Did Durnford Assume Command at Isandhlwana?.

Guest

6pdr, i happen to agree with what you say.
cheers xhosa

CTSG
The sequence.
19th Orders where issued to Durnford to get to RD.
21st Durnford sent Shepstone to the camp, probably to enquire what he must do next thats refered to in statements.
21st Shepstone returns with orders, this is where it gets airy fairy. There was a reference from Crealock to those orders on the 22nd. Apart from that there is not a thing we know apart from Durnford left the morning of the 22nd to go wagon hunting, so speculation would be that was a portion of his orders.
22nd The move to the camp orders.

I dont think the discussion is about any orders that were received, thats a given fact. Its more about how those orders were couched and interpreted. It is obviously unclear because we exceptionally brainy people cant agree on it, so how could a bunch of squaddies?

It was so disbelieved that the camp could be attacked that when the news filtered through to Pulleine he was "nonplused." But at that point there was still a chance, sorry 6pd but I will disagree, if someone with the experience and drive, ie Durnford was IN the camp and took control. Get Cavaye of the hills, drop the tents and backs to wall around the 2/24th Ammo wagons, give the QN his Requisition and kick the hell out of the ammo boxes.

Just a thought.

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This as I believe the attack happened. The right wing in full view at 9 oclock heading to the back of the mountain. The chest moving forward and executing a turning movement ( as statements ) and descending on the Eastern side of Mkwene ( not the tradionally believed Western side) Cavaye and Mostyn in between Mkwene and the small knoll on Nyoni and Dyson on the Western Face of Mkwene.

What started this line of thought was
1) a trail had been established by the 9 oclock right horn.
2) considering that was then the direction the threat was deemed to come from ( Statement to that effect) then surely the troops would be deployed across that line not stuck away at 90 degrees to the attack at the bottom of the Tahelane Spur.
3) it fits the map drawn by Essex, its to the front of the isandlwana axis, not the rear.
4) it fits the Gardner map for the same reason
5) it fits with Davis, Essex, statements.

Just something else to keep the wheels turning.

Cheers

Posts : 1261 Join date : 2010-04-12

6pdr wrote:

xhosa2000 wrote:: All, how many times have i heard here and else where that this 'command thing' has been done to death,but yet
many scroll down,look, and still feel compelled to post...

-
Fair enough, but I was referring to "who was senior." There is no doubt about that.

xhosa2000 wrote:: Durnford's return to camp was critical to its survival. it most likely placed Pulleine in an awkward situation...

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That is how you imagine it, but I think the game was up by this point. In my historical imagination no British decision could have mitigated
the disaster by the time Durnford rode in, let alone changed the outcome of the battle. However interesting this aspect of the discussion
may be to you, to me it is akin to debating how many angels can fit on the head of a pin...or in this case--given the odds--how long it
would take the British & allies to be completely annihilated. (Longer than a hungry man needs to eat lunch?)

xhosa2000 wrote:: There seem to be an appalling lack of communication between the two Colonel's, and no co-operation.

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HERE IS WHERE I THINK YOU STRIKE GOLD. I agree. And who set that tone? The Chelmsford/Crealock duo. Chelmsford communicated
with his staff primarily through Crealock (who seems to have been roundly detested,) often almost as an afterthought.

I believe this was because he believed his biggest problem was bringing the Zulu to battle not beating them. But whatever the case may
have been it is clear that Chelmsford was not conducting anything like a "council of war" where the current situation could be communicated
(let alone an optimal course of action be debated.) Before I am told that is not how "the command thing" was done "back in ye olden daeys"
I want to stress that a key facet of command has ALWAYS been the clear communication of orders.

If debating his intentions 130+ years later with the benefit of hindsight is frustrating, imagine how confusing those orders must have been
to his reports at the time! Why focus primarily on the (supposed) failings of Durnford -- the victim of those ambiguous orders -- instead of
Chelmsford, the man in overall command? However rash anyone finds his actions, Durnford did no more than follow his commander's example
of impetuously splitting his force and riding out in the middle of the night without so much as a brief conversation with Pulleine who was present.

xhosa2000 wrote:: it was Captain Gardner ,not Pulleine, who saw the need to reinforce the right,

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Yes. This is yet another indication the Pulleine was "commanding" the battle in name only. Time and again we see subordinates correcting or
amending him as if he's a nice guy but shouldn't be in charge. Ian Knight believes that the British would have been better with Durnford
dispatching his forces and staying in camp. If that is true it has less to do with "unity of command" than Durnford's experience/abilities. The
supposition is Pulleine was in over his head and Durnford might have grasped the situation sooner. Impossible to prove of course...

xhosa2000 wrote:: ...and Durnford himself came into the camp - not to assume overall command as was his duty- but to gather more
reinforcements and to return with them to the Nyogane.

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I would argue Durnford came into camp because he was ordered to. He expected to find additional instructions but there were none. After all,
Chelmsford had neglected to issue orders to Pulleine...so why would we expect him to be thinking about a distant force of no-account native
and colonial soldiers?! -6pdr

So what is so confusing about this order!!!! scratch

Was it Durnfords inability to understand a basic requirement!!

22nd, Wednesday, 2 a.m.

You are to march to this camp at once with all the force you have with you of No2 column.

Major Bengough's battalion is to move to Rorke's Drift as ordered yesterday. 2/24th, Artillery and mounted men with the General and Colonel Glyn move off at once to attack a Zulu force about 10 miles distant.
J.N.C.
If Bengough's battalion has crossed the river at Eland's Kraal it is to move up here (Nangwane Valley).

That is the perfect note to go to bed on. Rolling Eyes

G night from a warm Cape Town evening.

Posts : 1261 Join date : 2010-04-12

And good night from a freezing uk Sad

Subject: Did Durnford assume command at iSandlwana? Sun Oct 06, 2013 8:15 pm

I suspect that the orders that Durnford sent Shepstone to get were to confirm the requirements for Durnford's and Bengough's actions in the attack on the Matyana's.

It would not appear as though there were any changes to the earlier orders regarding Durnford's co-operation with the attack on the Matyana's, as on his arrival at the camp Durnford told Pulleine that he was not staying, so if there had been anything in the orders that Shepstone went to get that said Durnford was to take over command at the camp, then Durnford would not have told Pulleine he was not staying there. Another point is, why did LC send orders to pack up and move the camp and address them to Pulleine, if he had wanted Durnford to take command he would surely have addressed them to Durnford and not Pulleine.

Whatever the orders of the 21st were, I don't think that they had anything to do with Durnford staying at or taking over command of the camp, otherwise he would have mentioned this to Pulleine and showed him the orders confirming it, but he said that he was not going to take command and that he wasn't staying at the camp.

Posts : 2871 Join date : 2010-06-02

Many thanks Springbok.

Steve

Posts : 1086 Join date : 2012-05-12 Location : NYC

springbok9 wrote:: 2)Chelmsford
Chelmsford was later to agree with those orders. He said: "Distinct orders were left with Col Pulleine by
Col Glyn regarding the defence of the camp and therefore when I ordered Col Durnford to come to it from Rorkes Drift I
refrained from sending any fresh instruction to that officer which might have caused confusion."

In other words Chelmsford has full concurred with the orders issued to Pulleine, ( You are in charge) it can therefore be sumised that he agreed that Pulleine was to remain in command.
Ergo, it was not his wish that Durnford took command.

Pulleine handed the written orders to Durnford, so its likely that Durnford saw in black and white an instruction that despite seniority he was not to take command.
Pulleine being the gentleman he was then mentioned that Durnford was senior.
Durnford, the lone ranger that he was declined command. So obeying the wishes of his CIC. Have Fun CTSG

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I for one think this is brilliant. Your ideas are consistently thought provoking but occasionally they demonstrate a profound and original insight. What I love about this one is that Durnford's later irritability (when told he is about to get surrounded and especially when told that Pulleine has ordered to the piquet to hold its position no matter what) is explained by it, psychologically speaking. After all, if Pulleine did show him the order it would have been like being "gob smacked" with proof that Chelmsford either had not forgiven him, or did not trust him, or both -- or at least that's how he was almost bound to take it on after the upbraiding he'd received earlier for demonstrating a bit of initiative along the border.

Great stuff -- we're lucky to have your contributions here Springbok! - 6pdr

Posts : 558 Join date : 2012-05-05

There’s nothing wrong with the order!!! But it was demeaning to Durnford. He wanted to prove himself, but was unable to. He had made himself un-trust worthy, by wanting to do it his way. He was in the wrong mind-set when he arrived at Isandlwana.

Guest

6pdr,again i agree.goodnight frank.
cheers Les

Posts : 1086 Join date : 2012-05-12 Location : NYC

Mr M. Cooper wrote:: Another point is, why did LC send orders to pack up and move the camp and address them to Pulleine, if he had wanted Durnford to take command he would surely have addressed them to Durnford and not Pulleine.

Game. Set. Match. End of.

Posts : 558 Join date : 2012-05-05

6pdr wrote:

Mr M. Cooper wrote:: Another point is, why did LC send orders to pack up and move the camp and address them to Pulleine, if he had wanted Durnford to take command he would surely have addressed them to Durnford and not Pulleine.

Game. Set. Match. End of.

He didn't want Durnford to take command!

Posts : 1086 Join date : 2012-05-12 Location : NYC

springbok9 wrote:: But at that point there was still a chance, sorry 6pd but I will disagree...

Well, I said that you were brilliant but I never said perfect... Joker

Guest

great posts for a supposedly ' spent topic ' by the way,
the C IN C, D of C, was not fooled for a minute. his un-
published correspondence and letters in the aftermath
apportioned blame in no uncertain terms.
cheers xhosa

Subject: Did Durnford assume command at iSandlwana? Sun Oct 06, 2013 9:21 pm

Spot on Les.

I have posted this before about the D of C, he wasn't fooled by the cover up and the web of lies and deceit that was put about by Chelmsford and his cronies to put the blame onto Durnford.

Subject: Did Durnford assume command at iSandlwana? Sun Oct 06, 2013 9:25 pm

Ulundi.

What's the source of the quote you posted at 8.22?

Guest

Cheers Martin,thanks for that.
xhosa2000

Posts : 2593 Join date : 2009-04-24

Mr M. Cooper wrote:: I suspect that the orders that Durnford sent Shepstone to get were to confirm the requirements for Durnford's and Bengough's actions in the attack on the Matyana's.

It would not appear as though there were any changes to the earlier orders regarding Durnford's co-operation with the attack on the Matyana's, as on his arrival at the camp Durnford told Pulleine that he was not staying, so if there had been anything in the orders that Shepstone went to get that said Durnford was to take over command at the camp, then Durnford would not have told Pulleine he was not staying there. Another point is, why did LC send orders to pack up and move the camp and address them to Pulleine, if he had wanted Durnford to take command he would surely have addressed them to Durnford and not Pulleine.

Whatever the orders of the 21st were, I don't think that they had anything to do with Durnford staying at or taking over command of the camp, otherwise he would have mentioned this to Pulleine and showed him the orders confirming it, but he said that he was not going to take command and that he wasn't staying at the camp.

Martin, I'm not getting what you saying. It was established along time ago that Durnford wasn't ordered tO take command of the camp, that was Pulleine's job. All Durnford was required to do, was move to the camp. There was nothing else at the point he was required to do! He could have had himself a tea partie or went off Grasshopper collecting.

Posts : 627 Join date : 2009-01-20 Age : 46

Grasshopper collecting Very Happy

What involvement did Durnford have with the "Putini tribe"

Subject: Did Durnford assume command at iSandlwana? Mon Oct 07, 2013 12:23 am

CTSG.

Right, it was established a long time back that Durnford was not ordered to take command of the camp, and he even told Pulleine that he would not be taking over command as he was not staying at the camp. However, with him being the senior officer whilst he was there, he would have been deemed by many as 'being in command', and any suggestion he made may well have been taken as an order, hence the confusion about who was in command.

With him telling Pulleine that he would not be staying at the camp, this shows that he had other duties to perform that were not at the camp, don't forget that the earlier orders and his personal conversation with LC had informed him that he would be required to co-operate in the attack on the Matyana's. The orders of the 22nd instructed him to move up to the camp, where no doubt he would have expected to find further orders if there was any change to the earlier orders regarding the Matyana's, but there were none, so as far as he is concerned, the earlier orders are still the ones he has to follow.

It's a pity that we don't know the orders that Shepstone brought back on the 21st, but there couldn't have been any alterations to the earlier orders because Durnford told Pulleine that he would not be staying at the camp.

Posts : 1086 Join date : 2012-05-12 Location : NYC

Chelmsfordthescapegoat wrote:: He could have had himself a tea partie or went off Grasshopper collecting.

CTSG...now who is being confusing? The etymologist was Charlie Harford. But Durnford might have gone Zulu scouting. Wouldn't that have been a useful thing to do?

SAS1,

Re-your question about amaPutini, this is an extract from a short biography I wrote on Durnford:

...Durnford was in the meantime tasked with blocking the Drakensberg passes, in order to prohibit in order preventing a repetition of the amaHlubi incident, and any possible incursion from the BaSothos on the other side of the mountains. He had an available labour force in the amaPutini men who had unjustly been accused of conspiracy with the amaHlubi. Durnford bargained for the rights of these tribespeople, urging the Colonial Administration to repatriate to their dispossessed lands. Having successfully completed the task of blocking the mountain passes, the amaPutini set to road work, and the reputation of the work gang grow, so much so that Africans were actually volunteering to work for Durnford. Throughout 1874 they tolled...

JY

Guest

Hi JY,all, i had a good posting day yesterday,
but confess it was easy for me,as you all
know i have the Drooglever thesis, which is
very detailed on certain aspects which forum
members are very interested in,so my replies
yesterday were timed to encourage debate.
and it flowed yesterday.

Now i have said, i think i have an alright under-
standing of the AZW in general so i can post with
reasonable confidence,but i can be tripped up on
minutia..as we all can. my point being that i feel
a bit of a fraud reading and then quoting from
somebody else's work. but your replies were as
always excellent. but i take no credit which of
course belongs to Rob Drooglever..

Factoid..Our very own JY assisted Drooglever on
his book. cheers xhosa

Posts : 2593 Join date : 2009-04-24

John Young wrote:: SAS1,

Re-your question about amaPutini, this is an extract from a short biography I wrote on Durnford:

...Durnford was in the meantime tasked with blocking the Drakensberg passes, in order to prohibit in order preventing a repetition of the amaHlubi incident, and any possible incursion from the BaSothos on the other side of the mountains. He had an available labour force in the amaPutini men who had unjustly been accused of conspiracy with the amaHlubi. Durnford bargained for the rights of these tribespeople, urging the Colonial Administration to repatriate to their dispossessed lands. Having successfully completed the task of blocking the mountain passes, the amaPutini set to road work, and the reputation of the work gang grow, so much so that Africans were actually volunteering to work for Durnford. Throughout 1874 they tolled...

JY

Sympathetic to the native course!!!

Guest

any chance of you posting that in full.
cheers xhosa

Posts : 2593 Join date : 2009-04-24

"The Timarn Herald. THURSDAY. MAY 22, 1879.

Now that we have received authentic information, official and private, of the recent disaster which overtook the British troops at Isandula, a clear opinion can be formed of the causes which mainly led to it. When the utterly unforeseen and unhappy news was first telegraphed, a portion of the Press, English and colonial, took a hasty and one-sided view, and incontinently blamed Lord Chelmsford for bringing about the catastrophe. With a certain class of writers, ignorant of military matters, and supremely ignorant of the duties and responsibilities of a commander-in-chief wielding forces m the field, it was but natural, perhaps, for them to endeavor to fix blame on the general commanding, apparently forgetful that, however acute, prudent, and far-seeing the chief of an army may be, his orders are liable to be set at naught, and his best measures frustrated by disobedience on the part of his lieutenants. It is very clear from the papers before us, that Lord Chelmsford gave very positive orders that " the camp was to be defended." Unhappily the camp was not defended m the manner as it was intended it should have been by the General, and hence the terrible defeat and frightful loss of English soldiers and their native allies. It is a very sorry task indeed to impute blame on brave men, and on men who gave their lives m atonement for the blunder of misinterpreting probably the orders of their chief. But whilst rendering the fullest meed of praise for gallant and heroic conduct on the part of those slain at Isitndula, it must be admitted, m all fairness, that the sore straits Colonel Durnfovd and his command were brought to were owing chiefly to disobedience of orders. Let us look into the facts of the sad story. On the morning of the disastrous fight, Lord Chelmsford left Isandula with a strong reconnoitring force, for the purpose of feeling the country m advance leading to a noted stronghold of Cetawayo. On his departure he left strict injunctions with Colonel Pulleyne, then m command of the camp, "to defend the camp." Shortly after the departure of the General reinforcements arrived, m command of Colonel Durnford, R.E., who as senior to Colonel Pulleyne, took full direction of affairs, and, as a matter of course, was bound, as much as Colonel Pulleyne was bound, to carry out the orders of his General. But, unhappily, Colonel Durnford thought otherwise, and instead of using his thirteen hundred men as a compact force, with, each component part acting harmoniously, and with effect, together, that officer elected too meet the enemy with a portion of this scant array, some miles distant from the place he was ordered to hold. This, then, was the cardinal blunder ; and the more strange that such a j blunder should be perpetrated by an officer who, from special training, would have been supposed to know full well how to defend a camp against the attacks of foes whose strength lies largely m numbers. "To defend the camp " meant, m military parlance, to throw up entrenchments, thereby adding enormously to the defensive power of the tiny garrison. But nothing of the sort was done. Not an attempt of shelter of any kind was attempted, the wagons even were not packed, and our men, out m the open, m front of the tents, and facing the hordes of Zulus swooping m thousands down upon them, were literally overwhelmed by sheer force of numbers. The generalship and pluck of the enemy were remarkable. The first was shown m their order of battle. On each flank of the Zulu army projected two enormous wings, the main body somewhat held back, and as the wings gained ground on either flank of the British, they gradually drew together till at last, meeting, they formed — excepting at one place where the ground was greatly broken — a complete barrier round the camp and its defenders. As soon as the circle was all but finished, the main body rushed forward, and the fighting, though fierce, was brief indeed. Man to. man and twenty to one, the struggle was soon over. A few, a very few, escaped, but those who succeeded m cutting their way through, the living hedge of men found, many of them, death m the swollen waters of the Buffalo River. Before the Zulus made their final rush, they lost frightfully, our rifles telling with terrible effect on their dense masses. Whole ranks bit the dust, but an eye-witness says not a falter was seen, men supplying the places of their dead or wounded comrades unhesitatingly. It may be said that time did not allow of any useful work of defence being thrown up, but anyone conversant with such matters, and who knows the rapidity with which a comparatively slight shelter trench is constructed, and its after value, cannot fail to regret that something of the sort was not attempted at Isandula, — the more especially as the affair at Rorke's Drift, which took place the same afternoon as the slaughter at Isandula, conclusively showed the enormous advantage of the flimsiest defences against an attacking force. An hour or so previous to the three thousand Ziluß appearing before the two huts, our " position" at the Drift, they were without a vestige of protection around them; but the energy of two young Englishmen, Lieutenants Chard and Bromhead, supplemented by a few score of military hands, did much m the way of fortification — Heaven save the mark ! — by piling up mealie bags as an outer line, and biscuit boxes some two feet high as an inner line, of defence. To man this improvised fort were one hundred and thirty-one men, many of them natives. At about four o'clock the Zulus commenced their attack, and throughout the entire night till four o'clock the next morning their assaults were incessant and well sustained, but all to no purpose, each time being beaten off with great slaughter. Thus was one hut defended, the other, used as a hospital, was fired and had to be vacated, but its blazing roof did good service, showing our men the whereabouts of the enemy.
We may draw the comparison between Isandula and Rorke's Drift still further, and state that numerically the garrison at the latter place was actually more outnumbered, man for man, than was the camp-guard at Isandula. Tet Isandula was the scene of a massacre : Rorke's Drift of a bold and gallant defence. At the one place precaution was set aside : at the other ready wit and cool judgment built up a defence which three thousand Zulus, flushed with their Isandula success, could not break down. Rorke's Drift teaches a lesson of the value of the most impromptu of fortifications : Isandula shows how a misinterpretation of orders or their wilful disobedience may bring about a terrible disaster."

Posts : 527 Join date : 2009-02-28

"The Timarn Herald"

Posts : 1086 Join date : 2012-05-12 Location : NYC

Saul David 1879 wrote:: "The Timarn Herald"

Well, it did manage to spell "Durnford" correctly...

I think the Pākehā meant to write The Timaru Herald.

JY

Posts : 2308 Join date : 2010-07-02 Age : 44

MAY 22, 1879 Still thinking along the same lines as in 2013

Subject: Did Durnford assume command at iSandlwana? Thu Oct 10, 2013 1:06 am

Should this not be called 'The Tin Pot Herald'?

This is the sort of tripe that some people still believe is 'fact' even today. scratch

Chelmsford and his cronies certainly planted the seeds of blame into the bloke who wrote this garbage.

Thankfully, we now have renowned researchers who can take this sort of rubbish apart and show it up for what it is.

Subject: Did Durnford assume command at Isandlwana Thu Oct 10, 2013 6:11 am

Hi ctsg .
Seriously , you are way better than that ............aren't you ?

. At best that article is rubbish to say the least , I gave up when it mentioned something along the lines of fortification . Rolling Eyes

. I'm sure you got the desired result Joker

Cheers 90th.

Guest

all...

" Major Clery "
On the morning of 22 jan 1879 before leaving the camp Major
Clery sent the following written instructions to Lt Col Pulleine:

" you will be in charge of the camp during the absence of Col
Glyn. draw in ( from memory ) your camp, or your line of defence
( not certain which ) while the force is out.
also draw in your line of your infantry outposts accordingly, but
keep your cavalry vedettes still far advanced ".

Major Clery went to Col Pelleine's tent, just before leaving camp,
to see that he got these instructions, and again repeated them
verbally to him.
Major Clery also believes that in the written instructions he men-
tioned that Colonel Durnford had been ordered to bring up his
force to strengthen the camp.

Major Crealock
Lt Col Crealock also had sent written instructions to Colonel Durnford
" to move up to Isandhlwana camp at once with all your mounted
men and the rocket battery and take command of it".
( my underlining ).

Capt. Essex

" at this time about 11 am the impression in camp was that the enemy
had no intention of advancing in the day time, but might possibly be
expected to attack during the night.
No idea had been formed regarding the probable strength of the enemy's
force.
at the same time that Colonel Durnford left the camp, a company of 1/24th
under Lt Cavaye was sent out on picket ( mu underlining ) to a hill
to the north of the camp about 2,2000 yards distant. this was done at
Col Durnford's order.". point 2 Julian..

verbatim extracts from ' Lord Chelmsford and the Zulu War. edited by his
friend and apologist Mathew Gosset.

I'm still of the opinion that the command issue was used very effectively
to enable the ensuing cover up. neither Col's seemed to grasp the situ-
ation in time.and what they did'nt know till it was to late that all along they
were dancing to the Zulu timetable. cheers xhosa

Posts : 1086 Join date : 2012-05-12 Location : NYC

xhosa2000 wrote:: Major Crealock
Lt Col Crealock also had sent written instructions to Colonel Durnford
" to move up to Isandhlwana camp at once with all your mounted
men and the rocket battery and take command of it".
( my underlining ).

Capt. Essex

" at this time about 11 am the impression in camp was that the enemy
had no intention of advancing in the day time, but might possibly be
expected to attack during the night.
No idea had been formed regarding the probable strength of the enemy's
force.
at the same time that Colonel Durnford left the camp, a company of 1/24th
under Lt Cavaye was sent out on picket ( mu underlining ) to a hill
to the north of the camp about 2,2000 yards distant. this was done at
Col Durnford's order.". point 2 Julian..

verbatim extracts from ' Lord Chelmsford and the Zulu War. edited by his
friend and apologist Mathew Gosset.

Don't want anyone to get overexcited here. Should I assume the underlined parts are areas in dispute or that you find suspect? I only ask because at first glance it may not be clear that you seem to have a new toy (Lord Chelmsford and the Zulu War) and you label the co-author an "apologist."

If that is true, what is the (presumed) significance of characterizing Cavaye's position as a picket (piquet)? I already understand that some wonder whether Durnford or Pulleine was really responsible for that disposition...but I don't think I've seen a company sized deployment called a piquet before. - 6pdr

Guest

hiya 6pdr,noted this,and im just popping out for a few
hours,i will reply to your earlier post as well as this a
bit later..company strength piquet. hmmm, iv'e had
that particular ' new toy ' for nearly twenty years..
lost its shine after the first read.so biased.xhosa

Subject: Did Durnford assume command at iSandlwana? Thu Oct 10, 2013 5:04 pm

Well, for a start we only have Clery's word for what he is supposed to have written to Pulleine, and as springy mentioned in an earlier post, he had no right issuing orders to a senior officer.

Crealock is a proven liar, he never wrote "take command of it", it was all a blatant attempt to make Col Durnford the scapegoat and cover Chelmsford's backside.

The reports of zulus in the area had been coming in since the early hours, but the inept Pulleine had done little to nothing about these reports, and by the time that Col Durnford arrived it was far too late to do anything about the impending attack. But at least he did try to get better information about all the zulu movements that had been reported, and he did make an attempt to find out what the large body of zulus were up to that had been reported as heading in Chelmsford's direction, little did he know the vast size of the zulu force that had amassed in the area.

It is debatable who ordered Cavaye to his position, some say Pulleine others say Durnford, it could well be that Durnford had suggested to Pulleine that some men be sent to the position, and with Durnford being the senior officer at the camp, it might well have been taken as an order.

Guest

Martin,

cheers xhosa

Posts : 249 Join date : 2013-06-01

I am not sure if either Pulleine or Durnford were in command of the camp at any time.

Reading between various lines, it seems that Melville and the other more experienced fighting officers of the 1/24th were back-seat-driving in terms of the tactics and strategy in the defence of the camp?

Posts : 2558 Join date : 2009-04-06 Age : 62 Location : UK

I think most agree, that most of the Compaines, we're looking after themselves. Certainly no lines of communication.

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ray63.most kind. cheers xhosa

Posts : 1086 Join date : 2012-05-12 Location : NYC

kopie wrote:: I am not sure if either Pulleine or Durnford were in command of the camp at any time.

Reading between various lines, it seems that Melville and the other more experienced fighting officers of the 1/24th were back-seat-driving in terms of the tactics and strategy in the defence of the camp?

Actually, it seems that Pulleine followed Chelmsford's written instructions on how to deploy for the defense of the camp almost slavishly. But as Joseph Stalin pointed out, quantity has a quality all of its own. Melvill was assertive in defense of the status quo...as when Durnford tried to make off with a couple of companies but I have not seen any accusations that he was "back seat driving."

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Posts : 1086 Join date : 2012-05-12 Location : NYC

Which, as USUAL Littlehand that addresses the point not at all. We were talking about Melvill and "other experienced officers," rather than Pulleine and Durnford...but you are nothing if not consistent.

I"m sure springbok posted simular. However the reason I posted the artical, was the last line, after which he said I will go alone.

But yes your quite right, you were talking about other officers. Although the topic is dedicated to " Durnford " I shall stand down. Salute

Posts : 1261 Join date : 2010-04-12

When you considered, how keen he was to act on information received from a Bishop, and we know he was perpairing to attack, without waiting for reinforcements. "Acting alone". He was also prepared to attack any Zulus at Isandlwana. This must have been installed in his men, proven by Raw when he opened fire on the Zulus first. just as well a Zulu peace envoy wasn't sent.

Guest

6pdr. Melvill back seat driving,
could you please itemize his
participation in the battle in
order for me to understand
cheers xhosa

Posts : 1086 Join date : 2012-05-12 Location : NYC

littlehand wrote:: I"m sure springbok posted simular. However the reason I posted the artical, was the last line, after which he said I will go alone.

But yes your quite right, you were talking about other officers. Although the topic is dedicated to " Durnford " I shall stand down.

Well, I'm not sure the "other officers" backseat driving is going anywhere so there's probably no point in your standing down, but I salute the impulse. Salute

As far as the last line goes, my interpretation of that is Durnford was expressing his belief that they owed it to Chelmsford to pin down as many Zulu as possible to prevent them from showing up in the General's rear. How do you see it?

» What would have become of Pulleine and Durnford, if they had survived Isandhlwana
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