Durnford was he capable.5

Posts : 2308 Join date : 2010-07-02 Age : 44

Martin don't have a lot of time today, but you may find this helpfull. Source Keith Smith.

"There were four separate orders given to Durnford in a period of only two weeks. (There is no possibility that Durnford was ordered to Rorke’s Drift so that Lord C. could keep an eye on him: the order directing him there was sent on 14th January, the same day as Durnford decided to take his men across the Thukela.)

1. Lord Chelmsford's order to Lt.-Col. Durnford dated 8th January 1879: BPP, C. 2242, Enclosure 3 in No. 9: To Sir Bartle Frere: ‘I have therefore determined to remove two-thirds of Lieutenant-Colonel Durnford’s force from its present position opposite Middle Drift, and to send it at once to the Sand Spruit Valley for the protection of the Umsinga border.’
To Durnford: ‘On receipt of this Memorandum you will at once remove your two strongest regiments [sic] to Sand Spruit Valley, and take up such a position as will best ensure the protection of the Natal border from raids made across the Buffalo River between Sand Spruit and the junction of the Buffalo and Tugela rivers.’

2. Extract, Lord Chelmsford to Secretary of State for War, 14th January 1879: BPP C. 2242, Enclosure 8 in No. 20: ‘Lieutenant-Colonel Durnford, R.E., Commanding No. 2 Column, met me on my return to camp, as he wished personally to report on certain matters connected with his command ... I directed this officer to move one of his three battalions to watch, and eventually cross at the Gates of Natal, between Rorke's Drift and the Umsinga Mountain; while he, and the mounted men and rocket battery, were to join me with No. 3 Column. I directed the remaining two battalions to cross at Middle Drift, as soon as Colonel Pearson with No. 1 Column had reached Ekowe.’

3. Lord Chelmsford to Sir Bartle Frere, 19th January 1879, in French, Lord Chelmsford and the Zulu War, p. 80: ‘This column [No. 3] moves tomorrow about 8 miles, and another march will bring us to a position between the two places of refuge of the two Matyanas, from which I shall be able to operate against either according to circumstances. One of Colonel Durnford’s regiments [sic], will cross the river from the Sand Spruit valley while his mounted natives will co-operate with us from Rorke’s Drift, where they will be tomorrow (20th).’

4. BPP C. 2260, Enclosure 2 in No. 12: Extract from statement of Colonel J.N. Crealock. See also TNA (PRO), WO 33/34, Inclosure 1 in No. 72: ‘Soon after 2 a.m. on the 22nd January, I received instructions from the Lieutenant-General to send a written order to Lieutenant-Colonel Durnford, R.E., commanding No. 2 Column, to the following effect (I copied it in my note book which was afterwards lost), “Move up to Sandhlwana camp at once with all your mounted men and Rocket Battery, take command of it. I am accompanying Colonel Glyn who is moving off at once to attack Matyana, and a Zulu force said to be 12 or 14 miles off and at present watched by Natal Police, Volunteer; and Natal Native Contingent. Colonel Glyn takes with him 2nd Battalion 24th Regiment, four guns Royal Artillery, and mounted Infantry.”

Since the last order, when found on the battlefield, did not order Durnford to take command of the camp, it is reasonable to suppose that this order was read by him in conjunction with the previous one, and thus he decided to co-operate with Lord C. in the action against the two Matshanas. As an independent column commander, he was entitled to do this, but the intelligence he had received that morning, from both Lieutenant Chard and the various reports which came to him at the camp, should have told him that a sally with his mounted men was not the wisest course of action at that time. His best decision that day was to send Raw, Roberts et al. up to the plateau, a reconnaissance which should have been undertaken by Lord C. the previous day.

5. Royal Engineers Museum, Chatham, 4901.44.15. Printed circular issued by Lieut.-Colonel Edward Durnford, 1884, giving the actual order found on the battlefield and withheld by Crealock.
‘22. Wednesday.
2 a.m. The following Order sent to Col. Durnford:-“You are to march to this camp at once with all the force you have with you of No. 2 Column.
Major Bengough's Battalion is to move to Rorke's Drift, as ordered yesterday.
2/24. Artillery and mounted men, with the General and Colonel Glyn, move off at once to attack a Zulu Force about 10 miles distant.
(Sd) J. N. C.
If Bengough's Battalion has crossed the River at Eland's Kraal it is to move up here. (Nangwana Valley.)” ’

Subject: Re: Durnford was he capable.5 Sun Jan 04, 2015 11:41 am

impi
Was he an independent Column Commander? Where was his column?.

Before Clery issued his orders to Pulleine he seems to have agonised over if or not he SHOULD issue them and went looking for Chelmsford, arguably to get his permission, and couldn't find him. Hence he took the huge risk in doing it himself.

Just another litre of Saudi best for the flames

Cheers

Posts : 2871 Join date : 2010-06-02

Where did all this nonsense about "you can't trust a Bishop" come from?

What you do when you receive intelligence is you assess the content, and evaluate the source.

You don't say - Well he's a Bishop he can't possibly know about such things!

Steve

Subject: Re: Durnford was he capable.5 Sun Jan 04, 2015 11:53 am

Thanks impi. agree

Springy, look at impi's post, it looks like it was LC who decided to split up Durnford's column. So part of it was at middle drift, another part with Bengough, and the rest with Durnford.

What do you think about the possible missing order of the 21st?

Subject: Re: Durnford was he capable.5 Sun Jan 04, 2015 11:55 am

Spot on Steve.

This is why LC gave Durnford the rebuke on the 14th, yet on the 8th he had told Durnford that he was 'at perfect liberty'.

Posts : 2593 Join date : 2009-04-24

Julian Whybra wrote:: Impi

You wrote:
“Can you confirm if this is true, you will be able to give a quicker answer than most, due to your knowledge.
In "Correspondence Relative to Military Affairs in Natal and the Transvaal.", "Enclosure 3, in No. 26. (C.), "Summary of instructions for Officers Commanding Columns..." under "Colonel Durnford"
"... Unless supported by British troops this column is not to engage seriously a large force of the enemy."

I need the C number to find the doc among my Blue Book photocopies, can you let me have it? I may and may not be able to confirm the wording for you, I’m afraid. In 1985 I was working from the Senate House Library in the Univ of London (which holds complete copies of the Blue Books) and if the doc was important enough I paid to have it photocopied, if not, then I summarized it in a shorthand. But I need the C number (4 digits) to find it.

However, I would say that this doc relates to the time when there were five columns, two of which were assigned defensive operations on the Natal side of the border. Any such instructions were superseded when Chelmsford changed No. 2 Column’s role, split it up (with some of it acting defensively at Middle Drift and some, under Durnford, ACTING IN SUPPORT OF COLUMN NO. 3 in Zululand), i.e. the previous rules of engagement no longer applied. And so the pertinence of your quotation evaporates.

As to the questions ‘how large is a large force’ and what does ‘engage seriously’ mean take a look at Chelmsford’s Notes on the Findings of the Court of Enquiry (compiled Jan-Apr 1879 housed in the National Archives CP/31). Capt. Essex’s additional evidence reads:
“At this time about 11 am the impression in camp was that the enemy had no intention of advancing during the day time, but might possibly be expected to attack it during the night. No idea had been formed regarding the probable strength of the enemy’s force”
Note the time, and remember that the very last report Durnford had before leaving the camp was that the force in front of him mustered no more than 400 warriors.
You and I know, now, that there were reports of much larger numbers from individuals, some of which percolated back to Pulleine, but according to Essex’s subsequent testimony, there was no idea in the camp as to the enemy’s strength and Durnford advanced to prevent (or so he believed) Chelmsford’s force from being attacked in the rear. Also, ask yourself, would any commander (at the head of 100 native horsemen) engage seriously a known large force of 7,000 or more Zulus?

Cochrane's evidence - when we arrived at the camp it was to find that the troops were stood to and that an attack had been expected since an early hour.

Trooper Whitelaw saw several thousand Zulus on the high ground to the NE at 0700. He reported this to Pulleine in person at Lt Scott's direction. Clearly Pulleine passed this on to D.

At 0920 approx, some 40 mins before D's arrival, a body of Zulus estimated at 4000 (Pope's Diary and Chard's testimony refer) passed along the high ground (Tahelane Spur) in plain view of the camp, before disappearing to the NW (i.e. somewhere between Tahelane and the Manzimyama Valley). This was part of the 3 column enemy movement observed by Capt Barry on Mkwene Hill and reported to the camp immediately. Barry's report would have arrived with Pulleine about 9.45 a.m - barely 15 mins before D's arrival. (Though some argue he arrived at 10.30 - I myself am in the 10.00 camp).

There is no way it can be argued that anybody at Isandlwana was oblivious to a clear and present danger in arc NW through N to NE, quite distinct from whatever was going on 20 km away at Mangeni to the (approximate) SE. The threat was known about from 0730, and was reiterated for everybody to see at 0920-0940 approx. It was so pressing a danger that D suddenly got wobbly about his (previously abandoned) wagon train and sent Vause back down the road to look for it.

Curling, I think it was, referred to some of the officers making light of the fact that there appeared to be a likelihood of an action at the camp whilst the general was out in the wrong direction. Ironically this was viewed as amusing (I interpret this as excited subaltern banter).

CTSG

You wrote:
“Martin, we don't need Julian to tell us was in the order, Durford received on the 22nd, we all know what the Order contained. why would Lord Chelmsford changed the wording,when he asks Crealock to send it. But also remember, Crealock states he order Durnford to take command. (His own words) at the COE.”

You have written the last sentence as a fact and you have not qualified it so you must still believe it to be true. Crealock believed he had written ‘take command’, or he wanted to believe it, but he did not write it. When his notebook was found there was no such wording as ‘take command’. Crealock admitted as much in a letter to Gen. Nicholson in which he quoted the exact wording from his notebook in the Durnford Papers in the RE Museum accession no. 4901-31/9 (IN HIS OWN WORDS).

No Julian, you have read in wrong. I know the words commard wasn't written, into Crealocks order. Neither was reinforce or strengthen, the latter being dictated by Lord Chelmsford to Clery.

You have also quoted Chelmsford’s famous letter to Durnford as follows:
“When a column is acting SEPARATELY in an enemy's country I am quite ready to give its commander every latitude, and would certainly expect him to disobey any orders he might receive from me, if information which he obtained showed that it would be injurious to the interests of the column under his command.”

I suggest that you read this and apply it to Durnford’s situation and the status of his column when it was received and then read it again and apply it to his situation and the status of his column on the morning of the 22nd (see my note to impi in this post above) and think about the meaning of the wording.

Durnford did not disobey the ordered he received on the morning of the 22nd Jan. He moved to the camp. What he done after he arriived was injurious to his column but also caused injury to another column.

All

I have not found Shepstone’s order nor Hamer’s order/letter. No more speculation or rumour please. As we all know, rumour can all too quickly become fact. And I won’t be held to account for something I have not found! I am as a I said intending to present my opinions in an essay.

We understand could be injurious to your interests.

Posts : 2593 Join date : 2009-04-24

Mr M. Cooper wrote:: Spot on Steve.

This is why LC gave Durnford the rebuke on the 14th, yet on the 8th he had told Durnford that he was 'at perfect liberty'.

Yes, he was taking a libity with Lord Chelmsfords trust. Which of course ended abruptly after the 14th Jan.

Posts : 2871 Join date : 2010-06-02

CTSG

Can I just ask a clarifying question before we move on.

The way I read the recent discussion, you are no longer saying that Durnford was ordered to come up and reinforce or strengthen the camp. You are now basing your argument on him misreading the number of Zulus that were threatening the camp that morning and taking the wrong action?

Is that so?

Steve

Posts : 2593 Join date : 2009-04-24

Source John Young. Easy to understand break down of events.

" On 1st January, 1879, Durnford received orders from Lord Chelmsford ordering him to remain at the Middle Drift until the invasion, scheduled for the 11th January, was under way. When Durnford would be expected to co-operate between Pearson's Number 1 Column, which was to cross at the Lower Drift, and Colonel Richard Thomas Glyn's Number 3 Column, which was to ford the Buffalo River at Rorke's Drift.

On the afternoon of 11th January, Durnford paid a visit on Lord Chelmsford, who had now attached his headquarters to Glyn's force. He acquainted the General with some intelligence gleaned from messengers loyal to the Lutheran Bishop Hans Schreuder, before returning to his designated position.

At this time rumours and counter-rumours as to the Zulu dispositions were rife. Schreuder wrote to Durnford warning him of a threat of a Zulu incursion over the Middle Drift. Durnford received the message on 13th January. He hastily wrote a dispatch to Chelmsford apprising him of the supposed threat, and that he intended to meet the enemy on the Zulu side of the Middle Drift.

At 2 a.m. on 14th January, Durnford roused his men, and readied them for a forced march at 4 a.m. As Durnford was on the summit of Kranz Kop preparing to descend into the valley leading towards the drift a galloper from Lord Chelmsford met him.

The dispatch from Chelmsford was forthright and to the point:

Dear Durnford,

Unless you carry out the instructions I give you, it will be my unpleasant duty to remove you from your command, and to substitute another officer for officer for the commander of No. 2 Column. When a column is acting SEPARATELY in an enemy's country I am quite ready to give its commander every latitude, and would certainly expect him to disobey any orders he might receive from me, if information which he obtained showed that it would be injurious to the interests of the column under his command. Your neglecting to obey my instructions in the present instance has no excuse. You have simply received information in a letter from Bishop Schroeder[sic], which may or may not be true and which you have no means of verifying. If movements ordered are to be delayed because report hints at a chance of an invasion of Natal, it will be impossible for me to carry out my plan of campaign. I trust you will understand this plain speaking and not give me any further occasion to write in a style which is distasteful to me.

Chelmsford.

The following day Durnford was ordered to the vicinity of Rorke's Drift, with a few companies of his N.N.C., five troops of the N.N.H., and a rocket battery under the command of Brevet Major Francis Broadfoot Russell.

On 19th, Durnford received further orders to relocate the force under his immediate command to the Zulu bank of Rorke's Drift. On the 20th Number 3 Column reached Isandlwana.

On 21st, Lord Chelmsford sent out a two-pronged reconnaissance to ascertain the whereabouts of any Zulu forces. Elements of the reconnaissance came into contact with Zulu forces late in the afternoon. Messages were passed back to Chelmsford at Isandlwana requesting reinforcements.

In the early hours of the morning of Wednesday, 22nd January, 1879, Chelmsford made the decision to divide Number 3 Column, leaving one half at Isandlwana, whilst marching out with the other to meet the Zulu threat.

At 3 a.m., Lieutenant Horace Lockwood Smith-Dorrien, of the 95th (Derbyshire) Regiment of Foot, a special service officer detailed to transport duties, was ordered to return to Rorke's Drift. He carried orders for Durnford, instructing him to reinforce the camp at Isandlwana with the forces at his disposal.

Durnford received the orders at about 7 a.m. Durnford moved on towards Isandlwana with his mounted troops, having given orders for his infantrymen to follow on.

About a quarter of a mile from the camp at Isandlwana, he encountered a fellow Engineer officer moving in the opposite direction, his name was John Rouse Merriott Chard, a lieutenant from 5th (Field) Company. Chard informed Durnford that Zulus had been seen on the hills to the north of the camp. Durnford instructed Chard to inform the two N.N.C. companies to hurry on to Isandlwana.

Shortly after 10 a.m. Durnford arrived in the camp. He had with him some two hundred and fifty N.N.H., 'D' Company, 1st Battalion, 1st Regiment, followed on behind escorting Russell's rocket battery. Bringing up the rear was Captain Walter Stafford and his 'E' Company, 1st/1st N.N.C. acting as the baggage guard.

An obvious problem was presented with Durnford's arrival, who was in command? Durnford was a substantive Lieutenant-Colonel; it is feasible that he may not have been informed of his brevet promotion to the rank of colonel on 31st December, 1878. Lord Chelmsford had left behind in command of the encampment Brevet Lieutenant-Colonel Henry Pulleine of the 1st Battalion, 24th (2nd Warwickshire) Regiment of Foot. Pulleine had distinct orders to defend the camp.

Reports were coming in from outlaying piquets and vedettes of increasing Zulu activity. On e report stated that a Zulu column was moving off in the direction that Lord Chelmsford had taken his half column. Fearful that the General's force might be attacked on two fronts Durnford took matters into his own hands. He informed Pulleine that he intended to sweep the area thus drawing out the Zulus. He asked Pulleine for some of his imperial infantry to assist him in the task. Pulleine objected to the request, again stating his task was to defend the camp. Durnford then asked for support should his force encounter difficulties to which acquiesced.

Durnford sent two troops of his N.N.H. off on to the Nquthu plateau, under the command of Captain W. Barton. Whilst he himself went out with two troops of N.N.H. along the track the General's half column had taken. Following in the wake of the horsemen came Major Russell and his rocket battery, supported by 'D' Company, 1st/1st N.N.C. under Captain C. Nourse. Durnford had had the foresight to order Lieutenant Richard Wyatt Vause and his No.3 Troop of Sikali's Horse to reinforce the baggage guard.

It is not the purpose of this article to discuss the finer points of Isandlwana, and so what follows is only a synopsis of events.

Lieutenant Charles Raw commanding No.1 Troop, Sikali's Horse, chanced upon the concealed Zulu impi of some 25,000 warriors in Ngwebeni valley, thereby pre-empting the attack of the Zulus planned for the following day. Battle had commenced.

Durnford waged a fighting retreat in an
effort to turn the Zulu left horn. He and his men took up a position in a donga on the right front of Isandlwana. Here he was seen exalting his men, and standing on the lip of the donga in total disregard for his personal safety. Lieutenant Alfred Henderson of Hlubi's Troop, N.N.H., was drawn to the conclusion that he had lost his head. Others would recall how Durnford would deftly free the fouled breeches of his men's carbines, with his one good hand.

Durnford's men were reinforced by detachments of the Natal Mounted Police, the Newcastle Mounted Rifles, the Buffalo Border Guard and the Natal Carbineers. At this moment in time, members of the corps who in the past had included Durnford's bitterest critics were at his side.

Desperately short of ammunition Durnford and his mounted men were compelled to abandon their position, just as Lieutenant Charles Pope, commanding 'G' Company, 2nd/24th, was endeavouring to reinforce him. The left horn crashed into the lines of red soldiers and they were soon swallowed up.

Durnford rallied his mounted men in one last desperate stand, but the sheer weight of Zulu numbers told and he died surrounded by the enemy.

Initially his body was interred on the battlefield. However, on 12th October 1879, at the behest of the Colenso family his body was re-buried with full military honours at the military cemetery at Fort Napier.

In death he is as much an enigma, as in life he was a conundrum. Like his close friend Charles Gordon, he received a martyr's death, facing enemies with whom he had a marked affinity. Many have spoken since Isandlwana both in praise and to the detriment of Durnford. I will not sit in judgement of Anthony William Durnford. However close to where he died is the memorial to the Natal Carbineers who perished that day, and if I may misquote it - neither praise nor blame add to his epitaph."

Posts : 2593 Join date : 2009-04-24

rusteze wrote:: CTSG

Can I just ask a clarifying question before we move on.

The way I read the recent discussion, you are no longer saying that Durnford was ordered to come up and reinforce or strengthen the camp. You are now basing your argument on him misreading the number of Zulus that were threatening the camp that morning and taking the wrong action?

Is that so?

Steve

We know Durnford via Crealock wasnt order to reinforce or strengthen the camp. But if Clery had been allowed to send the original message it would have contained the words reinforce or strengthen the camp. Why the wording was changed we know not. But hopefully Julian's new essay might give the answers, should we choose to accept it!

Come on Steve, are you saying, that Durford didn't misread the numbers of Zulus threatening the camp, Julian says, there were only 400 reported.

Posts : 2593 Join date : 2009-04-24

Durnfords first report of Zulu in the Isandlwana area came from Lt John Chard. ( As you know) bearing in mind Durnford hadnt arrived at the camp, at that time.

"An N.C.O. of the 24th Regiment lent me a field glass, which was a very good one, and I also looked with my own, and could see the enemy moving on the distant hills, and apparently in great force. Large numbers of them moving to my left, until the lion hill of Isandhlwana, on my left as I looked at them, hid them from my view. The idea struck me that they might be moving in the direction between the camp and Rorke's Drift and prevent my getting back, and also they might be going to make a dash at the ponts.

Seeing what my duties were, I left the camp, and a quarter of a mile, or less out of it met with Colonel Durnford R.E., riding at the head of his mounted men. I told him what I had seen, and took some orders, and a message all along his line at his request. At the foot of the hill I met my men in the wagon and made them get out and walk up the hill with Durnford's men. I brought the wagon back with me to Rorke's Drift, where on arrival I found the following order had been issued. The copy below was given me, and preserved from the fact of its being in my pocket during the fight:"

Just out of curiosity. Is it known what orders & messages Durnford gave Chard.

Subject: Re: Durnford was he capable.5 Sun Jan 04, 2015 12:39 pm

Martin
Durnfords column was split ad infinitum. When he was called from RD to isandlwana was he still independent OR had the remnants of his column been incorporated into 'Glyns Column'. In Crealocks statement there are various nuances, for example look at item 7. In that he enumerates what the defensive force at iSandlwana was, and it incorporates Durnfords force.
item 3. Lt Col Durnford Re was not under Colonel Glyns command at this time. intimation that he was at some other time.
Item 4. Why would Crealock expect Smith Dorrien to find Durnford at the Bashee Valley ( Half Way to RD) were there preceeding orders issued telling Durnford to move to that location?

We don't know what the orders transmitted by Shepstone were. As I mentioned earlier Ian Knight is of the opinion that Shepstone was hold to hurry up the move from Sandspruit. That cant be, Shepstone knew that Durnford was already in camp at RD and would surely have reported to Chelmsford that fact.
Again we have no clue as to why Hamer was sent.

Cheers

Subject: Re: Durnford was he capable.5 Sun Jan 04, 2015 12:41 pm

Springy
Sorry to be dense but I don't understand your meaning in "When is a column not a column time?" Can you explain?
Julian

Posts : 2593 Join date : 2009-04-24

Steve.
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Julian Whybra wrote:: Springy
Sorry to be dense but I don't understand your meaning in "When is a column not a column time?" Can you explain?
Julian

Posts : 2871 Join date : 2010-06-02

CTSG

Thanks for the confirmation you are no longer contesting the meaning of the order to Durnford.

All I am seeking to do is to focus on where we place different interpretations. It is a complex picture and it helps to narrow down the area of argument.

No, I do not say Durnford got the strength of the enemy right (plainly he did not) - what I am not yet clear about is how much we can expect him to have known about the real numbers.

I think we have made more progress in this discussion than the last time, don't you?

Steve

Posts : 2593 Join date : 2009-04-24

It doesn't help when people, claim to be writing an essay, leading others to believe new evidence has been found, kind of delays things. And going by the Jenkins sarnario, it took months.
Still there enough information out there, to be getting on with.

Subject: Re: Durnford was he capable.5 Sun Jan 04, 2015 1:02 pm

CTSG

I take it that you know what a "column time" is. Please enlighten!

If it means simply 'when is a column not a column' and relates to Durnford's actions pre-19th and on the 22nd then the question 'when is a column not a column' is inappropriate and should be replaced by 'when is a column in an enemy's country' and 'when is it not'.
Answer: when it is in Zululand - when its commander would be given every latitude, and he would certainly be expected to disobey any orders he might receive, if information which he obtained showed that it would be injurious to the interests of the column under his command.

Subject: Re: Durnford was he capable.5 Sun Jan 04, 2015 1:07 pm

CTSG
At no time have I led others to believe that new evidence has been found. When someone suggested that I might, I was quick to post what I had not found.
I am writing an essay on this for publication. Not claiming to. This is done according to my timetable, not yours.
It doesn't help when 'people' mis-state facts, fail to acknowledge that they changed their position, and cannot write English.
Scenario is spelt according to OED rules, not CTSG rules.
I might also remind you that the Jenkins article produced much new evidence and primary sources and resulted in proof of Jenkins's presence at RD.

Posts : 1862 Join date : 2009-03-25

Even as been said before, information received from a Bishop. Durnford was ready to attack without gathering intelligence. Again bolsters his attitude regarding when Zulus are seen we should attack them.

Posts : 1862 Join date : 2009-03-25

Julian Whybra wrote:: CTSG
At no time have I led others to believe that new evidence has been found. When someone suggested that I might, I was quick to post what I had not found.
I am writing an essay on this for publication. Not claiming to. This is done according to my timetable, not yours.
It doesn't help when 'people' mis-state facts, fail to acknowledge that they changed their position, and cannot write English.
Scenario is spelt according to OED rules, not CTSG rules.

Look back at Martin's and Ymobs posts.
They seem to think you have.

Subject: Re: Durnford was he capable.5 Sun Jan 04, 2015 1:14 pm

24th
You look back at them.
At no time in my posts have I written that new evidence has been found. When someone suggested that I might, I was quick to post what I had not found.

Posts : 1862 Join date : 2009-03-25

Julian Whybra wrote:: CTSG
At no time have I led others to believe that new evidence has been found. When someone suggested that I might, I was quick to post what I had not found.
I am writing an essay on this for publication. Not claiming to. This is done according to my timetable, not yours.
It doesn't help when 'people' mis-state facts, fail to acknowledge that they changed their position, and cannot write English.
Scenario is spelt according to OED rules, not CTSG rules.

Julian you seemed to be on the defensive. It's just a discussion. Your doing you teacher thing again.

Subject: Re: Durnford was he capable.5 Sun Jan 04, 2015 1:16 pm

Perhaps it's because others appear to be on the offensive and doing their 'bully' thing again. It is just a discussion.

Guest

Well! was Durnford capable?. i have read the last two pages
with mounting disbelief, what a load of rubbish! most people
posing and posturing...crazy as a box of frogs. Very Happy

Guest

Hi Frederic, yes my evening was most pleasant
thank you.. yes Martin a missing order! would be
convenient, i wonder what it, if it existed might
have said?.. xhosa

Subject: Re: Durnford was he capable.5 Sun Jan 04, 2015 1:38 pm

Xhosa
I couldn't agree more.
I'm glad you enjoyed your evening.

Guest

Julian, your patience and forbearing is an
example to us all..thank you. xhosa

Posts : 1862 Join date : 2009-03-25

Xhosa certainly helpful as usual. Again with no foundation, easy to say it's rubbish, but tell us why.

Subject: Re: Durnford was he capable.5 Sun Jan 04, 2015 1:52 pm

Julian
Sorry, me that's being dense, juggling the test match viewing with trying be enigmatic.
When is a column not a column.
At the time Durnford was called to iSandlwana his column had been split quite significantly to a point where referring to it as a column was stretching the truth. My position is that when it was called to iSandlwana it was a de facto amalgamation/hostile takeover if you like by Chelmsford to incorporate it into Number 3 column.
I posted the other extracts from Crealocks statement in an effort to point out that he, Crealock, and by association Chelmsford saw it that way.
Hope that clears things up.

CTSG
At times your adamant that Durnfords orders going back in time cannot be read as one and that the time intervention precludes that. Surely then the reports of the impi spread out over a 5 hour period again cannot be read as a single entity. The last sightings acording to Cochrane were to the effect that the impi was retiring and a report from the scouts (Molife) that 400 were still in sight, That then has to be the point that Durnford focused on, not that there were a greater number a few hours earlier that were no longer in evidence.

Just a thought.

Cheers

Cheers

Subject: Re: Durnford was he capable.5 Sun Jan 04, 2015 2:00 pm

Springbok thanks for bringing the discussion back on topic. I was fast losing the will to live. Is there any point in discussing Julian's publication at this stage, wait until its been completed and published.

Posts : 1862 Join date : 2009-03-25

Point taken!

Subject: Re: Durnford was he capable.5 Sun Jan 04, 2015 2:05 pm

24th.

Neither Frederic nor I have said that Julian had found any new evidence. We were discussing the possibility that there might be a missing order from the 21st, but nowhere have we suggested that Julian had found this.

We also said that Julian was writing an essay, and that he did not want to say too much about it on the forum before he had finished it, just in case some others picked up on it and decided to use it. Therefor we would have to wait for Julian to finish the essay before we could discuss it.

Hope that makes things clear.

Posts : 1862 Join date : 2009-03-25

In which case did he really need to take his whole command to deal with 400 Zulus.

Posts : 1862 Join date : 2009-03-25

Mr M. Cooper wrote:: 24th.

Neither Frederic nor I have said that Julian had found any new evidence. We were discussing the possibility that there might be a missing order from the 21st, but nowhere have we suggested that Julian had found this.

We also said that Julian was writing an essay, and that he did not want to say too much about it on the forum before he had finished it, just in case some others picked up on it and decided to use it. Therefor we would have to wait for Julian to finish the essay before we could discuss it.

Hope that makes things clear.

ymob wrote:

rusteze wrote:: The following is sheer speculation on my part, it has no basis whatsoever in evidence, either primary or secondary. So feel free to take it apart.

Frank mentioned something in passing a couple of days ago that prompted some thoughts about Chelmsford's intentions for Durnford.

Frank spoke about Durnford's mounted force forming a flanking screen for the rest of the camp, when it moved to join Chelmsford at Mangeni (perhaps later on the 22nd or the day after). I could buy that as a legitimate use of Durnford's assets.

Remember, Chelmsford had no thought for the defence of the camp at that early hour of the morning, he thought it was secure. He left no orders for Pulleine at all (neither did Glyn) He was focussed entirely on attack.

Now the order from Crealock never said protect the slow moving second half of the column, we know. But they would have been very vulnerable (much more so than in the camp) and we are trying to fill a gap in the information we have.

When Durnford reaches the camp, as ordered, something totally unexpected begins to unfold. But it's not a problem, the General wants the Zulu force to be engaged at all costs. Then it appears to Durnford that the Zulus are retreating. So, thinking they may slip out of his hands, Durnford pursues.

The rest is history, as they say.

Steve

Bonsoir,
If i accept the analysis and all the points of Mister Whybra, i have the same conclusion.

But i have a problem:
Any order (konwn by the historians) was sent by CHELSMFORD to DURNFORD on the subject of the "moving the camp" (between the 20 january and the 22 january)

BUT:
We know that G. SHEPSTONE met DURNFORD the 21 January (but we don't know the contain of the instruction given by CHELMSFORD to DURNFORD);
We know that HAMMER was sent by DURNFORD the 22 January to get fresh instruction to the General.
(It's curious, because DURNFORD knows that CHELMSFORD was not at Isandhlwana at this time).

-This hypothesis (moving the camp) give (perhaps) an explication why DURNFORD left Isandhlwana with infantry natives, rockets battery and asked to Pulleine 2 regular infantry campanies (for a outpost between Isandhlwana and the new camp as the Major Dunbar at the Batshe valley?).

-Remember the essay " Isandhlwana and the Durnford's papers" by the same author and Mister Jackson
Whybra and Jakson wrote (about the order of the 22 january from CREALOCK to DURNFORD):"The question now arises as to how Durnford interpreted this order upon receipt. Although this is open to conjondture there certains points worth consideration. The use of the phrases "to this camp" and to "move up here" in the same order may have given rise to some confusion.
Did the former, in Durnfor's mind, indicate Isandhlwana camp or the new camp on the Mangeni?"
Today, Mister WHYBRA (and Springbok) tell to us that CREALOCK was well known for the clarity of his orders...

-There is also this curious comment of Mister Whybra (about his new hypothesis):
"Durnford showed no signs of confusion, neither when he received these orders nor when he entered camp and conferred with Pulleine. In fact I would say he showed singular purpose of mind".
Interesting comment, because I think that Mister Whybra doesn'nt like the hazardous hypothesis ...

Maybe, Mister whybra found new information on the meeting on the 21 January or a new HAMMER's letter ?

Just a thought.

frédéric

Subject: Re: Durnford was he capable.5 Sun Jan 04, 2015 2:19 pm

24th
Did he?
I was under the impression three companies were scouting the plateau, most of the NNC were camp/ridge bound and he took 100 men down the Quabe valley?

Cheers
Oh yes the rocket battery.

Subject: Re: Durnford was he capable.5 Sun Jan 04, 2015 2:19 pm

24th.

You missed out highlighting Frederic's last bit, which was;

JUST A THOUGHT.

Posts : 1862 Join date : 2009-03-25

But the thought was there, anyway enough, we are going of topic.

Subject: Durnford was he capable 3 Sun Jan 04, 2015 2:39 pm

Hi Springy
You mentioned earlier why did Crealock tell SD he would find Durnford in the Batshe Valley , how did Crealock know that ?
The fact is , that's were Durnford was ! , his column was camped 2 - 4 miles across the river in Zululand , we had this discussion when we had our disagreement about the number of roads you thought were available in zululand . In one of Smiths books possibly '' Source Documents of the zulu war '' . From memory SD gave the orders to Shepstone ( think it was him ? ) who rode back across the river into Natal , who , then found Durnford on a foraging mission , they then crossed the river back into zululand , went back to their camp and got ready to head to Isandlwana .
Cheers 90th Salute

Subject: Re: Durnford was he capable.5 Sun Jan 04, 2015 2:42 pm

springy

Thanks for the clarification of your post. See my post of 2.02.

You are quite right, I agree, that at the time Durnford was called to Isandhlwana his column had been split quite significantly to a point where referring to it as a column was stretching the truth. However, the fact remains that it WAS still an independent Column as demonstrated on the 22nd by Crealock being designated as being the staff officer with sufficient rank to give orders to an independent column commander and NOT Clery. It is also demonstrated by Durnford's actions on arrival at the camp and on leaving it.

Thus my position is that there was no de facto amalgamation/hostile takeover AT THAT POINT certainly not in Durnford's mind (though a future one - even an imminent one - may have been on the cards and in Chelmsford's mind). I do not feel that the later remarks by Crealock that you quoted indicate any takeover (de facto or de jure).

I also totally agree with you re the 'taking his whole command to deal with 400 Zulus'. He precisely did not do that.

Subject: Re: Durnford was he capable.5 Sun Jan 04, 2015 2:56 pm

Can anyone really take Crealock at face value after he has been proven to be a liar?

Subject: Re: Durnford was he capable.5 Sun Jan 04, 2015 2:59 pm

90th wrote:: Hi Springy
You mentioned earlier why did Crealock tell SD he would find Durnford in the Batshe Valley , how did Crealock know that ?
The fact is , that's were Durnford was ! , his column was camped 2 - 4 miles across the river in Zululand , we had this discussion when we had our disagreement about the number of roads you thought were available in zululand . In one of Smiths books possibly '' Source Documents of the zulu war '' . From memory SD gave the orders to Shepstone ( think it was him ? ) who rode back across the river into Natal , who , then found Durnford on a foraging mission , they then crossed the river back into zululand , went back to their camp and got ready to head to Isandlwana .
Cheers 90th

Hi Gary.

Is this the time that Durnford was obtaining wagons?

Subject: Re: Durnford was he capable.5 Sun Jan 04, 2015 3:01 pm

Hi 90th
Durnfords Camp was reputed to have established on the ridge looking down towards the drift, that's round about a mile plus from the river and a couple of miles from the mission station, the Bashee valley is the valley where Sihayos kraal was set, quite a difference in mileage, in fact close to 4 miles from the ridge to the Bashee crossing itself, so around equal distance from Rd and isandlwana, 6 miles each way.
Cheers
PS WI in the second innings 56 behind and two wickets down

Cheers Mate.

Posts : 2268 Join date : 2010-10-22 Location : France

Mr M. Cooper wrote:: 24th.

You missed out highlighting Frederic's last bit, which was;

JUST A THOUGHT.

Bonjour Martin,
Thank you very much.
I am reallly thinking that i have missed something on this debaten(just a discussion?, really?), certainly my bad English Wink

.

Cheers
Frédéric

Guest

This from J.L. Smails Historical Monuments and Battlefields of Zululand
and Natal. 1965. just interesting for the comment beneath the title,
about Zulu Movements, just a part of a much larger map.

[You must be registered and logged in to see this image.]

Subject: Re: Durnford was he capable.5 Sun Jan 04, 2015 3:13 pm

You are very welcome Frederic.

Salute

Subject: Re: Durnford was he capable.5 Sun Jan 04, 2015 3:22 pm

Nice map Les.

That must have been some size of a tree to use as a bridge for the zulus to cross the river.

Guest

Martin

xhosa

Subject: Re: Durnford was he capable.5 Sun Jan 04, 2015 3:32 pm

90th
Fully expecting your disagreement on the Durnford camp position so:
Raw: Colonel Durnfords camp, about a mile on the Zulu side of Rorkes Drift.
Vause: We had a smart ride of about 12 miles arriving at iSandlwana between 10 and 11
Stafford: We crossed the Blood River and pitched camp on the flat this side of the river.

Cheers Mate

Subject: Re: Durnford was he capable.5 Sun Jan 04, 2015 3:34 pm

Les
Signs of the bad old days when as a white man I needed a permit to get into a 'native reserve', interesting map of Fugitives drift though. changes the arrival point at the drift quite significantly.

Cheers Mate

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