
I wrote from memory. Never reliable I admit but I'll check and get back to you.

Tig
Stalker: Barker wrote that it was a group of mounted men who displaced him by trying to surround him, presumably a small group. On reporting back to Scott, he looked back to see Zulus on the hill he'd just left and on the flanks. Whitelaw then arrived to report 'thousands' of Zulus advancing.
Your theory re the amaviyo will only work if it's assumed that Whitelaw was not on the hill beyond Qwabe (as Lock & Q assume) but up on the plateau (on Barker's left flank as he described it). From there Whitelaw would have seen 'thousands'; from the plain he would only have seen the 6 amaviyo and would not have estimated them as ' thousands'.

Julian,

By the time you quote from Stalker, in my geography, Barker has travelled 2 miles from Qwabe to Scotts position on Conical Hill, he has conferred with Scott and started to return to Qwabe. At this point he sees zulus on the Hill he has just left, (Qwabe) he does not give any numbers. It follows that your point regarding the possible disparity of numbers in the amaviyo does not hold, since no numbers are given.

You are correct in that Barker does not quote any numbers but Whitelaw does, which information comes from Barker.

I really do not get your point here. If Barker had seen thousands of Zulus approaching him on Qwabe, this is what he would have reported to Scott. It would then be pretty stupid to ago back to a hill being approached by "thousands" of the enemy neither Barker nor Scott ever struck me as stupid.

It is clear that Whitelaw approached Scott and Barker from the left flank after which he advised them of thousands of Zulus.

I am at a loss to understand how you interpret this differently. Please explain.