Starve into submission

The Zulu's surrounded the entrenched British at a distance at Fort Eshowe in attempt to starve them into submission. They had control over the British supply lines.

I have mentioned this on many occasions, I think if this was adopted at Ulundi the Zulu's may well have had another victory.

We know the square formation moved as one onto the Battlefield!

My argument being, if the Zulu had kept their distance, there was not a lot the British could do. They could have gone on the offensive, but that would have broken or weaken the square, bearing in mind 20,000 Zulu's plus. I believe if the Zulu's hadn't charged into the square, LC would have been up the creek without a paddle, the only hope would have been Worsley's intervention? But that depends on the number of troops with him. Just my opinion!

I've always been at a loss to explain the zulu tactics during the war , I dont understand why they didnt attack the soldiers on the march or their supply columns , aside from Nyezane . I've never believed the '' Decoy '' aspect of Isandlwana , if they used that initiative once , surely it could've / would've been used again successfully ! .
90th

The Kings advice never to attack a fortified British position, fell on deaf ears more than once? Even when they knew the consequence in doing so from the Battle of Blood River?

Bed Time. Good Night!!!!!

I have never understood why the Zulu's attacked at Ulundi? they had see what British fire power could do, we know they feared men on horseback yet they ran straight into hell.  

Agreed , there were several times when the actions of the zulu army belied belief ! , especially if one thinks they '' decoyed '' LC out of Isandlwana !  . I certainly dont believe that , that was more good luck than good management in my opinion . Their stategy for the rest of the war was nothing short of what you'd expect from a primative people .
Good night Littlehand ! . Must be nearly 1am in the uk ? , hope you didnt / dont have work thursday ?
90th

00:06 UK Time. Good Night!!

Good night to you as well John  
90th

Which comes back to the point that we tend to give the Zulu more credit than they deserve in tactics. The were really very unsophisticated in their approach. Basically head on confrontation. The horns of the buffalo came from eShaka and was the last innovation in technique. There are rumours that even then that tactic was learned from Portugese traders out of Mocambique. Even at iSandlwana the attack would have failed if not for one brave ( probably scared stiff of going back to Cetshwayo without a win) man hadn't motivated the Umcijo regiment to attack head on.
So tends to make a mockery of the Q and L theories on decoys and advanced military tactics.

Cheers

90th wrote:

Agreed , there were several times when the actions of the zulu army belied belief ! , especially if one thinks they '' decoyed '' LC out of Isandlwana !  . I certainly dont believe that , that was more good luck than good management in my opinion . Their stategy for the rest of the war was nothing short of what you'd expect from a primative people .
Good night Littlehand ! . Must be nearly 1am in the uk ? , hope you didnt / dont have work thursday ?
90th

90th, your post here seems to disrespect and discredit the Zulus for their victory at iSandlwana.
It implies that their victory was more luck than skill and judgement.
Was this your intention?
And are you saying these "primitive people" lacked intelligence and were incapable of scoring a victory without luck?
From what I have read, I for one think Cetshwayo, Ntshingwayo and the other Zulu leaders were highly intelligent, wise and capable of cold, calculating thought.

springbok9 wrote:

The were really very unsophisticated in their approach.  Basically head on confrontation.

Just like the Sprinbok rugby team!

These tactics had served the Zulu well for decades, served them well at iSandlwana. There was no need to evolve new tactics in their minds. Remember, this war lasted a matter of months. There was no time to evolve, train and try out new tactics.
British tactics and the thinking of the generals in the Boer War and the Great War, took years to evolve and cope with the dastardly unsporting guerilla warfare of the Boers, or walking at a slow defiant pace, regiments in line, hopelessly, pointlessly and forelornly straight towards the German machine guns.

kopie. said.." I for one think Cetshwayo, Ntshingwayo and the other Zulu leaders were highly intelligent, wise and capable of cold, calculating thought".

      i could'nt agree more.

I think the zulu's were more cunning than they are credited for. For instance, they moved for many miles and avoided being found by LC's patrols, then when Dartnell thinks he has found them, LC goes off with over half the column to confront them, leaving the camp in the temporary command of the inept Pulleine, un-laagered (against his own written orders), and against the good advice from others. Seeing this, the zulu commanders could not believe their luck, and although it is said that they were not going to attack until the 23rd, how could they refuse an open invitation like this, the camp was theirs for the taking. It was only Col Durnford who realised that something was afoot, and he at least did send out some of his mounted troops to try to get some better information on the reported zulu movements around the camp, little did he know the size of zulu impi that was getting itself into position to attack the camp.

I agree with you Martin.
I think that it was unpalatable back in 1879, to even contemplate the possibility that white man could be out thought and out smarted by the "primitive" black man..

It seems that even today, there are some, particularly from the colonies, who find it just as unpalatable to believe that the great white dope could be outsmarted by the "blecks".
It is too much for them. Much easier to credit the loss of iSandlwana to jolly bad lack, or, the failings of one rogue white man.

Yes Kopie, we can't let the natives be seen as outwitting a general, and we certainly can't blame a 'LORD' now can we (what, what!!), that just wouldn't do old boy would it?

I know, let's blame that engineer chappy who was in command of those mounted natives, he can't speak for himself, he got the chop, so he will make a good scapegoat. We can rig it so that it looks like he disobeyed orders, and that way the general public will have someone to blame other than Lord Chelmsford.

kopie look out re your last post. duck  
was'nt aware the british had colony's
any more, did'nt they all take their ( foot )
ball's back after ww2.

Mr M. Cooper wrote:

Yes Kopie, we can't let the natives be seen as outwitting a general, and we certainly can't blame a 'LORD' now can we (what, what!!), that just wouldn't do old boy would it?

I know, let's blame that engineer chappy who was in command of those mounted natives, he can't speak for himself, he got the chop, so he will make a good scapegoat. We can rig it so that it looks like he disobeyed orders, and that way the general public will have someone to blame other than Lord Chelmsford.  

Engineer chappy. = Native sympathiser. But who's idea was to attack any Zulu's they see? Odd ball ! Makes one wonder, if he didn't have one of those little Zulu snuff capsules around his neck?  

No, they were polo mints.

  I wouldn't doubt that!

25,000 v 1500 Hmm i wonder what happened?.

The polo mint! Lit up.

Kopie
I for one moment dont wish to come across as a racist ( or one appearing to give the native little credence )  which it seems you may be implying because of my comments
regarding the zulu nation ? . I'm merely saying that if you look at the war after Isandlwana  , please show me where the zulu showed any sign of militarytactics or strategy in regard the future engagements , especially after what they SHOULD'VE learnt on the 22/ 23rd Jan . That is why I dont believe the decoy theory for one moment ! , if , as you seem to think that they did indeed pull off the decoy statagem ,  then please explain why something of this nature was most certainly lacking throughout the remainder of the conflict ?  . The war has instances where the zulu army showed a complete lack of solid military judgement / judgements as compared with the  '' mastersroke '' decoy plan at Isandlwana. I also think there is little doubt the zulu commanders certainly outdid the British officers in the battle at Isandlwana , but 25,000 against 1,000 is always going to end with the same result if there are no fortifications etc etc .
90th

90th, in regard to "military tactics" after iSandlwana, may i refer you back to my post of 5.05pm yesterday, the salient part i repeat here:

"These tactics had served the Zulu well for decades, served them well at iSandlwana. There was no need to evolve new tactics in their minds. Remember, this war lasted a matter of months. There was no time to evolve, train and try out new tactics.
British tactics and the thinking of the generals in the Boer War and the Great War, took years to evolve and cope with the dastardly unsporting guerilla warfare of the Boers, or walking at a slow defiant pace, regiments in line, hopelessly, pointlessly and forelornly straight towards the German machine guns."

My implication here is that the Zulus were no different to any other army in regards to what they "should've learnt" about tactics and changing them accordingly, even a sophisticated and  modern one like the British Army during the Boer or Great War. Enacting what "should've been learnt" takes time and lots of it in the real world. This is not wargaming we are talking about here!

As for any decoy on the 22nd January 1879, I have never stated whether I believe this to have been the case or not, however, I certainly do not rule it out, or dismiss the possibility that these "primitive" people would have been capable of enacting something as sophisticated as this, as you seem to have done. Of course, we will probably never know one way or the other as the Zulus never wrote orders down, but with a little logical thought, there is certainly enough circumstantial evidence to show that the Zulus were capable of (and did) decoy. For example, Dartnell was kept on his toes all night by the sight of hundreds of camp fires burning, leading him to think that there was a large force of Zulus encamped overnight, several hundred yards away from him. The following morning, there were almost no Zulus there - they had slipped away during the night to join the main impi; that my friend, was a decoy.

kopie wrote:

90th, in regard to "military tactics" after iSandlwana, may i refer you back to my post of 5.05pm yesterday, the salient part i repeat here:

"These tactics had served the Zulu well for decades, served them well at iSandlwana. There was no need to evolve new tactics in their minds. Remember, this war lasted a matter of months. There was no time to evolve, train and try out new tactics.
British tactics and the thinking of the generals in the Boer War and the Great War, took years to evolve and cope with the dastardly unsporting guerilla warfare of the Boers, or walking at a slow defiant pace, regiments in line, hopelessly, pointlessly and forelornly straight towards the German machine guns."

My implication here is that the Zulus were no different to any other army in regards to what they "should've learnt" about tactics and changing them accordingly, even a sophisticated and  modern one like the British Army during the Boer or Great War. Enacting what "should've been learnt" takes time and lots of it in the real world. This is not wargaming we are talking about here!

As for any decoy on the 22nd January 1879, I have never stated whether I believe this to have been the case or not, however, I certainly do not rule it out, or dismiss the possibility that these "primitive" people would have been capable of enacting something as sophisticated as this, as you seem to have done. Of course, we will probably never know one way or the other as the Zulus never wrote orders down, but with a little logical thought, there is certainly enough circumstantial evidence to show that the Zulus were capable of (and did) decoy. For example, Dartnell was kept on his toes all night by the sight of hundreds of camp fires burning, leading him to think that there was a large force of Zulus encamped overnight, several hundred yards away from him. The following morning, there were almost no Zulus there - they had slipped away during the night to join the main impi; that my friend, was a decoy.

Their tatics didn't serve them to well. Kambula and Ulundi! The British changed their tactics, form extended line to the square formation. The formation used by the Zulu's was useless against the square.

Hi Kopie .
Sorry I still dont have faith in the decoy theory , my reasoning being that the zulu fronting Dartnell wasnt the main impi , it was other chiefdoms etc , who were heading to join up with the main impi . The reason they werent there in then morning was that they had slipped away during the night so they wouldnt be seen heading in the direction of the impi . Maybe I'm not giving the zulu enough credit , but as I said , I didnt see them use any similar tactic again during the war .
Cheers 90th.  

90th wrote:

The reason they werent there in then morning was that they had slipped away during the night so they wouldnt be seen heading in the direction of the impi .  

And they left hundreds of decoy camp fires burning as they did so...surely this adds weight to the decoy theory??
Sure the British forces never fell for a decoy with such catastrophc consequences again, which is why there is little written about this and the Zulus never wrote down their operational orders for history, so any other decoys are not formally recorded.
But are you REALLY sure you have never read about small units of British or Colonial soldiers, who set out to pursue a small pocket of Zulus, only to be confronted by a much larger force over a hill, who then almost surround them? (I am sure I have, I will see if I can dig out a specific example or two).

CTSG - why would they have changed tactics that had served them so well over the decades against other tribes, and served them so spectacularly well at iSandlwana? If it aint broke, don't fix it.
Had the war gone on for a lot longer perhaps we would have seen an evolution in tactics, but really after iSandlwana, there were only a handful more battles to come. They used the tactics which had served them well previously.
It is easy for us to sit here now and re-fight the war and the battles with hindsight, but generally, the Zulus were always going to be on a hiding to nothing and were bound to lose the war sooner or later.
"The formation used by the Zulu's was useless against the square." Quite a ridiculous statement when you think about it really, CTSG! Most cavalry formations and charges by modern armies were useless against the square, CTSG. The Zulus had never seen a square before, never mind analysed it, and then, worked out a tactic to confront it! And littlehand's (wargaming, hindsight - ie NOT REAL WORLDLY) idea of a siege would not have been practical against the square at Ulundi either. If the Zulus had attempted to besiege the square, the ones who would have starved first would have been the 20,000+ Zulus. The Zulus didn't do logistics - they never had to before in decades and they went into battle only with the supplies that they carried.
Most people, including the British public at the time would conclude that the Zulus over-achieved during this short war; not under-achieved.

Hi Kopie .
Yes they nearly lured Buller into an ambush on the 3rd July , and a couple of other small parties at other times , but I'm talking on the scale of sophistication where they '' planned '' to lure LC and half his force from the camp , there is a major difference into '' Luring '' and '' Decoying '' on such a magnitude , we all have our thoughts , but to me , it was more good luck than good management . Plus , there are no zulu oral records or praises that state , that they did indeed attempt to lure LC from the camp . Surely , had that been their plan , I'm sure , they , the zulu would've openly admitted it if not straight after the war , but sometime later that , that was the case ! . If you can find any zulu evidence , where they've stated that LC was lured from the camp in a pre - meditated act , I'd like to see it , but till then I'll reserve my judgement and stay with my thoughts on the matter . Mehlokazulu was never one to hold back , it seems he called it as he saw it .
I'm happy to be corrected .  
Cheers 90th  

Opertunity Knocked!

Kopie and 90th.

I must admit that after reading L&Q, I was a believer in the decoy theory, however, after some consideration and after reading many other accounts, I came to the conclusion that although there may well have been some sort of plan on the part of the zulu commanders, the opportunity that arose at iSandlwana was more of a blunder by LC than a decoy by the zulu's. But the undetected move to the camp area by the zulus was well planned and well executed, so all credit to the zulu commanders for that. The camp fires that made Dartnell think he was up against a major force have been discussed on the forum before, and Julian said that this was a common thing for the zulu's to do, so even if it was not a deliberate decoy, it seemed to convince Dartnell that he was facing a much bigger force than he actually was. This of course lead LC to also think that the main impi was near Dartnell, and this is what prompted him to split his force without first getting some better information to make sure that this was the case. So it may not have been a planned decoy, but hell, it worked like one, and the zulu commanders would not have believed their luck when the camp was left un-laagered, and even if they had planned to attack on the 23rd, they must have realised what a great opportunity they had to take the camp on the 22nd. All the reported zulu movements that morning did not seem to make the camp aware that something was afoot, but it is now obvious to us that the zulu's were getting themselves into position ready to attack the camp. When Col Durnford arrived and heard the reports, he became aware that there was something going on, and when the report came in about zulu's heading in the direction of LC, he had to find out what they were up to. Little did he know that this was the left horn getting itself into position, and then he ran into them whilst going to find out what they were doing. So although it would appear that this was some great piece of decoy work by the zulu's, I am now of the opinion that it was down to the blunder of LC and a great piece of luck for the zulu's, they would not have been able to resist this golden opportunity to attack and take the camp. Hope you see what I mean.

Absolutely, opportunity knocked.
Perhaps we are arguing over semantics here 90th. Lure, decoy, diversion, trap, trick.
I certainly agree that the Zulus did not pull off a decoy on the scale of what the allies did prior to Operation Overlord with the whole Pas de Calais decoy.
However, their out-manouevring of Chelmsford's column to the North through the hills unseen was master stroke, no accident.
They had not planned to attack on the 22nd, but they saw the opportunity and took it.
Perhaps they had not expected to see Chelmsford lead out half of the camp force in the early hours of the 22nd, they were going to attack the whole force on the 23rd, but they saw the opportunity and they took it.
The Zulus who Dartnell encountered were on their way to the main impi some 10 or 12 miles away. They will have been in communication with the main impi - and please don't ask for written evidence of this; it would be churlish and naiive to think that they were not. (A distance of 10 or 12 miles could have been covered in an hour by a fleet footed messenger). They saw Dartnell's force, kept them busy til darkness then fixed Dartnell to the spot by leaving a small number of men behind (as the main force slipped away to join the main impi) to look after hundreds of fake camp fires through the night of the 21st and morning f the 22nd.
This is opportunistic. It is also decoying, or luring, or tricking, however you want to label it.
It shows intelligence, adaptability, thinking on the feet and tactical awareness.
You call it luck if you want to, I call it good management.

Thanks Mr Cooper, I think our posts crossed, so I am editing this in. On reading your post above, you and I at least, are singing from the same hymn sheet!
And I agree. My point is that the Zulus decoyed Dartnell's force, to fix them, to keep them away from the upcoming fight at the camp for as long as possible; they were not trying to lure Chelmsford out of camp, that wouldn't have occurred to them. What kind of crazy fool would have expected Chelmsford to split his force in half and march away from camp in the middle of the night?!?!?

All very well explained here.

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Hi Kopie.

I can see your point about Dartnell being deceived, and yes, no doubt he was, but it might have been a case of deceiving himself rather than the zulu's deceiving him. I know it's on the forum somewhere, but Julian is of the opinion that the zulu's always made lots of camp fires, and this is what appears to have fooled Dartnell. Who knows, it could well have been a long held piece of trickery by them to fool the enemy into believing that there was more of them than there actually was, if this is the case, then all credit to them, it worked with Dartnell. And even LC fell for it, for he also must have been under the impression that Dartnell had found the main impi, but where he made the mistake was splitting his force and dashing off without getting some solid confirmation that the main impi was indeed near Dartnell, was it a rush of blood or eagerness to find and defeat them, or was it underestimating them and being too overconfident, it might well have been a mixture of these, but he should have got confirmed proof that they were actually there before chasing shadows.

 

Why would the Zulus try to deceived Dartnell on the 21st Jan. The main Zulu Army never intended on attacking the camp until the 23rd. Seems a hell of a long time to try and deceived someone. Most likely Dartnell  came across Zulus making their way to the valley, ready for the main attack on the 23rd. 

The unexpected division of the camp,not only changed British plans but also those of the Zulus.

You are getting there impi. I think it was a case of Dartnell deceiving himself rather than the zulu's deceiving him. He ran into a large body of zulu's and decided to make camp for the night, during the night he saw many camp fires which fooled him into believing that there were a lot more zulu's than he thought. His message to LC also convinced him (LC) that this is where the impi was, and LC split his force and went off to confront them (without first getting proper confirmation that they were there). During the night most of the zulu's had left to join the main force near the camp, but their fires were still burning which gave Dartnell the impression they were still there. The zulu's around the camp must not have believed their luck seeing LC leave with half the column and with the camp un-laagered, even if they had planned to attack on the 23rd they surely could not resist a golden opportunity like this, so they decided to attack and take the camp on the 22nd, and that is what all the reported movements were during the morning, the zulu's were getting into position to attack.

I was thinking along the lines that Dartnell, thought it sensible to stay put, rather than moving back to camp in the knowledge that there were hundreds of Zulus in the immediate area. As I understood it, regardless of whether or not he received reinforcements, he was going to attack at day light anyway. The fact that Glyn pursuaded Chelmsford to go to Dartnell assistance, was a bonus for Dartnell, and a Bonus for the Zulu's waiting in the valley, fives miles from Isandlwana.

impi.

Yes Dartnell thought it best to stay out (getting dark), and let LC know what he thought he had found, and he said that he planned to attack in the day. Other messages were sent by Dartnell and passed on to LC, it was the content of one of these messages that persuaded LC to split the column and go to Dartnell not Glyn, Glyn just passed on the message to LC. But like you say, it was a bonus for the zulu's, they saw their opportunity to attack the camp and took it.

As normal Martin, we beg to differ on the Glyn issue. We don't know what representation he made to LC. was it verbal or written. But whatever it was , it changed LC mind. 

I have been looking for a topic, where it states Glyn and Dartnell were very good friends. How far that friendship spanned, I know not. But was this the real motivation for Glyns representation.? Just another avenue to go down. I will find t one day!

impi.

It is somewhere on the forum, I can remember reading it, but never mind, like you say, it will turn up one day. I don't know about Dartnell, but I do know that Glyn treat Coghill like a son, he must have been shattered seeing his beloved 24th (2nd Warwickshire) regiment cut to pieces at the camp, then finding out that Coghill had been killed near the river, no wonder he almost broke down.

I would agree, but when given the chance to speak up at the C.O.E. he only had this to say!

"

Glyn wrote:

2nd Evidence.—Colonel Glyn, C.B., states: From the time the column under my command crossed the border I was in the habit of receiving instructions from the Lieutenant-General Commanding as to the movements of the column, and I accompanied him on most of the patrols and reconnaissances carried out by him. I corroborate Major Clery's statement.

24th.

Before scapegoating Durnford, both Crealock and LC tried to scapegoat Glyn, however, he got wise to their tactics and avoided any sort of comments that might implicate him, that is why he only gave brief statements.

Wasn't trying to as you say Scapegoat anyone, I was pointing out, as the officer in command of the 3rd column, he really didn't have much to say at any stage. No wonder LC took control. If it had been left to Glyn, the army would have still be at the Docks, waiting for orders to march into Zululand.

24th.

I know you were not trying to scapegoat anyone, please read my post again. I was saying that before Crealock and LC scapegoated Durnford, they tried to scapegoat Glyn, but that he got wise and only gave brief statements. LC more or less took over control of the column from the word go, Glyn was only in command of the column in name only, it was LC that was really in control. Don't take my word for it, just take a read of it all for yourself, you will then see what everyone else seems to agree on.

Well Glyn was responsible for the 3rd column.
LC like Glyn was not at Isandlwana. Yet people try to use him as a scapegoat.

Chard, you cannot be serious, it was LC that was in total command of ALL the columns, he attached himself to Glyn's column and gave the orders, Glyn was forced to take a back seat.

No one is scapegoating LC, he was the one who caused it all in the first place, so no one can scapegoat the instigator.

Glyn was often ignored and also ridiculed if he commented on anything, ie; laagering at iSandlwana for instance, he was instantly shot down in flames. Maybe LC would have done better to listen for a change rather than make Glyn look like a fool.

that's the way i see it to!.  

Ray it's common knowledge in the zulu fraternity that Glyn was only in command by title , do you own any of Knight's books ? . I'm certain in Zulu Rising or possibly in his Large hard cover ''Silver Book '' this is mentioned . Which books do you have ? . I'm sure if you have a look you'll see this for yourself ! . Dont forget Glyn asked to fortify the camp LC said no !

Impi I never agree with you but you may finally have hit the nail on the head in regard to the zulu attempting to hide their wherabouts , which they were keen to do so , the attack from memory I think stated by Mehlokazulu was going to be dawn on the 23rd . I'm still waiting for you and Littlehand to show me your primary evidence that Glyn persuaded LC to gallop off into the night , when a day earlier or so Glyn wished to entrench or fortify ! , anyone wanting to do this is hardly going to suggest a day later to ride off into the night chasing shadows is he ? . There is NO WAY Glyn persuaded LC to do anything ! . LC did what he thought best , pure and simple . I suggest you get hold of Ian Knight's books and have a sit down and a read , all your questions wil be answered , but not sure you'll believe them anyway !    
90th

I was referring to Crealock's statement at the C.O.E. With regards to Glyn making a representation to LC which led to LC assisting Dartnell. That was it. Look at the previous posts and it's been pointed out quite a few times. And in the other thread!

I must be losing it ! , please show me in Crealocks submission that states Glyn categorically forced or pushed LC to divide the camp !. All I seem to remember reading is when Glyn saw the note he directed it's carrier off to LC stating something like he commands the column take it to him ! .
90th