The Battle of Isandlwana- The Missing Five Hours

Ron Lock – Peter Quantrill, 2010
http://www.rorkesdriftvc.com/isandhlwana/isandlwana-the-missing-five-hours.htm

CTSG. Thanks for the link. Here's another one. A reply from your hero of authors.

http://www.rorkesdriftvc.com/forum/viewtopic.php?t=2069

He always seems to have a problem with other authors work. In the first part he's trying to say that it was he who thought of the title "The Missing Five Hours" Why?

Ron Lock & Peter Quantrill's work is far superior to Mr Snooks.

24th
To a degree I would have to agree with you. There is a certain arogance about Mike Snooks dissmisive manner to anything that doesnt corobarate his own thoughts. He is driven by the positions he has occupied for some time, Colonel of the regiment in question, and the desire to uphold the regimental history and honour.
Ron and Peter have done some amazing research and cannot be faulted however as with any comments on the battle it comes down to interpretation, theirs or Snooks. Possible its a case of keeping an open mind and drawing ones own conclusion.
I know that Ken Gillings also has some pretty firm opinions, possibly agreeing with neither.
The brilliant thing about the debate is that its producing some really good talking points and fresh ideas.

regards

24th. Authors will always debate and comment on what each other writes, that’s what they do. Mike as started thread on the RDVC in-connection with the missing 5 hours in-order to started a discussion, I think he has raised some valid points and no doubt so will Ron & Peter. However I see (Denton Van Zan. :lol!:)
has jumped in with an attack on Mike, which has already forced the thread to go off topic. I would be fairly certain the relationship between these authors is very healthy.

My own view is. That Ron & Peter like always and undertaken some considerable research to produce this article. A great deal of this information is new to me.

Eyewitness accounts have been included, all of which we know to be reliable along with maps and other documentation to back-up their research. The Campbell Collections are probably the most realisable source of information any where dedicated to the Zulu War 1879.

I’m not sure it would be an easy undertaking for someone to invalidate any of this in the very near future. Hopefully the Missing Five Hours will raise some healty debates.

Congratulations to Peter & Ron for producing a new and remarkable insight into what may have took place at Isandlwana.

Admin
As I said in an earlier post. brilliant research and deduction but the bottom line is interpretation. Id like to get Kens take, hopefully he will be on line soon.
Never the less opens up a whole series of debates.

Regards

Well I have printed off the document and will have a good read to night. I still think Mike Snook will come back with a justifiable argument.

Quote :

I still think Mike Snook will come back with a justifiable argument.

CTSG. It's a remarkable document. It needs a lot of digesting to get an understanding of how it changes what we already know. I have been following the comments on the other forum, but there’s no real dialog at present. or a good representation of an argument against, just the odd criticism. I not sure anyone is going to put their on the block and openly challenge, this well re-searched and fact based document. It will take someone with a lot of knowledge to break this down and carefully revised the evidence put forward by Peter & Ron and that will not be an easy task, and could take months to put forward a valid argument.

Well I have browsed through the article, but first to admit, way over my head. What’s its actually about. (May change my user name to DUM-DUM. And I don't mean a bullet.

Has anyone got a map with the details on, or could publish one?

For a newbie like myself, I feel it would makes things a lot easier to understand!

cheers

Cisco click on link. Used the appendix ABCD to view maps ect.

http://www.rorkesdriftvc.com/isandhlwana/isandlwana-the-missing-five-hours.htm

To all forum members please take note of the following.

Copyright: Ron Lock – Peter Quantrill, 2010

No part of this article, including Appendix A,B,C and D may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means whatsoever without the prior permission in writing from the authors.

Admin wrote:

Cisco click on link. Used the appendix ABCD to view maps ect.

http://www.rorkesdriftvc.com/isandhlwana/isandlwana-the-missing-five-hours.htm

To all forum members please take note of the following.

Copyright: Ron Lock – Peter Quantrill, 2010

No part of this article, including Appendix A,B,C and D may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means whatsoever without the prior permission in writing from the authors.

Thank you.

Admin
Pete your so right. I spent a couple of hours re reading the thesis and plotting on my own maps. Its going to be a long time before anyone is going to come up with a really cogent arguement against it.
In the meantime well done to Ron and Peter.

Regards

Actually if you read Mike Snooks coments carefully you will find that theres not a lot of space between their individual theories.
The main differences appear to be the possibility of 2 camp sites for the Zulus and the theory of the decoys. Its pretty incontravertible that the maps are annotated by Wood. The back up to that is largely circumstantial so the various meetings could have easily taken place.
By and large a brilliant piece of historical detective work.
Mike as yet hasnt given any real reasons for his rather harsh dissmisal of the decoy theory, apart from stating that the zulus would not have had time to set it up. Personally I dont believe time is an issue. How long would it have taken Tshingwayo to delegate a leader and send him of with a few hundred warriors, Id venture to say that force could have been in position in the hills before the ponderous column was half way across the plain.
A further possibility of course would have been to decoy Datnell the prievious evening and then watch to see if the column would attempt to re inforce him.
Interesting stuff

Regards

“ Missing five hours” just a quick through the pages. Now I may have got some of this wrong, always glad to be corrected.

Just a few observations. Probably best to tackle this thesis in stages.

Page 4) the three main considerations.

Having conjecturally decoyed half of no 3 column
(Conjecturally) in the dictionary means to guess!!

So basically is this thesis saying the Zulu’s took a chance and only guessed that the British would send troops to assist Dartnell, it was not a conclusive part of the Zulu Plan. If the Zulu’s had never intended to fight until the 23rd Jan would they have gone to the trouble of taking a chance by guessing what the British might do. What if the whole column had left to assist Dartnell? Would they have just stayed hidden in the valley? For what purpose??


The Reconnaissance of Isandlwana.

I have always been sceptical about this claim, I not sure this risk would have been taken, especially after going to all the trouble of getting 20,000 warriors unobserved past the British Would one of the Zulu commanders really have put himself at risk of being killed or captured. And I’m fairly sure a mounted party of Zulu Warriors even if wearing red bandoliers would have stood out like a sore thumb especially in the early hours of the morning, any movement in the camp would have been challenged. I have never read this as being fact only hear-say (Could be wrong)

Strength of Camp Reduced

According to this thesis, this only happened thought luck; their guess seems to have paid off. (Conjecturally) decoyed half of no 3 column


Now as pointed out in the in the thesis, Ntshingwayo KaMahole was now presented with a sudden and unexpected tactical opportunity. Which changed his plans to make an attack on the 22nd. So I’m not sure what is meant by “unexpected tactical opportunity” Was it because they guessed correctly and half of no 3 columns moved out, or was it because some of the British remained (Which makes me think of another topic post not so long ago. (Was Isandlwana the intended target)? And the remaining force was just in the way.


Not part of the thesis but a personal thought based on the statements in the thesis

Witness statements, in relation to the sightings of Zulus first one being from:

Trooper Baker. Natal Carabineers 05:22hrs He states he noticed a lot of mounted men. Then says they discovered they were Zulus that were trying to surround them.
Whitelaw Reported a large army advancing “Thousands” This would be around 08:00hrs.

Barker quotes “ A large Army and Thousands”

Brickhill quotes “ Zulu’s showed in considerable force” between 6:00hrs & 07:00hrs.

Chard. 09:30 by estimation. Observe through filed glasses. Could see the enemy moving on the distance hills. Large numbers moving to my left.

Again I’m not sure if all of these sights were being reported back to Col: Pulleine. Its does state that Captain Barry road into the camp and reported to Col; Pulleine that the Zulus were advancing on the camp in large numbers. Lt Higginson corroborated this report in that the Zulus were deployment was taking place in view of the camp. Time stated 07:30hrs 22nd January.

With all of the above statements it should have been very obvious that something was about to happen, and to me this only shows Col: Pulleine to be an even more incompetent commanding officer than I first thought. Could he have been praying for Durnford to arrive so he could hand over command along with the responsibility?

The last part was a personal thought.

Hi CTSG
Some interesting observations.
Your first point. I dont think the authors are intimating that the Zulus 'Guessed'. I think they use the phrase in their own thoughts, possibly 'Arguably' would also fit. In other words its their possible conatation.
The thesis is I guess saying that an oportunity was taken, Dartnell was out of camp with a larg-ish force. That could have lead to a re enforcement or at the leaast the camp was weakened by the absence.
If the whole force had left camp, I have no doubt they would have been attacked on the plain and decimated. The Zulu were there to fight.
There are a 101 places that the camp could have been observed without the observer being seen, make that 102. If the camp was under some form of scrutiny, makes logical sense that it was, 1000 men getting ready to march of before dawn, breakfast firs, bugles, bugles etc. would have been more than enough to draw attention to some form of mass movement. The force had just journeyed from RD so it would be an educated guess they werent going back that way so the road to Ulundi and to Dartnells force would be a no brainer. Would therefore be be simple for a Zulu decoy force to pack up ( 2 spears, check. 1 shield, check. Right of we go ) and get ahead of this lumbering monalith.
The zulu force were expecting to face of against the whole column, they were prepared for that, when it was seen that half the force was moving out I assume that most military men would welcome that as a ' tactical oportunity'.

The reports of Zulu movement started getting to the camp an hour and a half after Chelmsford left, around 5.30 I believe. by 9.30 reports were coming in left right and centre. The troops had been stood to before breakfast ( traditionally around 6 to 6.30.

Raw, Shepstone, Hlubis Horse etc were only dispatched onto the ridge after Durnford arrived, some time around 10.30. So yes your probably right what was Pullein doing?

So before Durnford arrived there had been 5 hours of Zulu movements reported. And no action taken.

The sightings of the Zulu’s at the various stages between the 5 hours most certainly doe's reflect the lack of military experience on Pulleine’s part. CTSG raises a good point, was these sighting by the various individuals actually reported to Pulleine.. If it could be establish as to whether, Pulleine knew about the sightings then it would certainly cast doubts over who was actually to blame. Because it would appear that he just sat there and watch the whole thing unfold without taking any serious consideration to his position.

It’s all very plausible, Of course the out-come would have been the same, but it doe’s give some slack to the Good Lord Chelmsford, based on the fact that even after all these sighting nothing was done in anyway to fortify Isandlwana, and the statements show, they had more time to prepare than originally thought.

hi ctsg.
At the risk of repeating one's self :) . Chelmsford was at Isandlwana since the 19th and he didnt think it worth laagering
or entrenching while he was running the camp . Dont mention Glyn as he was basically left out of all the camp's operations .
And also there were and are instances were the Good Lord was asked if they should fortify etc etc . His reply ........
No , its not worthwhile . So I dont think you can blame anyone else for the laagering fiasco .
cheers 90th.

Yep I will go along with you 90th.
In fact as Ive often pointed out Im happy to blame Chelmsford for everything, including that my toast was cold this morning. :lol!:
Incidentally Im attending a lecture in Cape Town in two weeks, given by Rob Caskie, its on RD. Should be good fun to drag my son along to.

Sorry Chaps. You’re missing the point. I not trying to change your opinion on who’s to blame and who’s not to blame. Chelmsford left Isandlwana to assist Dartnell early in the morning 22nd January 1879.

Quote :

90th Chelmsford was at Isandlwana since the 19th and he didn’t think it worth laagering.

But the main issued here is that nothing happen at Isandlwana, until after he had left,

(Actually when you think about R.D wasn’t fortified and only was when news of the disaster at Isandlwana had hit them)

Now I’m not getting into a row of who was left in command. We know in was Pulleine. But if we look at the letter quote in Ron & Peter’s thesis

Quote :

“Doubtless finding himself Senior Officer on the spot [Durnford] when action had already commenced he according to the custom of the service took
Command, but this was now all too late a period to remedy the fatal error of Position selected before his arrival.”

We have all agreed in the past this is what would have been expect (“according to the custom of the service”)

So I think its fair to say that Durnford probably did arrive to late and the course of the disaster was on track from 05:30hrs. Infact Pulleine I had 5 hours to put in-place some sort of fortification far less time that those at Rorkes Drift, and with more men at his disposal. Ammunition stations could have been set-up, ammunition boxes could have been opened way before the attack commenced, as you know I have always pointed the accusing finger of fate at Durnford and Pulleine. But this thesis does show that Durnford was just unfortunate enough to be in the wrong place, and especially at the wrong time.Had Durnford arrived when Chelmsford left or shortly after then I’m fairly certain the position of the camp would have been far more organised.

No matter how much we debate this issue, what if and who did what, It would have always been a Zulu Victory, won because of the over-whelming numbers and the shear determination of the Zulu warriors. So should we be saying that the battle would have lasted a little longer had Isandlwana been fortified, possibly? Would the Good Lord Chelmsford have returned to assist during the battle of Isandlwana? Doubt it. A column on the move line formation open ground would not have stood a chance.

Pulleine failed to read the signs, failed to implement a plan of action, failed to pull his troops in, failed to ascertain that ammunition supplies were place at various locations.
Failed to hand-over command to Durnford. (But I can now understand why Durnford said he would not interfere) He probably realised that Pulleine had failed and didn’t want any part of it; maybe he thought he had made the right decision to leave Pulleine to it.

I will continue reading the thesis, but it has changed my opinion in that Durnford was not to blame and the total lost of the camp was down to Pulleine. I say total because if the command had been handled correctly some of the small resistance fighters like Younghusbands company may have survived due to exhaustion on the part of the Zulus.

CTSG
I would go along with a lot you have to say.
Even as late as 9/9.30 defences could have been brought. The perimeter sealed and a more defensive position established. Unfortunatly its where Mike Snooks defense of Pullein falls apart.
We do however speak in hindsight, but with the amount of reports coming in, and reaching Pullein, he should have realised something big was happening. To that end look at the messages he was sending out.

Heres a thought worth being shot down for. If the first reports came in at 5.30 and Chelmsford left at 4.30 how far could he have travelled ? Considering the field he was travelling, dongas etc would he not have been still visible from the camp? If so why didnt Pullein send a message across the plain informing his commander in chief what was happening?

Regards

Quote :

5.30 and Chelmsford left at 4.30 how far could he have travelled ?

Now that is a very good question, and worth debating. I agree. The Good Lord would not have been that far away, a couple of miles perhaps. It would have been easy enough to send a rider after him. So why was this not done, and who would have been the one to make the decision to send a messenger. (Pulleine) So put myself in Pulleine place. The Good Lords been away for just under an hour, I don’t have much Battle experience, I know that but then so doe’s everyone else. Do I cry wolf because of a few sighting of Zulu’s. Possibly even lose my command of the camp. No I will sit in my tent and have some Breakfast. Durnford will be along soon let him worry about it.


The question has already been asked. Was Pulleine actually? Receiving the reports of theses sightings.

CTSG
First reports at 5.30 by Trooper Barker who reportedd to Lt Scott, he advanced with Barker then Whitelaww reported to them a large army. They then retired on the camp.
Betwen 6 and 7 Brickhill ( in the camp ) reports seeing a large party on the hills.
6 oclock. Lt Higginson, Lt Vereker came into the camp....zulus apearing on extreme left
8 oclock.Essex, a piquet came in to report a body of enemy.
9.30 Chard, the enemy in great force.
Lt Pope, reported that zulus apeared and were pursued by Durnfords Basutos who had just arrived, that was around 10.30
10.15 lt Vause, rides back to the wagons on the RD road because zulus were seen heading behind the moun tain

Pretty safe to assume that Pullein was aware of the action.

Theoretically. How far could Chelmsford have got by say 6 when Vereker reported in. Thats one and a half hours. I run / jog at around 8k.s an hour, thats 5 miles an hour. In shorts and trainers. So on a good surface I could be 7/8 miles away from camp. In thick heavy serg, rifle in hand with a backpack and full marching gear ? 2 possibly 3 miles?
Taking into account the sun maybe just maybe they were out of site from the ground, from the ridge Vereker could have seen them though.

So maybe your theory is right, new command and didnt want to show his inexperience, the old army motto applies, 'if in doubt say nowt'.

Regards

The distance that Chelmsford had travelled in an hour would only be relevant if it became obvious that the main zulu impi was approaching the main camp at Isandhlwana at 5.30. It seems to me that zulu were being seen in small numbers almost all over the entire area, whether they were scouting parties, small war bands or assumed to be present where camp fires were seen. What Chelmsofrd did believe was that he was heading towards the main impi, a few sightings would not have altered his thinking.

Another interesting question is at what point did it become obvious that the main camp was under direct attack, how far then was Chelmsford - at the Falls? Even at this point the distance would have been too far to travel and even sending troops on horse would have been too late/ineffective/suicidal. It does seem though that Chelmsford was caught between the devil and the deep blue when Pullein's first message came through - the view to the main camp was too far to have observed anything meaningful, should he have turned back immediately?

Witness statements, in relation to the sightings of Zulus first one being from:

"Trooper Baker. Natal Carabineers 05:22hrs He states he noticed a lot of mounted men. Then says they discovered they were Zulus that were trying to surround them.
Whitelaw Reported a large army advancing “Thousands” This would be around 08:00hrs.

Barker quotes “ A large Army and Thousands”

Brickhill quotes “ Zulu’s showed in considerable force” between 6:00hrs & 07:00hrs.

Chard. 09:30 by estimation. Observe through filed glasses. Could see the enemy moving on the distance hills. Large numbers moving to my left."

I think the mentioned of the words " Thousands & Large " would have been cause for concern.

I think any return to the camp after 09:30 would be as you say Younghunsband. "late/ineffective/suicidal."

I believe that a return to the camp anytime before 12 oclock would have saved many lives. A force the size of Chelmsfords, including the mounted men, apearing in the rear of the left horn when all the rest of the Impi was commited would have done significant damage. It could also have draw a large quantity of attackers away from the clusters of stands being made.
So for whatever reason that didnt happen, what is I deem to be unforgivable is when they did eventually return, much like the lifeboats of the Titanic, no effort was made to see if there were any wounded that could have been saved. The replies to that statement will point to the zulus habbit of gutting there kills. Chelmsford didnt know that had happened, he didnt know they were all probably dead. He returned to the battlefield and forbade any exploration.
Unforgivable.

Regards

Not really into discussions of this sort, above my head: scratch: But would the problem with the ammunition boxes being screwed down have still existed. I’m sure Chelmsford's lot would have had the same problem, as it was only after Isandlwana that any column on the move would have the screws removed and just in-case a screwdriver close by. Chelmsford could not have used artillery for fear of hitting his own me. (Where have I heard that before)?

I am absolutely not an expert on the Zulu war like many people here, but yes, a lot of mistakes were made. Isandhlwana was unprecedented and the leaders of the British column would never have dreamed in their wildest nightmares, what was about to unfold. Nothing quite like it had happened before, so why would they?
The senior officers i/c must have been:
1 - not particularly phased by the sight of distant Zulus in Zululand.
2 - complacent
3 - confident in their own ability and that of their brave NCOs and men, to react competently if attacked.
4 - disbelieving or unaware of the potential fighting and destructive ability of the Zulu army.
5 - unaware of quite how many Zulu were hiding just out of sight.
6 - unaware that the Zulu were skillfully watching and stalking the column probably before it even entered Zululand.

I reckon the column were always going to get a good thrashing from the Zulus, no matter what mistakes Chelmsford, Durnford, Pulleine, or whoever else did or did not make in the hours and days leading up to the fateful event.

tasker224. Some excellent observations all of which are very plausible

Quote :

3 - confident in their own ability and that of their brave NCOs and men, to react competently if attacked.

I sure this was the case with the Good Lord Chelmsford. – Confident he had left the right person in charge.

hi all .
Great discussion by all those involved , and ctsg you seem to have mellowed and I agree with most of what you said .
Now that is something to behold and you seem to have Springbok in your corner as well :lol: . Very valid points by Tasker as well.
Littlehand I dont think the missing screwdrivers played any part in the debacle , to me it was a case of people not able to find
their own ammo wagons . And when it was to late , many boxes were sent to the lines but the mules more than likely became
impossible to control and basically took off to parts unknown . There are reports of mules carrying ammo heading wildly
down the R.D road .
cheers 90th.

90th
opposite way mate, CTSG has eventually moved into my corner.

Regards

Tasker
Spot on with all your points.
The army was arrogant, they seriously underestimated the Zulu. Amid all the reports coming in the senior officers still took time out for breakfast. It would appear that the only time an injection of urgency was performed was when Durnford arrived. Wrong or right at least he did act on the reports..
Interms of your conclusion.
Consider that at various other points during the war the Zulus were beaten back from a formed square by disciplined rifle fire. So as a what if let me put this back at you for consideration. The column wasnt split and was formed into a receive cavalry square with available amunition in the centre. Do you think they could have won?

Regards

I recall reading a report by a Zulu, where he stated that he had watched the soldiers coming out of their tents and putting on their jacekts. He said the atmosphere in the camp was relaxed. I remember thinking that this seemed unbelievable, how a number of Zulu's could get so close, unobserved.. Could it have been possible for a number of the Zulu's to sneak up in the long grass ?

I've tried searching for this report, but can't find it.

cheers

I will stick to the refrence side of the forum. I will let you old boys discuss the impossible.

Well gentleman, I continued reading the article on the missing five hours, but have given up. Why you may ask! Because the maps involved in the document (i.e.) x marks the spot were in the hands of Edward Durnford. Sent to him by Wood. The maps in-question when on publication Jan 1880 A year after the event.

Page 13 Read from “Confirmation that Wood”

Then go to page 14 read from “I return the two maps.

The author also writes “Thus it is apparent that Wood Conjecturally showed sympathy towards Anthony Durnford cause, and Edwards closing statement “With many thanks for your friendship”

For me it’s back to the Washing of the Spears. I have not read the entire document, its pointless for me, as I’m fully aware of the scandal that was being pushed by Colenso & co against the Good Lord Chelmsford. And I certainly will not take into account any new evidence that involves Edward Durnford. Maybe the Authors of the Missing Five Hours sit firmly in the Colenso & Durnford camp.

PS. Map 1 seems to have dissappeared. That would be the one that Edward never got his hands on. The map that shows the true positions..

Littlehand
Allways great to get your input.

CTSG
Dont give up on it, read again with an open mind. Durnford had copies only. Your paranoia is showing.

Ciskokid
Interesting quote, Id love to know the source.

Regards

Fanny Colenso so loved Anthony Durnford that she went on a one woman crusade to clear his name, enough said on that There is nothing new in the document just a re-organisation of the positions played out on that day. 22nd Jan 1879- Not Jan 1880. The writing on the map maybe that of Wood’s but it was not written in 1879. For all we know the writing on the map may have written by Wood, but dictated by Edward Durnford. At the end of the day we only have the authors word that the research carried out by hand writing experts ECT was actually done.

Quote :

At the end of the day we only have the authors word that the research carried out by hand writing experts ECT was actually done.

I think its safe to say that the authors in-question are totally reliable. Is it also safe to say, that if they had not mentioned Edward Drunford you would have been quite happy to except what they have written as fact.

Back to the Persecution Complex !

CTSG
It becomes more and more difficult with each of your posts to figure out exactly what your stance/points are.
The miniscule fact that Edward Durnfords name is mention in a context far removed from the thrust of a quite brilliant thesis is sufficient for you to insult the integrity of two of South Africas formost historians.
You use that minor point to attempt to discredit a concept that until two days ago you were whole heartledly arguing in support of.
What may I ask, I dread the reply, has Edward Durnfords sighting of the maps have to do with the proven historical points of when the various Zulu sightings occured.
What has he to do with the research by an accepted British Hero in Wood.
Are you accusing Evelyn Wood of being part of a conspirisy to defend Durnford by fabricating supported evidence?
You continually dismiss evidence because it doesnt sit by your side, because you cannot personally examine the historical figures involved.
A great number of guests log onto this site hopeing to pick up some form of knowledge of one of the worlds most interesting occurences, the forum members delight in participating to one degree or another in the topics raised,
your dispargment of renowned authors and historians is quite franky an embarrasment to this forum.

I have no doubt that this post will be deleated by Admin and I will be admonished. To that end Pete, I offer my appologise in advance to the forum members and accept that Im out of order.

As one would expect from Col: Mike Snook. Cool Calm and Collect.

Quote :

"To be quite clear old chap, Peter Quantrill and I enjoy a mature and entirely cordial relationship and correspond privately as friends and fellow historians. We share confidences together and we seek each other's opinions. The debates we used to play out here were stimulating games of mental chess for us, and were interesting and entertaining for those who followed them as well as for those who 'got it' and joined the debate in the same vein. Both Peter and I are old soldiers, he a Gurkha-sahib and me a Anglo-Taff; we have both seen much and neither of us is so foolish as to regard the Battle of Isandlwana as anything other than a historical conundrum and a curiosity - getting to the bottom of it is our hobby...perhaps you could say our obsession, though I would like to think that in our respective cases it has been an entirely healthy obsession.

It so happens that we don't agree on certain points of acute detail.....no matter. The battle happened 131 years ago and is of absolutely zero importance to the modern world, (though that is not to say it was not an important event in shaping South Africa and determining the destiny of the Zulu people). The place itself does have bona fide modern importance as a heritage site and a tourist attraction, but what Snook thinks about this point of detail from 1879 or Quantrill thinks about that one, does not ultimately, in either case, matter a hoot. People will not die, governments will not fall.....it does not matter.

Because we are both soldiers we are interested most in the tactical conduct of the battle - that is our field - but above us sit serious professional historians of Zululand like Knight and Laband. It is them, the doyens of AZW history, that Peter would have to convince with his paper, before it became accepted as history and not hypothesis. Peter and I can thrash out, to our hearts content, the military history at a level of acute detail far below that which actually counts for anything in the real world...but what we do as military historians doesn't really change the price of fish. Through a combination of British military incompetence and Zulu courage and audacity a great battle had a most unexpected outcome - an outcome so extreme that it is still deservedly remembered as a remarkable event - remarkable yes....but important in 2010....most certainly not.

The great tragedy is that the huge majority of people 'get' that the AZW is a hobby and an interest and is neither important, nor worth falling out over. A handful, for reasons best known to themsleves and presumably their therapists, are playing on another pitch. I feel sorry for them. But there is no point engaging with them. It is for moderators to deal with the problem (or not).

The great shame in a rdvc context is that Peter (and Ron) has put time and effort into his theory and wanted to have a measured and mature debate here - including with me from the metaphorical 'opposition' benches. You may see for yourself how unrealistic that simple and worthwhile aspiration is in the current environment. Pity, but there we are. So I won't be playing (not because I don't want to) but because there are those who would seek to prevent it.

Hope that contextualises what gives vis a vis Snook and Quantrill. I am not at war with anybody except the Queen's enemies.

Regards

Mike"

Source: RDVC.

CTSG. At least, Peter & Ron didn't hide the truth they have openly stated where there resources came from. Regardless of Edwards involvement read the document for what it is.

S.D

If it wasn't Lt: Raw would stumbled upon the Zulu's in the valley. Then who was it?

Extract from Interview with Mehlokazulu Kasihayo (The Battle Of Isandlwana)

Question: Where did you sleep the night before the battle ?

Answer: In a valley behind Nqutu, to the east of the king's kraal. there are many shrubs and small rocks there,

Q, Did you see Lord Chelmsford's army leaving the camp on the day of the battle ?

A: No, We received reports of fire arms and we saw it when we returned

Q: What orders were given with respect to the attack ?

A: No orders were given at all. It was not our day. Our day was the following one; We had not planned to attack on the day of the new moon. Our intention was to attack the camp the following day at dawn, but the English forces came to attack us first.

Q: Who attacked you first ?

A: The white and black mounted troops attacked us. The Zulu regiments were all hidden in the valley I mentioned, but Umcityu (uMcijo) launched his reply from below the Nqutu and was sighted by the men of the English forces on horseback, who could see Umcityu, but couldn't see the main body of the army. They open fire and as one and the main body of the Zulu Army took form in all directions, hearing the shooting. The attention of the English mounted troops was drawn towards the few men who had responded to their action and before these men knew where the main Zulu body was, we got up and left like a swarm of bees in every direction. When they saw how many of us there were, they withdrew and the uKhandempenvu Regiment pursued them.

It seems very clear (and should have been equally obvious to any experienced military man), that the 5:30am sightings and those immediately following, were intentionally driving in the 'vedettes' or 'Picquettes' - depriving the British of visibility of the Zulu armies movements and enabling the Zulu's scouts to get in close to observe the reactions of the camp. This should have caused all the alarm bells to start ringing. It didn't , considering that the detached column under Chelmsford was probably under a mile away at this time - see below , the detached column should have been warned and immediately returned to camp and dispositions for defence
made. Pulleine did nothing.

Certainly by 9:30am Chard was able to observe through Binoculars that the Zulu right horn was moving up and out of sight behind Isandlwana hill, which caused him to hurriedly return to RD, his concern that they may be going to attack the station seems to have vanished by the time he arrived though

Crealocks account, while needing to be treated with a great deal of suspicion in certain respects (eg: claims that Glynn not Chelmsford sent Gardiner back to the camp and claiming he had no knowledge of the orders sent, Gardiner's report says the General sent him), his statement that between 9:30am and 10:am they were camped 2 miles away can be accepted, and it was then that Pulleines first report of Large numbers of zulu around the camp was received.

2 miles - that means the column was moving around 2.5 hours to the mile and also means it would not have taken long for a mounted party to head back to camp to ascertain the situation - instead a man looks through a telescope and sees nothing amiss apart from the oxen having been driven in - because at this point the 24th had not deployed at all but was still in camp!!

It also means the column could not have been much more than 2.5 miles away at noon.

As I understand it if Raw had discovered the Zulu in the Ngwebeni valley he would have had to travel five miles from camp?

To be honest I am seeing the Lock/Quantrill theory as far more likely - even the decoy theory is reasonable.

Again from Crealock - the Zulu they were trying to engage kept retreating from hill to hill - so as the British caught up to them on one hill they retreated off the hill and up the next one - now that sounds like they were luring the British on, whether to an ambush or to get them further away from the camp is debatable but there is no doubt they were leading Chelmsford and the force with him by the nose.

That the Zulu's were perfectly capable of such ruses is evident in several situations throughout the campaign, the one that springs to mind is the attempt to lead Buller's horsemen into a trap the night before the advance to Ulundi.
It almost worked, even though Buller's instinct's kicked in and he ordered a retreat, three men were caught and killed.

Just some thoughts to keep the pot bubbling :)

Aidan

hi Aidan.
The pot is certainly simmering away nicely at this stage .
cheers 90th.

Aidan

Quote :

the detached column should have been warned and immediately returned to camp and dispositions for defence

This is a good point, and for the last week I have been trying to think of a reason as to why Pulleine did nothing. Any suggestions?

There doe's appear to have been a total lack of communication between 05:30 & 10:30 . I’m also thinking a lot more preparations could have been done during this time. I.e. Ammo stations set up in and around the camp. Troops pulled into formation, Tents Struck, Messengers sent out a lot earlier to Chelmsford. And messengers sent to warn Durnford of the activity.

"This is a good point, and for the last week I have been trying to think of a reason as to why Pulleine did nothing. Any suggestions?"

I have one suggestion:

Complacency.