Zulu deception of Dartnell at Matyana

It is quite clear that Lt Charlie Harford believed that the Zulus that Darnell's reconnaissance spotted and reported to LC were a decoy and that Dartnell, and so Chelmsofrd had been tricked. First thing in the morning of the 22nd:

"The Contingent were ordered to sweepover the Isilulwane Hill where the Zulus had kept their fires burning during the night and then work onto Matyana's stronghold to the right of it. Not a Zulu was to be seen when we got over the rise and as we were to find out afterwards, their fires were only a blind to mislead us as to their intentions, and the few men that we had seen exposing themselves and moving about had been left there to make us imagine the place was occupied by a large force."

In addition to this, on the morning of the 22nd, Chelmsford's interpreter Mr Longcast learned fron interrogating some Zulu prisoners that "an immense army was expected that day from Ulundi. He immediately reported this to Chelmsford." During this interrogation, on hearing the sound of artillery fire from the camp, these Zulu prisoners said "Do you hear that? There is fighting going on at the camp."

Doesn't this lend weight to the argument that Chelmsford was deceived into splitting his force by a great Zulu deception? It seems like the intelligence, strategy and communications of the Zulus were highly sophisticated, doesn't it?

Harford's not the only one to think this.

One can imagine that Chelmsford must have felt a right **** on realising that he had not only been duped, but that the deception had succeeded with terrible effect.
Alternative explanations needed, PDQ!

Hi tasker.

"Alternative explanations needed, PDQ!"

You are correct there my friend, hence the 'blame game' initiated by Crealock and Chelmsford.

Hello to all

Which decreed that the Zulus had wanted to draw out the 3rd column of the Isandhlwana camp?

Zulus in front of Dartnell, are an army of local defense, which has nothing to do with the Zulu royal army and there is no evidence that the two armies were in connection ...

LC has mostly been duped by himself and by Dartnell ...

Cheers

Pascal

The main impi spent the night of the 20th on the Northern Flanks of iSipezi, Forms the Northern Barrier to the Mangeni Valley. Without doubt they would have had skirmishers out protecting the column its highly possible that these skirmishers were the initial force the Dartnel ran into. Tshingwayo would have wanted the maximum protection to his column and would have probably been concerned that Dartnels forces would find him, the distance is not huge. I believe that he would have put out sufficient warriors to deter Dartnel from an all out attack (it did) and as the impi moved along the top of the Quabe valley into the Ngwebini the skirmishers withdrew. Possibly it was this withdrawl that therefore was seen as the troops being lead on , on the morning of the 22nd. The direction of that Zulu withdrawl was away from from the direction the impi took. The only part of the army that came close was Russel and he was enticed onto the slopes of iSipezi, away froy Silutshane and the Quabe mouth.

Just a thought.[You must be registered and logged in to see this image.]

these skirmishers were the initial force the Dartnel ran into.

Impossible, they were too many in front of Dartnell, for beings the scouts of the royal army ...

In addition, none of the first Zulu sources from the warriors who were present in the zulu royal army at Isandhlwana not talk about it ...

Dartnell had to deal with the warriors of a local irregular clan of the kind of the abaQulusi in the northwest zululand ...

Pascal MAHE wrote:

Which decreed that the Zulus had wanted to draw out the 3rd column of the Isandhlwana camp?


Zulus in front of Dartnell, are an army of local defense, which has nothing to do with the Zulu royal army and there is no evidence that the two armies were in connection ...

Pascal, your first point, no. But the Zulus were opportunists, and once Dartnell had arrived and found them, the Zulu may have decided to trick him into thinking there was a large army there, for the purpose of misinformation. (See my original post).

Your second point I disagree with. Again, see my original post:-
In addition to this, on the morning of the 22nd, Chelmsford's interpreter Mr Longcast learned fron interrogating some Zulu prisoners that "an immense army was expected that day from Ulundi. He immediately reported this to Chelmsford." During this interrogation, on hearing the sound of artillery fire from the camp, these Zulu prisoners said "Do you hear that? There is fighting going on at the camp."

What more evidence do you need? These prisoners were well informed. To assume there was no evidence that these 2 armies were in connectioin as you say, is doing a dis-service to the ability of the Zulus. You are being complacent, in assuming the Zulus did not have an effective communications system, complacent in the same way that Lord Chelmsford was.

But after the war , none of the first Zulu sources from the warriors who were present in the zulu royal army at Isandhlwana not talk about it ...

Not many would have known about it and there were other more important and immediate things that interrogators needed to know. In relation to everything else, this was just a small detail; but the captured prisoners that Mr Longcast reported on provide some evidence regarding the strength of the Zulu communication and strategic planning.
We will never have proof for every incident that occurred prior to, during and in the immediate aftermath of iSandlwana.
We get fleeting glimpses, if we are lucky.

Yes it's that ,none have proof for every incident that occurred prior to, during and in the immediate aftermath of iSandlwana.

Pascal MAHE wrote:

Yes it's that ,none have proof for every incident that occurred prior to, during and in the immediate aftermath of iSandlwana.

Proof no, glimpses yes.

Never any evidence of this is though, in a war like this there ...

Capt. Penn Symons, 2/24th, and present on the day with his lordship, prepared a report dated 21dt January 1880, headed "Private" and stated that it had been read by H.M. the Queen, the Prince of Wales, the Duke of Cambridge, Sir Charles Ellice. Sir A. Alison and the Intelligence Dept. It also mentioned that at the desire of Her Majesty the account should not be published until after the death of Lord Chellmsford. Penn Symons wrote:

"First to follow the main body, which I accompanied, we marched twelve miles. We then saw the enemy, scattered bodies of from ten to 500, dispersing and retreating in front of us in all directions. We followed them. It was hunting a shadow, or worse than a shadow as the men who well knew the Zulus and their tactics declared at the time that the cattle that had been seen and the retreating bodies of men, were simply decoys to entice us away from the camp. Be this as it may, the enemy that we went out to look for were at this very time, marching in a direction parallel to our line of advance, behind a range of hills, three miles only to our left, to attack the camp.."


Lt. Milne, RN is worth repeating: "[i]He (Lord Chelmsford) was led away by the Zulus who decoyed him from the camp" Source: Royal Archives, Windsor.

"From Laband's Rope of Sand.' published in 1995.
' While the main army moved from Siphezi to the Ngwebeni valley, Matshana led a small detatchment into the hills about the Mangeni valley, where it was reinforced by its own adherents. Subsequently, the British were to have few doubts that his movements were a deliberate ploy, devised by the Zulu high command to trick Chelmsford into committing the elementary error of dividing and widely separating his force.'
This statement is backed by source material note 13, quote:
"J.W. Shepstone Papers, vol 10: Reminiscences of the past, p 107, conversation with several of the chiefs on the late war; BPP (C.2260)
no. 10: Statement of Ucadjana, 3 February 1879."
Quantrill.

It is all very pretty this, but these stories do not come from Zulu and any ways we can not rely on the testimony of Zulu prisoners or not, in the war or after the war ...

Forces facing Dartnell were certainly not in connection with the Zulu royal army, it was a force of local defense ...

Thanks 24th.
So it appears we have HC Harford, Penn-Symons, Milne and Shepstone who formed the impression that Chelmsford's force were duped in the early hours of the 22nd.
And, according to Mr Longcast, Chelmsford's interpreter, some Zulu prisoners (from the actual force that faced Dartnell ) who actually knew and informed him during interrogation, that the camp was at that moment, under attack by the the army from Ulundi.

Tasker

The account from Chelmsford's men don't prove anything, it would have seemed to them that they had been decoyed but there is no hard evidence that they were, read the Zulu accounts, none of them make mention of one.

Cheers

Hi Tasker .
To be reasonable those you mention Harford , Penn - Symons , Milne & Shepstone are all speaking after the battle which to them gave the impression that they were duped into splitting their force , because that is exactly what they did and lost the camp because of it ! . As DB points out , there has never been a zulu account that I'm aware of , stating that was their intention , to lure C'ford out of the camp and split his force , as the zulu , I dont think had any idea what LC was proposing to undertake in the first place . Maybe it was a ruse , maybe it wasnt ! . I personally dont think it was a planned ruse , but you may think differently .
Cheers 90th.

Hi Tasker

All the evidence or interrogation of any Zulu warriors do after or during the war were referred by their interrogators ...

These Zulu warriors interrogators built the legend of Isandhlwana already at that deceived so many people before the onset of this forum .

Last year, I launched many subjects on the responsibility of Dartnell for the disaster of Isandhlwana and nobody was interested ...

So read well:

1 / Zulu were facing Dartnell were very numerous, but it was a local defense force, such as the Abaqulusi in the northwest of Zululand ...

2 /There is no connections for the preparation of a comprehensive plan to attract LC outside the camp ... because it did not serve in any way the Zulus who had more interest, to have a maximum of prey in the camp .

In fact, we can even say that Isandhlwana is a half strategic victory for the Zulus as half of their prey escaped...


3 / The presence of LC would not have changed the result at Isandhlwana.
If LC ​​had remained in his camp with all his troops, even with the reinforcements of Durnford,Zulus would nevertheless triumphed, the battle would only a longer duration and there were more deaths in each armies, the human disaster would have been huge and the désatre of Isandhlwana worse for British ago...

What happened is very simple:

1 - Dartnell had so many opponents in front of him he thought it was the Zulu royal army.

2 - He warned LC.

3 - LC joined him in mind to deliver the decisive battle.

That is why I often say that Dartnell was responsible , he was completely deceived by itself and misled LC.

But on the other hand it would not have changed ,the Isandhlwana camp was already lost in front of almost all of the royal army Zulu ...

To win, it would have taken defensive positions as RD, Kambula, Gingindlovu or Ulundi ...

Which was impossible because without the massacre of Isandhlwana, never defensive positions as RD, Kambula, or Gingindlovu Ulundi would have been taken ...

Cheers

Pascal

But who sent Dartnell to look for the Zulus!!!

He who has never been defeated, who thought before Dartnell, what believed Dartnell ...

sas1 wrote:

But who sent Dartnell to look for the Zulus!!!

My guess is that you don't mean that reconnaissance shouldn't have been conducted. So are you questioning the idea of sending out a "reconnaissance in force" composed of colonial rather than Imperial forces?

Pascal MAHE wrote:

He who has never been defeated, who thought before Dartnell, what believed Dartnell ...

Pascal,

Rather than getting into a blame game that comes perilously close to mimicking the (ludicrous) argument that Durnford is responsible for the defeat at Isandlwana simply because his troops stumbled on the Zulu main body first, there is a much more direct way to make your argument.

If the 25,000 strong main body had been behind the campfires witnessed by Harford et. al., then Chelmsford's half of the Center column would have been defeated in detail rather than Pulleine's half.

So, after allowing the main body to position itself so close to the main camp, Chelmsford compounded the error by dividing his force in such a way that WHERE EVER the enemy main body was located, it could deal him a strategic setback.

I understand your argument that the Zulu might have been better served by not allowing Chelmsford to withdraw his force from the noose that became Isandlwana, but it requires a further assumption that the combined force could not have stood off the Zulu main body. Many would argue that point vehemently.

I also think it is much easier to believe that Chelmsford simply could not imagine an army of 25,000 motivated attackers was out there anywhere. Otherwise, why would he have split his force? - 6pdr

Recognitions are beings made ​​by people how they should be doing ...

Another instead of Dartnell, would beings can not, if hasty conclusions and LC remained in the camp ...

Me instead of LC, I would have gone with my own eyes with a small escort, what it was ...

Not with half the troops in the camp.

And if I had felt, even if it was it a mistake, that the Zulu army was there, I sent a message to Pulleine to join me there as quickly as possible, and I would have sent the same message to Durnford ...

Suppose I was wrong, well the Zulus have found two times more troops in the camp they have found in reality

I believe that no members of the British army could be imagined the Zulu mass and fury, despite all the warnings ...

Armstrong

In life as in war, the best plans are the simplest ...

Dartnell has misunderstood the actual Zulu number and drew LC outside the camp, a chance for the Zulu of the royal zulu army ...

Well now with the history, troubleshooting, is that people want absolutely everything always complicated, it is the complotistes the revisionist and the negationist, but as I said, in life as in the war, the best laid plans are the simplest ...


So why get always abradacabrans scenarios?

Hi 90th, DB.
I do not think that Harford et al are saying that Chelmsford was deliberately lured away from the camp by the Zulus at all.
What they are saying is that once Dartnell had stumbled upon the Zulus, they KEPT Dartnell pinned there by lighting numerous fires which they kept burning through the night; probably to prevent his force returning to iSandlwana, which evidently, they knew was to be attacked the next day.
Whilst the few Zulus kept those fires going, the main Zulu force slipped away from the hills that Dartnell was camped on that night, and joined up with the main impi, as planned to attack the camp.
The fact that LC joined up with Dartnell was a piece of luck, a bonus - it left the camp weaker.
(Or perhaps, the fortune was Chelmsford's?!?!?!?)

tasker224 wrote:

What they are saying is that once Dartnell had stumbled upon the Zulus, they KEPT Dartnell pinned there by lighting numerous fires which they kept burning through the night; probably to prevent his force returning to iSandlwana, which evidently, they knew was to be attacked the next day.

It would be nice to have some Zulu testimony about why those fires were lit. Is there any? One thing seems certain -- the main body behaved VERY differently. I believe it was Mehlokzazulu who explained that the regiments there were not allowed to cook their food, presumably to prevent their position being given away. That marks a suspiciously sharp contrast to the behavior of the men (pretending to) confront Dartnell.

That said, I'm not familiar with the evidence that says they slipped away and joined the main body for a battle the next day...especially since the prevailing evidence is that the Zulu command group did not plan to fight under that moon.

6pdr wrote:

It would be nice to have some Zulu testimony about why those fires were lit. Is there any? One thing seems certain -- the main body behaved VERY differently. I believe it was Mehlokzazulu who explained that the regiments there were not allowed to cook their food, presumably to prevent their position being given away. That marks a suspiciously sharp contrast to the behavior of the men (pretending to) confront Dartnell.

That said, I'm not familiar with the evidence that says they slipped away and joined the main body for a battle the next day...especially since the prevailing evidence is that the Zulu command group did not plan to fight under that moon.

It would be very nice to have Zulu testimony, but we don't so we have to look at what we do have. We do have the testimony of Charlie Harford, Milne, Penn-Symons, Shepstone etc and they were right there; they were reliable, they were experienced and they were no one's fool.
As 6pdr says, if the Zulu knew to go on hard rations - no cooking - to not give away their position, then they also knew that lit fires would give the (false) impression of their presence. Harford acknowledges this.
The Zulus were opportunists, and whilst superstitious re the eclipse, they were not naiive or superstitious to the point of not looking a gift horse in the mouth. They did undoubtedly, originally plan to attack on the 23rd, but the situation developed and changed; the opportunities to attack the camp a day earlier presented themselves (pinning Dartnell, Chelmsford joining Dartnell) and the Zulu were smart enough to not turn the opportunity down.

Norris-Newman, wrote in his book In Zululand with the British (1880).

"The idea did not seem to have occurred to anyone that the enemy were carrying out a pre-constructed plan."

Ray63 wrote:

Norris-Newman, wrote in his book In Zululand with the British (1880).

"The idea did not seem to have occurred to anyone that the enemy were carrying out a pre-constructed plan."

Still doesn't Ray, for many students of this conflict. It is called "complacency" or underestimating your enemy.
Chelmsford was certainly guilty of it.

Chelmsford wanted to defeat the Zulu as quickly as possible, Dartnell thought he had found the main Zulu Army. Chelmsford responded by going to assist. Dartnell was only doing what he was ordered to do he found the Zulus. What happen after that was down to Chelmsford, it was he who led his forces on the shadow hunt.

Does it not bother anyone that Chelmsford sent Darnell out into the middle of Zulu land, hours away from help with
something like only 200 guns ? And most the guns had only 5 rounds, if they had been attacked by the main army they
would have been destroyed !!




Cheers

Why should we let It bother us, we weren't there.

Drummer Boy 14 wrote:

Does it not bother anyone that Chelmsford sent Darnell out into the middle of Zulu land, hours away from help with
something like only 200 guns ? And most the guns had only 5 rounds, if they had been attacked by the main army they
would have been destroyed !!




Cheers

tasker224 wrote:

The Zulus were opportunists...

Drummer Boy 14 wrote:

Does it not bother anyone that Chelmsford sent Darnell out into the middle of Zulu land, hours away from help with
something like only 200 guns ? And most the guns had only 5 rounds, if they had been attacked by the main army they
would have been destroyed !!

This is why I was pointing out that Chelmsford sent Dartnell's force out to SCREEN his intended move to a new campsite. He had already visited the general area of the Malakatha and Hlazakazi range twice over. (One could argue that was potentially foolhardy in itself but he apparently believed in leading from the saddle.) I don't think Chelmsford EXPECTED Dartnell to discover the Zulu army but he was aware that an entire army COULD BE hidden up there. Lacking any Imperial cavalry it made sense for him to deploy his light troops which were the mounted colonials and (some of) the Natal Native Contingent. To me, that was an intelligent use of those troops and perhaps the best role for the NNC.

Where Chelmsford made his second major blunder was impetuously rushing forward with half his Imperial forces when Dartnell ignored his orders to return by nightfall and instead sent messengers saying that he believed he'd found the main body. This is at least as impetuous as what Durnford did by leaving the camp, but less justified by circumstances IMO.

IMO it's also worth considering that Dartnell was quite experienced so his assessment of the situation may have indeed been consciously manipulated. Lonsdale on the other hand had a more limited track record.

Impi

What was the point in writing that ?

6pdr

I agree, but he did have a lot of horsemen, Natal Carbineers and NMP he could have sent.



Cheers

Drummer Boy 14 wrote:

I agree, but he did have a lot of horsemen, Natal Carbineers and NMP he could have sent.

Yes, the NMP and Volunteers is exactly who went on the extended foray with Dartnell into the hills (along with the 1/3rd NNC.) One company of the 3rd NNC was left in camp along with some of the mounted colonials who were retained for piquets...but the majority sallied forth on the reconnaissance.

Hi all

The Zulus had a plan very simple:

1 / Attach the third column and destroy ...

They had planned to do this on 23, put they were prevented by the reconnaissance missions launched by Durnford, which caused the zulu attack the 22.

There is nothing complicated or subtle from the Zulu, it's just a unfortunate concour of circumstances for them and the British in the camp , thanks to Durnford.

2 / Zulu opposite Dartnell are not an decoy, they are just there to defend their homeland, it is a local defense force ...

Dartnell has confused the local defense force with the main army and reported his discovery to LC. (LC could make the same mistake, if it was, in the place of Dartnell)

Makes mistakes is human.

LC will join with hundreds of men and 4 guns, without prior check.

The stupidity is human

There is nothing complicated or subtle from the Zulu, it's just unfortunate concour of circumstances for the British.

The result is known

All the rest is literature and all is unfortunate concour of circumstances ...

And remember, in war as in life, the best plans are the simplest

Cheers

Pascal

A point that has been consistently overlooked is that in Dartnels original communication, received late afternoon by Chelmsford when he was scouting the Nyoni ridge, Dartnel suggest that he will attack the following day. He doesnt mention anything about wanting reinforcements. His second communication early morning of the 22nd was written after he realised that his NNC did not have the ability to take on the Zulu. This evinced by the repeated false alarms and desertions of the NNC.
The main impi had moved from behind iSipezi on monday its dissingenuous to believe that the movement would not have been screened by a considerable force. The impi was in Matyana territory and would have no doubt been escorted by them. When Dartnel appeared very close to the main Army a force would have been deployed with sufficient strength to keep him occupied. And thats what happened. The NNC played their part in the comedy of errors by stampeding during the evening and really induced a self administered fear factor. The force on the oposite hill did exactly what was required of them, they kept Dartnell away from the army, bare in mind that the Zulu commanders did not know what Dartnels or Chelmsfords plans were. Even if there were Zulu spies in the camp Im fairly confidant that Chelmsford didnt discuss issues with them, hell he didnt even discuss them with his own staff.

The next day when Chelmsford arrived in the Mangeni area he chased a fairly small zulu component that really had no wish to give battle and kept withdrawing untill the Brits literally gave up chasing them ( See Russells route to the bottom of iSiphezi). Hence the belief that it was a deliberate ploy from Harford etc. It was a deliberate plo but not in the way Harford Symons believed.

When Milne climbed the hill to observe the camp he also passed comment on the positions of the Zulus being chased: They had congregated on the top of iSiphezi, the largest hill in the area and positioned at the head of the Mangeni valley. From that point they could have struck of to the head of the Quabe valley and been in touch with the main army for the upcoming battle on the 23rd. Incidently once you leave the base of iSiphezi headind towards Ngwebini the mountain is in full view as is a large portion of the plain.

Tie that in with the sightings of Whitelaw et al and the bigger picture starts to form.

Cheers

Everything beyond is very pretty and Dartnell NNC have the broad back ...

To do, after the war, the British interviewed Zulu generals present at Isandhlwana ?

Only generals who commanded the Zulu at Isandhlwana, know what they were scheming.

Pascal you state the obvious. But with some deductive reasoning and examining of the ground and sources considered opinion can be ventured. And that is really what this forum is about, the proposal of ideas and the discusion of those ideas, thats why we are here.
There is very little proof one way or the other of what actually occured but if we are to dismiss ideas and thoughts put forward we may as well return to our knitting.

Yeah, a forum is to discuss, but in fact we do not know what happened and those who were not aware also ...

The problem with the story 'is what is written by the victors and even survivors and that all liars, for reasons of propaganda

Yet we continued to talk with passion like me or per vice like other or because they are masochists , stubborn , obtuse for some, ect ... But it's normal, this is the kind of wildlife that can be found on all Forums ...

Otherwise springbok9, I hope that this year, I wish you a super healthy ...

Now you must be springbok9 000 000 000 000 000

Cheers

Pascal

springbok9 wrote:

The main impi had moved from behind iSipezi on monday its dissingenuous to believe that the movement would not have been screened by a considerable force. The impi was in Matyana territory and would have no doubt been escorted by them. When Dartnel appeared very close to the main Army a force would have been deployed with sufficient strength to keep him occupied. And thats what happened...<snip>...The next day when Chelmsford arrived in the Mangeni area he chased a fairly small zulu component that really had no wish to give battle* and kept withdrawing untill the Brits literally gave up chasing them ( See Russells route to the bottom of iSiphezi). Hence the belief that it was a deliberate ploy from Harford etc. It was a deliberate plo[y} but not in the way Harford [and] Symons believed.

Very interesting post Springbok. Even those of us who do get the chance to visit the main battlefield seldom have the opportunity to walk around the area you are talking about here. I agree that the Zulu seemed to be quite adept at screening tactics so it's quite possible that was what was occurring. It also makes intuitive sense that they would have detached a unit with familiarity of the local terrain to do so. I have read that was more or less standard practice for a Zulu army on the march. Can you be more explicit about what you mean by "not in the way ...Symons believed." Harford I have read but I am not familiar with what Symons had to say on this topic...

TIA,
- 6pdr

* Perhaps that should read, "no real wish to give battle EXCEPT ON THEIR OWN TERMS" in light of the failed attempt to encircle the colonials. Noggs and Harford seemed to take that attack fairly seriously and did not regard it as a faint.

Yeah springbok9, a forum is to discuss, but in fact we do not know what happened and those who were not aware also ... Very Happy

The problem with the story 'is what is written by the victors and even survivors and that all liars, for reasons of propaganda Wink

Yet we continued to talk with passion like me or per vice like other or because they are masochists , stubborn , obtuse for some, ect ... But it's normal, this is the kind of wildlife that can be found on all Forums ...

Otherwise springbok9, I hope that this year, I wish you a super healthy ...

Now you must be springbok 9 000 000 000 000 000 Wink

Cheers

Pascal

6pd
Symons expressed exactly the same thoughts as Harford, as did others. For so many to have the same thoughts I would believe that there has to be a 'meeting of the minds'. It had to have happened. Their interpretation of it was the zulus were trying to entice them forward, for once the benefit of hindsite assists us to reach the conclusion Ive outlined below.
So there was a gradual withdrawl of the Zulus, untill they got to iSiphesi there they met up on top of the hill.
That meeting was witnesed by Milne and Russell. I did post some time ago a succesion of photos from the Mangeni falls back towards iSiphesi. f it would assist I can resend them to Pete for a reposting.
The Zulus after lighting the fires on Magogo would have had a ring side seat to the shenanigans across the Nek to Dartnels camp, its really very close. They would have also been able to see the column crossing the plain from iSandlwana, a very clear view. I think, and it really is a personal view point, that they started to withdraw down into the valley with but were partially intercepted and a portion were forced back onto the Eastern slopes of the hills and into the caves. That was the major area of fighting. The balance retreated over the ridge at the end of the valley, actually counter attacked from there, and then over the silutshane neck to iSephesi.
It must have been a fair sized force and this 'fighting retreat' was exactly that a slow withdrawl so they could get to a position they could break of and join the main army for the projected attack on the 23rd. As it was Chelmsford splitting of his forces into the Mangeni area stopped a fast withdrawl and disapearance, the Zulu had to fight there way out.
One of the sentries posted in the Quabe area reported a large force before he was chased from his post. Its conceivable, seeing the short distance involved that this could have been the same force. Sorry its a bit of a pain to try and describe without a map. I will have a look and try and download something fromm Google Earth and annotate it if it would help.

Hope that helps

Cheers

But even if Chelmsford had admitted they were led away from the camp, what could they have done if they had realised this, they still could not have assist the camp at Isandlwana.

springbok9 wrote:

When Dartnel appeared very close to the main Army a force would have been deployed with sufficient strength to keep him occupied. And thats what happened.... The force on the oposite hill did exactly what was required of them, they kept Dartnell away from the army,
Cheers

Thanks Springbok, yes, I agree with this.
This is exactly what Harford is saying as I read it.
The Zulus kept a huge number of fires burning all night from tuesday to wednesday, to trick Dartnell into thinking a big old army was over there.
This succeeded - which ever way you look at it and whatever else happened next.

impi wrote:

But even if Chelmsford had admitted they were led away from the camp, what could they have done if they had realised this, they still could not have assist the camp at Isandlwana.

True. But that's why if we are going to apportion it at all, the primary responsibility for the disaster must be laid at the feet of Chelmsford. He had ultimate authority AND he put himself in a checkmated position. There was literally nothing he could do. He was without any good options even though the Zulu hadn't intended to attack until the next day. And I suspect that if their army was camped near the Mangeni instead, they would have overwhelmed his half of the column.