Who's to Blame

Drummer Boy 14 wrote:

Hi barrie,
not sure about the wounded but the camp defenders where not short of ammumntion. The men accoring to Mike Snooks book would have had at least 30 rounds left by the time the bugle called the retreat. Durnfords NNH men most likly did run out of ammuntion. The camp was lost because of Durnfords retreat exposing a flank.

Regards Db14

Welcome Barrie and hello.
DB14's assertion that the camp was lost because of Durnford's retreat, is of course just one, old fashioned viewpoint, and an over simplification. If Durnford had not retreated when he did, his detachment would have been cut to pieces in minutes anyway. He was an experienced and determined officer who had something to prove. I am sure he would not have retreated unless he had been in a pretty forlorn situation.
There were many factors that contributed to the camp being lost, a couple of others being Pulleine's failure to reorganise the defences after Chelmsford's half of the column decamped, Chelmsford actually splitting the column in the first place (complacency???) and the ferocious determination of the Zulu warriors on that day.
I would recommend you read Zulu Rising by Ian Knight. This has to be the definitive book on the AZW for the beginner. Mike Snook's book is also a worthwhile and exhiliarating read, but as a Colonel of the regiment descended from the 24th, some allege that Mike's viewpoint may not be entirely independant.

Hi barrie, tasker224
My point was once the mem had left the camp and where fighting.

Other reasons where

No fortifications (Chelsmford)
Bad campsite ( Chelsmford)
No reserve ammuntion ready at hand (Pulline)
Troops to spread out (Chelsmford)
Spliting of forces ( Chelsmford, Durnford)
Underestimating the Zulus ( Chelsmford, Pulline, Durnford)
Not taking the camps saftey seriously ( Chelsmford)

Hope this helps

Regards

Quote :

Bad campsite ( Chelsmford)

Didn't Glyn select the camp?

Quote :

Troops to spread out (Chelsmford)

Wasn't Pulline told to draw the troops in. He didn't comply. Well he did but to late.

I think it was Major Cleary

That is not the point, as GOC of the British in South Africa he could very easly have changed the campsite. Glyn may have been the Colum Commander but Chelmsford was in overall command so he could have easily have changed the camp site if he wanted also Glyn asked him if they should laarger and Chelsmford said no.

Pretty unfair to say Pulline or Durnford should have fortified when the GOC saw no reason to.

Pulline deployed the men in accord to the orders he had recieved from Chelssmford.

Person did the same as Pulline and he won his fight.

Thanks guys

Just seemed to me that a force as well trained as the British Army would have inflicted more damage to the Zulus.
Also from (allegedly) contempory Zulu reports the British aquitted themselves well in the hand to hand fighting of the "last stands",so the supposed number of Zulu casualties seemed on the low side.

Barrie

I think around 1000 Zulus died that day with another 2000 wounded. Of those wounded probebly another 1000 died.

The best book i could recomend are

How Can Men Die Better by Mike Snook

It’s going to be a bit like RD. We don't know how many were wounded and wondered of to die. And now we are seeing it was more like 25,000 to 30,000 Zulus that took part instead of the 20,000 we originally thought..

The blame game can go on for ever, Durnford, Chelsford, Pulleine !
Try this one!

Chelmsford split his forces ( weakening the camp ).
Why did he split the column?
To re enforce Dartnell who he was lead to believe was about to go into a contact situation with the Zulu army.
That was the whole object of the attack surely, to bring the Zulu army to battle.
That being said how could be get to Dartnells location with the best possible speed? Simple leave the slow moving baggage behind and advance with a swift column.
If he had elected not to do that his plan of action would have been to recall Dartnell and then do the whole lumbering advance as a column unit.

So to continue with the Blame Game, maybe Dartnell was at fault for entering a contact situation without the means to pursue it.

Just a thought for kicking around.

Springbok 9 ( following the mighty mighty Springboks in NZ )

Springbok. And the end of the day. Durnford decided for whatever reason to leave the camp. If he was ordered to take command, then lets say he did on his arrival, but when he left, the command fell back to Pulleine. Making him responsible for the camp and those in it.

Dave/90th

It was Fynn who recorded that he advised Chelsford to move to a better site on the plain but Cleary wa allready setting the camps positions.
Therefore would Cleary have done it on his own? or would he have been obeying an order?

Conversations abound about the camp location, Brown ,Melville et al and I believe at one point Glynn was asked about its exposed position, didnt he respond with a shrug and a comment something like, 'not of my doing'?

That would then elimanate Glynn from the equation. However if it wasnt Glynn then why was Cleary setting out the camp ( definitly he should have as it would be part of his job discription), his superior was Glynn and Cleary would take orders from him. Therefore if Glynn did give the orders but he wasnt in favour of it then surely logic dictates that Glynn in terms was ordered to place the camp. That order could only have come from a superior ( unless the arch villain Crealock usurped his masters authority and gave the order in his name.)

Sounds convoluted so I hope you can see my point.

Regards

Littlehand
Where is it recorded that Durnford was ordered to take command?

He most certainly was senior officer, but bare in mind he was operating as a seperate column. Therefore the decision was his, assuming no other orders were issued to the contrary, to stay or go.

He had been given free range by Chelsford in the oft quoted letter to operate independantly.
Wrong or right thats what he elected to do.

My problem with Durnfords behaviour was not that he left the camp but that he hung the rocket battery out to dry and then instead of getting back to camp post haste conducted his totally useless fighting retreat. All that did was use up ammo.

I agree with Springbok where was Durnford ordered to TAKE COMMAND????????????

His orders are at the Royal Engineers museum in Chattam and they do not state TAKE COMMAND.


Regards

   1st Witness.— Major Clery states: I am Senior Staff Officer to the 3rd Column, commanded by Colonel Glyn, C.B., operating against the Zulus. The General commanding accompanied this Column from the time it crossed the border into Zululand.
   On the 20th January, 1879, at the Camp, Isandlwana, Zululand, the Lieutenant-General commanding gave orders to Commandant Lonsdale and Major Dartnell to go out the following morning in a certain direction from the camp with their men, i.e., the Native Contingent, and the Police, and Volunteers, part of the 3rd Column. On the evening of the following day (the 21st) a message arrived from Major Dartnell that the enemy was in considerable force in his neighbourhood, and that he and Commandant Lonsdale would bivouac out that night. About 1.30 A.M., on the 22nd, a messenger brought me a note from Major Dartnell, to say that the enemy was in greater numbers than when he last reported, and that he did not think it prudent to attack them unless reinforced by two or three companies of the 24th Regiment. I took this note to Colonel Glyn, C.B., at once, he ordered me to take it on to the General. The General ordered the 2nd Battalion 24th Regiment, the Mounted Infantry, and four guns, to be under arms at once to march. This force marched out from camp as soon as there was light enough to see the road. The Natal Pioneers accompanied this column to clear the road. The General first ordered me to write to Colonel Durnford, at Rorke's Drift, to bring his force to strengthen the camp, but almost immediately afterwards he told Colonel Crealock that he (Colonel Crealock) was to write to Colonel Durnford these instructions, and not I. Before leaving the camp, I sent written instructions to Colonel Pulleine, 24th Regiment, to the following effect:—" You will be in command of the camp during the absence of Colonel Glyn; draw in (I speak- from memory) your camp, or your line of defence"—I am not certain which-"while the force is out: also draw in the line of your infantry outposts accordingly; but keep your cavalry vedettes still far advanced." I told him to have a wagon ready loaded with ammunition ready to follow the force going out at a moment's notice, if required. I went to Colonel Pulleine's tent just before leaving camp to ascertain that he had got these instructions, and I again repeated them verbally to him. To the best of my memory, I mentioned in the written instructions to Colonel Pulleine that Colonel Durnford had been written to to bring up his force to strengthen the camp. I saw the column out of camp and accompanied it."

That doesnt mention Take Commnad.

5th Evidence.—Lieutenant Cochrane, 32nd Regiment, states: I am employed as transport officer with No 2 Column, then under Colonel Durnford, R.E., on the 22nd January, 1879, the column marched on that morning from Rorke's Drift to Isandlwana in consequence of an order received from the Lieutenant General. I do not know the particulars of the order received. I entered the Isandlwana camp with Colonel Durnford about 10 A.M., and remained with him as Acting Staff Officer. On arrival he took over command from Colonel Pulleine, 24th Regiment. Colonel Pulleine gave over to Colonel Durnford a verbal state of the troops in camp at the time, and stated the orders he had received, viz., to defend the camp, these words were repeated two or three times in the conversation. Several messages were delivered, the last one to the effect that the Zulus were retiring in all directions—the bearer of this was not dressed in any uniform. On this message Colonel Durnford sent two troops Mounted Natives to the top of the hills to the left, and took with him two troops of Rocket Battery, with escort of one company Native Contingent, on to the front of the camp about four or five miles off. Before leaving, he asked Colonel Pulleine to give him. two companies 24th Regiment. Colonel Pulleine said that with the orders he had received he could not do it, but agreed with Colonel Durnford to send him help if he got into difficulties. Colonel Durnford, with two troops, went on ahead and met the enemy some four or five miles off in great force, and, as they showed also on our left, we retired in good order to the Drift, about a quarterof a mile in front of the camp, where the mounted men reinforced us, about two miles from the camp. On our retreat we came upon the remains of the Rocket Battery which had been destroyed.

 
A.
Captain Essex's Evidence. Rorke's Drift, January 24, 1879.
SIR,
I HAVE the honour to forward for the information of the Lieutenant-General Commanding, an account of an action which took place near the Isandlwana Hills on the 22nd instant. After the departure of the main body of the column, nothing unusual occurred in camp until about eight A.M., when a report arrived from a picquet stationed at a point about 1,500 yards distant, on a hill to the north of the camp, that a body of the enemy's troops could be seen approaching from the north-east. Lieutenant-Colonel Pulleine, 1st Battalion 24th Regiment, commanding in camp, thereupon caused the whole of the troops available to assemble near the eastern side of the camp, facing towards the reported direction of the enemy's approach. He also dispatched a mounted man with a report to the column, presumed to be about twelve or fifteen miles distant. Shortly after nine A.M., a small body of the enemy showed itself just over the crest of the hills, in the direction they were expected, but retired a few minutes afterwards, and disappeared. Soon afterwards, information arrived from the picquet before alluded to, that the enemy was in three columns, two of which were retiring, but were still in view; the third column had disappeared in a north-westerly direction. At about ten A.M. a party of about 250 mounted natives, followed by a rocket. battery, arrived with Lieu tenant-Colonel Durnford, R.E., who now assumed command of the camp. The main body of this mounted force, divided into two portions, and the rocket battery were about 10.30 A.M., sent out to ascertain the enemy's movements, and a company of 1st Battalion 24th Regiment, under command of Lieutenant Cavaye was directed to take up a position as a piquet on the hill to the north of the camp at about 1200 yards distant, the remainder of the troops were ordered to march to their private parades when the men were to be down in readiness, at this time, about eleven A.M., the impression in camp was that the enemy had no intention of advancing during the daytime, but might possibly-be expected to attack during the night. No idea had been formed regarding the probable strength of the enemy's force. At about twelve o'clock, hearing firing on the hill where the company 1st Battalion 24th Regiment was stationed, I proceeded in that direction. On my way I passed a company of the 1st Battalion 24th Regiment, under command of Captain Mostyn, who requested me, being mounted, to direct Lieutenant Cavaye
to take special care not to endanger the right of his company, and to inform that officer that he himself was moving up to the left. I also noticed a body of Lieutenant-Colonel Dunford's mounted natives retiring down the hill, but did not see the enemy. On arriving at the far side of the crest of the hill, I found the company in charge of Lieutenant Cavaye, a section being detached about 500 yards to the left, in charge of Lieutenant Dyson. The whole were in extended order engaging the enemy, who was moving in similar formation towards our left, keeping at about 800 yards from our line. Captain Mostyn moved his company into the space between the portions of that already on the hill, and his men then extended and entered into action. This line was then prolonged on our right along the crest of the hill by a body of native infantry. I observed that the enemy made little progress as regards his advance, but appeared to be moving at a rapid pace towards our left. The right extremity of the enemy's line was very thin, but increased in depth towards and beyond our right as far as I could see, a hill interfering with an extended view. About five minutes after the arrival of Captain Mostyn's Company I was informed by Lieutenant Melville, Adjutant, 1st Battalion 24th Regiment, that a fresh body of the enemy was appearing in force in our rear, and he requested me to direct the left of. the line formed, as above described, to fall slowly back, keeping up the fire. This I did; then proceeded towards the centre of the line. I found, however, that it had already retired. I therefore followed in the same direction, but being mounted had great difficulty in descending the hill, the ground being very rocky and precipitous. On arriving at the foot of the slope I found the two companies of 1st Battalion 24th Regiment drawn up at about 400 yards distant in extended order, and Captain Younghusband's company in a similar formation in echelon on the left. The enemy was descending the hill, having rushed forward as soon as our men disappeared below the crest, and beyond (?) the right of the line with which I was present had even arrived near the foot of the hill. The enemy's fire had hitherto been very wild and ineffective, now, however, a. few casualties began to occur in our line. The companies 1st Battalion 24th Regiment first engaged were now becoming short of ammunition, and at the request of the officer in charge I went to procure a fresh supply with the assistance of Quartermaster 2nd Battalion 24th Regiment and some men of the Royal Artillery.  I had some boxes placed on a mule cart and sent it off to the companies engaged, and sent more by hand, employing any men without arms. I then went back to the line, telling the men that plenty of ammunition was coming. I found that the companies 1st Battalion 24th. Regiment before alluded, to had retired to within 300 yards of that portion of the camp occupied by the Native Contingent. On my way I noticed a number of native infantry retreating in haste towards the camp, their officer endeavouring to prevent them but without effect. On looking round to that portion of the field to our right and rear I saw that the enemy was surrounding us. I rode up to Lieutenant-Colonel Durnford, who was near the right, and pointed this out to him. He requested me to take men to that part of the field and endeavour to hold the enemy in check; but while he was speaking, those men of the Native Contingent who had remained in action rushed past us in the utmost disorder, thus laying open the right and rear of the companies of 1st Battalion 24th Regiment on the left, and the enemy dashing forward in a most rapid manner poured in at this part of the line. In a moment all was disorder, and few of the men of 1st Battalion 24th Regiment had time to fix bayonets before the enemy was among them using their assegais with fearful effect. I heard officers calling to their men to be steady; but the retreat became in a few seconds general, and in a direction towards the road to Rorke's Drift. Before, however, we gained the neck near the Isandlwana Hill the enemy had arrived on that portion of the field also, and the large circle he had now formed closed in on us. The only space which appeared opened was down a deep gully running to the south of the road into which we plunged in great confusion. The enemy followed us closely and kept, up with us at first on both flanks, then on our right only, firing occasionally, but chiefly making use of the assegais. It was now about 1.30 P.M. ; about this period two guns with which Major Smith and Lieutenant Curling, R.A., were returning with great difficulty, owing to the nature of the ground, and I understood were just a few seconds late. Further on the ground passed over on our retreat would at any other time be looked upon as impracticable for horsemen to descend, and many losses occurred, owing to horses falling and the enemy coming up with the riders; about half a mile from the neck the retreat had to be carried on in nearly single file, and in this manner the Buffalo River was gained at a point about five miles below Rorke's Drift. In crossing this river many men and horses were carried away by the stream and lost their lives ; after crossing the fire of the enemy was discontinued, pursuit, however, was still kept up, but with little effect, and apparently with the view of cutting us off from Rorke's Drift, The number of white men who crossed the river at this point was, as far as Icould see, about 40. In addition to these, there were a great number of natives on foot and on horseback. White men of about 25 or 30 arrived at Helpmakaar between five and six P.M., when, with the assistance of other men joined there, a laager was formed with wagons round the stores. I estimate the strength of the enemy to have been about 15,000. Their losses must have been considerable towards the end of the engagement.
I have, &c., (Signed) E. ESSEX, • Captain, 75th Regiment, Sub-Director of Transports.

Oops. Now I suppose the question has to be, if Durnford wasn't in command. Why did Pulleine hand over command of the camp to Durnford If he was left in commard in the absence of Glyn.

He didnt take command, what did he do whilst in commnad of the camp.

In How Can Men Die Better, Durnford arrives and tells Pulline that he is not going to interfere with his running of the camp.

HE WASNT ORDERED TO TAKE COMMAND!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

If you would like it i will see if i can take a photo of the orderer at the Museum and also a photo
of the transcript that goes with it and post them to the forum.

This will prove he wasnt ordered to take command

Regards

Quote :

He didnt take command, what did he do whilst in commnad of the camp.

What did either of them do while in command of the camp,apart from having breakfast together.

PS. I bet your be disappointed when you get to the museum.

CTSG i think you will find that it was lunch that they had together :)

Drummer boy. Don't put all your faith in one book. Unfortunately the author writes how he imagined it to be. Let's say it doesn't give an accurate account.

Hi Barrie.
The following from ' Journal 3 Anglo Zulu War Historical Society ' by Adrian Greaves .
The fact that British volley fire invariably reduced the visibility of the attacking zulus to the defenders by creating a thick
smoke screen has not , to the best of my knowledge , previously been considered by historians . Lt E.O.H Wilkinson 60th
Regt who was present at Gingindlovu describes as such '' We followed suit , firing volleys by sections in order to prevent the
smoke obscuring the enemy '' and '' Independent firing means in firing in twenty seconds , firing at nothing ; and only helping
our daring opponents to get close up under cover of our smoke '' are revealing observations .

Further on Private Mossop ( Of Hlobane Fame ) also alluded to the problem in his famous book '' Running The Gauntlet '' , He wrote
about the matter following the battle of Khambula ; '' The camp to be defended was large , we had lost a lot of men on Hlobane the
previous day . We were armed with the MH Rifles charged with black powder , and each shot belched out a cloud of smoke ; it became so dense that we were almost choked by it - and simply fired blindly into it . There was one continous roar from Cannon , rifles and the voices of men from both sides shouting . The smoke blotted out all view . It made every man feel that all he could do was to shoot immediately in front of him - and not concern himself with what was taking place elsewhere '' . I have this book and its
a very good read , and I also believe its the only surviving description by an Irregular trooper that took part in the Hlobane conflict .

Here is a table from the same article by Adrian Greaves .

Battle Rds per man per hr British combatants ( ex - native ) Zulu fatalities on or near battle .

Rorke's D. 25 104 500.
Gingind. 7 Rds ( Marines 16 ) 3390 1100 ( Half post battle rout )
Kambula 33 2086 1000
Ulundi 10 4165 950 - 1500 ( many post batt rout )

Adrian goes on to say , '' Extrapolating this hypothesis further , could this smoke screen scenario have been the reason for the relatively low expenditure of ammunition during the main battles of the zulu war ? . Of course , no -one knows the rate of fire or ammunition expenditure at Isandlwana but we do know from the various quarter masters' ammunition returns ,post battles , the exact quantity of ammunition used during all the other engagements , by dividing the total ammo fired by the number of trained soldiers involved and again by the hours of each battle .
Hope this helps .
cheers 90th .

Statement of Lieutenant-Colonel J. North Crealock, Acting Military Secretary.

[i]1. Soon after 2 A.M. on the 22nd January I received instructions from the Lieutenant-General to send a written order to Lieutenant-Colonel Durnford, R.E., commanding No. 2 Column, to the following effect (I copied it in my note-book which was afterwards lost): " Move up to Sandhlwana Camp at once with all your mounted men and Rocket Battery—take command of it. I am accompanying Colonel Glyn, who is moving off at once to attack Matyana and a Zulu force said to be 12 or 14 miles off, and at present watched by Natal Police, Volunteers, and Natal Native Contingent. Colonel Glyn takes with him 2-24th Regiment, 4 guns R.A., and Mounted Infantry."

Hi John.
This is wear the trouble lies . I'm fairly certain I have Crealocks transcript written of that day and it certainly doesnt
have the words '' Take command of it '' in the letter to Col Alison back in Eng , I will check it out tonight !. Crealock
has more than likely added that part after the demise of Durnford in an effort to cover his own A - - E !. As I said I will
check it out later .
cheers 90th.

Funny how he lost his note book. An important part of the evidence.

Crealock lied the order didnt state take commad.

Also isnt their an account from Major Cleary stating that he was ordered to write to Durnford and order him to reinforce the camp, but then Crealock appered and he wrote the order instead.

Quote :

Crealock lied the order didnt state take commad.

Drummerboy. Can you substantiate that accusation.

Chard1879 f you read these books on the Zulu war, such as The washing of the spears, The herosim and tragady of the Zuluy war 1879. The orders are clearly stated not to state Take Command.


Give me 23 days and i am seeing all the effects of Durnford including his ORDERS and i will see for myself what they state and i will write on the forum exactly what they say.


Regards

Looking forward to that drummerboy. Try a get a photograph.

Hi John / Chard14.
This is from Sonia Clarke's ' Zululand At War '

Chelmesford added that Col Durnford with his column should be summoned to reinforce the Isandlwana camp . As Crealock in the
adjoining tent overheard the remark he asked his General if the staff officer for No3 Column should dispatch an order to Durnford
who had an INDEPENDANT COMMAND . '' No , let you do it '' retorted Chelmesford , This episode , related by Clery to Col Harman
on 17th Feb 1879 ( I have posted this portion of the Letter on here recently ) may have had an important bearing on the disasterous
events at Isandlwana. Clery understood that the General intented Durnford TO REINFORCE THE CAMP - Clery wrote in this vein
on at least six occasions . It appears , however , that Crealock wrote ambiguously to Durnford and DID NOT STATE CLEARLY THAT
THE COMMANDER OF NO2 COLUMN WAS TO REINFORCE AND TAKE COMMAND OF THE CAMP . The text and layout of Crealock's ( footnote 20 ) was as follows .CAN WE ALL READ THIS SLOWLY ! '' You are to march to this camp at once with all the force you have with you of No2 column . Major Bengough's ( footnote 21 ) Batt is to move to Rorke's Drift as ordered yesterday .
2 / 24th , artillery and mounted men with the General and Colonel Glyn move off at once to attack a force about ten miles distant .
Signed JNC PS - If Bengough's Batt has crossed the river at Eland's Kraal it is to move up here '' . It is interesting to note that
Crealock wrote ' The General and Colonel Glyn ' , thus contradicting his later insinuation that Col Glyn led out the force !.
So there we have it , certainly no mention of '' TAKE COMMAND '' . Now for the footnotes number 20 is as follows ;

The message was copied into J.N.Crealock's notebook which was later recovered from the Isandlwana battlefield . CREALOCK
DID NOT INSTRUCT DURNFORD TO TAKE COMMAND OF THE CAMP AS HE STATED IN HIS REPORT . ( Parlimentary Papers
1879 [ C. 2260 ] , P 98 , ) although , as senior to Pulleine , Durnford would automatically have assumed command when inside the camp . In 1882 Crealock attested to Durnford's brother , Edward , that the message in the notebook was the version taken at daybreak on the 22nd Jan by Lt . H. Smith - Dorrien , transport officer of No3 Column , to Col A. Durnford .
So in my words the lying or cover up continued at Anthony's expense !.

Footnote 21 , Major Harcourt Bengough , 77th Regt , passed staff college , commanded the 2nd Batt NNC .

So can we now not mention again Durnford was told to take command of the camp , when clearly he wasnt !.
cheers 90th.

Hi impi i will do my best i definatly hope to get photos of his sword and scaberd as well as his orders.






Regards DB14

Whether Durnford was ordered to take command or not is insignificant in every possible way to the outcome of the battle.

The only interest in this minor point, is to apportion blame in the blame game.

The camp was lost, no matter who was in command.

Hi Tasker.
Here , here . I doubt it could have been prevented at all . The only chance was to have fortified like Khambula and Eshowe.
But , Isandlwana was seen as a staging point only , so therefore didnt warrant any major defensive works .
cheers 90th.