Durnford was he capable. 3

there is little evidence that Chelmsford was a part of the conspiracy other than ‘simply grasped the proffered lifeline’...said littlehand...thats a conspiracy!

Martin wrote:

Come on mate, you have been in the mob, you have to have a certain amount of self confidence, and you know as well as I do that you have to be prepared to take responsibility if or when the time comes, ie; if officers and nco's are down, someone has to be prepared to take responsibility and try to get the lads out of a fix. So I don't see your point when you say you think he had a "I know better than you" attitude, however, I think that it showed that he did have a confident manner, and maybe that is why Captain Hay said that "every man was prepared to follow him".

Martin unfortunately Springbok is a serious contender when it come to the Battle of Isandlwana. So "come on mate" won't cut it. You ideas of what possibly happened and how Durnford interpreted the order is all in your mind. You make it fit to your way of thinking. Springbok is well beyond that, infact I think it's insulting to think Springbok will change his mind, because he was in the mob. Read the thread about his trip, we nearly lost him on that trip, so either speak for you self and debate your case, or as I have said before stick to Zulu Hart!

Les before you respond on behalf of Martin. Not interested?

Hi LH.

Please take a look at the book 'Zulu Victory' by Lock and Quantrill.

I haven't got my copy available at the moment, so can't give you the page number, sorry mate.

But, look near the back end of the book for the chapter on the cover up. There is a very eye opening piece in there that describes Chelmsford and Crealock taking a 'private' coach ride, in which they discuss the 'rigging' of the enquiry. They choose the officers to oversee the enquiry, and they plan certain aspects of it all, it is very interesting, and it will give you a good idea of the lengths they went to in the effort to blame Durnford and clear Chelmsford, so, it most definitely was a conspiricy.

Cheers.

no i respond because you used my name, not interesting?.

impi.

I have a cat that has more intelligence than you, get back in your play pen, there's a good boy.

Tomorrow you can watch the teletubbies if you are a good little lad.

Mr M. Cooper wrote:

Hi LH.

Please take a look at the book 'Zulu Victory' by Lock and Quantrill.

I haven't got my copy available at the moment, so can't give you the page number, sorry mate.

But, look near the back end of the book for the chapter on the cover up. There is a very eye opening piece in there that describes Chelmsford and Crealock taking a 'private' coach ride, in which they discuss the 'rigging' of the enquiry. They choose the officers to oversee the enquiry, and they plan certain aspects of it all, it is very interesting, and it will give you a good idea of the lengths they went to in the effort to blame Durnford and clear Chelmsford, so, it most definitely was a conspiricy.

Cheers.

I know about the carriage trip. Done some on that on another thread.

To be honest, I'm beyond Durnford and Chelmsford. For me it was Crealock that instigated the start of what is being debated here. Unfortunately LC got dragged into it hook line and sinker, to the point where only lies would suffice. But I'm happy to watch the debate continue.!

Hi LH.

I understand mate.   

Martin, take a look at Crealock's part. Start with his state at the COE. By the way, there's no need to read between the lines. He uses his wording well!

"1. Statement of Lieutenant-Colonel J. North Crealock, Acting Military Secretary.

1. Soon after 2 A.M. on the 22nd January I received instructions from the Lieutenant-General to send a written order to Lieutenant-Colonel Durnford, R.E., commanding No. 2 Column, to the following effect (I copied it in my note-book which was afterwards lost): " Move up to Sandhlwana Camp at once with all your mounted men and Rocket Battery—take command of it. I am accompanying Colonel Glyn, who is moving off at once to attack Matyana and a Zulu force
said to be 12 or 14 miles off, and at present watched by Natal Police, Volunteers, and Natal Native Contingent. Colonel Glyn takes with him 2-24th Regiment, 4 guns R.A., and Mounted  Infantry."
2. I was. not present during the conversation between Major Clery, Staff Officer to Colonel Glyn, and the Lieutenant-General, but the evening before, about 8.30 P.M., on this officer asking the Lieutenant-General if the 1-24th " Were to reinforce Major Dartnell in the Magane Valley," he said " No."  The General received, I believe through Colonel Glyn, a subsequent representation which caused the fresh orders at 2 A.M. the 22nd, and the orders to Lieutenant-Colonel Durnford.
3. Lieutenant-Colonel Durnford, R.E., was not under Colonel Glyn's command at this time; he had been moved from his original position before Middle Drift, with some 250 Mounted Natives, 200 of Sikalis footmen, the Rocket Battery, and one battalion of the 1st Regiment Natal Native Contingent to the Umsinga District, on the Lieutenant-General's seeing the ease with which the Natal frontier could be passed in that part of the Buffalo River. The Lieutenant-General's order was therefore sent to him by me, being the only Head Quarter Staff Officer (except the Aide-de-Camps) with him. These details formed part of No. 2 Column under his command.
4. I sent the orders to him by Lieutenant Smith-Dorrien, of 95th Foot, with directions to leave as soon as he could see his way. I expected him to find Colonel Durnford at the Bashee Valley; it was delivered and acted upon.
5. Although I was not aware at that time of the Lieutenant-General's grounds for ordering the troops from camp, yet it was evident to me that he wished to close up to the camp all outlying troops, and thus strengthen it. He would naturally also consider that the presence of an officer of Colonel Durnford's rank and corps would prove of value in the defence of a camp, if it should be attacked.
6. The Lieutenant-General had himself noticed mounted men in one direction (our left front) on the 21st. A patrol of the Mounted Infantry had found another small body of the enemy in our front, and Major Dartnell, we knew, had a strong force before him on our right front. It was evident to me that the Zulu forces were in our neighbourhood, and the General had decided, on the evening of the 21st, to make a reconnaissance to our left front.
7. It did not occur to me that the troops left in camp were insufficient for its defence. Six Companies British Infantry, 2 guns, 4 Companies Natal Contingent, 250 Mounted Natives, 200 Sikalis men, and details of Mounted Corps appeared to me—had I been asked—a proper force for the defence of the camp and its stores.
8. I subsequently heard Major Clery state that the had left precise instructions to Lieutenant-Lionel Pulleine "to defend the camp." Such instructions would, I consider, as a matter of course, be binding on Colonel Durnford on his assuming command of the camp.
9. The first intimation that reached me on the 22nd of there being a force of Zulus in the neighbourhood of the camp was between 9.30 and 10 A.M. We were then off-saddled on neck facing the Isipise range, distant some 2 miles from camp. During  the three previous hours we had been advancing with Colonel Glyn's Column against a Zulu force that fell back from hill to hill as we advanced, giving up without a shot most commanding positions. Major Clery at this time received a half sheet of foolscap with a message from Lieutenant-Colonel Pulleine informing him (I think it ran) that a Zulu force had appeared on the hills on his left front. Our own attention was chiefly bent on he enemy's force retiring from the hills in our front, and a party being pursued by Lieutenant Colonel Russell three miles off. This letter was not addressed to me, and I did not note on it the time of receipt, but one I received from Colonel Russell soon after is noted by me (I think, for it is at Pietermaritzburg) as received at 10.20.
10. Lieutenant Milne, R.N., A.D.C., shortly after this descended a hill on our left, whence he had been on the look-out with a telescope. All the news he gave regarding the camp was that the cattle had been driven into camp. I believe this to have been nearly 11 A.M.
11. In the meantime information reached the General that the right of our force was smartly engaged with the enemy's left. Two companies of 2-24th and the 2nd Battalion of the Natal Native Contingent climbed the hill to our right, and, striking across the flat hill, joined the Volunteers who were still engaged. Colonel
Glyn accompanied them, having first ordered back the four guns and two Companies 2-24th to the wagon track, with instructions to join him near the Mangane Valley. He had also sent back instructions by Captain Alan Gardner, 14th Hussars, to Lieutenant-Colonel Pulleine. I was not informed of their nature. I took the opportunity of ordering our own small camp to proceed and join us, as the General intended to move camp up to the Mangane Valley, as soon as arrangements could be made.
12. The 1st Battalion Natal Native Contingent had been ordered back to camp, and to skirmish through the ravines in case any Zulus were hanging about near the camp.
13. Not a sign of the enemy was now seen near us, and followed by the remaining two Companies 2-24th, we climbed the hill and followed the track taken by the others. Not a suspicion had crossed my mind that the camp was in any danger, neither did anything occur to make me think of such a thing until about 1.15, when Honourable Mr. Drummond said he fancied he had heard (and that natives were certain of it) two cannon shots. We were then moving back to choose a camp for the night, about 12 miles distant from Isandhlana. About 1.45 PM., however, a native appeared on a hill above us, gesticulating and calling. He reported that heavy firing had been going on round the camp. We galloped up to a high spot, whence we could see the camp, perhaps 10 or 11 miles distant. None of us could detect anything amiss; all looked quiet. This must have been 2 P.M.
14. The General, however, probably thought it would be well to ascertain what had happened himself, but not thinking anything was wrong, ordered Colonel Glyn to bivouac for the night where we stood; and taking with him some forty Mounted Volunteers proceeded to ride into camp.
15. Lieutenant-Colonel Cecil Russell, 12th Lancers, now joined us, and informed me that an officer of the Natal Native Contingent had come to him (about 12 noon, I think) when he was off-saddled, and asked where the General was, as he had instructions to tell him that heavy firing had been going on close to the camp. Our whereabouts was not exactly known, but the 2-24th Companies were still in sight, and Colonel Russell pointed them out, and said we were probably not far from them. This officer, however, did not come to us.
16. This information from Colonel Russell was immediately followed by a message from Commandant Brown, commanding the 1st Battalion Natal Native Contingent, which had been ordered back to camp at 9.30 A.M.—(the Battalion was halted a mile from us, and probably eight miles from camp)—to the effect that large bodies of Zulus were between him and the camp, and that his men could not advance without support. The General ordered an immediate advance of the Battalion, the Mounted Volunteers and Mounted Infantry supporting it.
17. I am not aware what messages had been sent from the camp and received by Colonel Glyn, or his Staff; but I know that neither the General nor myself had up to this time received any information but that I have mentioned.
18. At 3.15 the Lieutenant-General appeared to think that he would be able to brush through any parties of Zulus that might be in his road to the camp without any force further than that referred to, viz.:—1st Battalion Native Contingent and some 80 mounted white men.
19. At 4 P.M., however, the Native Battalion again halted, and I galloped on to order the advance to be resumed, when I met Commandant Lonsdale, who remarked to me as I accosted him, "The Zulus have the camp." "How do you know?" I asked, incredulously. " Because I have been into it," was his answer.
20. The truth was now known, and every one drew his own conclusions; mine were unluckily true, that hardly a man could have escaped. With such an enemy and with only foot soldiers it appeared to me very improbable that our force could have given up the camp until they were surrounded.
21. The General at once sent back Major Gossett, A.D.C., 54th Regiment, to order Colonel Glyn to advance at once with everyone with him. He must have been five or six miles off. It was now 4 P.M. We advanced another two miles, perhaps. The 1st Battalion, 2 Regiment, Natal Native Contingent, deployed in three ranks, the first being formed of the white men and those natives who had firearms, the Mounted Volunteers and Mounted Infantry on the flanks, with,
scouts to the front.
22. About a quarter to five we halted at a distance, I should think, of two miles from camp, but. two ridges lay between us and the camp, and with our glasses we could only observe those returning the way they had come. Colonel Russell went to the front to reconnoitre, and returned about 5.45 with a report that "All was as bad as it could be;" that the Zulus were holding the camp. He estimated the number at 7,000.
23. The troops with Colonel Glyn had pushed on with all possible speed, though the time seemed, long to us as we lay and watched the" sun sinking. At 6 P.M. they arrived, and, having been formed into fighting order, were addressed by the General. We then advanced to strike the camp and attack any one we found in our path back to Rorke's Drift.
24. I consider it but just to the Natal Native Contingent to state that it was my belief that evening, and is still the same, that the two Battalions would have gone through any enemy we met, even as our own British troops were prepared to do. I noticed no signs of wavering on their part up to sunset, when I ceased to be
able to observe them.
(Signed) J. N. CREALOCK,
Lieutenant-Colonel, A- Mil. Sec.

 

Now read Clery's statement. This I believe was the Order that should have been sent to Durnford, however, Clery states that general told Crealock to send it ?

"   1st Witness.— Major Clery states: I am Senior Staff Officer to the 3rd Column, commanded by Colonel Glyn, C.B., operating against the Zulus. The General commanding accompanied this Column from the time it crossed the border into Zululand.
   On the 20th January, 1879, at the Camp, Isandlwana, Zululand, the Lieutenant-General commanding gave orders to Commandant Lonsdale and Major Dartnell to go out the following morning in a certain direction from the camp with their men, i.e., the Native Contingent, and the Police, and Volunteers, part of the 3rd Column. On the evening of the following day (the 21st) a message arrived from Major Dartnell that the enemy was in considerable force in his neighbourhood, and that he and Commandant Lonsdale would bivouac out that night. About 1.30 A.M., on the 22nd, a messenger brought me a note from Major Dartnell, to say that the enemy was in greater numbers than when he last reported, and that he did not think it prudent to attack them unless reinforced by two or three companies of the 24th Regiment. I took this note to Colonel Glyn, C.B., at once, he ordered me to take it on to the General. The General ordered the 2nd Battalion 24th Regiment, the Mounted Infantry, and four guns, to be under arms at once to march. This force marched out from camp as soon as there was light enough to see the road. The Natal Pioneers accompanied this column to clear the road. The General first ordered me to write to Colonel Durnford, at Rorke's Drift, to bring his force to strengthen the camp, but almost immediately afterwards he told Colonel Crealock that he (Colonel Crealock) was to write to Colonel Durnford these instructions, and not I. Before leaving the camp, I sent written instructions to Colonel Pulleine, 24th Regiment, to the following effect:—" You will be in command of the camp during the absence of Colonel Glyn; draw in (I speak- from memory) your camp, or your line of defence"—I am not certain which-"while the force is out: also draw in the line of your infantry outposts accordingly; but keep your cavalry vedettes still far advanced." I told him to have a wagon ready loaded with ammunition ready to follow the force going out at a moment's notice, if required. I went to Colonel Pulleine's tent just before leaving camp to ascertain that he had got these instructions, and I again repeated them verbally to him. To the best of my memory, I mentioned in the written instructions to Colonel Pulleine that Colonel Durnford had been written to to bring up his force to strengthen the camp. I saw the column out of camp and accompanied it."

Thank's LH.

Notice he says that ("I copied in my note book which was afterwards lost"),   

Hummm, "how very convenient", is what I would say.

We all know that Crealock was a proven liar, so his statement can be ruled out, but reading through it does show what sort of lengths he went to in the effort to cover his own and Chelmsford's backsides.

Thanks for posting that LH, very interesting.   

In a nutshell if Durnford had received the order that Clery mentions "strengthen the camp," he would have know, what was required of him, and possibly on arrival, fortified the position, and acted differently.
However the order he did received was open ended. But I don't think LC knew at the time what Crealock had sent, but it wasn't what he requested to be sent if that makes sense!

We know the loss of his notebook to be true, but it was discovered, and it didn't say take command!

very Hmm indeed, more from me later today!

Martin sorry forgot to add. Let me know your thoughts on the highlighted! I kind of get the feeling LC is saying you,made the mess, you clean it up? Could be wrong!

"War Office, March 15,1879.
   THE following Despatch has been received by the Secretary of State for War from Lieutenant-General Lord Chelmsford, K.C.B., Commanding the Forces in South Africa:—

From the Lieutenant-General Commanding in South Africa to the Right Honourable the Secretary of State for War.
Durban, Natal, February 8, 1879.
SIR,
   I HAVE the honour to forward herewith the proceedings of the Court of Inquiry held to take evidence regarding the disastrous affair of Isandlwana.
The Court has very properly abstained from giving an opinion, and I myself refrain also from making any observation or from drawing any conclusions from the evidence therein recorded.
   I regret very much that more evidence has not been taken, and I have given instructions that all those who escaped, and who are able to throw any light whatever upon the occurrences of the day, should be at once called upon for a statement of what they saw.
   I deem it better, however, not to delay the transmission of the proceedings, which will no doubt be awaited with anxiety.
   I have directed my Military Secretary, Lieutenant-Colonel Crealock, to append a statement of the facts which came under his cognisance on the day in question, which may possibly serve to throw some additional light on what, I fear, will still be considered very obscure.
   It will, I fear, be impossible to furnish an absolutely correct list of all those who perished on the 22nd January, as every record connected
with the several corps belonging to No. 3 Column has been lost.
   Colonel Glyn is doing his best to furnish what is required.
   Since writing the above the printed list of killed and wounded has reached me, several copies of which I beg to enclose.
I have, &c., (Signed) CHELMSFORD, Lieutenant-General."

Sorry LH, posts crossed.

Yes, Clery was only a Major, he couldn't issue orders to a Colonel, and when you think about it neither could Crealock, he was a Lt Colonel (a lower rank than a Colonel).

Clery took it upon himself to write instructions to Pulleine, again, he shouldn't have done this, he was a lower rank than Pulleine.

When you think about it all, Chelmsford should have made absolutely sure that what he wished both Pulleine and Durnford to do was written out cleary in the orders, but he was that eager to get out of the camp and confront the zulu's that he failed to do this, and as a result he was responsible for all the confusion which ended with the loss of the camp. Then comes the realisation that he will be held responsible for this, so, like you say, Crealock devises a plan, but however, Chelmsford also goes along with it. So between them, they conspired and concocted a cover up, and scapegoated Dunford for the loss at iSandlwana.

Again LH, thanks for posting this, another interesting read.   

I think your missing the point, read it tomorow, I think we are all tired!   

Yes LH, I see what you mean. It does appear that he realises that he's sort of 'dropped a clanger'.

I'm certain that there is more than meets the eye with all this, and also that many people back home realised that something stunk (or should I say, was not quite right) with what was being said at the time, even the Duke of Cambridge was not convinced by the whole affair, in fact he was the one that made the list of questions regarding what had happened.

Cheers mate.   

Martin wrote:

Yes, Clery was only a Major, he couldn't issue orders to a Colonel,

Clery says. The General first ordered me to write to Colonel Durnford,
Although a Major, he was following orders.

Here's a thought. Did Crealock lose his note, to hide the truth from LC. As far as LC was concerned he wanted Durnford to Strenthen the camp. As seen by Clery's statement.

24th.

He might well have been following Chelmsford's orders, but they both were not following military protocol.

No, I doubt it.

If Chelmsford had wanted Durnford to reinforce or strengthen the camp, that would have put Durnford in command with being the senior officer, however, Chelmsford sent a message back to the camp addressed to Pulleine not Durnford, this shows that Pulleine was in command of the camp.

LittleHand
Your spot on in targeting Crealock. There is a key period from the night of the 22nd that I have no doubt serious discussions would have been held with the WHOLE Chelmsford staff, Gosset included ( and whatever you do never write him out of the equation.). On the 23rd Clery, and Im sure it was to try and protect Glyn not Chelmsford, dropped the life line. From there various survivors were interviewed including Essex, whos story was to change afterwards. And then some quiet time on that most uncomfortable and slow drive back to PMB.
Martin
Will reply at length a little later but for the time being it was possibly just fortuitous that Crealocks diary was lost, and it really bad luck that it was found later.The series of events that lead to the message being sent to Durnford: Clery had delivered the message from Dartnel and was in the tebt discussing and being given orders in his position as ADC to Glyn. At some point in that discussion about who would join his foray Durnfords name cropped up and Chelmsford instructed Clery to tell him to bring his column to the camp ( In Clery's words to strengthen the camp. Crealock listening in from the tent next door quite rightly pointed out that Clery should not address an instructoion to COLUMN COMMANDER, note not a Colonel. Chelmsford agreed and assuming that Crealock had heard the full interchange said "no let you do it." And Crealock sent of what he had heard, wrongly.
So Littlehand has put his digit well and truly on the point. Crealock was in the centre of the web. He was a nasty piece of work and very disliked, but it would appear very class conscious and old school toady type loyal. He did in essence become Chelmsford chief body guard and protector.

Cheers.

Impi,

How can you diagnose a condition in 2014?  Which the doctors in 1864 obviously missed:

 On 5th January, 1864, he was promoted to the rank of first captain.  In August of that year he returned again to Britain.  By now Charles Gordon had achieved an international reputation at the head of his "Ever-Victorious Army" in China. Durnford was apparently intent on joining "Chinese" Gordon, and in the latter part of 1864 he sailed for the Orient.  Wicked fate again intervened with Durnford's plans, he was taken ill with heat exhaustion and had to be disembarked at Ceylon (Sri Lanka).  So severe was the complaint he remained hospitalised for three months.  Durnford's biographer, his brother Edward, states that Gordon nursed Anthony back to health.

I am not inferring that Durnford was not without his demons or his vices.  But on what foundation do you really have to make such an assumption as to his mental health 150 years on from the event?

John Y.

Information came from TWOTS!
But most dismiss information from there? Do you have anything to show he didn't have a nervous breakdown.

I have Durnford having collapsed on route to Ceylon with heat apoplexy and returning to England.

Cheers

Impi,

I think we can dismiss Donald Morris' allegation as unfounded.

The contemporary report that I was shown concurs with the same finding as Frank has given 'heat apoplexy.'

Frank,

He was actually en-route to China, the ship docked in Ceylon (Sri Lanka) where he was taken ashore for treatment.

John Y.

springbok9 wrote:

I have Durnford having collapsed on route to Ceylon with heat apoplexy and returning to England.

Cheers

Me too!
Article: "Brevet Colonel Anthony William DURNFORD, Royal Engineers, 1830-1879" By...John Young!!!      
Cheers

Frédéric

Les
No doubt about it. Chelmsford initially denies receiving any but in one of his letters he refers to a specific message. There is also anther mention that he received messages from Crealock the next morning. Theres also a third mention of Gossett having received message(s).
I will dig them out and post.

John young, aren't they next door? Just North of Pretoria?   

Cheers

Les
The two messages from the camp, Gardners and the second from Pulleine. Both of which Chelmsford professed not to have seen. Crealock most certainly had them he sent copies to Col Bellairs on the 24th Feb. Chelmsford in a memorandum refers to the note from Puleine and mentions that it was only received late in the afternoon, and that as it contained no note of danger from attack, or any request for assistance, I feel that my assumption that no danger was anticipated was correct. So he admits he saw it on the 22nd and yet has issued a denial of ever having see it. Crealock was given those messages by Chelmsford on the 223rd.
Gosset admits was also involved later having spoken to Captain Church who had ridden forward and reported the situation. Gossett was with Harness at the time and this message was passed back to Chelmsford and was the reason behind his decision to look for himself. Not mentioned by Chelmsford either.
So yes some economy with the truth from various senior officers.

Cheers

No wonder impi is all at sea reading stuff like 'zulu hart' and 'twots'.

OK, Morris did what he thought best at the time, however, he also made a lot of mistakes and also copied other material which was later proved wrong, he was also in a way a bit like Mike Snook, ie; adding his own misleading ideas.

Hi Springy.

Yes, Crealock was the instigator of the cover up, but like you say, there were also others who were involved including LC himself, so they knew what they were doing.

OK, Durnford was a column commander, but he was also a Colonel not a Lt Colonel, his brevet came through in late 1878.

Crealock did hear from the next tent, and pointed out that Clery should not be sending orders, and like you say, he wrote and sent the order. But really LC should have checked the message in the order before it was sent, that way he could have amended it accordingly.

I am not so convinced about LC saying that he wanted Durnford to reinforce the camp, as that would have meant that Durnford would be in command with being the senior officer, and after the rebuke sent to Durnford, I do not think that LC would have wanted that, so I think it is a red herring and all part of the deceit and cover up. Surely if LC didn't trust Durnford, would he really send for him to take command of the camp, I don't think so. No, I think he wanted him to be close by to support him in his venture against the Matyanas, and that is why he was sent for to come up to the camp. LC sent an order back to the camp, if he had intended that Durnford should reinforce the camp, then this would have meant that Durnford (as senior officer), would have been in command, but the order sent back to camp was addressed to Pulleine not Durnford, so I don't think LC wanted Durnford to take command.

Like you said springy, Crealock was the hub of the wheel, but there were also plenty of spokes, so how can we really trust what these officers said regarding Durnford when they were all in on the web of lies and deceit and the cover up?

Hi Springy.

Yes, Crealock was the instigator of the cover up, but like you say, there were also others who were involved including LC himself, so they knew what they were doing. This is probably going to go against the grain a bit. But Chelmsford was a Lord of the Realm, an Officer, a Gentleman and very old school. Im really tempted to believe that the more gutter fighting Crealock was the spin doctor reacting to a possible flummoxed Chelmsford demeaner. Does that make sense?

OK, Durnford was a column commander, but he was also a Colonel not a Lt Colonel, his brevet came through in late 1878. I seem to recall, I need to look it up, that it was actually mentioned by Crealock that a Major could not issue an order to a Column Commander, Im pretty sure that's right and is why Chelmsford agreed.

Crealock did hear from the next tent, and pointed out that Clery should not be sending orders, and like you say, he wrote and sent the order. But really LC should have checked the message in the order before it was sent, that way he could have amended it accordingly. I think Chelmsfords mind was more concerned on the larger scope of things and of course Crealock was his hand picked Military Secretary

I am not so convinced about LC saying that he wanted Durnford to reinforce the camp, as that would have meant that Durnford would be in command with being the senior officer, and after the rebuke sent to Durnford, I do not think that LC would have wanted that, so I think it is a red herring and all part of the deceit and cover up. I don't think it is a cover up, considering it came from Clery I would tend to believe it, there were a hell of letters written in confidence afterwards by Clery and he was a terrible gossip Im sure it would have come out. But no he stuck to his guns.Surely if LC didn't trust Durnford, would he really send for him to take command of the camp, I don't think so. No, I think he wanted him to be close by to support him in his venture against the Matyanas, and that is why he was sent for to come up to the camp. LC sent an order back to the camp, if he had intended that Durnford should reinforce the camp, then this would have meant that Durnford (as senior officer), would have been in command, but the order sent back to camp was addressed to Pulleine not Durnford, so I don't think LC wanted Durnford to take command. Yep its a mute point martin, have a look at the other thread ive started.

Like you said springy, Crealock was the hub of the wheel, but there were also plenty of spokes, so how can we really trust what these officers said regarding Durnford when they were all in on the web of lies and deceit and the cover up? I have no doubt there was a rush to cover a certain regal backside but no I don't believe its as wide spread as we some times think. To have the amount of people involved that has been suggested would risk a leak at any point. I do think however people were doing the natural thing and covering their own backsides.

Cheers

I'm on the point of giving up! but not quite..its as plain to
see as daylight to a person with 20 2o vision. god i've
posted Ellice's memo on the companion thread,
Chelmsford stuffed up! and crealock covered his ass..its
as simple as that, why dont people read posts properly?
you would have to be a one eyed man with a cateract
not to understand the truth! military secretary!!! there
was no such rank till crealock made it up, sanctioned by
the nervous nellie which was chelmsford! all open your
eyes, and then look through them.

Hi Les
I know what Elice had to say but if we are just to read the books and accept as fact then poor old petes passion will close down. On top of which you've posted the Questions asked by Ellice not the response or the justification behind that response. In similar vein more is known these days than in 79/80 and our understanding has grown, sufficiently to allow us the luxury of questioning those earlier findings.
I see Martin has rather naughtily compared you to Fred Astairs and Ginger Rodgers. Reminds me of an interviewer asking her how it felt to dance with such a great dancer she replied, " I do everything Fred does except I do it backwards and in high heels." Reminds me of me and iSandlwana, I do it backwards in quicksand   

Yeah i get it, i give to much truth, which kills
speculation, and therefor much of the fun..
k i will again tone it down, and pretend i dont
know what i do! a sort of unre- education, i'm
a bad boy not thinking of others...  
Martins a git.   

springbok9 wrote:

Sorry Frederic, missed your comments about Durnfords experience. He was a serving officer for 31 years had commanded various detachments in a variety of circumstances. He had very successfully raised the Mounted Contingent virtually single handed, so yes a highly experience officer.

Oh, c'mon Springy. This evasion is not worthy of you. Frederic was clearly asking after his (supposedly superior) COMBAT experience! There can be very little doubt as to his organizational skills...(in my mind, at least.)

ymob wrote:

So, we have two men (RAW and SHEPSTONE) who served with him at Bushmans pass, and later agreed to become Officers under his commmand;
It is for me a valid point on the capacities of DURNFORD (for these men).

Very strong point, Frederic.    It undercuts the idea that Durnford was some sort of pariah, militarily speaking...and the circumstances of his death tend to confirm that as well.

I was reading Commandant Brownes book, and he says. That Chelmsford was the best General he had served under, and that no colonial soldier blame him for the diaster. Now there's food for thought, based on Durnford commanding a colonial force.

springbok9 wrote:

[Shepstone] was in fact pretty loyal to [Durnford], and when he got separated from Durnford still went to look for him.
In terms of his stand on the back of the mountain Im not to sure that he was holding back the right horn, I really think that by the time he got to the saddle the right horn was already there. Ive still got it in the back of my mind that he could have fought to the saddle with Younghusband and then carried on around the side of the mountain when younghusband decided to make a stand.

For clarification Springbok, are you saying that Shepstone worked his way south with Younghusband and then north again on the opposite side of the hill? I recognize this is speculation but I'm wondering how you envision his overall path?

6pd
Just trying to promote some healthy debate is all...............and rapidly getting to the point where Im starting to believe that the only thing that interests this forum is argument, abuse and attempting to put opposition down. In short getting to be a pain in the arse and not worth the effort!
Cheers

6pr
I posted an essay on this some time back, but in broad strokes I believe Shepstone fought his wa back across the top of the camp to the 2/24th ammo wagons and from there up the incline. He was seen in the camp area by Malindi. The first few cairns start to appear just north of the main cairn indicating the line of the fight, Younghusband backed up under the cliff face before eventually charging down, the last survivor going upwards to the cave, To the west of that position a couple of cairns move over the ridge to the west then down the back of the mountain linking up with a series of cairns that surround Shepstones grave. It was just a theory.

Cheers

24th wrote:

I was reading Commandant Brownes book, and he says. That Chelmsford was the best General he had served under, and that no colonial soldier blame him for the diaster. Now there's food for thought, based on Durnford commanding a colonial force.

Browne may have indeed preferred Chelmsford to Durnford but he's not a man whose opinion I would trust.  To me his book(s) was highly politicized and pandered to popular perceptions which were being manipulated by Chelmsford's people (like Crealock.)  Or to put it more directly -- I don't think Browne ever let the truth get in the way of his prejudices and telling a damned good story.

Dont feel that way springbok, you changed my mind
more than most others, your insights are worthy,and
challenging, i have my own battles to fight on here,
but i'm never down..it will calm down as always. have
a glass of red mate.

springbok9 wrote:

It was just a theory.

And like virtually all of yours, a quite beguiling one!

24th
Wood Buller Lloyd all say the opposite as did Wolseley. But as they say you cant win em all.

Cheers

6pd
Frederic comes up with some brilliant points and posts, but push a bit harder and he gets better. He really doesn't need me to tell or explain things hes got it all plus a really logical mind.    He posted that Im his dance master and he likes to dance.  
Good Bloke.

Cheers

springbok9 wrote:

6pd
Frederic comes up with some brilliant points and posts, but push a bit harder and he gets better. He really doesn't need me to tell or explain things hes got it all plus a really logical mind.    He posted that Im his dance master and he likes to dance.  
Good Bloke.

Indeed! Cha, cha, cha...    

1st Witness.— Major Clery states: I am Senior Staff Officer to the 3rd Column, commanded by Colonel Glyn, C.B.

About 1.30 A.M., on the 22nd, a messenger brought me a note from Major Dartnell, to say that the enemy was in greater numbers than when he last reported, and that he did not think it prudent to attack them unless reinforced by two or three companies of the 24th Regiment. 

I took this note to Colonel Glyn, C.B., at once, he ordered me to take it on to the General. 

The General first ordered me to write to Colonel Durnford, at Rorke's Drift, to bring his force to strengthen the camp, 

but almost immediately afterwards he told Colonel Crealock that he (Colonel Crealock) was to write to Colonel Durnford these instructions, and not I. 
This is where Clery's involvement in the order regarding Durnford ends! 

Before leaving the camp, I sent written instructions to Colonel Pulleine, 24th Regiment, to the following effect:—" You will be in command of the camp during the absence of Colonel Glyn.

I went to Colonel Pulleine's tent just before leaving camp to ascertain that he had got these instructions, and I again repeated them verbally to him. To the best of my memory, 

I mentioned in the written instructions to Colonel Pulleine that Colonel Durnford had been written to to bring up his force to strengthen the camp. 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

1. Statement of Lieutenant-Colonel J. North Crealock, Acting Military Secretary.

1. Soon after 2 A.M. on the 22nd January I received instructions from the Lieutenant-General to send a written order to Lieutenant-Colonel Durnford, R.E., commanding No. 2 Column, to the following effect (I copied it in my note-book which was afterwards lost): " Move up to Sandhlwana Camp at once with all your mounted men and Rocket Battery—take command of it. I am accompanying Colonel Glyn, who is moving off at once to attack Matyana and a Zulu force.

This is what Crealock should have sent Durnford.
", to bring his force to strengthen the camp, "

Although I was not aware at that time of the Lieutenant-General's grounds for ordering the troops from camp, yet it was evident to me that he wished to close up to the camp all outlying troops, and thus strengthen it. He would naturally also consider that the presence of an officer of Colonel Durnford's rank and corps would prove of value in the defence of a camp, if it should be attacked.

I subsequently heard Major Clery state that the had left precise instructions to Lieutenant-Lionel Pulleine "to defend the camp." Such instructions would, I consider, as a matter of course, be binding on Colonel Durnford on his assuming command of the camp.

Of course, LC & Clery makes no mention of Durford taking command.


Here's a question highlighted. From Smith Dorrient 48 years service.

"At about midnight I was sent for by General Lord Chelmsford and told to take a dispatch back to Rorke's Drift for Colonel Durnford, R.E., who was expected there with reinforcements consisting of native levies. I rode back, 10 miles, arriving at Rorke's Drift just before dawn on the 22nd, and delivered my dispatch. It ought to have been a very jumpy ride, for I was entirely alone and the country was wild and new to me, and the road little better than a track; but pride at being selected to carry an important dispatch and the valour of ignorance (for I only realised next day that the country was infested with hostile Zulus) carried me along without a thought of danger. Colonel Durnford was just moving off with his levies towards Sandspruit (away from Isandhlwana), but on reading the dispatch, which conveyed instructions to move up to reinforce the Isandhlwana camp (as Lord Chelmsford, with the main body of the force, leaving the camp standing, was moving out some miles to the east to attack the Zulu Army), he at once changed the direction of his march.

This is basically saying what Clery was ordered to dispatch to Durnford.

littlehand wrote:

1. Soon after 2 A.M. on the 22nd January I received instructions from the Lieutenant-General to send a written order to Lieutenant-Colonel Durnford, R.E., commanding No. 2 Column, to the following effect (I copied it in my note-book which was afterwards lost): " Move up to Sandhlwana Camp at once with all your mounted men and Rocket Battery—take command of it. I am accompanying Colonel Glyn, who is moving off at once to attack Matyana and a Zulu force.

Why go on quoting things like this when they only weaken your argument? Amazingly, the order was found in tact and it DID NOT SAY, "...take command of it." This is now an accepted part of the historical record. He was dead wrong either through a faulty memory or because it was very much to his and Chelmsford's advantage to claim as much. I understand that you are merely quoting his testimony as recorded, but it has been proven to be DEAD WRONG and it makes any rational being question the reliability of this man. Personally, I think he was a bald faced liar who (against all odds) was caught out.

6pdr, if you read the post correctly taking into account LH post yesterday, he is showing exactly what you are spurting off about. Clery was dealing with the order as directed by LC. LC, then instructed Crealock to send it, LH says in his post where Clery's involvement ends. It's then down Crealock who for whatever reason, sent a totally different message. And we know, Crealocks order didn't state " Take command"

And what argument is LH having, which you claim has been weaken. He is just posting information to help Martin, If Martin doesn't what help he only has to say, I'm sure it wouldn't bother LH!

Move the debate forward and stop treading water.