Durnford was he capable.5

24th

Crealock did not lie. In 1882 he showed his notebook order to E Durnford who copied it down. E Durnford included it later in his writings and in letters to newspapers.
The wording is exactly the same as appears in Crealock's 1886 letter to Jekyll/Nicholson.
The only difference between it and the CoI Crealock-memory version is there is nothing about taking command or reinforcing the camp.
Its discovery actually weakened the Crealock-Chelmsford case against Durnford.

Also you wrote at the end of your previous post that E Durnford's remark in his book was 'not true' and that Melvill reminded Pulleine about his orders.
Saying it is 'not true' is not strictly correct. E Durnford was simply not aware of Melvill's comment at the time of writing.

From the 90th.

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Thanks Les
90th .

Written by Crealock.


"Dear Major Jekyl’l’
I imagine you refer to the copy of the orders which I made at 2am 22 January & which was found on the field 7 months later by Colonel Black & forwarded me & which, stained with the mud of the field, lies before me-

A [???] thus & is I believe almost verbatim with what I officially stated to be my memory of it –

“You are to march to this Camp at once with all the force you have with you of No 2 column – Major Bengough battalion is to move to Rorke’s Drift – as ordered yesterday.

2/24: artillery & mounted men with the General I Colonel Glyn move off at once to attack a Zulu force about 10 miles distant

if Bengoughs battalion has crossed the River at Hands Kraal it is to move up here (Naugwane valley)”

I fear I have no longer any of the old maps in which these names appear – but my memory of the time is was meant to present is corroborated by a sketch to which I have first referred

As is as shown by any coloured sketch a most rugged broken country as I have never been called upon officially to enter into the controversy you refer to I have not been mixed up in it.

I however showed Colonel Durnford in my house in 1882[?] the note book with the copy of the orders in it -. So as to put at test (as I hoped) any doubt on the matter

In supplying the Inspector General with this information I imagine I am doing so for official purposes & sanction.

I am faithfully

Crealock

Colonel.

We should be weary of the note book story, as it passed Though the hands of those trying to restore Durnfords reputation.
Luchard also fails to mention that Col Durnford did take command of the camp. Kind of makes a mockery of the note book order. They argue Durnford was not ordered to take command, but both failed to mention he did.

The Letter from: C E Luard

Dear Sir Andrew Clarke,

     Some circumstances of a very remarkable nature in connection with the late Colonel Durnford R.E. one of my predecessors here, have been brought to my notice, & I write to you about them because you are the Head of the Corps, & because you are known as a man who has the power to do whatever you consider should be done.
     I have also written to Sir Linton Simmons, who was T.G.F at the time when Colonel Durnford’s name was so prominently before the public, & to Sir Gerald Graham, whom I believe to have been a personal friend of Colonel Durnford’s,  if General C.G. Gordon were in England I would write to him also, as I know he was a personal friend, & that this is a case in which he would take a great interest.
     If, after reading this correspondence you will confer with Sir Linton Simmons & Sir Gerald Graham, & will let me know what mode of action it has been decided to adopt in this matter, I shall be much obliged, & I beg that you will understand that whatever trouble it may take, or however unpleasant it may render my position here socially, I as a brother Officer & one of the successors of the late Colonel Durnford, am quite prepared to act, if desired, as a local agent in this matter, & to see that justice is done.
     But, after due deliberation I have decided that it is most fit to refer this grave matter in the first instance to officers senior to myself.
     I have to go back to this day six year ago, when Colonel Durnford was killed at Isandhlwana. Despatches & letters were written, statements & speeches were made & ultimately he was made the scapegoat for the disaster; it is only quite recently that an article by a Military writer appeared in “Blackwood” in which the author was evidently still of opinion that Colonel Durnford was mainly responsible for that disaster to our arms, & this must be assumed to be the general impression both with the general public, & also amongst the great majority of military men, & especially with the latter, as the published official account by the Intelligence Department still conveys that impression.
     Prior to the 22nd January 1879 Colonel Durnford received certain orders, & though it was stated soon afterwards & repeated by Lord Chelmsford on the 18th August, & again on the 2nd September 1880 in the House of Lords that Colonel Durnford had received orders to take charge of the camp at Isandhlwana, it subsequently transpired from Colonel Crealock on the 18th may 1882, i.e. nearly three & a half years afterwards by a reference to his note book, that Colonel Durnford had not received orders to take charge of that camp. It must be apparent to any Military man that it never could have been intended that he should have assumed that charge, being at the time in independent command of another column of the army, more especially as not a word appears to have said, either to Colonel Glyn whose camp it was, or to Colonel Pulleine who was left in temporary charge of it, that such a change of command was contemplated! It was also intended to move the camp on up-country as soon as possible.
     When Colonel Durnford arrived at the camp, he, as senior officer present seems to have taken cognizance of the state of affairs, so far as it was possible for a man in his position to do, & he stated distinctly that he was not going to remain in camp, an expression of which he certainly would not have made use, had orders been conveyed to him that he was to do so. On the contrary there can be no doubt now that he proceeded on his way to join & help his general in the battle that was supposed to be going on at the front.
     However the military authorities refused to allow the question of relative responsibility for the disaster at Isandhlwana to be re opened, & the stigma attached to Colonel Durnford’s name never having been publicly removed, will remain till that is done.
     But what became of the original order, which was sent to Colonel Durnford? & it is mainly in connection with that subject that I now address you.
     For four months the bodies of our slaughtered soldiers laid unburied on the field of Isandhlwana, within eight miles of a British force, & with no one to oppose their burial, but on the 21st May 1879 a cavalry force under General Marshall, composed of the K.D.Gs, the Natal Carbineers, &c., visited the field & buried some of the bodies, including Colonel Durnford’s.
     In the Natal Witness for the 27th May, & in the supplement of the 7th June, a sentence occurred as follows “after the papers & “maps found on Durnford’s person had been removed, a pile of “stones was heaped over the body.”
     It has been stated to me that this sentence about “the papers “& maps,” was originated by a telegram which was received by the Editor of the Witness from a Mr. Dormer, then at Ladysmith, that this gentleman received the information on which his telegram was based directly from the mouth of a Mr. Alfred Davis, one of the proprietors of the Witness newspaper, who was anxious to find the remains of his brother who had fallen at Isandhlwana, that, being at Rorke’s Drift in May 1879, & having been a member of the Natal Carbineers Mr. Davis seized the opportunity of one of that Corps being ill to borrow his arms & accoutrements & uniform & accompany the Natal Carbineers, that he found his brother’s body & took form the pocket of the jacket his sister’s letter, written only a few days before the disaster, which tends to show how little the remains had been disturbed since the battle, that Colonel Durnford’s body was found at the same spot & that he Mr. Davis rode past haste to Ladysmith, where he met Mr. Dormer &, being very much fatigued, gave him (Mr. Dormer who was correspondent of another paper) the information for himself, on condition that he would telegraph it to the Witness – which he did.
     A friend of Colonel Durnford’s, on seeing this sentence in the Witness, went & questioned a certain Theophilus Shepstone about it, having been the officer in command of the party of Natal Carbineers who found & buried Colonel Durnford’s body, & his reply was that it was quite a mistake, there was no papers of any kind, & could not have been as there was no coat. So the matter was dropped, the questioner having at that time full confidence in the truth of Captain Shepstone’s statement.
     But on the 22nd May 1879, i.e. the day after the visit to the field of the battle of Isandhlwana, veterinary Surgeon Longhurst K.D.G. writing home to his friends in England, described the burial of Colonel Durnford at which he had been present, & mentioned amongst other articles taken from his body before burial “a letter”. When Mr. Longhurst’s letter reached its destination a friend of the Durnford family was present, & heard it read aloud, & Colonel E. Durnford about it, who at once wrote out to Natal to request that enquries might be made. Mr. Longhurst was then in the Transvaal but on his return & before arriving at Pietermaritzburg, he was purposely interviewed by Asst. Comm. General Elmes & he then verbally confirmed what he had previously written home a week afterwards, however during which time he had been in P.M. Burg he declined to answer any questions on the subject.
     The K.D.Gs went from Natal to India. Colonel E. Durnford wrote twice, at intervals of six months, to Mr. Longhurst, but these letters were not replied to. A third letter was written & sent to Mr.. Longhurst’s Commanding Officer, Colonel Master, to be given to Mr. Longhurst, who then, three years having now elapsed since the battle of Isandhlwana, replied, confirming in the most circumstantial way his previous letter. A copy of this letter was sent to Natal to a friend of the late Colonel Durnford, who, anxious that Captain Shepstone would have every chance of proving his innocence or of confessing privately, stipulated that he should be told privately of the contents of Mr. Longhurst’s statement.
     Captain Shepstone met with a complete denial. But I am informed that he did not merely say “I took no papers”, but added, “I could not have taken any because there was no coat on the body.”
     Captain Shepstone then wrote to Colonel E. Durnford, & sent the names of four persons, viz. Mr. Royston, Mr. Cook, Mr. Macfarlane, & Yabez Mulife, (a Basuto who had been attendant on the late Colonel Durnford), as persons who would support by affidavit the statement that there was no papers & no coat on the body when found.  
     Captain Shepstone subsequently forwarded affidavits Mr. Royston, Mr. Cook & Yabez Mulife, but not one from Mr. Macfarlane. On these affidavits being forwarded to Natal they were examined by a friend of Colonel Durnford’s, & they seemed in several respects so insufficient & unsatisfactory that further reference was made to Captain Shepstone, who caused Mr. Cook to make a second affidavit.
     By this time very grave suspicions had arisen in the minds of the late Colonel Durnford’s friends that the original orders sent to that officer had been found on his body & concealed, & enquiries were then set on foot with the view of obtaining further information, especially to ascertain whether the body of the late Colonel Durnford had or had not a coat upon it when it was found.
      The result of these enquiries seems to establish beyond a doubt the fact that he had a coat on at that time.
      I must now proceed to explain the position occupied by Captain Shepstone. This gentleman usually known in Natal as “Offy” is the son of Sir Theophilus Shepstone, & is a prominent member of the most powerful & influential family in this Colony. He himself is one of the most astute lawyers in the Colony, & is what is termed a general favourite.
      The evidence will be laid before you in extenso presently, but I may say that, when it was far less complete than it is now, the case was submitted to an English Barrister who said it was strong enough to take into any English Court of Justice, i.e. in the Natal Court he seemed to doubt whether justice might be so readily obtained against so powerful & public a man.
     It was subsequently submitted privately to a trustworthy lawyer in Natal, who gave it as his private opinion that the case was strong enough to justify any judge in requiring the other side to disprove it, & he has since admitted that if the case were brought into Court. Captain Shepstone must be ruined.
     Nevertheless, as an instance of the powerful position held by the Shepstone family in Natal this gentleman whilst giving his private opinion as a friend, refused absolutely to have anything to do with the conduct of the case under any circumstances, as, if he took it up, whether he won or lost it, his position would be rendered so unpleasant that he could scarcely continue to live in the Colony.
     I had thought of obtaining an interview with Captain Shepstone, with the view of attempting to get to the bottom of this matter, but I am of opinion that I should not be doing right in taking that step. He has had three chances of clearing himself, & has not availed himself of those chances. In fact it is chiefly due to his attempt to prove too much that the establishment of his guilt has been rendered possible. I do not believe that I am at liberty to render myself individually liable to any legal action which the subtlety of the law might devise, a liability which should be born, if at all, by the Secretary of State for War.
     The course which seems the right one to take is that I, as representing the Secretary of State for War, should receive authority to engage the services of a well qualified lawyer, who should be instructed in the first instance to have a private interview with Captain Shepstone, lay before him sufficient evidence to convince him, if he is open to conviction, that his case is one which is sure to go against him if brought into Court, & ask him whether he has anything to urge against a criminal information for theft being laid against him personally.
     If he then admits the truth of the charge, & states that he is not alone responsible, & can produce evidence which shall be satisfactory, i.e. if he states – his statement being duly supported; that he took these papers & handed them over to some one else, the prosecution might be diverted to some one even more guilty than himself.
     If, on the other hand, Captain Shepstone on being interviewed, adhered to his denial, I should have authority to take immediate steps to prosecute him, or take such steps as the law may empower, including the appointment of commissions to take the evidence of those persons in India or elsewhere whose evidence is so important.
     I may say that there is one lawyer in Natal in whose ability to conduct such a case & in whose entrepidity to undertake it, regardless of consequences, I should have full confidence, & I should be prepared, if duly authorised, to instruct him accordingly.
     But as it is possible that, for some reason or other, at present unknown (for I have not communicated with him.) that gentleman may decline to undertake the case, it would be most advisable that a well qualified should be sent from England with full instructions how to proceed, & who should act, if possible, with the lawyer above referred to, who otherwise would be secured by the defendant.
     It is, however, for consideration whether, if prosecution has to be undertaken such action should be instituted in our English Court or in a Natal Court, for it must be borne in mind that several of the most important witnesses are colonial gentlemen who are intimately aquainted with, & are in some cases personal friends of Captain Shepstone & the temptation to avoid the consequences of having been instrumental in ruining that gentleman viz the weight of displeasure which could be exerted by members of his powerful family, might have a deterrent effect in obtaining confirmatory of the statements they have made.
     This is a point which should be determined beforehand & on which I should receive instructions, but it is manifest that much care would have to be taken to ensure the arrangements being such as will conduce to success & not to failure.
     But, whatever course it is decided to adopt, I wish it to be clearly understood that it is not in the smallest degree from what is termed a feeling of revenge, that any of these preliminary steps have been undertaken.
     All who have been interested in this matter have worked from no other feeling than the earnest desire that a gallant soldier who, whatever others may have done, did his duty nobly & well, shall not be defamed. They have felt as I feel that no conduct is more disgraceful, no act more cowardly, than defamation of the dead.
     Captain Shepstone is one whose connection with the case must be considered from an abstract point of view. I am only one of a vast number of people who would regard his conviction as a matter most sad in itself, but justice must take its course, &, if convicted he must take on his own head the full consequence of his crime. Something will at all events been done to show what means were adopted to ruin the reputation of as gallant a soldier as ever breathed."

I am                                                              
Dear Sir Andrew Clarke                           
Yours vy truly           
C E Luard.

Source: The Sun Turned Black - Ian Knight.

You could be right!

Luchard says.

"It must be apparent to any Military man that it never could have been intended that he should have assumed that charge"

Well it seems it wasn't apparent to Col Anthony Durnford. But then again Luchard did say any Military man"

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JAZWHS 4th ed Dec 1998

Little hand

Nangwane not Naugwane

John

Re Black's discovery - what utter nonsense.  Don't you think Crealock might have noticed that something was crossed out??? Don't you think E Durnford might have noticed??? You're not talking about the antics of Del Boy here remember.

Re Luard's letter you might like to look at the actual date of his letter and whether that keys in with your suppositions rather with the date implied (but not stated) in the work from which you have quoted the passage.  It's important as the trail of logic rather falls apart.

Re the 'argument' - Cochrane who was present in the tent mentions nothing about an argument - not even a hint of one or a euphemism of one.
Stafford was outside the tent and only half-heard what was going on - where are the details? - LOOK at the date of Stafford's account.

JW wrote:

John
Re Black's discovery - what utter nonsense. I'm not even going to dignify it with a response

I wasn't really expecting a response, but I'm happy with the one, you wrote. Best not to start up-rooting the found in the draw theory. To many of the Coleno clan involved.

John
I DID decide to give you a response after all. It seemed only right.

John it's actually Colenso , I know ctsg isnt a fan of the Colenso's , and for what reason I'm not sure , what's your reason ? , you both dont seem to believe anything that has to do with , or come via the Colenso clan , maybe ctsg , and yourself , can enlighten the rest of us , as to why you , or both of you , hold little regard to the Colenso family .
90th

90th, If you use the search button, there is a lot on the forum, from CTSG on the Colenso's that would answer your question.

Here is just one of his posts from another thread...

CTSG wrote:

Subject: Re: The Battle of Isandlwana- The Missing Five Hours Wed Oct 06, 2010 12:22 am Reply with quote




Well gentleman, I continued reading the article on the missing five hours, but have given up. Why you may ask! Because the maps involved in the document (i.e.) x marks the spot were in the hands of Edward Durnford. Sent to him by Wood. The maps in-question when on publication Jan 1880 A year after the event.

Page 13 Read from “Confirmation that Wood”

Then go to page 14 read from “I return the two maps.

The author also writes “Thus it is apparent that Wood Conjecturally showed sympathy towards Anthony Durnford cause, and Edwards closing statement “With many thanks for your friendship”

For me it’s back to the Washing of the Spears. I have not read the entire document, its pointless for me, as I’m fully aware of the scandal that was being pushed by Colenso & co against the Good Lord Chelmsford. And I certainly will not take into account any new evidence that involves Edward Durnford. Maybe the Authors of the Missing Five Hours sit firmly in the Colenso & Durnford camp.

PS. Map 1 seems to have dissappeared. That would be the one that Edward never got his hands on. The map that shows the true positions.. Idea



_________________
"Dear Durnford,
Unless you carry out the instructions I give you, it will be my unpleasant duty to remove you from your command, and to substitute another officer for the commander of No. 2 Column. When a column is acting SEPARATELY in an enemy's country I am quite ready to give its commander every latitude, and would certainly expect him to disobey any orders he might receive from me, if information which he obtained showed that it would be injurious to the interests of the column under his command. I trust you will understand this plain speaking and not give me any further occasion to write in a style, which is distasteful to me."

Thanks Littlehand .
90th

A real weakness in the arguments put forward on this subject is the blinkered approach which says. "I have not read it because i do not like, or I disagree with, the person who wrote it". The only way to resolve things is to study the literature, wherever it comes from, and critique the content. Closing your mind to something because you dislike the author is not sound historical research.

Steve

Not weakness, there just different opinions.

You cannot have an opinion on something you have not read.

Steve

You can, if you feel the document in floored at the early stages.

xhosa2000 wrote:

From the 90th.

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tahelane spur
Cavaye and Mostyn, postion that seems along way off from the camp. With just 70 rounds of ammunition.

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You can't if you want it to be taken seriously I am afraid!

Steve

Different opinions. Makes the world go around.

Mr Greaves
The map posted by xhosa for me isnt to scale , my best guesstimate from the ( Left ) edge of the camp to the Tahelane 700 - 900 mtrs ? . Someone on here may have a better idea , Ken Gillings would probably know . I do have some pics taken from the Nyoni Rock - Nquthu Ridge looking toward the right of Isandlwana and showing the Tahelane spur area , not sure if xhosa has posted them previously , Pete does have them as well .
90th

Mr Greaves
your comment '' Different opinions makes the world go around '' , that's exactly the trouble with these threads , they go round and round and continue to do so . But hey , who cares , people are entitled to think and believe what they see fit , it all depends if they are open to change and wish to have an open mind I suppose . Forgot to add , 70 rounds per man is a lot I suppose when your are fighting Natives with spears ! , say two companies , about 150 - 170 men x 70 = 10,500 or 11,900 rounds , seems a lot of Ammo to me ! .
90th

little hand
Re your post quoting something CTSG wrote....what CTSG failed to mention is that the X was indicated to Wood by Henderson (you remember, the bloke that said Durnford was 'off his head' - no fan of Durnford then!)
And yet CTSG is rejecting it because the map passed through Wood's hands...!....CTSG both wants his cake and eats it too!
It's the old, old story - if you make your mind up first and then try to find only evidence that fits your version and ignore the rest then what you get is bad history and untruth.
Amateurish.

For those who ask why were the troops so well forward?, this is one opinion..

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JAZWHS..5th ed June 1999.

Xhosa
I must point out that the text in this work is inaccurately copied from the original primary source. There are errors of detail. It is good enough to use as a reference but not to quote from without checking the primary source.

Well there is your cue my friend to go into detail,
and correct it..its for those other members who
wish to follow the debate, but don't necessarily
post..

Xhosa

para 14 should read

(14) Outposts, should be posted far
in advance of the Camp -
and as a rule they should be
placed on the ground, best suited
for defence.
At least one sixth of the Total
Force should be employed on
this duty.
When thought desirable, a group
of six, instead of four, may be
placed on the line of sentries.
In this case, a double instead
of a single sentry, will be on
the alert. Supports will be required
equally in both cases.

para 15 should read

(15) In order to obtain the earliest infor=
=mation of a night attack, being
intended, a group of British Infan=
=try (six men), and a section of
Natives (10 men), under an Officer
should be pushed well forward to
the Front, and to the rear, and
to, each flank of the outposts
just before dark. These groups
of (16) men, should be at least 500
yards in front of the Line of
outposts, and should be instructed
to fire Volleys in case the enemy
is discovered to be advancing.
Each of the four parties should
be provided with a Lantern, and
Flags, so that when having to fall
back to the outpost they may not
be fired on by their own side.
They should also have the counter=
=sign given to them.

Julian has already published them in full, together with copies of the original, in his "Studies of the Zulu War 1879: Vol 1."

Steve

rusteze/Xhosa
As so often with primary docs the punctuation and exact wording is important which is why in the work Rusteze mentioned I published the text exactly as it appears in the original and also included photos of the original docs.

Yes i have most if not all of JW's pub work..trigger happy
is a phrase that springs to mind!

I was highlighting someone else's comment previous.. why?
were the troop deployments so far advanced? are we saying
Pulleine was not acting strictly according to his lordship's
orders?..what happened to the column commanders orders?..
funny they should all go missing! and as always i keep firmly
in my mind the heading of the topic......

Did both Pulleine and Durnford carry out their respective orders
faithfully..

Julian..thank you for the corrections, i knew you would..
Steve, read it thoroughly..my querys cover more than semantics..

Les

I was responding to Julian's point about the need to reproduce texts accurately by pointing out where an accurate text could be found. That's all.

Less of the finger wagging please. Trigger happy my foot.

steve

K steve fair enough, the article raises important points
directly concerning this debate, i took note that neither
Julian or yourself undertook to respond to them..xhosa

That's fine. Your text highlighting Greaves views about Chelmsford's directions for defensive formations is well made and relevant.

Steve

xhosa2000 wrote:

From the 90th.

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Nice image. How accurate is the drawing.

Hi Chard
It's accurate as it was prepared by the resident Tour guide Rob Gerrard who is based at Isandlwana Lodge , he gave me some copies when I was there in April 2014 , which I've sent to a couple of people , obviously xhosa being one . It isnt to scale but it is what it is , the distances are vast on the battlefield , which I knew of before I went , but you can't really appreciate how great these distances are till you see them first hand , and for the lay of the land , it's difficult terrain , as I've said many times , if you are back toward the mountain , but still on the plain , you cant see the sizable zulu village , which is hidden in the dead ground , in the middle of the plain !
90th

To give a slight perspective of distance..

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Pic's courtesy of the 90th.

Hi Les
Thanks for posting those couple of pics , it certainly does put it into perspective .
90th

Chard1879 wrote:

xhosa2000 wrote:

From the 90th.

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Nice image. How accurate is the drawing.

Who was actually responsible for sending the men so far from the camp, or on a serious note where they put there to cover Durnfords retreat.

Ulundi
LC did have a say where the troops were to be positioned , which has been mentioned many times on here over the years , Pulleine set his defences as per instructions in the booklet handed to column commanders and high ranking officers , Pulleine needed a certain amount of area to set up his defence etc etc , Pearson also used the same strategies , as per the booklet , also on the 22nd Jan 1879 at Nyezane . Basically this means Pulleine was adopting the defences set out by LC in his booklet . I even think xhosa posted the diagram only a week or so ago ! .
90th

Back on topic!

Ulundi.
Who was actually responsible for sending the men so far from the camp, or on a serious note where they put there to cover Durnfords retreat.[/quote]

[quote="Ulundi"]

Chard1879 wrote:

xhosa2000 wrote:

From the 90th.

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Nice image. How accurate is the drawing.

Who was actually responsible for sending the men so far from the camp, or on a serious note where they put there to cover Durnfords retreat.

Ulundi sorry about the rubbish, being posted prior to this one.

Ulundi. From a very good friend of mine.



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Think i know who your good friend is, but he seems
a bit confused as to who ordered the troops out of
camp! one requested support ( Durnford ) the other
picked the companies and the placement. ( Pulleine ).

What is not rubbish is the fact that the third column
had a fatal flaw! in taking command Chelmsford
removed from Glyn all operational decisions which
became more and more evident as the machine
trundled on to Isandhlwana..Clery layed out the camp,
and almost at once its inherent danger became
apparent to senior officer's some of who voiced grave
misgivings as did Glyn himself..so in effect the die
was cast.. from the very onset!. they would get much
much worse owing to the C IN C South Africa's complete
ineptitude and complacency.

Chelmsfordthescapegoat wrote:

Ulundi.
Who was actually responsible for sending the men so far from the camp, or on a serious note where they put there to cover Durnfords retreat.

[quote="Ulundi"][quote="Chard1879"]

xhosa2000 wrote:

From the 90th.


Who was actually responsible for sending the men so far from the camp, or on a serious note where they put there to cover Durnfords retreat.

Ulundi sorry about the rubbish, being posted prior to this one.

Ulundi. From a very good friend of mine.

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Thanks CTSG. I will give that some thought.

Good Post CTSG. Sent you a Message

The above no longer makes any sense! sequentially
its all over the place, and if you think that i am
talking rubbish on this, read the thread down from
time. 8.24.