A LOST LEGIONARY IN SOUTH AFRICA. Captain Church

"After a time Captain Develin rode up to me. " Well," said I, " who did you see? " " I first saw Major Black with the second 24th and repeated your message he at once turned back. Then I saw Colonel Harness with the guns he at once turned back. Then I saw the mounted men, and they turned back." " Well," said I, " where are they? " " Why, sir," he replied, " as we were marching back we met the staff and the troops were ordered to go back again, so I came on alone." Why had this been done? Those who want to know had better get the book Miss Colenso wrote in defence of Colonel Durnford, and if they study the
evidences recapitulated in that book, especially that of Captain Church, they may find out. I am only writing of what I actually saw myself, and have no wish to throw mud at anyone".

I have read the passage regarding Captain Church, in Colenso's book but can't get to grips with what Browne's getting at? He is obviously pointing the reader to something, perhaps someone could help!

Hiya Ray63, i have alluded to it before. in my opinion.
you would not have got Chelmsford back their unless you
dragged him back kicking and screaming..think about it! he
had gone out to support Dartnell and hopefully engage the
enemy, he made it clear that he was afraid the enemy would
not close in battle! so he was in his words ready to confront
whatever he came across, but as we know he came across
no force of any significance! we know how he spent the following
day chasing shadows up hill and dale, so what if he had been
confronted by the main Zulu army? WHERE WAS THE AMMO!!!!
he left instructions that the ammo would follow if needed! so
if it was needed how long would it take to bring it from the
camp at Isandhlwana! even at full speed ahead..how long? so
if the camp under full attack was wiped out in two hours..how
long would it have took to do the same to LC's command! yes
look what you posted, you know what your really asking, but
you just would'nt say it! fair enough..and if anybody raises the
point that i'm besmirching a dead generals reputation and honour,
dont bother!. just scroll down and dont reply..inconvenient
truths have the habit of being just that!.

I blame Major Gösset (aide-de-camp)!

Hiya John. interesting, he and ' Fred ' were bosom
buddy's, he went through his papers after his death
in 1905, the result can be seen in French's book
many years later..air brushed to death!

I think this is from "Colenso's " book.

"The senior officer who fell at Isandhlwana—with having disobeyed his orders, and so caused the disaster. This attack was followed up by Lord Chelmsford in a letter in the Times of August 25th; and in a speech (House ofLords) on the 2nd of September.The statements made by Lord Chelmsford, on which he bases his charge, are full of misrepresentation, and are largely contradicted by proved facts. The main features of the case, viz., the circumstances to and sur-rounding the situation at Isandlwana, are ignored ; and he thus strives to limit the question, as he had at the Court of Inquiry, to the actions of the camp defenders.The most cursory inquiry proves that there is not the slightest foundation for the charge Lord Chelmsford has made ; and, further, that the question of " orders " in no manner covers the causes of the disaster.It may suffice here to say that Colonel Durnford was the commanding officer of No. 2, a distinct Column, and marched into Isandlwana camp at or soon after 10.30 A.M.,finding there no further knowledge of the enemy's move-ments than that reported to Lord Chelmsford, and received by him between 9 and 10 A.M.The strength of the enemy being unknown, small de-tached bodies only having been seen, it was Colonel Durnford's plain duty to reconnoitre, which he did withhis own troops, not interfering with the camp force, who are shown to have been under the distinct orders of Colonel Pulleine.Within one hour and a half of Colonel Durnford's arrival, his and Colonel Pulleine's forces were suddenly attacked by an overwhelming Zulu army, which had been permitted to approach, unseen and unsuspected, through sheer carelessness and negligence of their superior officer.Colonel Durnford had no orders whatever regarding the camp beyond (if it were so) " take command of it." And Colonel Pulleine's orders, if assumed to have been binding on Colonel Durnford, were not departed from. Lord Chelmsford's statements.

Colonel Dumford's previous career may also be called inevidence. His behaviour at the Bushman's Kiver Passproved how unswerving he was in obedience to orders. Before finally leaving the events of the 22nd January,we must fully notice an important episode that occurred,and which had a serious bearing on the disaster we have to lament. We have seen that the guns with an escort " were ordered to retrace their steps .... to join Colonel Glyn at the rendezvous near the Mangane Valley. We will now follow their movements.When Lord Chelmsford discovered that the enemy he had come in search of had disappeared, 4 guns royalArtillery, 2 companies 2-24th Regiment (Captains Churchand Harvey), and about 50 Natal Native Pioneers, the whole under the command of Lieut.-Colonel Harness,RA., were ordered to march to a rendezvous in advance by a different route to that taken by the remainder of the column ; this was necessary, as the guns could not go overthe ground taken by the latter. To carry out the order,they had to retrace for over two miles the route by which they had come in the morning, and then bear to the left.This was done (a short halt having first been made, to let men and horses have a rest), and about twelve o'clock they reached some rising ground, when they again halted, not being certain of the direction of the rendezvous, to await Major Black, 2-24th, Assistant Quartermaster-General,who had gone on to find it. Almost immediately after this halt the firing of cannon was heard, and looking towards the camp, about eight miles off, they saw shells bursting against the hills to the left of it Soon after-wards a body of about 1,000 natives suddenly appeared inthe plain below, between them and the camp ; the Native Pioneers thought they were Zulus. Captain Church told Colonel Harness if he would let him have a horse he would go and find out. Colonel Harness at once gave him one,and sent a mounted sergeant with him. As they galloped towards the natives, a European officer rode out, and when they met said : " The troops behind me are Commandant Browne's contingent, and I am sent to give you this message : ' Come in every man, for Grod's sake ! The campi s surrounded, and wil be taken unless helped at once'Captain Church rode back as fast as he could, and found Colonel Harness in conversation with Major Gösset (aide-de-camp) and Major Black, both of whom had come up during his absence. Colonel Harness promptly said:"We will march back;" but Major Gösset ridiculed the idea, and advised him to carry out his orders. Colonel Harness then asked Major Black and Captain Churcht heir opinions. They both agreed with him without hesitation. Colonel Harness gave the order to return,and started without a moment's delay ; Major Gösset riding off in the direction of the General About 1.30p.m. Lieut.-Colonel Harness was on his way to the camp,and had got over about two miles of ground when hewas overtaken by Major Gösset with orders from the General to march back to the rendezvous. The orderwas obeyed.Now the startling reflection comes home that to thismost important fact, bearing on the events of the day(for even if too late to save life, Colonel Harness wouldhave saved the camp), there is not a hint even in thedespatches of Lord Chelmsford, or the official statementof his military secretary.The latter goes so far as to say, in paragraph 17 of his statement "I am not aware what messages had been sent from the camp and received by Colonel Glyn or his staff;but I know that neither the General nor myself had upto this time received any information but that I have mentioned." This statement refers to a time after the The first official mention of this appears in a Blue-book of August,1879, where Lieutenant Milne, R.M". (aide-de-camp), says : " In the meantime, news came that Colonel Harness had heard the firing, andwas proceeding with his guns and companies of infantry escorting themto camp. Orders were immediately sent to him to return and rejoin Colonel Glyn."

General had arrived at a spot about a mile from where Commandant Browne's battalion of natives were halted,after he had received the message, " Come in, every man,for God's sake," etc., and after he had met Colonel Harnesson his return march to the rendezvous ; and not only that,but apparently after the receipt of a most importantmessage from Lieut-Colonel Pulleine, described as follows by the special correspondent of the Times of Natal(Captain Norris-Newman) : " We did halt there, and found the staff there as well, looking on through the field-glasses at some large bodies of Kafirs [Zulus], who werein close proximity to our camp about ten miles off. The Mounted Police were ordered to halt and off-saddle ; but Captain [T.] Shepstone and his volunteers had orders to proceed back to camp to see what was up. I joined them,and we had not gone far on the road when a mounted messenger came up with a note from Colonel Pulleine tothe General, saying that the camp was attacked by large numbers of Kafirs, and asked him to return with all the help at his command. With this we halted, and awaited the up-coming of the General, who came along at once,and proceeded up the valley to reconnoitre. About three miles had been got over, during which we passed the four guns under Colonel Harness, and some of the 24th ....on their way to encamp at the new ground. A mountedman was then seen approaching, and was recognised as Commandant Lonsdale. He brought the dreadful newsthat, having chased a Zulu on horseback, he got separated from his men, and had ridden quietly back to camp ; but on arrival there, within about three hundred yards of it(at about 2 p.m.), he found large bodies of the enemy surrounding it and fighting with our men. He had just time to discover his mistake, turn, and fly for his life,when several bullets were fired at him, and many Zulusstarted in chase."—Natal Colonist, January 30th, 1879.The above message is undoubtedly that mentioned by Captain Gardner as having been despatched from the camp at or soon after twelve o'clock.

And there still remains the fact that, not only as regards Colonel Harness, does there appear to be an unaccountable omission in the "statement" alluded to,but also we find mention of only one message from the camp; where as other messages are known to have been received, and to have been in the possession of the Assistant Military Secretary."Here also we must allude to Sir Bartle Frere's despatches of January 27th, and February 3rd and 12th.In the first he says : ' In disregard of Lord Chelmsford's instructions, the troops left to protect the camp were taken away from the defensive position they were in at the camp, with the shelter which the waggons, parked,would have afforded. . . ." "We know that the troops did the best they could, left as they were by their General in an open camp — we know they had no"defensive position"—and we know that the waggonswere not " parked " but drawn up in rear of their owncamps.Sir Bartle says, February 3rd: "It is only justice to the General to note that his orders were clearly not obeyed on that terrible day at Isandhlwana camp."And on February 12th, he says : " It is impossible to shut one's eyes to the fact that it was, in all human probability, mainly due to disregard of the General's orders that so great a disaster occurred " (a little qualifying his sweeping assertion of February 3rd).But yet again Sir Bartle returns to the charge, and says,June 30th : " It is difficult to over-estimate the effect ofsuch a disaster as that at Isandlwana on both armies,but it was clearly due to breach of the General's order,and to disregard of well-known maxims of militaryscience." By the General's directions this statement was to be " of the facts¦which came under his cognizance on the day in question."— Further remarks on the messages will be found in the appendix." Lord Chelmsford's statements compared with evidence."

what grounds Sir Bartle Frere bases those assertions we know not—no known orders were disobeyed—and, inspite of the special pleading in these despatches, we must come to the conclusion that Sir Bartle Frere's remarks were penned in utter ignorance of facts, and that theaccusations concerning "disregard of well-known maxims of military science " should have been applied, not to the soldiers who fell at Isandlwana."

As most of us are probably aware , this threads title is the the same as the Hamilton - Browne ( Maori ) book , on his time in South Afica , from memory all this is covered in it , Capt Church , Harness etc etc , and lets not forget the 4 or 5 messages he said he sent off to Chelmesford , all this info is on here , I think I posted it ages ago ? . I dont have the Colenso book so not sure of it's contents . I've also posted Harness's letter on here regarding his movement in his attempt to head back to camp , which was curtailed , when Gossett rode up and told him to turn back , as Chelmesford had ordered him to do so .
John
A couple of years ago I remember posting that there are many people to blame for the Isandlwana disaster , and yes , I tend to agree , Gossett is possibly one of them ! , then again , in his defence , he is only following orders , from of course , the good Lord Chelmesford ! . For what its worth , if LC had decided to act and return later after the battle had commenced , I doubt the result would be any different , just a lot more casualties on the British side , and off course a very limited relief to arrive at RD , if any survived to arrive there at all !. Dont forget that many of the troops had little ammunition remaining ! , that was also one of the reasons they let the zulu army pass them after RD , when they ( LC's Column ) were heading to RD on the morning of the 23rd .
90th

Dear Lady Chelmsford " 7 June 1906
I am sending off the two boxes with the paper's
tomorrow and also the keys.
i enclose a statement of the manner in which i have arranged the
papers and i hope it will be satisfactory to yourself and Fred.
i am writing to him by this mail enclosing a copy of the statement
and i would suggest that your copy should be put in one of the boxes
when read. i have read every letter and telegram and annotated most
of them. in some cases i have given additional information from my own
knowledge and journals. i need not say it has been a pleasure though
a painful one,to read records of that time, but the perusal of them
have further raised Lord Chelmsford in my estimation. his foresight, his
consideration for everyone under his command, and his zeal for public
service, and the brave front he opposed to calumny and misrepresent-
ation all show what a great and good man he was. i hope some day,
when the principal actors in those days are gone, that justice will be
done to his memory.
yours very sincerely
Matt Gosset


In my last few threads i have said some very controversial things..these
are my own private opinions, expressed publicly, i do not expect anyone
to directly respond to them! i know through experience that this will not be
the case..which is fine, but to all who seriously study this AZW please
consider all the information you receive over the coming year's..as for
my last few ' freds ' they will of course die a natural death.   

Les
One of my biggest issues over the years is exctly what you have written, IF Chelmsford had thoughts he was going to engage the main impi then why so little ammunition, why split his forces over the whole Mangeni area, why didn't he send back a senior officer to confirm the situation at the camp. Unanswerable questions.
I can see where you allusions are taking you and sorry mate cant go with it being a deliberate ploy to abandon the camp to its fate. I do believe however he made some horrendous decisions the three mention above being just a few. He thought he was still fighting the men from the Eastern Cape, a vastly different proposition. It was really only after loosing so many men that he saw sense and changed his methods.

Cheers

Perhaps Gosset, could see returning to the camp, would only achieve getting them all killed. Which of course it would have. The 1st mistake had been made, why make another one?

Les
One of my biggest issues over the years is exactly what you have written,......not aimed at you Frank.

So what am i? a loose cannon! opinionated! intolerant! sarcastic! overbearing!
so what am i! knowledgeable, perceptive! concise! kind! Witty! ( very dark humour )

I guess i'm a mixture of all those thing's..a sheep i am not, if i was blessed with a
tolerable brain and the ability to use it, i reason and then make assertions and even
assumptions! ( i know historians would shudder at that. ) i have been studying this
war for a very long time..i am composing this reply as thoughts enter my head, i'm
not looking at books or the internet, now when ray63 asked for help above after
setting down his thoughts and concerns, i thought to myself..no chance mate! if
you get any, you will only get stock, tried and regurgitated replies, so me being me!
i had a rush of blood to the head and told him my perceived truth! portions of which
to my mind are! Why did LC not take his ammunition with him! i say again, Darnell sent
two messages asking for assistance, the second one so decided his lordship that he
split his command..BEFORE KNOWING THE DISPOSITIONS OF THE ENEMY!! when he got
to the bivouac, aside from the stated night alarms all was quite on that frontage! so
his lordship decides to split his forces again! this time chasing shadows, while the thought
struck him that he would push on to a suitable location for the next camp! Now amongst
all this LC had been acquainted through his spies ( intel ) that the zulu had left Ondini
a few days earlier and would be around his vicinity anytime! again! why? did he not take
the ammunition if apon arriving at Dartnell's position he might (expect ) the whole Zulu
army to be apon him? why? when he received that message from Pulleine..08.05, received
by HP at 09.30, did he say.." there was nothing to be done by that"!. why did he recall
those officers who were most anxious to push on and assist their comrades at Isandhlwana!.
that's just a bit of it...before we even get to the court of enquiry, chelmsford had to wait
around till all the men could be assembled from their various goose chases, before he could
march them back to the camp, skulking past the victorious Zulu army with not enough rounds
to engage them!


One of my biggest issues over the years is exactly what you have written...is that so!
so c'mon, anybody care to give me some answers that will stand up! i have no vested
interests in this subject, i have not sought to make a penny from it, that will come when
i pass, and my meagre offerings are disposed of! i am not casting aspersions on anyone,
if people can make a bean from their knowledge, well good for them! i ask the questions
that nobody else dares to...nobody has to answer just ignore me that's fine! you started
this ray63 god bless you    just one more point Cambridge hammered Chelmsford he
really was not satisfied and as for beaconsfield ( Dizzy ) he would not receive him at his
own house!.

Ammunition/ screwdriver's,our friend Methlakazulu ( contemporary spelling ) says..
We ransacked the camp and took away everything that we could take; we broke
up the ammunition boxes and took out all the cartridges... nuff said!.

Hi SAS
I don't think Gosset had the intel to make an informed decision. Or the will to find out more.
Cheers Mate

Hi Les
Sorry posts crossed.
As I said above, I fully agree that Chelmsford took insufficient ammo, IF he was certain that he was about to face the full impi. There again possibly that was the only occasion that he expected the 1/24th command to make that decision? ( A touch of sarcasm )   
"So what am i? a loose cannon! opinionated! intolerant! sarcastic! overbearing!
so what am i! knowledgeable, perceptive! concise! kind! Witty! ( very dark humour ) Yes     

"so c'mon, anybody care to give me some answers that will stand up! i have no vested
interests in this subject, " Look back on the original 'Durnford was he capable thread' I argued these self same points for something like 70 pages. Its all there.

Frank! you totally disarm me with your good humour!   

I don't think there's any doubt that Chelmsford left with insufficient ammunition if he was expecting a dust up on the scale of Isandlwana. To simply castigate him without asking additional questions seems a waste of time to me however.

We know it was difficult to move the heavy ox drawn wagons over the traders' road. Ammunition wagons are heavier still and would have been that much more a challenge. Add to that the way to the area of the Mangeni Falls would have been more rugged. Add to that they were trying to travel there mostly during darkness. My theory is that Chelmsford fully intended to bring the wagon he ordered packed and then somebody impressed upon him the folly of it. Yet he went anyway.

I would ask, "What did Chelmsford really anticipate encountering?" Maybe he thought he would encounter the main impi or maybe not. If he did anticipate it actually being there then was he simply underestimating its potential size? The same issues pertain to the battery he brought along because it could not keep the pace either.

I have read that Chelmsford was rushing to arrive because he believed he could set up an ambush for the attack he expected the Zulu to mount against Lonsdale & company at sunrise. If that is the case he clearly was not anticipating anything on the order of 20,000 men.

To my mind the most likely explanation was simple ignorance. As human beings we all make assumptions. Chelmsford underestimated the fighting power of the Zulu based on his prior experience in South Africa. He ASSUMED that one foe would behave pretty much like another...and therefore he was under no threat of serious attack. This was not irrational. In crushing the Gealeka and Griqua amaXhosa as well as the Pedi in 1877 and 1878 the British Army had encountered nothing like what was about to engulf it.

Chelmsford probably thought he had to hurry and engage before the impi got away, or worse, slipped over the border into Natal. In fact, I bet he conceived the main danger to him was political -- that he be found insufficiently aggressive by men like Shepstone and Frere -- rather than military.

I don't think there's any doubt that Chelmsford left with insufficient ammunition if he was expecting a dust up on the scale of Isandlwana. To simply castigate him without asking additional questions seems a waste of time to me however.

We know it was difficult to move the heavy ox drawn wagons over the traders' road. Ammunition wagons are heavier still and would have been that much more a challenge. Add to that the way to the area of the Mangeni Falls would have been more rugged. Add to that they were trying to travel there mostly during darkness. My theory is that Chelmsford fully intended to bring the wagon he ordered packed and then somebody impressed upon him the folly of it. Yet he went anyway.

I would ask, "What did Chelmsford really anticipate encountering?" Maybe he thought he would encounter the main impi or maybe not. If he did anticipate it actually being there then was he simply underestimating its potential size? The same issues pertain to the battery he brought along because it could not keep the pace either.

I have read that Chelmsford was rushing to arrive because he believed he could set up an ambush for the attack he expected the Zulu to mount against Lonsdale & company at sunrise. If that is the case he clearly was not anticipating anything on the order of 20,000 men.

To my mind the most likely explanation was simple ignorance. As human beings we all make assumptions. Chelmsford underestimated the fighting power of the Zulu based on his prior experience in South Africa. He ASSUMED that one foe would behave pretty much like another...and therefore he was under no threat of serious attack. This was not irrational. In crushing the Gealeka and Griqua amaXhosa as well as the Pedi in 1877 and 1878 the British Army had encountered nothing like what was about to engulf it.

Chelmsford probably thought he had to hurry and engage before the impi got away, or worse, slipped over the border into Natal. In fact, I bet he conceived the main danger to him was political -- that he be found insufficiently aggressive by men like Shepstone and Frere -- rather than military.
     

Hi All
For what it's worth , LC has been quoted in History firmly believing his main obstacle to finishing the zulu as a threat , may be his inability to bring on a confrontation with the Zulu Army , LC was also quoted in History as stating that once the Zulu have faced the Martini Rifle , he doubts they will do so again !. Complacency , Arrogance , Overconfidence call it what you like , it was one of the main reasons the Camp was lost . He wasnt fighting a race like those from the Eastern Cape who dealt with hit and run tactics . He learnt the hard way   
90th   

"Complacency , Arrogance , Overconfidence call it what you like ,"

All of the above plus a teaspoon of sheer carelessness.= Recipe for disaster. ( Damn I love being dramatic at times )

  

Yes and that explanation passes the smell test or if you apply Occam's Razor.