Survivors, NMP Tprs Doig and Shannon

Hi All,

This excerpt from the NMP archives gives a graphic record as to what surviving NMP Troopers Doig and Shannon experienced before doing a runner and arriving in Ladysmith ;

They had been sent out with the mounted men to hold the main Zulu army in check which they did until their ammunition was exhausted . Messengers sent back for more cartridges did not return so the whole body retired , only to find the the (ammuntion) boxes could not be opened , there being no screwdrivers available

The practice of screwing down the lids (on the ammunition boxes) was abolished when the news reached England .

At the moment the mounted men arrived back in the Isandlwana camp , the right horn of the impi had appeared in the nek, thus closing the Rork's Drift road . I imagine that the appearance of the enemy in this quarter was quite unexpected , because had ammunition been available and the troops concentrated, it would have been possible to hold the ground .

The Infantry were however split up into companies, and were all over the place , and it was too late to move them.

The Police and Volunteers were intact and near Col Durnford , who in the final rush, gave the order, " Get away as best you can !". Very few men heard this (command) and therefore very few escaped (with their lives) .

The Rorke's Drift road being closed , the men could only make a dash for the south over horribly rocky ground where even horses could scarcely escape from the pursuing enemy. Many fugitives were overtaken and killed (on the Fugitives trail) and I dont think one single footman succeeded in reaching the Buffalo river alive. With the river in flood in front and bloodthirsty enemy in the rear, each man dashed into the stream (the flooded mZinyathi) as he reached it .........

barry

PS: underlining for emphasis and bracketing by barry

Encore bravo Barry ,vive la police du Natal,la meilleure unitée coloniale de cette guerre...

Cheers

Pascal

Bon apres-midi, Pascal,

D'accord, merci beacoup.
Il ete mon pleisir.
Que voulez-vous savior sur les annees Matabele's

Cordialment

barry

Barry,va voir sur mon sujet sur le forum

Hi Barry

What i ment with regards ammo was that the men of the 24th did not run short or out of it,
if they had how did they retreat so far?


The others, NNH and NMP would have run short as they fired faster.

Good post


Cheers

Bonsoir DB14

They never ran out of ammunition, they simply retreat to avoid the melee as long as possible, it's called a tactical retreat, if the line of battle was in the camps from the beginning, they would have resisted even most beautifully the poor devils ...look your pm

Cheers

Pascal

Hi DB14,

Pascal is right about a fighting retreat being undertaken. This is a standard military manouver.
However a fighting retreat could also be conducted with the bayonet and revolver, if rifle ammo ran out.
Dont forget too that the MH bayonet was a formidable piece of hardware.
Unless someone else comes up with hitherto unpublished reports on this , will we ever know what really went on in the closing stages of that battle.
Your point about the 24th not being short of ammo could also be right as there are reports that the Imperial regiments were not supplying the Colonials with ammo, when they were short.
The fact that Col Clarke reports that the enemy got away with 200,000 rounds of unused ammo and that large quatities of unused ammo were also found lying on the ground by him on 02/02/1879, just ten days after the battle, "up on the hill" supports the theory that the overall supply was ample, but it was just not getting to where it was most needed, in time.
Thus, a question of battlefield logistics and , too little, too late.

regards

barry

Hi Barry

If some 2,000 zulus are charging at you can you retreat with 60 men 1,300 yards with the bayonet??

The 24th didn't run out


Something else bothers me, according to the Zulus when the NMP and NC reached the camp they dived from their horses and made a stand with Col. Durnford and held out for a while volleying. It doesn't sound like they had time to get more ammo, so how did they fight so long if they ran out of ammo??


Cheers

Hi DB 14,
Unfortunately the men who were actually there , who survived and made the statement about the shortage of ammunition are no longer around to be questioned in detail.
However, this same complaint came from other survivors as well. I tend to respect the information which eminates from prime sources and put more store in it.
If there was no credence in this, the ammunition box closure would not have been modified by the WO with immediate effect once the reports came in.
Having some understanding of the "heat of battle" I can identify with this problem and believe that battlefield logistics was the cause of the shortage.

regards

barry

Hi DB14 .
I know I've / we've covered this before , the fact of the matter is you say they had plenty of Ammo , well they probably
did at the the start of the battle , one of the reasons for the tactical withdrawl could have been that the officers realised there
wasnt ENOUGH ROUNDS being sent out / or making it to the firing line , and this on it's own neccesitated a withdrawl , which would have been done by volley fire and not firing away indescrimatedly . No-one is saying they ran out completely on the firing line , more so a case of it was dwindling away and a withdrawl closer to the camp would make replentishment a lot faster , therefore have access
to all the Rounds in the camp .
cheers 90th

Hi 90th

When the 24th got back to the Saddle they were still firing furiously. Younghusband and his men held out for ages shooting and bayoneting any Zulu that tryed to get to them.

The reason for the retreat was Durnfords retreat had opened a flank, which some 4,000 zulus were pouring though to attack G Company. Plus Pulliene may have heard of the Right horn behind Isadlwana.


Cheers

HIDB14.
If I remember correctly Younghusband's Co was not way out on the firing line as he was on the left of the line , so therefore
probably had more rounds left per man than those Companies that had withdrawn from the firing line . Hope this makes sense .
Cheers 90th.

Hi all

Sorry , but without the bullshit of Durnford, and the Zulu turning movements, the 24 th would have been forced to retreat to shorten lines, another tactical maneuver required in this situation ...

Cheers

Pascal

Pascal
For once I agree with you

Pascal
For once I agree with you

Hello

Thank you, it's good that you should say this, because you know in one million times more than me on the Zulu War, we will eventually get along one day you'll see.

Today I just received a strategic wargame on Isandhlwana and Rorke's Drift and I will find myself in the shoes of Durnford, Pulleine and Chard, 22 January 1879.

I tremble in advance, how to prevent the massacre?

This is a solo wargame, impossible to predict the Zulu movements !

Au secours !

Cheers

Pascal

90th
I will on the battlefields some time in march, I intend to photograph the view front and back from each company position. That should give the forum a good idea of the view of the aproaching impi and also the view showing the retreat that had to be undertaken. With a bit of luck I will be able to send back from isandlwana lodge on a daily basis. Havent finalised the arrangements yet. At the same time I will get the photos of the Shepstone grave area you have asked for.

Regards

Hi Springbok.
That will be great if you can get photos of the lay of the land which confronted all the companies on the firing lines from their approximate positions. Including those on the far left , Younghusband etc .
George Shepstone's outlook on the Western Face will also be interesting. Looking forward to your efforts .
cheers mate , 90th.

And relief has not been changed since too ?

Cheers

Päscal

Bonsoir Pascal,

Non,les contours geographiques n'ont pas change en 10,000 anee, mais il sera bon tres utile pour
tous de voir de nouvelles du paysage.


Cordialment

barry

Bonsoir Barry

And especially to know the status of the land per report to vegetation, January 22, 1879 ...

To know how far the Zulu could approach the British line of fire without being detected?

Super important at the tactical level...(look your pm barry)

Cheers

Pascal

Hi Barry

All i can say is read Mike Snooks

How Can Man Die Better

It is the best book on the battle i have read and shows how lack of ammo to the 24 is a load of rubbish

http://www.amazon.co.uk/How-Can-Man-Die-Better/dp/1848325819/ref=sr_1_1?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1327524532&sr=1-1

Cheers

Good post DB14.

Being a bit of a pain on insisting on source material let me quote Umhoti( from Jackson) " When the soldiers on the Manzimyama ( Anstey) had been wiped out those under isandlwana were still fighting."

( Durnfords watch had stopped at 3.40. ) look at the time line for Anstey to have retreated from the front line, across some 1300 yards of the camp, over the saddle and another couple of miles to the stream. Then think that at least Durnford and probably Younghusband were still fighting. Look at that time frame, close to 3 possibly longer hours.
There was an eclipse of the sun between 3 and 4 and two Zulu mention this." The tumult and the firing was wonderful".

Any logical reconstruction of the battle will show a fighting retreat and a stand on the saddle that lasted well beyond the initial concepts of the battle. That length of battle could not have been fought with anything less than the MH.
Bayonets and 'pistols' wouldnt have done it.

Probably the finest researcher ever on isandlwana was FWD Jackson. His comment on the screwdriver question is " Stories about the Sergeant Major of the 1/24th losing the only screwdriver are picturesque fiction."I dont believe there are any first hand commentaries concerning the screwdriver issues. Historians in general have debunked the theory on numerous occasions.

The NMR archives regarding this particular issue,quoted by Barry, are not first hand source material but rather a re telling of rumour. The English used is not first person but rather a commentary, valuable but needs to be put into context.

There will be argument that why did the Chelmsford insist on ammo boxes being pre opened afterwards ! After the battle reasons had to be sought for the defeat...........it couldnt be allowed that Chelmsford was to be blamed............. so ammunition supply, Durnford, anything really was thrown into the mix.

The sole statement on ammo being issued is from Smith Dorean and even that is subject to interpretation.

There is proof ( Ian Knights dig) of steel components and bent screws being found on the firing line and on the saddle.

Just my thoughts, happy to be shot down.

Regards

Hi all

DB14 , it proves that Mike Snooks
is impartial and honest ...

Isandhlwana is first strategic defeat of Chelmsford, and second a tactical defeat of Durnford,that is known since 1879...

Cheers

Pascal

And the poor Pulleine served only try to calm Durnford the swordsman ,Durnford the hussars..

Cheers

Pascal

For me responsible for the disaster are those misinformed Chelmsford ...

Without them, it would not have left the camp with more than half of the garrison, he was misled by whom?

Hi Pascal , Db14, Springbok9


Sprinbok9
No need to be shot down at all. Because of the dearth of information pertaining to the closing actions at isandlwana there is much speculation on what really transpired there. We latter day generals are trying to understand what the cause of the failure was. Thus ,there are many opinions, each based on what is known to the opinion giver.

DB 14
Thanks for your favoured author recommendation.I personally have Mike Snook's work quite low down on my favourites. He deals far too narrowly with the subject and seems to lack the holistic approach others have .

Pascal.
The point I make is that Isandlwana was a dismal failure for the British Forces.Something was very wrong.
Now the sheer length of their defensive lines was one definite problem. However if all links in that defensive chain were working properly and holding, there was some chance of all beating a retreat back to the ammo supply , closing up, and winning the day. However if one or two of the links collapse ( because ammo ran out). the chain breaks,the enemy gets behind the lines, and the rest is history, despite the fact the the 1/24th may have been firing furiously to the end.

Remember too that the NMP, who did much cleaning up, recovering arms and ammo from the Zulus long after the remains of the Imperials went home, report that 200,000 rounds of ammo was lost to the enemy, the problem was not a macro one, but micro, ie battlefield logistics.

regards

barry

Pascal
If I may draw a disctinction between Mislead and Misinformed.

The basic premise that Chelmsford left camp was to re enforce Dartnel. Dartnels orders were to be back in camp for nightfall. He elected however, probably for good reason, to camp out and ask for re enforcement. Chelmsford assumed that Dartnel was in touch with the main Zulu army and acted accordingly.

This is probably the moment that decided the fate of the 1/24th.

Chelmsfords thoughts must have been racing A) He had to support Dartnel, or even send out a significant force to protect him. B) He assumed that from the information given that Dartnel was about to make contact with the main impi, this what he, Chelmsford wanted. C) He could not pack up the whole camp and get to Dartnel in time. D) Plan B, split the force. Bring up the reserves from RD to make up for that split. E) His mind was now fixed on the theoretical battle with the impi. His orders to Durnford and Pulleine where either impresise or where not conveyed correctly.

That half hour in the early hours of the 22nd are the key to the whole battle. Ammo, screw drivers, orders, lines of defence.................they are details.

Barry
At first reading Mike Snook is brilliant, its only after thinking and reading again that the holes start to apear. Its good but not the definative work. To my mind the best researched book is I as I pointed out earlier Jackson.

Regards

Yes Barry

But I think the origin of the disaster is that Chelmsford has been misinformed, or he would not have left the camp, and in this case not defeat at Isandhlwana in spite of the Zulu attack ...

So I think by thinking calmly, Chelmsford have may not be the real culprit ...

Who sent messages that have decided Chelmsford to abandon the camp ?

Cheers

Pascal

Hello

Excuse me, Springbok 9 ,I read your post but I wanted someone to tell me that Dartnell confused the Zulu in front of him with the whole army zulu ...

I know that this recognition was not easy at that time, but Dartnell made a mistake ...

Well now, if the Zulus had not attacked the camp, but the troops of Chelmsford and Dartnell, the British were also beaten ...

For the history of ammunition and boxes of ammunition, all this is literature, if not how the last stand would have gone so far from the camp ...

In any case the Zulu right horn did not do his job of encirclement, if ever so many brave soldiers have been killed so far from the camp ...

Cheers

Pascal

Barry

Snooks tells the battle down to the last man, its amazing, i'm sure others would agree.

Your missing out



Cheers

DB14

Snooks is the actual Colonel of the regiment , it can be said that much of the 24 th ...

Cheers

Pascal

Poor DB14

Snooks tells the battle to the last man, while he made of ​​the survivors ?

Cheers

Pascal

........... his version of the battle down to the last man . There are other versions.

Hi all

I have been following this topic for some time now, very interesting, and springboks posts of today (26 Jan), are brilliant, well done mate.

I really think that Chelmsford should have gained some better information before splitting his force and dashing off on what became a wild goose chase. I have also been looking into what I think may have been some well thought out zulu tactics. First they seem to be in a large force against Dartnell, who decides not to return to the camp and send word to Chelmsford. Chelmsford assumes that Dartnell is in contact with the main impi and so decides to split his force and go to the aid of Dartnell with the intention of surprising the impi and gaining a quick victory. The zulu's have now got what they wanted, they have forced Chelmsford into dividing his force, leaving the camp at Isandlwana at about half its force, however, they later see that Col Durnford has come from Rorke's Drift to support the camp, so they put their plan of deception into action once again. They make a move towards Chelmsford which draws off Durnford, who thinks that they are trying to trap Chelmsford, he goes off in an attempt to stop them, but then when it is too late, he is informed that this is a ploy to draw him away from the camp, he then makes a fighting withdrawl to the donga, and the rest is history.

I really feel for Durnford, and think that he was villified by Chelmsford and Crealock in order to get Chelmsford off the hook. And if only Pulliene had used his head when the zulus were first reported long before Durnford arrived, things just might have been different.

Hope that you gentlemen don't mind me jumping in to your debate, but I thought that I would let you know what I think was some well thought out zulu tactics to divide the force at the camp, not once, but twice.

Martin.

Hello Martin

The Zulu have wanted to attract Chelmsford on Dartnell ?

I do not think so, if Chelmsford was because then everything else came with all the third column, leaving the Isandhlwana camp as planned in the future ...

In this situation, an attack by the Zulus of Chelmsford was terribly dangerous ...

The Zulus could not foresee that Chelmsford would leave troops in the camp ...

Besides this time, also called Durnford by Chelmsford to Isandhlwana could strengthen as it tried to do at the beginning of the attack on the camp ...

Cheers

Pascal

Oh I forgot ...

We must not forget that the Zulu would not attack the 22 but the 23 ...

So Dartnell, Chelmsford and Durnford were united on 22 without problems and if the Zulus had attacked them on 23 as they had planned to do so, they were beaten ...

Cheers

Pascal

His version makes sence and disples myths such as the stupid ammuntion one.

+ Dartnel was asking for 2 companies of the 24th to assist him, he didn't say he was in contact with the Zulu Army





Cheers

Sam, So why Chelmsford came with many troops?

Martin
Read the missing 5 hours theory. It encapsulates everything you have said.

Pascal
Also read the above it disputes the proposed 23rd theory.

Wrong or right I dont know, but its damn riveting stuff. I will be walking the area in March, so I hope to have a better understanding of the lines of sight and dead ground areas.

Regards

Pascal MAHE wrote:

For me responsible for the disaster are those misinformed Chelmsford ...

Without them, it would not have left the camp with more than half of the garrison, he was misled by whom?

Jumping into this debate a little late, but Pascal, I thought you of all people would have given credit to the Zulu.
Chelmsford was misinformed, or more precisely, he was deceived by the Zulu in a brilliant piece of tactical planning.
The large Zulu force out to the west to engage Chelmsford's scouts and fool them into believing that this was where the main Zulu impi were located, whilst in reality, the main force of 20,000+ Zulus had totally outflanked Chelmsford, stealthily moving unseen through the hills to the north.
Luckily for Chelmsford, he fell for the deception and half the column and he DID split off west. If he hadn't, the Zulu victory would have been much, much bigger.
It was the Zulu, in actual fact, who were unlucky that Chelmsford slpit his force. Had he not done so, the Zulus would have put back the invasion of their homeland for years.
Let's not be bad losers. Give credit to the Zulu where it is due. It was their victory and brilliantly achieved.

DB14. I thought it was understood that Col: Mike Snook writes how he feels it may of happen. Not as in fact.

Hi springbok

Thanks for that. Yes, I have heard of the missing 5 hours theory but have not read it yet, I will have to look on the forum to see if I can find it.

When you go there in March, will you be taking pictures to put on the forum? It would be appreciated if you could do that, so that we can get a good view of the positions etc. Hope you can oblige mate.

Martin.

http://www.rorkesdriftvc.com/isandhlwana/The-Missing-Five-Hours.pdf

DB14, read what impi says.

Mike Snook's books are tremendously entertaining and gripping reads, but the battle of iSandlwana that you read about in HCMDBi s what Snook imagines what might have happened.
The truth is, we will never know what happened in those final moments.

I do realise that

Its just a must read, gets rid of most myths



Cheers

Hi 24th

Many thanks for the quick link, much appreciated.

Martin

Hi all

DearTasker concluded from what you say, Dartnell and Zulu scouts were saved, without knowing it, the life at half the soldiers in the third column and that of Chelmsford itself, had to think ...

I would have to reconstruct the kind of battles that could take place if:

1 - The Zulu army attack on 23, the troops of Chelmsford, Dartnell, Pulleine Durnford and that could have been collected on 22, where there was Dartnell, as I explained above, provided that no cavalry unit was "cause" by inadvertent a Zulu regiment, because that is what triggered the battle of Isandhlwana, which should have taken place on 23 ...

2 - The Zulu army at Isandhlwana 22 attacks, the troops gathered of Chelmsford, Durnford and Pulleine at Isandhlwana, Chelmsford as they had not left the camp despite reports Dartnell ...

Qui aurait gagné dans ces deux situations ?

Cheers

Pascal