The 21st January and the Decoy theory

xhosa2000 wrote:

"forming a laagar" ,says 6pdr, just highlighting
that mate so i can say..again..not a sod was
turned.. and yet drooglever thesis, in response
to one message including the word Laager! and
has no one seen the sketch on the 23rd showing
troop's occupying SLIT TRENCH'S.  

Good point, but wasn't there a lack of spades, as like the screwdrivers?

"Spades to save the day. If only they had known.?

By Sir Henry Havelock.
"If the men at Isandula had had these light spades, they would have been able, even in a few hours, to have intrenched the camp, or, at any rate, to have thrown up a few rifle pits flanking each other. Then, with the powerful weapons with which our men were armed, he undertook to say that we should not now have been mourning a great disaster;"

24th hiya,    , my self i would be digging
like billio using anything to hand! but the whole
force was riddled,rotten beyond repair, with
complacency, the British thought they were
dishing out a right hammering,err wrong, but
then again it was all wrong.

last thing from me to night, Ammunition failure
at Isandhlwana? it was that basic!. LC! went
off without his ammo! proving to me he did
NOT KNOW what was in front of him,or anywhere
else! incompetence! meanwhile..same thing during
the main battle at the camp, lack of ammo? heard
accounts of rounds spilling out of the pouches
during the fighting withdrawal, retreat,rout, and
annihilation. we know that was not a factor dont
we?.  

Just a point in regard to the camp selection from memory it was Clery who picked the spot , happy to be corrected .
24th
Not sure if you are kidding or not in regard to Gen Havelock's quote ? , Havelock wasnt in Sth Africa , how he thought a shortage of spades contributed to the disaster is beyond me , the screwdriver myth has also been discredited over the years ! . Dont forget they had the pioneer battalion with them and I'm sure they would've had plenty of spades as they needed to do much work on the land so the column could continue its advance , as usual happy to be corrected .  
Cheers .

In response to the 'Digging a trench round the camp.'

These are the ground conditions:

The depth of the topsoil is no more than 300 mm ( 12 inches) after that its solid solid solid.

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Along the front of the camp there is rock, lots and lots of rock. This was the natural defence line that the troops used.

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The distance around the camp, excluding the mountain itself is very close to 2 kilometres. To dig a decent trench would involve moving around 2160 cubic metres of bedrock.

Hope that puts it into perspective

24th wrote:

Good point, but wasn't there a lack of spades, as like the screwdrivers?

For want of a nail... My kingdom for a horse...shoe? deus ex machina ad infinitum...

springbok9 wrote:

To dig a decent trench would involve moving around 2160 cubic metres of bedrock. Hope that puts it into perspective

Quite cogently.

But I have another question for you Springbok.

At this EARLY point in the campaign, how long do you think it would have taken to laager the camp...or whatever portion was possible with the wagons in the park etc..?

I'm aware the Boer trekkers were very talented where it came to that...and a lot of the wagon drivers and transport personnel were Boers. But was a British column up to forming a laager every step of the way at this point in the war? They weren't "born to it" so to speak.

After all, there were a lot of different types of transport with the column -- some of them VERY heavily loader relative to what the trekkers were carrying -- so I wonder whether there were enough skilled hands with the column to form a huge laager in anything under 3-4 hours?

Just looking for opinions...as it sounds like it's a lot harder to do than say...like digging into bedrock.

It happened on the second invasion, no reason it couldn't have happened here. In theory?????????
There is a big difference between the Voortrekkers and iSandlwana though. The Boer carried everything in their wagons, apart from live stock. In laagering the live stock was herded into the centre. With the British camp the individual Battalion wagons were not parked on the saddle. Its a point often forgotten but they were arranged behind the tent line so it would have been virtually impossible to get those wagons out without dismantling the camp.
The oxen for all those wagons plus the oxen for the 'transport' wagons on the saddle could not have been accomadated in a laager. Any laager would perforce have to be constructed on the saddle and that would have left the whole camp plus supplies plus live stock at the mercy of any Zulu who happened to want to practice the South African art of 'affirmative shopping'. And THAT was against the orders from TJULT Clery.

To answer your other question, there were more than sufficient transport drivers to arrange a laager, ie make a circle. But the concept of a laager is far more than that, it entails blocking the spaces under the wagons and in between the wagons. That is what takes the time.

Cheers

could they have made a laager?, why of course!
but ask your self the the basic question,why
did'nt they? answer, because they did'nt know
what was about to hit them!! and of course
during the second invasion every-
body laagered! Chelmsford got it badly wrong the
first time around to his credit he did not second
time! i will dig out an image of the troop's ' dug in '
around Isandhlwana, it was the morning of the
23rd just before first light and before, they left
to ' relieve ' the garrison at RD. some one gave the
order to dig in to protect the camp overnight.

This has now gone from decoy,chain of command,to
landscape gardening.  cheers

Nothing wrong with a good bit of landscaping  
But yes your right Les, they just didn't appreciate the depth of trouble they were in. Even half way through the fight there was the Pulleine quote: " Oh what a fool a fellow is............" even then there was no appreciation that the right horn was busy getting closer.
There is I think two separate quotes from the returning column that seems to indicate some attempt had been made to form a barricade on the saddle. Must dig them out.

Cheers

Happy Manchester last night, 5-0 and 4-2.  

springbok9 wrote:

It happened on the second invasion, no reason it couldn't have happened here. In theory?????????

Yes, I appreciate that but was just wondering, really, how long it would take since for the most part all of the transport would have first required inspanning. That requires managing a lot of beef. Most of the wagons had no rear axles. Oxen won't backstep. The wagon park was very dense and it would have required a lot of close quarters maneuvering under pressure. Doesn't mean it couldn't have been done...but they hadn't tried it AS A COLUMN even once yet. I take your point about the battalion wagons as well...and it all goes back to the vast herd being set to grazing although there are different accounts of where they were located and what they were doing as the morning wore on.

xhosa -- yes, you make the salient point. Halfway through the battle Pulleine still hadn't a clue the camp was in danger, so why would they be taking extraordinary defensive precautions? I totally agree...but I was just considering the logistics of the situation. It's easy to say dig in or laager if we assume it could be done with a magic wand, but there were some real world reasons that Chelmsford ignored his own written instructions and we have to assume it was something more than just pure negligence.

- 6pdr

how do Frank, yeah thats why i'm with your
time line, i dont think most people appreciate
just how fast this battle was as the Zulu un-
stalled and rushed the camp, in my PB is the
rather poor quality image showing the troop's
occupying slit trenches. shhh! about the foot
ball i dare'nt watch most of the time.    

but there were some real world reasons that Chelmsford ignored his own written instructions and we have to assume it was something more than just pure negligence. said 6pdr.

6pdr, hello to you.   i think our post crossed!
" just pure negligence ", the more i have thought of
this, the more badly his lordship emerges! to think he
rode out! splitting his command, riding off into the early
dawn thinking Dartnell had discovered the main Zulu army.
and his lordship had said on many occasions that he was
afraid he would not be able to induce the Zulu to fight.
but what does he do!!! goes off without the Ammunition!!
what was he going to fight the main Impi with!..

To say he failed because of a lack of reliable intelligence is
damning, when as you say, he did not heed Bellair's mixtures.
one last thought, why was LC so eagar to get AWAY from
Isandhlwana?. almost, as if he knew something.  
cheers xhosa

xhosa2000 wrote:

the more i have thought of
this, the more badly his lordship emerges! to think he
rode out! splitting his command, riding off into the early
dawn thinking Dartnell had discovered the main Zulu army.
and his lordship had said on many occasions that he was
afraid he would not be able to induce the Zulu to fight.
but what does he do!!! goes off without the Ammunition!!
what was he going to fight the main Impi with!..

Yes, when I came to this board I was looking for reasons to excuse Chelmsford but I ended up persuaded by the other camp. Once you've read in depth it's difficult not to imagine Chelmsford champing at the bit. Leaving the ammunition wagon behind undercuts any claim that he might have defeated the Zulu army with his precipitate maneuvering. It's quite clear, really. He simply did not believe a Zulu force could defeat British regulars...and for the most part that perception was contagious. He was anxious to claim HIS victory...and that's the mark of an amateur. OTOH, his second campaign showed that he was quite capable of being a skilled professional too. So, this was mostly a matter of attitude...i.e. "overconfidence." The Zulu were not the xhosa...as he had been forewarned.

6pdr,  

I would image Pulleine would have been more concerned about getting the waggons ready to roll, at Chelmsford request.

In the great world of hind-sight. Would rifle pits have saved the day.

hi Dave, would of delayed the inevitable, again all about
the number's, cheer's.

one last thought, why was LC so eagar to get AWAY from
Isandhlwana?. almost, as if he knew something.

That last bit was me being mischievous,and very tongue
in cheek.  

That all depends on what was written in the message LC received from Clery? What ever it said, It made LC move to Dartnells assistance. Remembering at first he wouldn't go to his assistance!

impi, your a bad man.   no conspiracy.?.  

Hi Dave
The order to move, hence the possibility of moving the wagons only came through Gardner, and that arrived at the same time as the bad news from Shepstone.
The troops would have been so tired digging the trenches they wouldn't have had the energy to resist. Besides all the reports of the battle say that the line was holding till the recall was sounded and that's the point it broke down.
So the real question and answer to the mystery of iSandlwana surely would be, why was the recall sounded, or more bluntly; Who panicked????????????? I know who my monies on !

Xhosa
Naughty !

Impi
Question I don't recall ever asking before, did that message from Dartnell actually survive ? I know the contents come down through Clery and have never been disputed but Im sure Ive never actually heard of the message itself surviving.

Cheers

springbok9 wrote:

Hi Dave
The order to move, hence the possibility of moving the wagons only came through Gardner, and that arrived at the same time as the bad news from Shepstone.

Although Clery did state!

"I sent written instructions to Colonel Pulleine, 24th Regiment, to the following effect:—" You will be in command of the camp during the absence of Colonel Glyn; draw in (I speak- from memory) your camp, or your line of defence"—I am not certain which-"while the force is out: also draw in the line of your infantry outposts accordingly; but keep your cavalry vedettes still far advanced." I told him to have a wagon ready loaded with ammunition ready to follow the force going out at a moment's notice, if required"

I did read, in a blog somewhere that Pulleine was more worried about not having the waggons ready. Than the reports coming in with regards to sighting of Zulus.?

Hi Impi
The only two occasions when waggons were called into play were as you say, early in the morning when the QM was loading a wagon and found it was wrong size so went to speak to Coghill about arranging a larger/smaller one.
And secondly on the arrival of Gardiner.
So the early morning one was all pretty casual in camp, Coghill was in his tent, and the later one the brown stuff was about to hit the fan. So I don't think there was to much concern there. Possibly where that comes from is that Brickhill was told to get the oxen hitched, and I think that was more a case of worries about the live stock rather than the wagons.

Cheers

Springbok

I through that the order to retreat was given because Durnford was falling back leave the flank exposed ?


Cheers

Hi Db
Im not that sure it was . A problem Im trying to solve so it can slot into the time line, is how can Durnford be in two places at the same time? There is testimony he was at the donga when they pulled bak, didn't he help a volunteer find his horse? If therefor the bugles then sounded to pull back how come Durnford was talking to Essex and watched the NNC run past him. And round about the same time he is talking of wanting to gather the men together. And yet again one of the retreating volunteers remarked that he saw Durnfordd " where we saw the guns in the morning."

Ive got a very open mind till those points are solved.

Cheers

DrummerBoy 16 wrote:

I through that the order to retreat was given because Durnford was falling back leave the flank exposed ?

Reasonable to surmise, but I'm not sure there's any real proof that was the sequence of events. What fascinates me is, who gave the order?

springbok9 wrote:

...how can Durnford be in two places at the same time?"

Funny you mention that.  I am more confused about his movements than ever.  I only recently got hold of Whybra's "The Cochrane Accounts of Isandlwana" and found myself trying to reconcile  Durnford's supernatural movements which at some points involved doubling himself and at others wearing a cloak of invisibility.  

Cochrane rode all the way across from "the" donga (whichever one) to the 7-pounder half battery and (apparently) convinced them to reorient one gun.  He never reunited with Durnford again, but Durnford was supposedly riding over to that area shortly thereafter.  How hard could it have been to spot a solitary figure riding across the front of the camp, or north of it, when that would have been like running across a shooting gallery?  Nearly everybody else would have been kneeling or prone most of the time...not mounted.  I don't get it.

I hope to be in a position soon to post an essay and maps showing the Durnford movements.

Cheers

springbok9 wrote:

Good debate.
Few answers:
Kopie Springboks to win by 20, All Blacks by 15 plus.  

Kopie your other posts on the decoy, good thoughts but possibly the last paragraph of this post may influence your thinking.

Impi your 8.14 post
Highly possible

your 8.31 post
The camp site was on a flat area half way up the slope so a great defensive position for troops well armed but not for Dartnells rag tag bunch. Your right the Zulus would have 'eaten them up' quick time.
Chelmsford had absolutely no option at all, he had to advance to Dartnell in force. The two companies requested could have been wiped out on the trail. He couldn't ignore them and he couldn't take the whole force. Beside which this was what he wanted, the opportunity to bring the Zulu to battle.   

John
Very possible, even probable there were spies, but they didn't have to go into the camp the view from the ridge would have told them everything they wanted.

There is no history in Africa of the Zulu, Xhosa, Venda Tswana or any of the other half a dozen cultural groups using smoke as a signal, with any degree of sophistication that is. The African way is to shout from the hill tops and relay messages for long distances. Its said, Rider Haggard I think, that his servant in Pretoria knew about the battle the next morning.

I don't think Ntshingwayo would have put himself into danger by going into the camp. He was a famous man and could very easily have been recognised by the camp Zulus.

The distance and country side would not allow for any rapid communication between Chelmsford and Pearson. The fact that both battles took place is variously put down to both impis being discovered ( lends support for the lack of tactical knowledge theory ) or that the attacks were planned for the 22nd before they left Ulundi, and that kills of the day of the dead moon theory.   

6pd
The decoy theory is actually built on sound fact, but so are a lot of other theories on this passage of events. All speculative but indeed all plausible thoughts. What we have to be extremely careful of is over complication things when a simple explanation would suffice. In that area I fully agree with Mike Snook, though not on his bloody arrogant way of putting things.  

The key again ( sorry keep banging on about this ) is the time and space possibilities:  

Couple of key points

20th January: The main impi has moved to its bivvi area behind Siphezi
                    Lt Brown patrolling the front of Siphezi is driven of by some very agresive  flank guards to keep him away from the bivvi.
21st January: Dartnells forces , in particular the mounted volunteers, start to investigate the area from Mangeni to Siphezi ( that's the sequence of photos at the start of the topic) they again are not allowed to get to close, at one point they were close to being surrounded. That's the flank guards again. But by this time the impi was on the move around Siphezi towards Ngwebini. ( Photo F, the path is on the extreme left of the hill moving towards the camera. In the second photo,G, I have swivelled by 180 degrees so Siphezi is behind me.) In front is the whole plain with iSandlwana that small blip on the left horizon ( if there was a look out on top of iSandlwana and he was alert he would have seen the impi moving on the 21st.
What separated Darnells advance across the plain and the impis movements was virtually the curvature of the earth, not much else. If you think of all the comings and goings across that plain its amazing that the two sides never saw each other. So POSSIBLY it wasn't such good generalship that got the Zulus that close just blind luck? Oh yes and bloody inefficient imperial scouting.

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Imagine 20 000 men all moving in a fairly big crowd through long grass ! The track they would have left was HUGE. Dead give away to any one passing by. Its my contention that this is what was being guarded on the 21st and 22nd, the track itself.
When the Zulus moved ahead of the troops they were, in my opinion, "leading them a merry dance" up the Mangeni valley and across the ridges towards Siphezi and away from that track. It would have been like an arrow pointing the direction the impi had travelled. Not a lot of sophistication behind that just plain old common sense.

That's my theory anyway. If nothing else adds something to the debate.

Cheers

Just to add weight to Springboks observations. Highlighted in orange.




Extract from The Relief Of EKowe

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Source
THE ZULU WAR.
Star , Issue 3497, 26 June 1879, Page 3

It has been said, that after the Battle, a chief said

" You gave us the battle that day ... for you dispersed your army in small parties all over the country"

Was he referring to LC taking half the force with him? Or the positioning of the Compaines at Isandlwana ?

I've read that recently in a Keith Smith book and I'm of the opinion it was referring to LC's trek in trying to locate the zulu army .
90th

The following account is of great interest as having been given by a Zulu deserter:—

"The Zulu army, consisting of the Ulundi corps about 3000 strong, the Nokenke 2000, the Nkobamakosi, including the Uve, 5000 strong, the Umcityu 4000 strong, the Nodwengu 2000 strong, the Umbonambi 3000, and the Udkloko 1000—a total of 20,000 men in all—after an address from the king left the Nodwengu military kraal on January 17th, and proceeded on their march towards Rorke's Drift. On the 20th they halted for the night close by the Isipezi hill, and on the 21st, keeping to the eastward, they occupied a valley running north and south under the spurs of the Ngutu hill, which concealed that of Isandhlwana, distant about four miles nearly due west. The order of encampment was—on the right, the Nodwengu, Nokenke and Umcityu; in the centre, the Nkobamakosi and Umbonambi; on the left, the Ulundi and Udkloko corps. On the morning of the 22nd there was no intention of making an attack on account of some superstition as to the state of the moon, and they were sitting down resting when firing was heard by the Zulus on the right. This was at first supposed by them to be an attack on the centre, but a[55] move being made in that direction this proved not to be the case; and it was soon found out that this was the whites engaged with Matyana's people some ten miles off to the left front. Just after the Zulus had resumed their position, and again sat down, a herd of cattle came past their line driven down by some of their scouts from the right. Just when these were opposite the Umcityu regiment a body of mounted men on the hill to the west were seen galloping and evidently trying to cut them off. When several hundred yards off, seeing the Umcityu, they dismounted, fired a volley, and retired. The Umcityu at once jumped up and charged. This example was followed by the Nokenke and Nodwengu on the right, as well as by the Nkobamakosi and Umbonambi in the centre, whilst the Undi and Udkloko formed a circle—as is customary with the Zulus when a force is about to engage—and remained in their position. With these were the two chief officers Mavamingwana and Tyugwayo, who after a short pause led away these centre troops in a north-westerly direction, and keeping to the north of the Isandhlwana performed a turning movement, unseen by the English through the nature of the ground. Thus the original Zulu left became the extreme right, the right the centre, and the centre the left. The two regiments forming the latter—the Nkobamakosi and Umbonambi—made a turning movement along the front of the camp to the English right, but became engaged before they could complete it. The Uve battalion of the Nkobamakosi had to retire till reinforced; and the Umbonambi suffered heavily from the artillery fire. Meanwhile the Zulu centre, consisting of the Umcityu[56] (left centre) and Nokenke and Nodwengu (higher up on the right) under the hill, were making a direct attack on the left of the camp. The Umcityu suffered very severely from both artillery and musketry fire; the Nokenke from musketry fire alone; while the Nodwengu suffered least. When the camp was carried the regiments became all mixed up together; some pursued the fugitives to the Buffalo; the remainder plundered the camp: but the Undi and Udkloko made the best of their way to Rorke's Drift, in order to plunder the post there."

Source:THE STORY OF THE ZULU CAMPAIGN

Impi wrote:

"Thus the original Zulu left became the extreme right, the right the centre, and the centre the left

."

Didn't know that, there original plan of attack had changed. I thought the horns were made up of the young fit men who could run quicker than the older regiments. Yet this states the centre became the left horn. ?

Not heard this before?

"At six a.m. on the 22nd, a company of the Natal Natives was ordered to scout towards the left, the enemy having appeared in that direction. Whilst these were away Durnford arrived, about nine o'clock, with a rocket battery under Colonel Russell, R.A., 250 mounted natives, and 250 native foot. News was now brought in that the Zulus in very large numbers were driving the pickets before them. A later messenger—a native without uniform, supposed by some to be a Zulu purposely sent with false intelligence—brought the news that the Zulus had divided into three columns, one of which it was supposed was about to attack Colonel Durnford's baggage, still on the road from Rorke's Drift, the other to harass Lord Chelmsford and Colonel Glyn's party in their rear, whilst the third was to hover round and watch the camp. Finally came the news "Zulus retiring in all directions." Colonel Durnford thereupon asked Colonel Pulleine to lend him a couple of the 24th companies, but he declined, saying his orders were to guard the camp, and he could not, under the circumstances, let them go without a positive command. Durnford then determined to go on with his own force, which he divided into three, one part being sent up the hill to the left (east), one to the left front, and the third to the rear, in the direction of Rorke's Drift, to act as an escort for the baggage not yet arrived. The rocket battery was of the party that proceeded to the front under Colonel Durnford in person, to a distance of four or five miles from the camp, but being unable to keep pace with the mounted force was soon left behind."

I wonder who the "Some" were? Trouble is, we will never know, what tales the survivors told around camp fires. We do know that many claimed to have been at Isandlwana, based on the tails told by those who were there!

Impi who was the author of the book, your taking your information from?

I would say it wasn't primary evidence. Just text to fill a space on a page! Could be wrong!

The book was written by Ashe from the Diary of Wyatt-Edgell.
So its an interesting read in that it picks up the stories that were being spread through the troops, but its heresay not first hand, hence the amount of mistakes.

Cheers

Hi springy.

This is a BIG problem with these types of books, and an even BIGGER problem is that many readers of these 'hearsay' and 'tall tale' type books believe what they read and then quote it as fact.

It is down to books like these that a lot of mistakes are made by people who believe it to be true, hence the arguments that arise about Col Durnford, Chelmsford's orders, etc, because some people keep on believing all the hearsay, tall tales, soldiers stories, camp gossip and other rubbish written in books like these. These books are full of mistakes and unwarrented quotes, they are full of supposition, false beliefs and hearsay. It's about time that these sort of books were withdrawn, put in a pile and burned, then maybe people would read factual books rather than rubbish books and this would help them to understand events better.

Mr M. Cooper wrote:

It's about time that these sort of books were withdrawn, put in a pile and burned, then maybe people would read factual books rather than rubbish books and this would help them to understand events better.

I respectfully disagree.  This sort of book is valuable for exactly the reason Springbok states -- they provide a window on the tenor of the times. You can't know how virulent the hogwash was without having the evidence. There is no excuse for burning books.  The fault is in a reader and the solution is to encourage them to read a wider selection.  Censorship is not the way to go -- especially not such an extreme version. Have some faith in human nature.  Those who WANT to sort things out, eventually will.  Those who don't...well you can't educate people against their will.

Martin wrote:

Mr M. Cooper wrote:It's about time that these sort of books were withdrawn, put in a pile and burned, then maybe people would read factual books rather than rubbish books and this would help them to understand events better.

That's outrageous

Sorry Martin
Cant go with you on that. Morris is fraught with errors but his was the first work that really inspired todays research.
And as I said this book does show what the troops were listening to and believing.

  

i have a lot of sympathy with
Martins view! (not the withdrawing, burning, ect, thats a
tad harsh! ) but i understand the gist of his point..now,
i'm a book collector, i just happen to collect book's mainly
concerning the AZW. so trust me when i say i buy any
book that comes on the market..safe to say i have scores
of the modern publications, from morris on there was a
definite trend to popularise this brutal little conflict, and it
seems that would be authors were cueing up to inflict there
input on the serious Zulu war fraternity.so as ive said i buy
everything that comes out. my point! i can count on
the fingers on one hand the authors i could honestly re-
comend, inc some so called ' big names '. i'm used to speed
reading these offering's, mentally correcting as i go..   

Sorry Martin , I tend to agree with the others , those books do serve a purpose , as 6pdr states, it's worth reading what the thoughts of these people were during and after the conflict , the only way to find the facts is read all the evidence etc ete
and see what is factual and what wasn't ! .
Cheers 90th   

Ummm, Yes you are right chaps.

I may have been a bit harsh saying to burn them.   

But many would be authors jumped on the AZW bandwagon and just copied other work and accepted the version of events that LC and his cronies wanted them to accept rather than do their own researching. They just seem to follow suit and jump to the wrong conclusions without doing any thorough research. The problem is that there were too many 'authors' and too many books that just followed the trend, and when some folk read them today they tend to think that because there are a lot of books all more or less saying the same thing, then that must be right, but if they would only read the more reliable books they would understand the AZW a lot better than some of them appear to do

You are right, it's the reader that is at fault, they need a better understanding so that they can sort out the truth from the hearsay and other rubbish.

    

That would be the modern day authors. That said, the facilities today for researching were not available back then!

Mr M. Cooper wrote:

Hi springy.

This is a BIG problem with these types of books, and an even BIGGER problem is that many readers of these 'hearsay' and 'tall tale' type books believe what they read and then quote it as fact.

It is down to books like these that a lot of mistakes are made by people who believe it to be true, hence the arguments that arise about Col Durnford, Chelmsford's orders, etc, because some people keep on believing all the hearsay, tall tales, soldiers stories, camp gossip and other rubbish written in books like these. These books are full of mistakes and unwarrented quotes, they are full of supposition, false beliefs and hearsay. It's about time that these sort of books were withdrawn, put in a pile and burned, then maybe people would read factual books rather than rubbish books and this would help them to understand events better.

Martin, if your referring to the " Colenso " Books I would totally agree!   

You were overdue for that one CTSG. What's been keeping you?

Why!!   Of course!