Lieutenant A. F. Henderson, Commanding the Hlubi Troop, Natal Native Horse.

"The Zulu War medal awarded to Lieutenant A. F. Henderson, Commanding the Hlubi Troop, Natal Native Horse, one of the few survivors of the massacre at Isandhlwana, later awarded the C.M.G. for services during the Siege of Ladysmith, and commanding the Estcourt Militia Reserves during the Natal Rebellion 1906""

"Alfred Fairlie Henderson was born sometime in1854 and educated at Heidelberg in Germany, returning to Natal in 1872 where he began farming and prospecting for gold. Of his fortunate escape from the battlefield of Isandhlwana, the following details appeared in the Natal newspapers at the time of his death: “With the passing of Mr. Henderson, Natal has lost a soldier whose experiences in the Zulu and Anglo Boer Wars were probably more trying than any other men who survived them. In 1879 he was one of the very few to escape the massacre of Isandhlwana and in 1899/1900 he again figured in the very few who existed through the siege of Ladysmith. It was his extensive knowledge of the Zulu language, his wide experience of Dutch habits and his familiarity with every part of Natal that made him an extraordinarily useful man in these wars. And, combined with those acquired qualifications there was an innate ability for soldiering which readily brought him to the forefront in the Intelligence Department in both campaigns. At the outbreak of the Zulu War in 1879 Mr. Henderson was placed in command of a big batch of natives recruited from Edendale under Captain George Shepstone. This contingent was amongst those surrounded but with one or two others Mr. Henderson broke through the weakest spot in the Usutu circle and effected a narrow escape. Having come through such a slaughter with his own life one would have expected that he would have moved on to safety as quickly as possible, but he did not, and in his actions at this juncture one can read the bravery, unselfishness and hardiness which combined to form a noble character. One of the very few Natal Carbimeers who escaped was Trooper Barker whose narrative of the battle was taken as an official one. In Barker’s description one reads that he (Barker) escaped and was riding away when he came across Lieutenant Higginson who was running away having lost his horse in crossing the flooded river. Barker gave his horse to Higginson and continued on foot. It appears that Mr. Henderson saw Higginson riding and recognised Barker’s horse, so promptly discovered that Barker was left behind unmounted, fleeing from a horde of blood-thirsty Zulus. It was riding to a possible death but Mr. Henderson did not waver. He collected another horse and rode back to meet Barker. In company with other men they escaped to Helpmekaar.”

Three days after the disaster at Isandhlwana Henderson wrote to his father from Helpmekaar, “You will have heard before this reaches you of the fight and massacre in Zululand. I would have written you yesterday only I wanted to try and hear something about George [Capt. G. J. P. Shepstone, Natal Native Horse, killed - Alfred’s brother-in-law]. I am afraid there is no hope for him. Colonel Durnford we think was killed as he has not turned up. The kaffirs surrounded us in thousands. We were fighting from about 9.30 a.m. until about 2 p.m. when the Zulus drove us into the camp. Our kaffirs fought well and stood their ground until we were surrounded. I never saw George all through the fight as he was with another part of our mounted men. There must have been about five hundred of our men killed. Twenty-two of the Natal Carbineers are killed. I don’t know what they are going to do with us just now. We have lost everything belonging to us. We may have to go down to town to fit out again then I will be able to give you more particulars.”

Alfre wrote again three days later with further details: “I wrote you the other day to say that I had got out of the fight the other day. I have not as yet heard anything about George. If I had known what sort of a man Durnford was (when he got into action) I don’t think I would have gone with him. He was close to me during most of the fight and he lost his head altogether in fact he did not know what to do. The General was (I think) a good deal to blame as he left the camp in such a bad place to defend. As far as I can make out there are about 700 killed white and black. They say there were about 20,000 Zulus and I think there must have been quite that number. We shot hundreds of them but it seemed to make no impression they still came on. Here we are now with nothing, all I saved was my mackintosh which was on the saddle. I have got one shilling left today. We have got to patrol the country with my troop and the Edendale troop, the only ones left...”

It is curious that Henderson makes no reference in his letters to the remarkable defence of Rorke’s Drift, for, at about 3.30 p.m. he arrived there from Isandhlwana with some one hundred men of the Hlubi and Edendale troops, Natal Native Horse. Lieutenant Chard, no doubt grateful for some reinforcements in light of the disturbing news that Henderson carried with him, put them out as a mounted screen to observe the Drift and the reverse slope of the Oskarberg. Several more survivors from Isandhlwana arrived and attempted to impress upon the garrison the futility of a defence, but Chard’s resolve could not be altered. These survivor’s, however, having seen the horror of Isandhlwana, and believing the same fate would surely befall Rorke’s Drift, continued their flight. At about 4.20 p.m. sporadic gunfire was heard behind the Oskarberg, and the Natal Light Horse galloped past the mission station in the direction of Helpmekaar. Lieutenant Henderson, pausing only to report that his troops refused to obey orders, took off in pursuit of them.

Henderson shortly afterwards contracted typhoid fever and returned to his home where he was nursed back to health in time to be in at the kill when the Zulu power was crushed at the battle of Ulundi. For the next twenty years Alfred was engaged in business with interests in several mining concessions amongst other enterprises. In the Boer War Henderson again came to prominence and received high commendation from the Director of Military Intelligence: “Mr. Alfred Fairlie Henderson, Field Intelligence Department, took part in the Defence of Ladysmith and was present at the operations near Helpmekaar and the actions at Alleman’s Nek and Bergendal and the advance on Lydenburg. Mr. Henderson’s services were invaluable. Mentioned in despatches, London Gazette 8th February, 1901.” For his scouting services throughout the defence of Ladysmith, Henderson was created a C.M.G.

Alfred subsequently served through the Zulu Rebellion of 1906 in the Helpmekaar Field Force under Colonel Mackay of Estcourt and was Chief Leader of the 1st Estcourt Militia Reserves. In a newspaper report of the 1st June, 1906, a correspondent with this force wrote that it seems a strange coincidence so many years after Isandhlwana that the Carbineers should camp on the scene of the calamity which had taken place twenty-seven years earlier. He added that it seemed even stranger since, with the Carbineers in the person of Mr. Henderson, chief leader of the Estcourt, Mooi River and other reservists, there should be one of the survivors of the fight. “A hale hearty old Gentleman, Mr. Henderson despite his years is as eager now as he was in the full vigour of his youth in pursuing the work he has taken up.”

Ok John ,Mr. Henderson is capable...

I have been reading Neil Thornton's Rorke's Drift - A new Perspective which early in the piece, mentions the Hlubi Troop of Durnford's force under the command of Lt Henderson. You will all recall that shortly before the Zulu assault on Rorke's Drift, Henderson arrived with about 100 of the troop. Chard's orders were that Henderson's men should observe and check the advance of the Zulus until forced back. Then, they were to return to the Drift, let their horses loose and join the defenders.

As we know this didn't happen and the troop was last seen fleeing toward Helpmekaar. Henderson stopped and told Chard that his men would not obey his orders and could not be persuaded to stay and fight. Henderson and Bob Hall, a civilian contractor who had been with the troop, remained at the drift for a time but later slipped away.

I note from the above that Henderson, in letters he wrote home, makes no reference to Rorke's Drift. To me this does not come as a surprise given his mysterious departure from that place during, or at sometime before, the fighting. The account above is perhaps slightly inaccurate in that it says that "Lieutenant Henderson, pausing only to report that his troops refused to obey orders, took off in pursuit of them." It also seems that Henderson went on to later serve with credit in later battles and campaigns.

My question is this - could it be construed that Lt Henderson's departure from RD was a case of desertion in the face of the enemy and if so, why does it appear that no action was taken against him?

Bonjour,
To answer to your second question, a court martial was not possible against a Colonial.
See in the same vein the case of Stevenson (or Stephenson) at RD.
Cheers
Frédéric

Merci Frederic. So if the accounts of Henderson's strange disappearance from the barricades at RD are to be believed, then his 'colonial' status seems to have saved him from ignominy. However, I would have thought that his indiscretion would have been common knowledge on the old boy network and his future prospects dismal. But as we see, this was not the case so perhaps he had a legitimate excuse for his apparent desertion.

Bonjour,
As an officer of native's troops, the usual sanction for an accusation of cowardice was the resignation of his functions (as Officer).
As you know this was not the case for Lt Henderson.

Habitually, the authors give two legitimate excuses for his apparent desertion:

1°) The mounted natives who fought bravely at Isandhlwana were exhausted nervously and physically when they arrived at RD,
2°) They had not enough ammunition to stay at RD.

The first argument is hardly contestable.

About  the second argument:

RD was a supply depot with a lot of ammunition. But a supply depot for the Column n°3 (LC / Glyn) not for the column n°2 (Durnford's men / Lt Henderson).
There is a debate about the guns / carbines used by the natives troops.
Did the natives mounted troops of Durnford use the same ammunitions as the regulars, the NNC and the Colonial mounted units (NC / NMR / NMP / BBG) belonged to the Column n°3 (There are no native mounted units in the column n°3)?

For Edmund Yorke (“Isandlwana 1879”), the carbines used by the Durnford's mounted troops were not compatible with the MH ammunition. It's the reason (for him) why Quartermasters of the 24th foot refused  to issue ammunition  to men of the NNH.  Neil Aspinshaw,  a specialist of the MH and a member of this forum, has some doubts about this hypothesis.

Personally on this specific subject, I notice that the Edendale troops asked to a “Boy”  of the 24th , (the guard of an ammunition's wagon) some  cartridges during the battle of Isandhlwana (testimony given by Sgt Kambule), others Durnford's officers also asked to the Quartermasters of the 24th to give them ammunitions. We know that during the battle, Durnford's troopers used cartridges belonged to the NC.Testimonies which tends to prove (in my view)  that the ammunitions were compatible. So, it seems that the second argument is not valid.

To complicate matters, Henderson belonged to the powerful Shepstone's family. I wonder if this family link had an influence on Henderson's (military) career after the battles of Isandhlwana and Rorke's Drift (and incidentally on Chard's report about the behaviour of Henderson and his men at RD) .

Just a thought.

Cheers
Frédéric

Thank you again Frederic, you obviously have much information on the ZWs. With regards the suggestion that the ammunition for the carbines used by Durnford's mounted was not compatible with that available at Isandlwana, I suppose it depends on what type of carbines they were carrying. If they were issued with the MH carbine, then there was no problem in using the ammunition held at Isandlawana. The rifles used by the 24th there were the MH rifle. The Boxer cartridges for the rifles was identical to the carbine except that the latter carried a smaller charge of blac powder. This was apparently so that if the carbine was fired while the user was mounted, there would be a lesser recoil and less chance the firer would be dislodged from the saddle. But the bottom line is that either cartridge could be fired by either version of the MH.

As regards Henderson's apparent desertion we have differing accounts. One says that he immediately galloped after his fleeing troops after a short stop at RD. The other account suggests that Henderson did stop at RD and manned the barricades, disappearing some time later.  Who knows where the truth lies.

Either way, he does not seemed to have suffered in his later life and career.

If I can chime in here, I used to have in my collection a photograph of Hlubi and his men at the time of 1888 campaign against the Zulu.  Although there were a number of Martini-Henry and Swinburne-Henry carbines, there were also a number of Snider carbines, and in at least one case a Spencer carbine.

In his work Zulu War - Volunteers, Irregulars & Auxiliaries Ian Castle was unable to establish which weapon Hlubi's Troop were equipped with.  

I would therefore conject if in 1888 Hlubi's men were equipped with a mixed bag of firearms, what might they carried have nine years earlier?  My conjecture is they might well have carried a similar mixture.  If so then Ed Yorke's hypothesis might carry some weight.  How many - if any - might have still be equipped with the Terry carbine they had carried at the time of the Langalibalele kaMthimkhulu?  

The norm during the Victorian period was to keep native troops "One gun behind."  So if the British had a Martini-Henry the local-raised native troops would be armed with the Snider-Enfield.  

Just my thoughts.

John Y.

Bonjour Mr Young,
Thank you for sharing your interesting thoughts with us.
According to Mr Julian Whybra, the Quartemasters of the 24th refused to issue ammunition to others units for another reason.
I shall research his hypothesis.
Cheers
Frédéric

In the topic “Wagons at Isandlwana”, Mr Whybra wrote:
"Each Coy would have go to its own ammunition waggon behind it's battalion's camp" and “NNC AMMO IS FOR THE NNC; 1/24TH AMMO IS FOR THE 1/24TH. »

A the question, “As you know, in this time, it was exceptional for two Battalions of the same Regiment to fight side to side. What was for a Coy of the 1/24th (for example) "its own ammunition waggon"? strictly from the 1/24th?”, Mr Whybra answered, “Yes, 1/24th ammo for the 1/24th; 2/24th ammo for the 2/24th.  This would have held, I imagine, until the loss of a waggon, desperation, all hope was lost, a sauve qui peut was the case.It would seem that Durnford's NNH were refused ammo at the 24th ammo waggons until the rout as above.  Remember, even the boy refused them ammo and Kambula's troopers were picking up loose cartridges from the floor round the waggon where S-D, perhaps, had spilt some.Some may think the 'requisition' and 'boy' episodes foolhardy but as Knight points out in Zulu Rising, and as S-D does himself, these are examples of discipline under fire, steadiness, and thorough-going professionalism. "The Boy stood on the burning deck whence all but he had fled..." (26th February 2016)

Cheers

Frédéric

John, that is interesting information and the philosophy of having native troops 'one gun behind' makes sense. Never know what they might have gotten up to if equally armed! Given the fact that they did carry a mixed bag of firearms, it is probable that the reserve ammo at RD, being meant primarily for the Brit troops, would not be suitable or in sufficient quantities, to resupply Henderson's men. But I still think he was a cad!

"One gun behind"...

P.S. Thompson, in "Black Soldiers of the Queen" about the third Regiment (n°3 Column), "One in ten received rifles: about 300 Martini-Henrys, the Standard British weapon, and 205 Enfields, old but still serviceable muzzle loaders".

Cheers.

Frédéric

From the testimony of Sgt Kambule, we know that the Edendale’s troops had no more ammunition during the fight at Isandhlwana. They found some cartridges of MH on the grass near the waggon kept by the Boy’s of the 24th Regiment.
According to P.S Thompson, “The Edendale Horse made two of three stands during its retreat and picked and saved several fugitives on foot… Kambule later gave two different accounts of what happened at the Drift. According to one he found that a large number of the enemy had got across the river ahead of the fugitives, whereupon he dismounted his men and ordered them to fire. Three volley dispersed the enemy.”
See also the account given by Trooper Barker, Natal Carbinners.

No problem with the MH cartridges for the Edendale’s troops.

Cheers.
Frédéric

If the breach of ammunition for the Durnford's troppers is a fact reported by the surviving officers of the Column n°2, none of them has evoked a problem of ammunition compatibility.

Happy to be corrected.

Frédéric

This photo is from the book.. Henderson Heritage.. Concerning the
Henderson's of Natal, it include's extracts from Alfred's Letter's home
during the AZW.

[You must be registered and logged in to see this image.]

ymob wrote:

Bonjour,
To answer to your second question, a court martial was not possible against a Colonial.
See in the same vein the case of Stevenson (or Stephenson) at RD.
Cheers
Frédéric

Spudee,
The sanction taken against Captain Stevenson (Stephenson ) for his behaviour at Rorke's Drift:
"6. The services of Captain Stevenson, 2-3rd, Natal Native Contingent, are dispensed with, being no longer required"
General Order n°37, dated 10th February, 1879 / Times of Natal, 21st February, 1879.

Cheers

Frédéric

Frederic, if they could do that to Stevenson, who also served in a colonial unit, why couldn't they do the same with Henderson?

Frédéric,

Again, if I cite Ian Castle's Osprey work he states that the Edendale Troop were issued with Martini-Henrys, and that the Zikhali Horse troops were issued with Swinburn-Henrys. So the standard infantry rounds could be fired, albeit with the problems that Spudee has already mentioned.

To use Ian Castle's word it was 'unclear' what the type of firearms were carried by men of Hlubi's men. There is a poor copy of the photograph of Hlubi's men in 1888 in John Laband's Rope of Sand (photograph no. 70), however, it is difficult to see the weapons carried due the quality of the reproduction of the image.

John Y.

The carbines of the Volunteers and the NMP were Swinburne-Henrys.
One Officer of Mounted troops used ammunitions found in the area of the NC.
I suppose it makes sense for thé Zikhali horse troops.
Thé question again is : réserve ammuntions of SH at the mission of RD?
Cheers
Frédéric

Spudee wrote:

Frederic, if they could do that to Stevenson, who also served in a colonial unit, why couldn't they do the same with Henderson?

For the two reasons given in my post of Friday (I suppose).


Keith Smith wrote: "The men of the NNC had different reasons for departure [ at Rorke's Drift / Capt. Stephenson]. They had only recently been drafted into the NNC and since the unit was pooly provided with officers and NCOS, their training would have been virtually nil. We cannot be certain if they were even armed but given that the rest of the NNC had only ten men in every hundred armed with rifles, most of them old muzzle-loaders,...In these circumstances, then, it is hardly surprising that they chose to leave when they saw the mounted natives Under lieutenant Henderson also depart, who were fully armed and mounted. What is to be deplored was the departure of Stephenson himself, which was hardly the action of an officer and a gentleman. We have already seen that every other company commander of the Contingent had chosen to stay [at Isandhlwana] with their British Army comrades and shared their fate...Clearly, Stephenson was not of the same stamp as his NNC fellow officers" ("The Commandants: the Leadership of the NNC in the AZW" / Thesis)

Maybe Henderson has been protected by his connection with the Shepstone's family? (just a thought)

Cheers

Frédéric

John
The 1888 situation was very different to that of 1879.
Hlubi's men would have been issued as per orders of the day. So, Swinburnes according to Castle.

Spudee
Can I suggest you read pp. 61-63 of Studies in the Zulu War vol I where you can find Hall's account of what happened to himself and Henderson in some detail (Henderson was NEVER behind the barricades).
In my opinion, there was no case for desertion to answer.

Julian,

Please direct me to where Ian Castle states that Hlubi's men were issued with Swinburn-Henrys.

Thanks in anticipation,

John

John
Apologies, I wrote in haste. I meant to write Martini-Henrys. Somehow it came out as Swinburnes.
By the way, I've written to the Dorehills to ask if they mind if I share the dorehill photo with you for comparison purposes. I'm still waiting to hear from them.

Julian,

Ian Castle does not mention Martini-Henrys either, as I clearly stated above he states that in his findings it was unclear which firearm that Hlubi's men were issued with.

As to the Dorehill issue that has already been resolved, so there is no need to pursue the matter.

Regards,

John Y.

John unfortunately I have no access to ps. 61-63 of Studies in the Zulu War vol I. Would it be possible for you to give a brief summary of what is said there please?

Spudee
Hall:
“I was the last white man to leave Isandhlwana camp alive. Mr. Henderson, some Natal Police, and Edendale Mounted Natives, were also eye witnesses and we fired several shots at the Zulus who were blocking the way. When we left the hill where I caught up Mr. Henderson and the Police, the whole of Isandhlwana Nek and hills were covered with the Zulu army. One or two gun carriages were caught just over the Nek, and we watched these being taken back and then we rode on to Rorke’s Drift...When Mr Alfred Henderson and myself arrived at Rorke’s Drift from Isandhlwana about 1 or 2 p.m. on that fatal day, Mr Dalton asked us if we couldn’t get the native contingent back to build a laager. These natives were employed by the A.S.C. with their wagons, etc. but had just bolted. We got on to our horses, fetched them back and stood over them while the laager was built under the direction of Mr Dalton.…no laager would have been built had Mr. Henderson and myself not turned up as we did, to make the native contingent return and work at the laager. These natives numbered about 100, and only a few soldiers and A.S.C. men were here, not sufficient to do the work required.…When the laager was completed, Mr Dalton asked Mr Henderson and myself if we go and reconnoitre over the hill, and we saddles up and went off. At that time all the native contingent had again disappeared, also some natives Mr Henderson had brought with him, mounted boys from
Edendale...We went over the hill and as we were returning we saw some Zulus making a rush for Rorke’s Drift House. I remarked, ‘The Zulus are upon us,’ and we galloped towards the house…My horse was the faster of the two, and I got to the house first above the fence, and I passed within a few yards of the Zulus, the first shots were fired from the hospital and whizzed about my ears. Mr. Henderson went round below the fence and we met outside the wall of the Commissariat shed and the cattle kraal. Here we took shelter and there we stayed and fired away at the Zulus as they came down the hill and squatted themselves in the garden under the peach trees and among the mealies.
I must tell you now that when the Zulus first attacked Rorke’s Drift, there were not more than twenty five of them and they kept coming on in batches of twenty five to fifty and so they continued rolling up, until they set the hospital on fire. At this time Mr. Henderson and I had exhausted all our ammunition and had to move further away to a thorn tree about 500 yards below the house. It was getting dusk, and as we saw no chance of returning to the laager, as the whole place would soon be on fire, we decided to leave, and started to ride to Helpmakaar. On the way we fell in with a convoy taking ammunition to Rorke’s Drift and quietly trekking along in complete ignorance of what had happened there. Mr. Henderson stayed with them the night, and I went off after my cattle at Helpmakaar…As an eye witness I know what happened at Isandhlwana and Rorke’s Drift, up to the time the hospital was fired, and well can I see the whole thing as it commenced and ended. ”

John
Sincere apologies!!! I misread your e-mail above. I've had a throbbing toothache since Fri evening and can only put my befuddlement down to that. I'm trying to get an emergency dental apptment as I type.

Julian,

My sympathies a feeling I have know all too well.

Not helped by the fact some of my former dentists must have been classmates of John Henry Holliday!

John Y.

Hi JW,

Thanks for that.
A few more interesting  pointers opposite the real events of that day.
An ammunition wagon still coming up would suggest that it was a supply for one of the volunteer regiments. NNC etc. 1-2/24 th had theirs already and so did the NMP. I would speculate that it was  Durnford's. This is why they were trying to draw ammo from the Imperials.
Members of the ASC helping to build the baricades at RD is a new angle.
Henderson being shut out of RD once the fighting at the barricades started well supports his leaving the field.
In this dark neck of the woods dentists play hard to get too, so being masters of improvisation we make do with a wee dram or two for temporary relief, mind....  gargling only, try it.

regards

barry

John, Barry
Thanks, it's antibiotics, ibuprofen, paracetamol and hot salt water for relief now till Wed morning for root canal treatment. Misery.
Re the ammunition waggon, this was not Durnford's, but was additional supplies for the regulars of Column no. 3, I believe.

Nothing worse than toothache. Always leads to an abscess.

Bonsoir,
I'm not very familiar with the Battle of Rorke's Drift: Someone sees a valid reason why Henderson and Hall go “500 yards below the house” instead of the “laager”? The narrative of Hall has been published under the title “The brave fugitive” by irony (I.E: poltroon).
Cheers

Frédéric

Thank you very much for going above and beyond, especially with a severe toothache. Hope that is rectified soon. I wasn't aware that native troops from one of the militia units were involved in the barricading of RD. But what you have posted is partially supported in Neil Thornton's book Rorke's Drift - A New Perspective.. At p.36 'The work to fortify the post progressed at a rapid pace. Captain Stephenson's natives worked hard and their contribution to the defensive preparations was vital. Indeed, with a large number of the 24th men out on skirmish patrols, out on outpost duty, and busy elsewhere, it is likely the mission would not have been adequately fortified in time had the natives not been present.' However, there is no mention of Henderson's men being involved in this work.

According to the book, Chard, not Dalton (as above) ordered Henderson to 'Observe the movements, and check the advance of the enemy as much as possible until forced to fall back'. They were then to turn their horses loose and join the men behind the barricades.

Here things become somewhat affected by the fog of war. In the account John quotes, Hall account says that he and Henderson galloped back to the position at RD near the cattle kraal. Here the 2 men established themselves at the barricade and engaged Zulus. At this point Hall's story (above) becomes confusing.

He said 'I must tell you now that when the Zulus first attacked Rorke’s Drift, there were not more than twenty five of them and they kept coming on in batches of twenty five to fifty and so they continued rolling up, until they set the hospital on fire. At this time Mr. Henderson and I had exhausted all our ammunition and had to move further away to a thorn tree about 500 yards below the house. It was getting dusk, and as we saw no chance of returning to the laager, as the whole place would soon be on fire, we decided to leave, and started to ride to Helpmakaar.'

However, Chard's account (p.99 Rorke's Drift - A New Perspective) reads 'At a point when the zulus were almost upon the garrison, the defence was thrown into turmoil when Henderson and his mounted men abandoned the post, closely followed by Stevenson and his natives.'

I suppose the bottom line is that we will never really know the truth of what happened but I tend to believe Chard's account.

Hi Spudee,
Correct. Hall's account has been corroborated by Neil in his work.
Yet, the Edendale troop's participation in the conflict was played right down and even out. Chard got all the accolades quite unjustly. Maybe Chard did not even know what was going on under his own nose.
Khambule was one of the leaders of those loyal African soldiers, who were doing sterling stuff yet recieved no recognition from a most unappreciative establishment.
There are more holy cows to be dealt with, that was just one of them.
Once again, history and the passing of time is the judge.

regards

barry

John
Abscess makes the heart grow fonder, eh?
ymob
I believe Hall and Henderson were "shut out" of the post and could not get inside the barricades before the Zulu attack.
Spudee
I think it's the other way round...Hall's account supports Thornton's sentence!
Also you have misread Hall's account I think.  It was Stevenson's NNC they were directing not Henderson's NNH - they had already ridden off much earlier.
I can't find the post in which John has typed a quotation but the jist of it - establishing themselves at the barricade and engaging the Zulus fits in with what is known.
Chard would not have known that Hall and Henderson had returned and were outside the barricade - to him it must have seen as if they had cleared off.  Thus he wrote as he did.  And at one and the same time, both Hall's and Chard's accounts state the truth, as they knew it.
I should say that since Studies in the Zulu War I have come across another as yet unknown Hall account which will feature in a future publication and will shed yet more light!

Mr Whybra,
Thank you. I understand now your opinion about It Henderson.
Kind regards
Fred

Thank you Julian.  I have re-read Hall's account and you are of course correct. And the suggestion that Hall and Henderson were unable to back behind the barricades also seems right and clarifies the situation.

Seems to me there is another potential factor in this.  Immediately after the collapse at Isandhlwana it cannot have been at all obvious (especially to Colonial officers) that going to help defend the small outpost at Rorke's Drift would have any value in defending the colony from imminent and widespread attack. Most seem to have made for Helpmakaar, which at least offered the prospect of re-grouping. We know that half of the Impi that crossed the Buffalo spent their time attacking the border farms. RD could easily have been bypassed all together leaving the small number of defenders twiddling their thumbs. I also find it unsurprising that Henderson and Hall contrived not to loose their horses despite what Chard might have said.

Just a thought.

Steve

'I also find it unsurprising that Henderson and Hall contrived not to loose their horses despite what Chard might have said.'

Too true Steve.

I don't accept that they did not have the opportunity to dismount and enter the barricades. Hall described being by the storehouse and cattle kraal.

If it was Bourne and Dalton (or any member of the garrison for that matter) who went out on horseback to make contact with the Zulus, it is difficult to imagine them not being able to return to the barricades.

That said, considering what Hall and Henderson had just been through, and since they had no ammunition who can blame them!

I for one will certainly not judge them for riding away.

Neil

Note: I look forward to Julian's 'new' Hall account, which may reveal more detail about them not being able to get into the defensive perimeter (and which may change my opinion if that is the case)

nthornton1979 wrote:

I don't accept that they did not have the opportunity to dismount and enter the barricades. Hall described being by the storehouse and cattle kraal.

That said, considering what Hall and Henderson had just been through, and since they had no ammunition who can blame them!


Neil

Bonjour,
There was a stockpile of ammunition at Rorke's Drift and I suppose if necessary spare rifles ?
Cheers

Frédéric

There were Troopers from the NMP at Rorke's Drift. Their weapon was a Swinburne-Henry. With what ammunition did they fire (after having spent their personal endowment)?

Frederic I have a feeling the MH ammunition.
Neil Steve
Looking at the track of Hall and Henderson they would have ridden over the SW ridge and across the back face of the compound between the station and Shiyane then around the store room to get to the
stone Kraal.
From the time they got within distance of the defence their first obstacle to penetrate would have been the hospital rear, then between the hospital and the Store was fairly substantial barricade with the two wagons, so again I would suggest that there wouldn't have been an opportunity for a MOUNTED man to enter. After that link barricade there was the rear and then side of the store, so again no access. Once round the 'corner' the ground drops away forming the ridge on which the defence line was built so again it could have been pretty difficult for access. For a man on foot there would have been many opportunities to find a way in but honestly would anyone, after witnessing iSandlwana, want to get rid of his horse? Addendorf was the only man to do that I think.
Just a thought.

Steve, about time you threw away all those out of date maps and bought a decent GPS for the car.

Cheers

Another thought would be they rode down the Southern side of the hospital escaping any fusillade from the back of the hospital, the wagon barricade and the roof of the store, then across the face of the barricade to the kraal. In which case the mealie bags on top of the stone outcrop would have stopped a mounted man getting in. The same with the cattle kraal really.

Cheers

Cheers Frank,

I'm thinking more along the lines of Henderson and Hall entering the defensive perimeter on foot. I wouldn't expect them to enter the defence whilst mounted. In other words - ride to the barricades and give up their horses to join the defence, as per Chard's instruction.

As it stands at the moment, with the evidence that is 'out there', I'm struggling to see that this was not achievable in a physical sense.

Ymob - as for ammunition (or lack of) - That was one of the reasons that Hall provided for not staying. You are correct that others had the same weapon but the duo would not have spoken to them or made any arrangements to be supplied with extra ammunition.

Neil

Morning Frank/Neil

You put your finger on it Frank when you say "would anyone want to get rid of their horse". Henderson and Hall clearly could have entered the barricades on foot, but deciding to open fire from a position which preserved their means of escape was surely a wise tactical move. Had the defenders themselves been sufficiently mobile I am sure no defence would have been attempted and nor should it have been. We tend to view these things in the light of the brave and stoic defence that ensued and assume that those who could have remained, but did not, were in some way culpable. I don't think that is the case at all.

PS. Throwing away old maps I regard as sacrilegious. They are the means of time travel in comfort. Here is another that I love - not Africa this time but India. Lt Col T R M Macpherson of the 8th Bombay Native Infantry hunting Tiger in 1880.
[You must be registered and logged in to see this image.]

Steve

Well put Steve.

I fully concur.

Neil

Steve if you recall the discussion we had some time back, the short cut to iSandlwana, I managed to photograph an old 1879 map showing the horse trail I was so adamant about. Ive also got some aerial photos from 1944 showing the trail very clearly and interestingly the military road is non existant.
I will post during next week.

Cheers

PS Didn't realise Woods had teed of in that area !

Looking forward to it Frank.

Steve

In my opinion Hall and Henderson are two différent cases: Hall didn't enlisted as soldier, it was not the case for Henderson, an Officer.
I can understand that a Trooper/Private or a civil left the battlefield, but an Officer...If not, what is the difference between a Trooper/Private and an Officer?
See the case of Lonsdale or Vereker at Isandhlwana.


Cheers
Frédéric

Another slant on Hall's letter to the Natal Witness.. from the excellent book..
Rorkes Drift by those who were there. it was taken from Laband and Thompsons
Kingdom and Colony at War.

[You must be registered and logged in to see this image.]

There is implied criticism, particularly of Bromhead, in Hall's account when he is described as "smoking his pipe above the house". Dalton organises things and Henderson and Hall bring back the NNC sappers to build the defences. Chard is at the Drift, Bromhead is off somewhere having a pipe. The implication seems to be that if Dalton and themselves had not been around to organise things the defences would not have been built. There may therefore have been another factor in Hendersons and Halls departure - they thought they had already done their bit in saving the garrison.

It will be interesting to see Julians new account from Hall.

Steve