The Battle of Kambula

At 12.45 on 29 March 1879, the tents were struck, reserve ammunition was distributed, and the troops took up their battle stations. As the troops moved to their posts they could see the Zulu right horn, circling north out of British artillery range before halting north-west of the camp. The left horn and centre of the impi continued westwards until they were due south of Kambula. At 1.30 Lieutenant-Colonel Redvers Henry Buller suggested his mounted troops sting the right horn into premature attack, which was agreed to. The men rode out to within range of the massed Zulus, fired a volley and then galloped back, closely followed by a great wave of 11,000 Zulu warriors. As soon as the horsemen had reached Kambula, and cleared the field of fire, the British infantry opened fire with support from their four 7-pounders firing shell, and then when the Zulus got closer canister shot. A small number of Zulus managed to burst into the laager, and were repelled with bayonets, while the bulk of the advance was held at bay by the steady British musketry and gunfire. Some of the Zulu force swung right to come in against the western sides of the laager, but were met with equally effective resistance. After about half an hour the Zulu right horn drew back to the north-east.

At 2.15, as the right horn made its withdrawal, the left horn and centre surged up out of the ravine, their leading warriors falling to crossfire from the laager and kraal as they came over the crest. However, more and more swarmed on to the glacis between the cliff and the defenders, funneling into the gap between the kraal and laager. The Zulus soon forced their way into the cattle Kraal and fought hand-to-hand with men of the 1/13th company. The cattle in the kraal hampered both sides, but with Zulu pressure mounting up the heavily outnumbered British troops managed to extricate themselves and pull back to the redoubt. Zulu riflemen were now able to open fire from behind the walls of the kraal to give their advancing comrades cover. At about this time the right horn came on again from the north-east, charging across the north face of the redoubt towards the guns and the eastern sides of the laager.


The closing stages of the battle of Kambula. A company of the 1/13th in the foreground are driving the Zulus back into the ravine.Although now attacked on both sides, Wood appreciated that the situation to the south was critical and ordered two companies to clear the Zulus off the glacis. Led by Major Hackett the men formed in line with bayonets fixed and charged across the open ground, forcing the Zulus back over the rim. The troops then lined the crest and opened volley fire into the packed warriors in the ravine. The counter-attack had succeeded perfectly but Hackett’s men suddenly found themselves under fire from their right, where Zulu marksmen had concealed themselves in a refuse tip. Hackett sounded the ‘Retire’ and his men returned to the cover of the laager, but not before losing a colour-sergeant, a subaltern and himself receiving a blinding head wound. The sight of this withdrawal encouraged the Zulus in the ravine to charge again, but along the narrow killing zone in front of the laager they could not this time prevail against the controlled volleys from behind the wagons and the redoubt.

On the north side the Royal Artillery men fought their guns in the open, not taking cover, and poured round after round directly into the right horn.

The Zulus charged again and again, with unwavering courage, but the head of each charge was shot away and at about 5pm Wood sensed the impetus was going out of their attack. Two companies moved to clear the kraal and lined the rim off the cliff with a further company to fire into the dead ground. As soon as the Zulus began to pull away eastwards he ordered Buller to mount his men up and pursue. The Zulus were harried mercilessly for 7 miles, mounted troops firing one handed with carbines from the saddle or spearing them with discarded assegais. The Frontier Light Horse men singled abaQulusi warriors for their special attention, chasing them as far as Hlobane and extracting a savage revenge for their comrades killed the day before at the Battle of Hlobane.

I'm inclined to think this is from one of Ian Knights book's. Could be wrong.

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Battle of Khambula (1879)
With almost 1,500 troops killed at Isandlwana, Chelmsford’s central column retreated, leaving the flanking columns unsupported. The southern column under COL Pearson dug in at the Eschowe mission while the northern column under Colonel Wood assumed a defensible position on an open ridge known as Khambula. King Cetshwayo could not follow up with his success at Isandlwana because of his losses and his inability to maintain an army in the field. It was not until March that the Zulus were ready to attack again. The King decided to concentrate his forces against Colonel Wood’s northern column, placing the victors of Isandlwana again in command. The main impi performed its ritual purification rites and set off for Khambula on March 24. After defeating a detachment of Wood’s mounted forces at Holbane on March 28, the Zulu army bivouacked and prepared to assault Wood’s fortified position at Khambula. Wood had built a long and narrow earthwork redoubt on a high point on the ridge, and below it the camp was protected by two wagon laagers, the smaller one crammed with 2,000 cattle and connected to the redoubt by a wooden palisade (see figure A- 15).Wood’s force consisted of over 2,000 men, including 15 companies of imperial infantry and six 7-pounder guns. Wood’s position along the crest of Khambula ridge commanded an open slope to the north with good fields of fire. To the south the ground was steeper, dropping away to marshy streams which formed the headwaters of the Mfolozi River. Four guns were unlimbered between the main laager and the redoubt. By noon five Zulu columns could be seen heading towards the camp. Wood opened up reserve boxes of ammunition and as his men fell in the Zulu columns diverged, with two forming the right horn and moving north of camp while the other three approached from the west and south of camp, assuming the chest and left horn roles. Because of the terrain the right horn was in place long before the chest and left horn.

Initially the right horn halted about 3 miles away outside of artillery range to allow time for the other columns to get into position, but for some reason they changed their minds and advanced forward to a range of 1,000 yards and prepared to assault. Although King Cetshwayo had warned his men of the lesson of Rorke’s Drift to not attack fortified British positions under any circumstances – the impi, perhaps overconfident from Isandlwana and Holbane, had no patience for subtle strategies to lure the British away from their defenses. Wood realized that if he could provoke the right horn into launching a premature attack before the left horn was ready, he might be able to concentrate his fire on each assault in turn, rather than being attacked on all sides at once. 100 men mounted their horses and rode out from the north face of the laager. They rode down the open slope, dismounted 50-100 hundred yards from the Zulu masses, and poured a volley into them. The plan worked. With a sudden roar, the 6,000 Zulu warriors in the right horn sprang forward, scattering the horsemen before them, and chasing them back to the nearest laager. Once the horsemen were clear of the line of fire, the British behind the laager opened a devastating fusillade. With no cover or concealment, the Zulu were shot down in droves. Some Zulu managed to survive the hail of gunfire and reach the wall of wagons, but they did not last long, and were eventually forced to retreat to the only substantial cover available, an outcropping of rocks some 700 yards back. The noise and smoke of this first attack brought the left horn hurrying up from the valley.

The marshy ground slowed them enough however that when they did launch their assault until after the right horn had already been beaten back. Fortunately for the Zulu the steep elevation of the ridge on this south side offered a covered approach from British fire until they reached the crest. From there it was just a few hundred yards to the laagers, although it was all open groundsubject to a withering British cross fire from the redoubt and main laager. About 2:30 pm the left horn and chest began their assault. From his high point Wood saw the attacks coming and repositioned three of his guns to cover the south. The Zulus succeeded in occupying a patch of long grass on the camp dung heap and the smaller cattle laager. From these positions Zulu armed with British rifles taken at Isandlwana were then able to fire down into the main laager.

This was the crucial point in the battle. The dung heap and captured laager between them secured the flanks of the remainder of the Zulu left horn readying itself to rush up the slope between them. Wood recognized the danger, and ordered two infantry companies under the command of Major Robert Hackett. to make a sortie from the main laager to the head of the slope (see figure A-15). Hackett’s men marched out in perfect discipline, lined up at the edge of the open crest, and volley-fired down into the mass of the Zulu left horn sheltering below them. This was enough to discourage them from launching their attack. The British then directed volley after volley from the main laager to clear the Zulu firing from the dung heap, and shrapnel shells were fired into the cattle laager to clear it. While all this was going on, the Zulu center or chest had approached Khambula from the east, streaming across the open ridge across the old camp site, only to be met with the same heavy fire that had broken the other attacks. For over three hours, the Zulu continued to attack the camp; the bloodied right horn even rallied for another major assault. Yet the attacks were never coordinated enough for a simultaneous assault. By late afternoon, the Zulu were spent and they prepared to withdraw. Wood sent out his mounted irregulars to drive the Zulu from the field. The irregulars pursued them for seven miles, cutting down hundreds of Zulu, many too tired to even raise their shields. 800 Zulu bodies were collected from around the camp; hundreds more lay on the line of retreat; hundreds more died later of severe wounds. The total Zulu death toll is estimated at 2,000 – 3,000. In contrast, the British lost 29 men killed and 55 wounded. This was the most decisive battle of the war. Conclusion The same Zulu commanders who won at Isandlwana were in command at Khambula.

The Zulus were fresh off their victory the day before at Holbane. Yet the Zulu swarm lost, and they continued to lose the rest of the war. Why? Perhaps most important is the lack of simultaneity. At Khambula the horns attacked the British laager piecemeal and were destroyed in turn. The right horn did not wait until the left horn was ready to attack and the devastating losses from their first assault probably broke their spirit for the rest of the battle even though they later assaulted again. Part of the problem was their primitive command and control. Zulu commanders relied on line-of-sight (LOS) to communicate their orders use signals positioned at high points (and they used runners of course). The two horns at Khambula could not see each other because they were separated by the ridge itself. This was not the first uncoordinated Zulu attacks were bloodily repulsed by a Boer commando of roughly 800 men drawn into a defensive laager on the bank of the Ncome river. The Zulus were severely outgunned. It was the British who enjoyed a standoff advantage. Spears are no match against rifles and 7-pounder artillery guns. In addition, the British did not run low on ammunition this time. The Zulus’ only hope was to bring their superior numbers into close combat at the same time. This time the Zulu did not enjoy superior situational awareness nor did they achieve surprise. British situational awareness was much improved due to the previous day’s battle and the fact a spy warned Wood that the impi planned to attack him at noon. The Zulus were not elusive to all of the British force. Zulu warriors could outrun British infantry but not the irregular cavalry. These cavalrymen turned this defeat into a rout during the retreat phase.

Finally, the Zulu swarm was attacking a fortified position with a 360 degree defense so they could not be outflanked. The British were using wagon laagers, cleared fields of fire, earthworks, trenches, and a well chosen defensive site that utilized the high ground. The Zulus had no logistical or siege craft capability to attack a fortified position. This impi should have followed its King’s advice in the first place and refused to attack this fortified position.


source: Pardee Rand Graduate School

http://archive.scotsman.com/article.cfm?id=TSC/1879/05/17/Ar00707

Hi all

This battle would not have happened because the Zulu king forbade his generals to attack a fortified position and his generals were in agreement, the king and his generals were of superior intelligence, but unfortunately two of the Zulu regiments were consist of too impetuous warriors, the inGobamakhosi and the umCijo ( the umCijo have triggered the battle of Ulundi...)

This is exactly the same problem for the king and the generals Matabele, fifteen years later ...

Cheers

Pascal

Hi all

Why the Zulus have delivered this battle?


The Zulu king forbade his generals to attack a fortified position and his generals were in agreement.

The Zulu king and his generals were of superior intelligence ,then it really is because two of the Zulu regiments were consist of too impetuous warriors, the inGobamakhosi and the umCijo ( the umCijo have triggered the battle of Ulundi...)

The general Zulu had no authoritative on some of its regiments or he disobeyed the king ?

Cheers

Pascal

Hi All

The interesting thing about the article from the Times is:

Lieutenant Raitt was in the 80th Regiment and he states that they manned the guns. I have not seen that some or part of the 80th Regiment were listed as taking part in this battle before.

Does anyone know if they did take part or have any other references to the 80th Regiment taking part in the Battle

Only these regiments took part.

Royal Artillery, 11th Battery, 7th Brigade.
1st Battalion of the 13th Light Infantry: later the Somerset Light Infantry and now the Light Infantry.
the 90th Perthshire Light Infantry: later 2nd Battalion the Scottish Rifles; disbanded in 1966.
Mounted Infantry
Frontier Light Horse under Lieutenant Colonel Buller
Boer Commando
Native Contingent of Swazis

Hi Littlehand

That's just my point, never seen any of the 80th listed for the battle, but the article clearly states that the 80th manned the guns.
Lieutenant Raitt was later to become a Major-General, so would he lie

Hi all

The 8O th is the backbone of the 5th column.

Nothing to do with Wood and the 4th column at Kambula ...

Cheers

Pascal

300 shells seems an awful lot in 6 hours. And 299 hitting target every time.

Hi all

Samuel Wassell was in the 80th foot (Staffordshire Volunteers), and he won his V.C. at Isandlwana, I think he was part of the I.M.I. The I.M.I were also at Kambula, so there could have been men from the 80th foot (Staffordshire Volunteers) amongst them.

Martin.

Regarding the 80th foot (Staffordshire Volunteers) during the zulu war, and at Kambula.

I have been looking through my books and found the reason why the men of the 80th manned the guns at Kambula. It appears that approximately 25 men of the 80th were attached to No.11 battery, 7th brigade, R.A. (source, Ian Knight, Zulu War)

Although not here at Kambula, don't forget that there was also colour sgt Anthony Clarke Booth of the 80th foot (Staffordshire Volunteers), who won his V.C. at Intombe River.

Martin.

Hi Martin .
Found this in ' A Staffordshire Regiment InThe Zulu & Sekukuni Campaigns 1878 - 1879 80th Regt Of Foot ' by Robert Hope
Giving the stats for the Battle Of Kambula on page 171 . '' 80th Regiments Involvement ; '' Soldiers of the 80th , approx 27 in number were attached to the 1st Sqdn Mtd Infantry and were engaged in this action ; with 1 man being severely wounded .
A mounted gun detatchment consisting of members of the 80th Regt were attached to the 11th Battery 7th Bgde Royal Artillery- 1 man was severely wounded in the head .
cheers 90th.

Hi all

Exact all this, but in organization chart, it never counts the men detached, (such as those in the IMI, for example) as being parties of their original Regiment ...

They are part of another unit (like all those who constituted the squads IMI, for example)

Its like this for every organization chart of every battle of this war.

See organization chart of Isandhlwana for example, for infantrymen that are not of the 24 th ,he is never say that their regiment was there ... If not , there was many regiments at Isandhlwana, including others infantry regiments, hussars, lancers etc ...

If one company complete, of the 80 th was at Kambula, then yes, we could say that this regiment was there, but this is not the case ...

Cheers

Pascal

Hi all

Impi wrote:
300 shells an awful lot in 6 hours. 299 hitting target and Every Time.

For the artillery ,Ok....

but with 6 or 4 guns guns?

And the rocket launchers ?

These too were also of the artillery with artillery gunners to serve them ...

And 299 corpses, who counted them ?

Cheers

Pascal

Hi Martin & 90th

Many thanks for the information, that has just confirmed that the article is true.

Hi 1879graves

No problem, glad to help out.

Martin.

Hi Graves1879.
Happy to return the favour or a change . .
cheers 90th

Kambula
"February 1879 passed with no major engagements, save for the mounted patrols sent out daily to raid the kraals of Zulus harassing No. 5 Column across the eastern Transvaal Colony border. At Kambula a hexagonal laager was formed with tightly locked together wagons, and a separate kraal for the cattle was constructed on the edge of the southern face of the ridge. Trenches and earth parapets surrounded both, and a stone-built redoubt was built on a rise just north of the kraal. A palisade blocked the hundred yards between the kraal and redoubt, while four 7-pounders were positioned between the redoubt and the laager to cover the northern approaches. Two more guns in the redoubt covered the north-east also. This month saw Wood receive much needed reinforcements in the form of Transvaal Rangers mounted troops, a troop of German settlers and five companies of the 80th Regiment of Foot (Staffordshire Volunteers) Wood had hoped to capitalise on the near-autonomy of the Zulus surrounding him, by trying to wean them from any allegiance they felt to Cetshwayo, centring hopes on one Uhamu Cetshwayo’s half-brother who had always been friendly towards the British and at odds with the Zulu King. On 13 March, Uhamu entered the camp with some 700 of his people, requesting escorts to bring the rest of his people out of hiding. They were hiding in caves near the headwaters of the Black Umfolozi River 50 miles to the east and only from Ulundi. It would be considerably risky to escort large numbers to safety over this area, but Wood considered it worth it. An escort of 360 British mounted men, in addition to about 200 of Uhamu’s warriors were able to return to Kambula with around 900 further refugees. Shortly after this achievement, Wood received a request from Chelmsford to create a distraction to draw off some of the Zulu strength while he attempted to relieve Battle of Eshowe Knowing that an impi was preparing to leave Ulundi and attack either Kambula or another British fort, Utrecht, Wood reckoned that by attacking Hlobane on 28 March he could drive cattle off the mountain, prompting the impi to attack him in his well-prepared position at Kambula."

Nice one Impi

five companies of the 80th Regiment of Foot.

that seals it

That's what's so excellent about ths forum. Working together gets results.

Nice one. Another factual event solved

Hi All.
I'm not home at present and will be out most of the day so I cant check my books , but where were the 5 Co's of the 80th Regt during the battle of Kambula ?????. According to Hope's book which is about the 80th Regt there is no mention of 5 companies being present at the Kambula battle ! . The only memebers being present were the those in the IMI or R.A . . Had they left the camp at Kambula and joined Rowland's Column before the 29th March ????................. . I have Morris's book here and see that the 80th Regt Co's ( 4 Co's In Washing of the spears ) were indeed given to Wood for his flying Column in APRIL , AFTER the Kambula Battle . I was getting a tad confused there for a while . . It seems Impi's post may not be 100 %
or some of it may be missing in regards to the times mentioned . As all the books I have and I checked yesterday do not mention the 80th being involved in the Kambula battle ( Except for those in the IMI & R.A whose numbers I posted yesterday ) , Pascal was correct in saying they were the main force with Rowland based at Luneberg . Also as we may all know , this was the Battalion that had 90 odd troops massacred on the Ntombi River on the 12th March . Impi what is the source for your post ??.
cheers 90th.

This from 'Uniforms and Weapons of the Zulu war' by Christopher Wilkinson-Latham.

80th (Staffordshire Volunteers) regiment.
At the beginning of January 1879 five companies of the 80th regiment, which had been scattered at various outposts in Natal and the Transvaal, were ordered to join Col Rowlands' No5 Column of the army of invasion and marched to Luneberg, from where the main supply route between the Transvaal and Natal started.

He then goes on to mention the one company that were involved in the battle of Intombe River, he does not mention any of these 5 companies again until the battle of Ulundi, and says that the 5 companies, with two gattling guns in the centre, formed one side of the hollow square.

From Ian Knights book 'Rorke's Drift Zulu War' (which includes the battle of Khambula).
Ian says that there were approx 25 men of the 80th attached to No11 battery, 7th Brigade R.A. he does not mention any other men of the 80th, but it is known that there were some men of the 80th in the Mounted Infantry, but this would not be 5 companies, probably just as 90th says, around 27 men.

I have looked in other books, but can find no mention of there being 5 companies of the 80th at Khambula, they just get mentioned has being with Rowlands 5th Column.

Hope this helps.

Martin.

Hi all

It's amazing the kind of thing that can be read on the forum ..
The 80 th has nothing to do with Kambula! This regiment was the spine of the 5th column ... It is well known ... Everyone knows that! See my last post on this topic ...

Cheers

Pascal

Hi Pascal

Quote :

The 80 th has nothing to do with Kambula!

Are you saying that Lieutenant Raitt was not telling the truth and him and men of the 80th being at Kambula.

What I am saying is that an Officer and men of the 80th Regiment did take part, (attached to No11 battery, 7th Brigade R.A.) about 25 men or part of the Mounted Infantry.
The article I published was talking about men of the 80th manning the guns, which I have never heard of before, now I know they could have been part of No11 battery, 7th Brigade R.A., which brings some truth to the article.

So in a round about way, men of the 80th Regiment did take part in the Battle of Kambula.

Graves. If it's not in any of the books written by the modern day historians, it didn't happen.

Hi Littlehand .
What are you saying '' Didnt Happen '' ? . If your referring to the 80th Regt at Kambula , read my post from the Robert Hope book it is the history of the 80 th Regt taken from their archives . They were indeed at Kambula but only in the numbers I mentioned in my post regarding the IMI & RA . I assume that is what you are referring to with Graves1879 . If I'm wrong , sorry ,
my bad !.
cheers 90th.

Appologie accepted.

Hi Littlehand

Are you saying that because Lieutenant Raitt's account of Kambula has not been publish by a modern day historian, it is untrue?

It did take place. But be cause it hasn't been published by modern day authors it will be taken as untrue. Yet you have posted evidence that it did take place. And they did man the guns.

Hi Littlehand

Understood, having a blonde moment :lol:

No doubt your excellent find will end up in some New Zulu War Book. At some point.

Hi all

As I posted yesterday (23 Feb 11.55pm). I read through the battle of Khambula sections in a number of my books, and the only book I could find with any mention of the 80th being at Khambula was 'Rorke'e Drift - Zulu War' by Ian Knight (which also contains the battle of Khambula). Ian says that approx 25 men of the 80th were attached to No11 Battery, 7th Brigade, Royal Artillery. He does say that there was also a squadron of Mounted Infantry (99 men), but does not say how many of these men were from the 80th.

However, Gary (90th), posted that there were 27 men of the 80th in the Mounted Infantry, so there were at least 52 men of the 80th (Staffordshire Volunteers) regiment present at the battle of Khambula.

Hope this helps.

Martin.

The history, it is all written down and out there somewhere.
I would imagine this would be common knowledge to anyone with a special interest in the 80th. It is these odd men and small detachments which are, indeed, of special interest.

I didn't know until Graves posted the artical that they manned the Guns.

Hi Littlehand .
We have to be careful in what we write , as you said '' I didnt know until Graves posted the article that they manned the guns '' they did but as far as I'm aware it doesnt mean that only the 80th Regt people were working the guns , I think Raitt mentions the '' Gun '' Detachment ( As in one ) manned by the 80th . Happy to be corrected .
cheers 90th

Hi Gary (90th)

I doubt it would take 25 men to work just one gun, but they could have worked perhaps 3 or 4, with the Royal Artillery men on the rest, but I wonder if they could have had anything to do with working a rocket battery of a few troughs?

I read in Christopher Wilkinson - Lathams book 'Uniforms and Weapons of the Zulu War', that. (quote) At Ulundi five companies of the 80th, with two gattling guns in the centre, formed one side of the hollow square.

Could it be that these 25 men had these gattling guns at Khambula? If so, I can't recall reading anything about them (unless I missed it), have you any knowledge on this mate?

Martin.

Hi Martin.
When I posted the 80th's involvement at Kambula there was no mention of them manning the Gatling's etc, etc . All that was mentioned was the numbers involved in the IMI & R.A . as you say 25 is far to many one would think for a '' Gun Detachment '' ( As in Artillery ) . I think Raitt mentions '' The Gun '' manned by the 80th men and not guns .
cheers 90th.

Hi all

Stop the delirium

Men's of the 80 th were at Kambula, but not the 80 th !

Otherwise the 80 th and other regiments were also at Isandhlwana

Cheers

Pascal

Hi Martin.
According to the Hope book there were 6 x 7pdr's at Kambula , no mention of any Gatling's or Rocket Troughs . The Hope book says and I quote '' A mounted gun detachment consisting of members of the 80th Regiment were attached to the 11th Battery 7th Bgde R.A. - 1 man was severely wounded in the head '' . Sorry Martin it doesnt say how many were in the Gun Detachment , and Raitt also mentions that the Gun manned by the 80th men did well , so I would say only 6 - 8 were needed to man a gun ? . I have read this somewhere but not sure where . On further reading , Wood's Column had 2 Rocket troughs during the Invasion of the 11th Jan , but these arent mentioned as being in service at Kambula . Further reading in Hope's book
Identifies the severely wounded man with the Gun Detachment as Lance Sgt Thomas Brown 1387 80th Regt , he was employed as a Gunner .
cheers 90th.

Hi all .
Some may be interested , here are some details on Lce / Sgt Brown who was severley wounded in the head at Kambula while in his Role as a Gunner . ( From the 80th Regt )
Brown , Thomas . 1387 Lance Sergeant , Born ; Knutsford , Cheshire , Enlisted at Manchester 1 / 9 / 70 ; Aged 19 yrs 9 mths .
Joined Regiment at Belfast 8 / 9 / 70 , Description ; Eyes Blue , Hair Dark Brown , Complexion Fresh , Height 5ft 5 1/4 inches , Trade Labourer , Religion C of E , Awarded Indian General Service Medal with Clasp ' Perak ' . Discharged by purchase 17 / 1 / 83.
cheers 90th.

Hi all.
For those wanting to see more details on Raitts service in the Army go to the thread ' The one's the History books forgot '
cheers 90th.

Hi all

Gary , in the british artillery ,they are a trough of 9 pdr per artillery section of 2 guns

Cheers

Pascal