Durnford left the Donga at the hight of the battle??

In ZV it states that Durnford left the Donga to confer with Pulliene at the hight of the battle.

It also says he met Troopers Barker and Hawkinsof the NC and ordered them to the Donga to assist the NNH.

Is this true?

I have never heard of it before


Cheers

Different authors, Different research resources & Different Views.

Hi DB
Is ZV ( Zulu Victory ) by Lock & Quantrill ?? . If so , is there a footnote regarding that matter ? . What is the page No ? .
I'm always reticent to believe anything along those lines , unless of coarse , there is an accompanying footnote revealing their primary source info . What Pete said is of course true at times , different Authors , differing views . That is in my opinion why footnotes are crucial to getting an informed view of any given situation . Also in answering your question , I dont think I've come
across that being mentioned in other publications . I will have a look through some today and see what I find .
cheers 90th. :idea: .

90th wrote:

Hi DB
Is ZV ( Zulu Victory ) by Lock & Quantrill ?? . If so , is there a footnote regarding that matter ? . What is the page No ? .
I'm always reticent to believe anything along those lines , unless of coarse , there is an accompanying footnote revealing their primary source info . What Pete said is of course true at times , different Authors , differing views . That is in my opinion why footnotes are crucial to getting an informed view of any given situation . Also in answering your question , I dont think I've come
across that being mentioned in other publications . I will have a look through some today and see what I find .
cheers 90th. .

[quote]

Hi DB 14 and 90th,

Un "Zulu victory" by Lock and quantrill: See p.203 (ed. 2005). "When they [BARKER and HAWKINS] encountered DURNFORD. He ordered them to ride at once to the Nyokana donga where they were to assist Lhubi's troop"

No footnote, I am afraid...

Cheers

YMOB

Hi DB.
Sorry , I dont think Durnford would have left the Donga for any reason , as he did send 2 or 3 possibly more people to find
ammunition , so no way would he have left , until some primary evidence comes to light saying it did happen I dont believe
it . None of the eye - witnesses ie ; His troops , Cochrane or Essex etc mention Durnford being in the camp while his men
were still in the Donga . We know he sent people back to camp to get more ammo etc . He would have been short of officers
as they were primarily the one's he sent back . As for Barker & Hawkins , this from Zulu Rising by Ian Knight .

'' In fact , Durnford also had with him Lt Scott and the Carbineer Vedettes whom he had collected shortly after he met the survivors
of the Rocket Battry . Trpr Barker - who had ridden back to the camp after passing the Rocket Battery earlier , to replentish his supply of Ammunition - HAD JUST RIDDEN BACK OUT AGAIN when He saw Durnford , ''Followed by some mounted natives '' who called out '' Carbineers , hurry up and follow me '' before leading his men into the Nyogane just above Bradstreet's position . Here they dismounted , Hawkins myself and others giving our horses to one of Durnford's natives to hold , promising to tip him when the fight was over , however , he left our horses after a time and rejoined his troop ( FN 57 ; Stalker , Natal Carbineers )
cheers 90th.

It has always been one of my problems with Durnfords behaviour and why I attribute some of the blame for the defeat to him.
To many of his senior staff were sent of to get ammo extra men etc. ( Davies ) When the withdrawl commenced there were insufficient officers ( Simeon Nkambule) to control it and give Pope a chance. From all the accounts it was a fragmented rush to get back to the saddle with some troops hardly sparing a moment before escaping along the road.
At that stage Durnford was seen at the donga by Edwards ( Durnford was holding his horse ).

Durnford was then met heading towards the infantry line ( not controling the withdrawl ) he met Gardner and then Essex. Both mention him in their statements.

Bradstreet was ordered to leave the donga by Durnford ( Gardners statement) Therefore Durnford had to have been in the donga.

Durnford was also seen later in the camp area by Nourse acting very distressed ( Nourse statement) and spoke about not suviving the disgrace.
He was seen at this time also by Nyanda, raws induna., and on the firing line by Harry Davis. Thats the weird one.

He then returns to the tents and meets up with Bradsteet and Scott and the eventual stand at the foot of the koppie. I have allways thought that there had to be a slowing down of the left wing in order that Durnford could have made the journey he did.
The only way that could have happened would have been the Carbineers fighting a rear guard action untill joined by Pullen, semi confirmed by Barkers statements.

My point being that here were a bunch of very brave men who fought a controled retreat ( Barker) covering the withdrawl of some of the 'mounted men', lead by Bradstreet. So why wasnt Durnford there doing his job he had so strongly held onto, heading an independant column.

Instead he runs around the camp area ( Essex Gardner Nyanda Davis Barker), headless chicken would be a good description untill he meets back with the Carbineers. Doesnt take a lot of imagination to guess what they said to him to get him back under control.

And so to the hero,s death. With some of the unsung ( not sung enough ) true hero's


Just a view point for discussion, happy to be ripped to shreds.


Regards

Hi DB14

Durnford abandons the donga simply because it is turned on its left and right ,it's a strategic retreat, he had to do this ...

Cheers

Pascal

The real issue is not that he left the donga but the way he did.

Durnford made some strategic mistakes in this battle, his method of disengaging the Zulu at the Donga was one of them
His abandonment of his men.
Not ensuring his lines of supply was another ( he didnt have a clue where his ammunition was)
Hanging the rocket battery out to dry.
His 'fighting retreat' to the donga.

To my mind his contribution to the mess.

Hi Springbok9

Fully daccord and it's first fault is that he shipped the company Cavaye in front of Zulu ...

Cheers

Pascal

Pascal
The Cavaye posting is an ongoing issue. Julian/Jackson rely on a remark made by Chelmsford to justify Durnford sending Cavaye onto the spur. There are other accounts that attribute that action to Pulleine.
The Cavaye position was reputably mention by Essex to Chelmsford in an informal briefing and included in Chelmsfords report on the Court of Enquiry. Essex never included it in his own report. A key point.

Possibly the blame game starting?

How do I know if Durnford or Pulleine who gave that order?

According to Rothwell and Knight, it's Durnford ...

But after that, which sent the other companies, one after the other?

Authors and historians interpret according to their own thoughts. Look at the source material and draw your own conclusions.
In this issue start with Chelmsfords summary and comments on the C of I.
Statements by Essex, Cochrane, Gardner, and the other suvivors.

Very well dear sir, and where do we find in commerce, Chelmsford summary and comments on the C of I.and statements by Essex, Cochrane, Gardner, and the Other suvivors ?.

A lot on this web site. The rest by dilligent searching through archives.
Check through the topics on the main menu there is a heading for suvivor statements. Es,sex, Gardner there are quite a few there.
Northwest medals web site is also a good place to start.

Enjoy

Thank you, I look after it I When I have a minute's rest ..

Hi All .
I think I've made sense of this in my mind anyway , so here it is .
Cochrane who is with Durnford and his men never mentions Durnford , leaving the donga to go back to the camp , While they are still fighting in the said Donga .
Essex says he got into camp before Mostyn & Cavaye and found Durnford , Durnford then hurried off to rally some more men .
Durnford was in the camp at this time because they had already retreated from the donga , and those native troops who were with Durnford had already decided to flee as they had only a limited supply of ammunition ( Hlubi & Edendale Troop ) . So basically the troops that Durnford did attempt to rally were no doubt the one's he died with later in his last stand . Also the Edendale troop was credited with laying down a covering fire from the Natal side of the Buffalo which enabled more of the fugitives to get to safety .
cheers 90th.

Also Henderson took his troop to the Ammuntion wagons but the Righ Horn cut them off from the camp so they had to flee.
From Jabez Molife's account of the battle

Also

Harry Davies says in a letter to his Farther that he didn't see Durnford after he left the Donga so i'm not sure about his remark about Col. D being on the firing line,


For Some reason Zulu Victory states that there was a lack of ammo


Cheers

Hi DB.
The percieved lack of ammunition was due to the simple fact that it didnt arrive fast enough to the troops in the front line .
We must remember the firing line was a long way from the Ammunition wagons . I'm thinking many of those who were charged
with the task of taking the Ammo to the front line , would have seen the numbers of zulus involved and probably thought it impossible to hold them off in any case , and possibly decided to flee !. Zulu Victory also mentions this as a reason as why the Ammo supply began to dwindle at a crucial point of the battle .
cheers 90th. :study:

I thought it was proven that ammo was getting to the firing lines, in the documentary by Ian Knight.

Hi 90th

But that can't be right


If there was a lack how did H company retreat 1,300 meters to the saddle and the others over 800 yards to the camp.

Essex's cart arrived at the firing line and in 2001 many parts of Ammuntion boxes were found all along the firing line.

They were only in action on the firing line for around 40 mins at Isandlwana, while at Kambula Woods men fired 33 rounds in 4 hours.


Cheers

DB14 can you name your source.

Quote :

Kambula Woods men fired 33 rounds in 4 hours.

Hi Chard1879.
Ammunition was getting to the front line but unfortunately not enough of it to check the advance . I'm fairly certain Ian Knight has
said as much , it wasnt a case of NO ammo getting to the firing line but merely to little to late !.
cheers 90th.

DB 14
You have asked exactly the right question, how could that retreat occur without ammo, sure as hell not just with bayonets. Bullets would have given them the space needed.

There is no proof whatsoever that ammo was the cause of the retreat. That hoary old chestnut came from Morris who based it on the conversation between Pullen and SD.

The only verifiable shortage of ammo was in the donga, but even then the carbineers were able to put up a very credible fighting retreat.

Regards

DB14 Re: Harry Davis

Yeah his statement about Durnford and his batman being at the front line is weird. Some how doesnt fit the time and space equation for Durnfords movements.

Should be questioned.

Regards

Hi all

After IK in Isandlwana The great Zulu victory

"Some of the 24 th were running low on ammunition,and a staff officer organised a fresh supply in a mule cart from the camp."

Cheers

Pascal

Chard1879 wrote:

DB14 can you name your source.

Yes

Its in

Zulu by Saul David
Zulu Rising by Ian Knight




Cheers

Drummer Boy 14 wrote:

Chard1879 wrote:

DB14 can you name your source.

Yes

Its in

Zulu by Saul David
Zulu Rising by Ian Knight




Cheers

[quote]

Hi all,

Julian WHYBRA, a meticulous historian, knows very well this subject.
Please, Mr WHYBRA help us!

Cheers

YMOB

The foor note in Ian Knights Zulu Rising says

"Imperial infantry expended in four hours an avarge of 33 rounds per man."

From Midshipman to Field Marshal by Sir Evelyn Wood

Cheers

Click Here: From Midshipman to Field Marshal by Sir Evelyn Wood

Hi All.
Just wanting to clarify a couple of points .
Springbok . I didnt mean to imply the retreat was due to Ammunition failure . The commanders had to make a decision as they
saw what confronted them directly ahead and seeing what they could of the other parts of the firing line , they realised that their
extended firing line was becoming untenable . Its been mentioned i think by Curling that he had heard a couple of bugle calls , which
I'm positive he says it was either the ' Retreat or Retire ' . I'm not sure how many rounds the troops in the firing line had with them
either 50 or 70 , I'm more inclined to go 50 as that was the standard ? , and the extra 20 was a reserve if I'm correct ?. At this point
the officer's one would expect would realise that the troops had been firing consistently and would also realise that they couldnt keep up this Suppressing / Volley fire for ever . Whether the Bugles sounded the retire is a mute point , as those in command in the firing line would have no doubt worked out for themselves that an orderly retreat was the only option open to them , obviously in an attempt to set up a different defensive posture closer to the camp and the ammunition .

DB . The ammunition failure did indeed occur , but this was when the firing line Co's had already retreated and where basically on their own surrounded by the attacking zulus . This is mentioned concerning H. Co on page 275 of HCMDB .
cheers 90th.

The men of the 24th have 70 cartridges on them when they have their black leather pouch Expense of 30 rounds on them, but they all had ?

Also on the the reserve ammunition wagons of the battalions, there 30 cartridges per man.

It is Kambula, the infantry of the 90th and 1 / 13 th have drawn an average of 30 rounds per man in 4 hours.

At Isandhlwana, they have learned much, necessarily ...

Cheers

Pascal

In volley fire, 50 rounds can be learned in 12 or 13 minutes at the minimum ...

In independent fire, 50 rounds can be fired in 4 or 5 minutes, at the minimum ...


In volley fire, 70 cartridges can be fired in 17 or 18 minutes, at the minimum ...

In independent fire, 70 cartridges can be fired in 6 or 7 minutes,at the minimum ...

But that's the theory ... In fact with the tactical moves, long ago in the 80's, when IK and I have correspondence by letter, we had calculated that the infantry had fired for about an hour, at the rate of one shot per minute around ...

Cheers

Pascal

Hi Pascal ,

I too find the quote of 33 rounds per man in 4 hours very dubious. What were they doing for the other 3 hours 30 minutes? I take it of course that is what was fired and not drawn from the QM.


regards,

barry

Barry,this is what I say, he confused with Kambula (30 cartridges per British light infantryman in 4 hours)

At Isandhlwana, feel the terror that saw the soldiers of 24 th, they learn much faster and more than that ...50 to 100 cartridges per British 24 th infantryman in 1 hours)

Hi Pascal,
Correct .
If that low rate of fire is correctly reported, why was the ammunition supply problem ever raised by many witnesses to the battle. Remembering that some units carried 40 rds on them others 70, thus, the frontline should have never run out. So, if this is correct, shortage of screwdrivers to open the boxes should never have been reported as there was no need to draw anything from the QM Sergeant.
Simple logic tells me that someone has become a little confused..

regards


barry

Hi All.
Fairly certain the Ammunition rates and expenditures have been posted previously allbeit a while ago . Here are some instances
from an article by Ian Knight in ' The Journal Of The Anglo Zulu War Historical Society ' 11th Edition June 2002 .
This concerning Isandlwana .
'' If the 24th were firing slowly and carefully , then , how many shots did they fire during the battle ? . Clearly , this is crucial to any calculation regarding ammunition expenditure , but the answer will never be known . We simply do not know when individual companies opened fire , and for how long they fired continuously. When Mostyn & Cavaye's companies first opened fire on the zulu right horn , it was at long range , and the rate would have been moderate or even slow - the need to place shots was more important than the need to pour in the volume of fire necessary to break up an imminent attack . Essex thought Mostyn's Co had only been in action on the ridge for about 5 mins - and Cavaye's , by implication rather longer - when it was ordered to withdraw to the foot of the heights. It seems likely from other sources that Mostyn & Cavaye were in action on the heights for rather longer . Nevertheless , it's
worth noting that Essex says these Companies were running low on ammunition by the time they reached the bottom of the ridge , and that he was prompted to organise a re- supply . Certainly , if they had been in action for 20 mins firing an average of 2 rds a minute - not an improbale rate - they would have used up rather more than half the rounds with which they had bagan the battle .
( 70 Rounds per man , 20 in either pouch on the front of the waist belt and 30 in the black expense pouch or ' ballbag ' )

Captain Hutton observed at Gingindlovu that the average number of rounds fired per man was rather under 7 ; that of the Marines next to me was 16. Wood states at Khambula - the line battalions were very steady , expending in 4 hours an average of 33 rounds per man . At Ulundi , the average was 10 rounds expended in half an hour . The measured volleys of the 24th at Isandlwana can be compared favourably to the experience of Pvt. Williams of the 1 /24th , Colonel Glyn's groom . Williams was in the camp as the zulu attack developed , and together with several officers' servants , began to fire from the edge of the tent area at the distant zulus. This was independant fire with no-one to direct it and Williams noted '' we fired 40 -50 rounds each when the NNC fell back on the camp and one of their officers pointed out to me that the enemy were entering the right of the camp . We then went to the right - and fired away the remainder of our ammunition. Note Williams 70 rounds lasted him throughout the battle . It's interesting to note that at Gingindlovu , if Hutton's estimate of the number of rounds fired by the 60th Rifles is correct , then 540 men fired over 5,000 rounds he noted afterwards only 61 dead were found within 500 yds of their line , in the most destructive fire zone. Although more undoubtedly fell at loger ranges, and an incalculable number were wounded - several times the number killed - this figure suggests a ratio of 80 shots to kill one zulu . Using Wood's figures at Khambula some 1200 infantry fired nearly 40,000 rounds, killing up to 2,000 zulus a rather better ratio of 20;1 reflecting the greater experience of the Battalions involved . Perhaps the most famous example of fire being effective without being unduly destructive is Rorke's Drift , here the defenders fired nearly 20,000 rounds in 10 hrs , killing some 600 zulus- an avge rate of fire rather less than 15 per hr , with a kill ratio of 33; 1 .
cheers 90th.

Garry

The only good statistic for this war to have a good idea not too far from reality is that it takes an average of 25 rounds to kill or injure a Zulu .... I say to kill or injure, not just to kill ...

Divide your number of cartridges fired and get average losses in killed and wounded Zulus ...

Ian Knight and I were therefore calculated in the late 1980's with also Ian Castle, 1 or 2 shots per miutes on average for one hour at Isandhlwana ...

But bravo for your post, I love those kinds of numbers

Encore d'autres s'il te plait...

Cheers

Pascal

Hi

The men of the 24 carried 70 rounds per man

It is ridicuals to say they blazed away or ran short, if they did how did 4 companies retreat 800 yards and H company retreat 1,300 meters to were they fell.

Or LT Anstey and his men retreating nearly 3 miles to where they fell??

At Kambula some men had no targets for a long time and when they did they fired slowly and shot the attacks to peices.

Read

How Can Man Die Better by Mike Snook, this explains how ridiculas it is to state the 24th ran low.



Cheers

Sorry, but there has never been proved that they had their full complement of ammunition on them ...

The men had been in action before and were steady and good shots.

There officers where trained and had also fourght before.

They would all have realised the threat of the Zulu attack.

They had orders to keep all there kit on.

Ammuntion was getting to the firing lines and the men were never short on the line, if so they could never had retreated so far.

Cheers

Hi DB.
Not sure if your answering a post or merely commenting , but if you are referring to my post , Essex himself said that Mostyn
and Cavaye's companies WERE running short of Ammunition after their withdrawl from the ridge. Hutton was referring to the
3 / 60th Rifles at Gingindlovu , I didnt post what John Dunn said but he did say he was disappointed in the imperial troops at Gingindlovu because some of them seemed to fire at an absurd rate . Be wary of Snook's writings as he does tend to be liberal
in his thinking of what happened at Isandlwana . I think you should read my post slowly in regard to what Ian Knight's thoughts are
on the expenditure of rounds . Doesnt Mike Snook also mention that Wardell's company were also running short of ammunition after
their withdrawal from the firing line . No- one is saying that they ran short on the firing line to a dramatic degree , but this could have happened during their withdrawal to the camp . Page 275 '' Few of Wadell's men still had cartridges '' From HCMDB . Anstey may be a different story, if he retreated through the camp proper he quite possibly was able to find boxes of Ammunition Lying around in the
camp itself where others had left them , or attempted to send them off , but had fled when they realised it was a lost cause . I may be wrong here , but do we know for a fact that all 70 rounds were issued per man or did they only have the 20 x 2 in their pouches on their waist belts ? . If the 30 rounds are a reserve ,does that mean it was carried all the time on their person ? , if so it's hardly a reserve is it ?. If in fact the 30 was issued before an action , there is no mention anywhere that I've ever seen of the men at Isandlwana lining up to get the extra 30 Rounds before trudging out to the firing line position !!. This may get a few replies , hopefully
not rude one's !. :pale: :pale: .
cheers 90th. :study:

Hi 90th

The men carried 70 rounds at all times
The first line reserve for each man was a further 30 rounds in the Ammuntion wagons.

I understand that the men would have run out of ammo in the end, retreating 1,300 meters is going to use up a lot of ammo.

The men had orders to keep on all there kit and i haven't seen a report to say that the men didn't have 70 rounds


Cheers

On wagons, there was indeed a reserve of 30 cartridges per man, put it intact since the beginning of the invasion.

But it did not prove that any companies have gone into battle with 70 rounds per man ...

They did certainly not all their expence pouch to 30 cartridges ...

Because the officers did not expect to fight a desperate battle ...

[quote="Pascal ]

Because the officers did not expect to fight a desperate battle ...[/quote]

Why, there had been reports of Thousands of Zulus near the camp since 7am


Cheers

Hi DB.
You may well be right in regard to the 70 Rounds , but as you said , you havent seen a report stating that the men didnt have
70 Rounds , well I havent seen one that said they DID have the 70 rounds ? . '' Confusing , isnt it Dutchy '' ! . Wonder where
that line come from !. I couldnt resist a little humour . I should be asleep , its 3.40 am here but couldnt sleep earlier , should try again . I'm sure someone will post the info regarding the amount of ammo they carried . Dont think I'll be going through any books
now !.
cheers 90th.

They did not be attacked, evidence Durnsford went to the rescue of Chelmsford, it's well known .

Hi All,
I think that to say that the general ammunition supply at Isandlwana ran short is definitely not correct.
What is being said is that supplies to the troopers on the firing line definitely ran short despite what Mike Snook or anyone else may say.
It was a more complex problem of battlefield logistics derived from ; ammo boxes up on the wagons not been opened fast enough : coupled to ammunition runners, themselves being overrun or waylaid ; coupled to there not being enough screwdrivers to open the ammo boxes on the wagons; coupled to the fact that Imperial units were refusing to supply the Colonials with ammuntiion .

In Col Clarke's (Tpr Clarke NMP was a member off the Dartnell patrol ) official battlefield damage and losses report published in the 1908 Nonqai (p121) he reports as follows on the Isandlwana battlefield 23/01/1879, early am ;

.....the enemy which were about 30,000 in number had captured over 200,00 rounds of ammunition, 800 rifles and two 7 pounder field guns , the latter still being being in the nek as we left , but having being run into a donga we failed to see them. Needles to say we looked for bodies of our comrades , of whom 34 had been left in camp, of these 23 were found near the body of Col Durnford, who commanded at the camp, 9 had escaped , Tpr Pleydell was killed near the water cart which he drove but I have never heard what happened to the 34th man.

regards

barry

Hi Barry

There certainly was a problem for other units but not the 24th. If there was how did they retreat so far?

I presume they just shooed the nasty Zulus away.

Did Trp Clarke mention anything else about the battle field when he returned?


Cheers

Barry, the only problem with the ammunition, what was it too far of the companies.

And that because the officers in charge did not expect to fight a desperate battle, just a battle as something in front of the Xhosa in 1878 ...

Hi Db14,

Yes he does, read the post earlier on the forum about the recovery of the colours from the mZinyathi. He was there 10 days later with Maj Black, of the 24th, on that task.

regards,

barry