Durnford was he capable.5

Quote: Another though:
We think that the mission of Durnford was to go to the Mangeni (Crealock's order).
Strangly, Chelmsford, Crealock, Glyn, Cleary were not surprised during the day not to see him in this area.
Would you like to go into that a bit more, not to sure where you are with it?

Regards

I wonder what the result would have been, if Chelmsford had ordered Durnford to go to Dartnells assisitence. ?

Hi Ray
Interesting question!
When Chelmsford arrived at the Mangeni area most of his men were on foot trudging rather slowly up and down the hills. Durnford however with his 250 mounted men plus Dartnels mounted men would have covered ground a lot faster, and a lot more ground. A lot more Zulu would have fallen to them Im sure. But still they would not have been near the camp area so no effect there.

Morning Frederic/all.

I like your hypothesis, which I think is credible in terms of Chelmsford's intentions for the camp as things stood at breakfast time at Mangeni on 22nd.

1. We know that Isandhlwana camp was to be a temporary stopover, so Chelmsford expected the whole of the remaining column to join him, including Durnford, (perhaps over two or three days).

2. His early morning order to Durnford to come up to the camp either meant he should join him as a separate force (as per the earlier order), or he wanted Durnford to accompany the remainder of the column on their move to Mangeni. No other option existed at that time.

3. Proper use of Durnford's force in the latter context would be to act as a screen for the slow moving column.

3. Gardner arrived at the camp at about 12.00 with Chelmsford's orders for Pulleine to pack up the camp. That means he must have left Chelmsford about two or three hours earlier. Chelmsford would not have known where Durnford was at that time, so it is perhaps not surprising he does not mention Durnford specifically.

In fact, Gardner left Mangeni before Durnford got to Isandhlwana and, as Frank says, arrived there after he had left.

4. Knight says that when Gardner was delivering the orders to Pulleine to begin packing up the camp it became clear that the camp was under attack. Gardner advised Pulleine to disregard Chelmsford's order at that point.

Steve

Frank,
I agree with most of your arguments, they are logics.
You say: (...) "Chelmsford could only have made up his mind to move camp much later in the day, during the breakfast maybe?"
As you know, during the breakfast, the 22 January, Chelsmford sent HB to isandhlwana to help Pulleine.
You say, "in this case, there could not have ben an order to Durnford".
Why? Because Chelmsford supposed that at the arrival of HB at isandhlwana, Durnford was not here.
So where was Durnford in the spirit of Chelsmford?
On the road to the Mangeni?
In this hypothesis, Chelsmford was waiting his arrival in the area of The Mangeni, no?
Or, there are no testimonies by him or others senior officers "about their surprise" not to see Durnford in the area of the Mangeni during the day.
From memory, Chelsmford learn that Durnford was stayed at Isandhlwana only about 3 PM with the receipt of the Gardner's message ("basutos are retired).
You say: "there surley would have a mention by either".
Surely, but remember how and when the realty of the "crealock's order" to Durnford has been known.

About no "preplan" to move the camp on the 22 january, you  are probably right...but .

Amitiés.

Frédéric

Bonjour Steve,

Many thanks for your help.
I am in difficulty on the dancefloor, my dance's professor moves to fast for me!!!
I enjoy yours points.

Cheers

frédéric

Frank Allewell wrote:

Hi Ray
Interesting question!
When Chelmsford arrived at the Mangeni area most of his men were on foot trudging rather slowly up and down the hills. Durnford however with his 250 mounted men plus Dartnels mounted men would have covered ground a lot faster, and a lot more ground. A lot more Zulu would have fallen to them Im sure. But still they would not have been near the camp area so no effect there.

Altering History abit more , regarding the camp. Durnford would not have been there to send out scouts, therefore the Zulu would have remained hidden.

Frederic
Without a doubt I don't believe that Chelmsford could have moved his camp without a great deal of mounted support, from that point I fully agree with you. When Gardner was sent back was it to tell Pullein to pack up the whole camp or just for those already out? Im sure it was for the elements already at Mangeni. So the points you raise bring more questions in that: If you are wrong, then what would the Guard have been for close to 100 wagons? Dartnells mounted volunteers weren't ear marked for it, they had already off saddled and were brewing tea. So who did Chelmsford have in mind, a couple of companies of the 24th from the camp? That would have really depleted the force.
Your theory makes a lot of sense my friend. Having said that now how would the instructions/requirements have been communicated. Do you think its possible that Chelmsford would have left the escort up to Pullein to arrange? Or would he have anticipated Durnford would have taken charge? If its the former then would be not be breaching protocol. And if its the later, and it should have been, why didn't Gardner say that? A further extension, do you think its possible that Smith had something to say and has gone unrecorded by history?

Just a couple of things to keep your toes tapping.

Cheers

Ray quite right, but to take it a step further. If Chelmsford had sent Durnford, would he still have gone himself? And that raises a whole new question I think.

cheers

But then Glyn would have been in command. Would he have done things differently ?

But based on LC and Durford relationship. Not sure he would have gone with Durnford.

How long do you think in would have taken Durnford and Dartnell, to get back to the camp if they had been recalled due to enermy activity around the camp. Based on if LC had sent Durnford to assist Dartnell.

Frank,
You made a very good point with your argument about the mounted men of Dartnell and the companies of the 24th (for the move of the camp).

I think, we don't know, today, all the pieces of the puzzle.
They are too many inconsistencies.
The "official history" built by the authors about some points (the 22 january) is for me not logic: as the Durnford's orders, the moving of the camp.
Chelsmford is certainly questionable for the Isandhlwana campaign. It is not the case for the second invasion. Chelsmford was not stupid or mad.
He was a seasoned staff officer.
He was rewarded for this quality (Order of the Bath)
So the lack of clarity of his order to Durnford the 22nd january and the decisions taken the same day are not logics and remain a mystery for me.
He had a defect, specially for a General, his indecision.

According to Gardner, effectively, only partial removal of the camp was considered by Chelmsford.
The Captain Gardner was a staff officer not the Major Stuart Smith of the RA.
It seems that the return of Smith at Isandhlwana has been made on his own decision.
So, unfortunately for my hypothesis, i think that Smith "has nothing to say" about the moving of the camp (from Chelmsford).

I think the answers to yours questions about the moving of the camp are "with Durnford".
But i am actually unable to build "a logical thread" with him!!!

Merci pour votre aide.
Amitiés.

Ray
It took Chelmsford two hours in the morning to ride from the camp to Mangeni, so I imagine that with a bit of urgency maybe 90 to 100 minutes.
Cheers

Frederic I think the award of the Order of the Bath was well deserved and I take nothing away from that but its akin to a man that serves 30 years for a company then gets given a gold watch and kicked out.
But you are so right there are so many questions. Possibly we do tend to over think and look for the complex when the simple is more suited. Sherlock Holmes springs to mind.
Having walked across that plain and seen really how open and 'non threatening' it seems there is allways the possibility that a strong escort wasn't really required. After all Chelmsfords only worry was 'getting the Zulu to fight'. If you look at the various documents and see how many trips took place across that plain over a 24 hour period, from Lt Brown to Lt Wash to Dartnell to Maorie Browne plus many many more, it was almost like a stroll around the park. So maybe just maybe an escort wasn't deemed required. We do tend to look at things in retrospect and think that while all these various parties were traipsing across the plain an army of 20000 was just a stones throw away with some very sharp sticks.
So if we accept therefore that Chelmsford wasn't concerned about an escort it still leaves the issue of how he could have expected pullein to pack up around 50% of the camp and transport it across the plain through some really horrendous dongas.

Happy thinking.

Cheers

Frank,
To be honest during the last your, i have imagined the same scénario. I have in mind thé testimony of HB about thé picnic and thé words of Crealock...

Frank,
With your last explanation, "the puzzle" of the move of the camp seems OK...
In this view the unconsciousness of Chelmford is terrible and incredible.
I am grateful to you for your useful help to understand this battle.

But there are still unanswered questions;
For example
where was Durnford in the spirit of Chelsmford the 22 January?
On the road to the Mangeni?
In this hypothesis, Chelsmford was waiting his arrival in the area of The Mangeni, no?
Curiously, there are no testimonies by him or others senior officers "about their surprise" not to see Durnford in the area of the Mangeni during the day.
It seems to me that the answer of this question is useful for the comprehension of the order given to Durnford (Crelaock's order) in Chelmsford's mind.

Amitiés.

Frédéric

I.E: I will remember the lesson . As you know, it's the second time i made the same mistake ("look for the complex when the simple is more suited")    

Frederic
Weve had some really long and exhaustive, at times acrimonious discussions about the Durnford/Chelmsford relationship. As you know there are many theories on his orders, his succession of orders, the links between those orders etc. I honestly believe without any shadow of proof that Chelmsford wanted Durnford brought up to the camp as a natural part of his staged advance. In other words brought to iSandlwana to wait for the orders to advance further. really no more than that. Durnford was very obviously in his, Chelmsfords, mind as the orders to do so where sent down to RD.
So again for me the simple approach.
The issue of Mangeni as being Durnfords destination isn't for me really. I know that can still be debated, and probably should be, but for me its a 'Red Herring". Eventually he would have got there but not in the short term.
The key to virtually ever single contentious issue at iSandlwana is Crealock. I live in hope that one day in some long forgotten trunk in a dusty attic there will be found a comprehensive private diary.

Bonsoir Frank,
Your hypothesis seems to me plausible.
I see, maybe, only one "little" note, not really a objection.
You wrote:"Chelmsford wanted Durnford brought up (...) to iSandlwana to wait for the orders to advance further".
So, why Lord Chelmsford did not give him the command of the camp (as his arrival), as senior Officier at Isandhlwana?
Clery in the order given par him to Pulleine said: your are in command of the camp during the absence of Glyn.
We know that the orders by Chelmsford to  HB and Gardner about the moving of the camp contained any mention about Durnford.
Your answer on this subject (about HB) is: Chelsmford didn'it know if Chelsmford is arrived at Isandhlwana.
Steve told us of a period of two to three days to Durnford before his arrival at Isandhlwana (in the Chelmsford's mind).
Effectively, with this last argument i understand why Chelsmford did not give the command to the camp to Durnford.
So i  will continue to work on this subject.  :  
I have in mind the analyse par Mister Whybra in his essay the "Durnford's papers"
Thanks again for your patience and the time taken with me.  : :
Amitiés.

Frédéric

Morning Frederic
I think a question we should possibly ask our selves when looking at this whole 'who was in command' issue and 'does the senior officer take automatic control', is that a couple of days before' Durnford was ordered up to Rorkes Drift, then the general tenor of his instruction was no different, broadly speaking, to the order issued on the morning of the 22nd.
With that in mind the question that needs to be asked is: ' Why did Durnford not take command of Rorkes Drift from Spalding.'The answer really amongst the convoluted conventions of the Victorian military structures would be, it wasn't his place to do so. Really as simple as that.
Apply this to the arrival at iSandlwana, theres no difference in the two situations really.

Or am I getting to simplistic?

Regards

PS Fully agree on the quality of Julians paper, but as with anything they can be questioned and debated.
PPS Keith Smiths thesis on the NNC Commanders is currently being absorbed.

Hello Frank,

Congretulation, sincerly!
Thé note by Crealock on this subject by Crealock ait thé COI mâkes a sence...
Amitié
Frédéric

I don't think a half-way house along the lines of the Bashee camp makes sense - Durnford didn't have the men or equipment with him to do it - no pioneers, no engineers, no entrenching tools, no waggons with camping equipage.
I don't think the escort idea works either - same reason - the NNC, the Rocket Battery - why?

Julian
Agree on both points.

mister Whybra,
Thank you for this pertinent advice.
Cheers
Frédéric

Right, back to watching SA being thrashed by India.

Shouldn't have bothered ive had more interest reading CTSGs posts.

Frank Allewell wrote:

Shouldn't have bothered ive had more interest reading CTSGs posts.

Is that a compliment Or insult. I agree must posts are more interesting.

Julian Whybra wrote:

I don't think a half-way house along the lines of the Bashee camp makes sense - Durnford didn't have the men or equipment with him to do it - no pioneers, no engineers, no entrenching tools, no waggons with camping equipage.
I don't think the escort idea works either - same reason - the NNC, the Rocket Battery - why?

Bonsoir Mister Whybra,

I suppose your answer must be understood only in the context of the 22 January

Some notes about your two points:

#First:
A outpost is not necessary fortified.
It seems to me that Chelsmford (or others senior Officers) had given no intruction to Dunbar about the entrchment of his post.
Chelsmford even told Dunbar "in case of a night attack to use the bayonet!"(Hill of the Sphinx).
So it was not necessary a problem for Durnford not to have pioners, engineers...
A outpost can be made only for a few hours (I.E: camping equipage).
But effectively, the hypothesis was not plausible in the context of the 22 January.

#Second point:
In the same logic, if Durnford's mission (crealock's order / 22 January) was to go to the Mangeni (in Chelsmford's mind), why Chelmsford's wrote to Durnford to take with him the Native infantry and the rocket battery?
In the first hours of the 22 january, a battle was expected by Chelmsford, the speed of The Durnford's column was also expected.
I see an argument for the hypothesis of Frank.
I.E: The Crelaock's order was for Durnford to stay à Isandhlwana to wait for the orders to advance further, not to go to the Mangeni.

Cheers

Frédéric

No matter how one construes the order received by Durnford, the fact is the wording on that order, does not mention Durnford leaving the camp, he was to remain there. It doesn’t matter, if LC had intended Durnford to do something else.  What we think may have been, or what should have been is neither here or there.

On the 14th January,  The dispatch from Chelmsford was forthright and to the point:

First few lines of the letter“Dear Durnford,
Unless you carry out the instructions I give you, it will be my unpleasant duty to remove you from your command, and to substitute another officer for officer for the commander of No. 2 Column. “

Adds weight and evidence to the effect that Dunford fails to follow instructions.


"22nd, Wednesday, 2.00am

"You are to march to this camp at one with all the forces you have with you of No 2 column.  Major Bengough's Battalion is to move to Rorke's Drift as ordered yesterday.  2/24th Artillery and mounted men with the General and Colonel Glyn move off to at once attack a zulu force about ten miles instant."

Looking at the last order, where does it state leave the camp? Where does it say Reinforce LC or protect LC.

Durnford possibly did think he was doing the right thing, and what would have been expected of him.
But in carrying out those actions he clearly disobeyed orders.

Is it not time to close the History Books on the Scape-Goat issue. The last order, really says it all.

Bonsoir Littlehand,

You wrote: "the last order, really says it all".
Clearly for you and others members, not for me.
Cheers.

Frédéric

But you are unable to bring anything new to the table, that's based on evidence, that contradicts the last order. It can only be based on speculation, and that's all it can ever be.

littlehand wrote:

But you are unable to bring anything new to the table, that's based on evidence, that contradicts the last order. It can only be based on speculation, and that's all it can ever be.

Littlehand,

If the answer is "so easy" as you say,
Why so many books have been written on the subject?
Why the opinions of the authors are divergent ?(see for example HCMDB by Snook and Zulu Victory by Lock and Quantrill)
Why are you on this forum? (it's not really a question / see no offense)
Cheers.

Frédéric

That's a very good point. The authors are doing what we are. Giving their opinions of what they think happened. But none can challenge the wording of the last order. The Order was binding on Dunford, his interpretation and actions of that order, was partly to blame for the loss of the camp.

To make it clear. Quite a large portion of the blame.

LH wrote:

Is it not time to close the History Books on the Scape-Goat issue. The last order, really says it all.

Agree.

There are enough Military men on the forum, CTSG is a prime example, to know that there are 'General Orders' issued. Such a one was the order to Durnford from Chelmsford. It was an order to move forward on the next stage of the advance. Such 'General Orders are exactly that, general.
LH your quite right it did not list all the actions you say. But there are many others it failed to list, where to camp, where to park his waggons, indeed what to do with his men. Simply the amount of negatives that would have to be covered would be treating senior officers like children. Can you imagine the whole list of dos and donts? It would make order issuing untenable. Senior officers, column commanders hell even humble NCOs do on occasion make use of there brain and experience to take a command decision. Russell did it, chasing around the Mangeni area, Dartnel did it by staying out, Maorie disobeyed a direct order by not going to the camp, he took a command decision to climb a hill and go on the defence. The rocket Battery did the same by deviating from their line of march, the artillery battery turned back to assist the camp, all command decisions.
Ive never yet seen an order issued that could cover any eventuality.
Theres far to much read into Crealocks order to Durnford. It was a simple command to continue the advance into Zulu land, nothing more nothing less. Possibly not the order that Chelmsford wanted nor expected, but maybe he should have been a touch more diligent in issuing or checking?

Cheers

CTSG
Not an insult just an attempt at humour and to show my disgust at my national bloody cricket teams inept performance.

I can see what Littlehand is saying about Durnford obeying the last order given to him by Chelmsford - or at least, Crealock's interpretation of it.

But It cannot be left there, because Chelmsford issues further orders at breakfast on the 22nd to begin moving the rest of the Isandhlwana camp before Durnford had even arrived there.

It is not credible that he meant Durnford to remain at Isandhlwana by himself, so only two options remain, both of which entail Durnford leaving the camp.

Either to act as a screen for the remaining column, or join Chelmsford in hunting the Impi.

Which of those options was in Chelmsford's mind at the time is what we are, quite rightly, discussing.

Nobody expected, or planned for an overwhelming Zulu attack on the camp, least of all Chelmsford. What Durnford and Pulleine did about that is not what this discussion is about. It has been done to death already.

Did Chelmsford intend that Durnford's force should remain a separate column once the move to Mangeni had been completed? Did he intend to absorb Durnford's column into Glyn's  - in which case, who would be in command? All of these things would need to be decided pretty quickly on the 22nd - but disaster overtook the plans (whatever they were).

Frederic has uncovered an interesting line of discussion.

Steve

Steve
Quite possibly your 'not credible', is a possibility, hardly likely I admit but Durnford was always the last line of defence so to speak. Left behind at Middle Drift. Left behind at Rorkes Drift. Quite possibly he could have been detached (was he attached in the first place? ) to remain at iSandlwana to cover the supply route.
However although an interesting point in it self I would want to believe that Chelmsford would have brought that up in his commons statements etc. Interestingly about Chelmsford and Frederics comment about him being rewarded, Order of the Bath I believe. He did apply for a number of posts and was turned down on a number of occasions. Even to the point at one stage of omitting the Zulu campaign from his resume.

Bonjour Steve / all,
About your first point (I.E: your message Feb. 20 2015, 12.10 PM), you have in mind the 1/24th Coys who were still at Helpmekaar? not the Durnford's column? (I.E: the delay of 2 or 3 days to join Chelmsford)
Cheers.
Frédéric.

Hello Frederic/Frank

No, not the troops at Helpmekaar. What I meant was, it would take some time for the slow moving ox-carts and stores at Isandhlwana to get to Mangeni. Frank has made the point about the difficulties of heavy wagons crossing the dongas - I don't think they could have made it in one day and they would need the protection afforded by Durnford's mounted men as they slowly progressed.

Your right Frank that Chelmsford would have had to consider protecting his lines of communication and supply - and that would get more difficult the further he advanced without bringing the Zulu to battle. But I don't think he would have left all of Durnford's assets at Isandhlwana to do that (perhaps a smaller holding force based in a fortified position on the saddle? - to include the bloody rocket battery!).

Chelmsford could not afford to take too long about all this and I think he recognised that Durnford could help flush out the enemy (which, of course, he did). It was a shame that Chelmsford wasn't there when it happened.

Steve

rusteze wrote:

I can see what Littlehand is saying about Durnford obeying the last order given to him by Chelmsford - or at least, Crealock's interpretation of it.

But It cannot be left there, because Chelmsford issues further orders at breakfast on the 22nd to begin moving the rest of the Isandhlwana camp before Durnford had even arrived there.

It is not credible that he meant Durnford to remain at Isandhlwana by himself, so only two options remain, both of which entail Durnford leaving the camp.

Either to act as a screen for the remaining column, or join Chelmsford in hunting the Impi.

Which of those options was in Chelmsford's mind at the time is what we are, quite rightly, discussing.

Nobody expected, or planned for an overwhelming Zulu attack on the camp, least of all Chelmsford. What Durnford and Pulleine did about that is not what this discussion is about. It has been done to death already.

Did Chelmsford intend that Durnford's force should remain a separate column once the move to Mangeni had been completed? Did he intend to absorb Durnford's column into Glyn's  - in which case, who would be in command? All of these things would need to be decided pretty quickly on the 22nd - but disaster overtook the plans (whatever they were).

Frederic has uncovered an interesting line of discussion.

Steve

Steve I take in you referring to the message from LC to Col Pulleine. Delivered by Gardner!

Littlehand
Yes, precisely!

In which case, Pulliene was asked to send supplies, but he was to remain at Isandlwana and entrench it.
So Durford would not have been alone.



Statement by Captain Alan Gardner, 14th Hussars. Camp, Rorke's  Drift, January 26, 1879.

"I LEFT the force with the General about 10.30 A.M., and rode back to Isandlana Camp, with the order to Lieutenant-Colonel. Pulleine to send on the camp equipage and supplies of the  troops camping out, and to remain himself at his present camp, and entrench it."

Also there is nothing in LC orders relating to Durnford. So it looks like LC really did intend for Durnford to just go to the camp. 

It's the first mention by Chelmsford in an order specific to the central column to entrench a camp ...
Cheers

Steve,
Thank you for your answer.
Cheers
Frédéric

Steve wrote:

"Did Chelmsford intend that Durnford's force should remain a separate column once the move to Mangeni had been completed? Did he intend to absorb Durnford's column into Glyn's  - in which case, who would be in command? All of these things would need to be decided pretty quickly on the 22nd - but disaster overtook the plans (whatever they were)"

Possibly the time line in which LC had to organise events, before leaving to assist Dartnell, had a lot to answer for.

It makes sense, that LC ordered Durnford to the camp, based on the camp and supplies being vunarible due to the reduction in man power. Durnford was the nearest and could get to Isandlwana quickly.

Bonsoir,
There is, maybe, another argument for Franck's hypothesis about Durnford's mission in Chelmford's mind ("go to the camp and wait ")
It's the so discussed Crealok's testimony, from his memory, about the contain of the famous order to Durnford ("strengthen the camp / take command of it).
We know that in reality the order didn't contain such instructions to Durnford but maybe this testimony reflected (at least partially) the intention of the General in the first hours of the 22 January...

Actually, i see only three arguments against this hypothesis:
1°) The two orders to Pulleine  to move to the camp (HB / Gardner) were sent to Pulleine, not to Durnford the senior Officer in the camp;
2°) Chelsmford in the order said nothing about the  Durnford's mission;
3°) No order was sent to Durnford about the move of the camp (at least for information).

"This silence" about an important order (the move of the camp) and a senior Officer , is it a "common practise" in military protocol or an abosolute impossibility?
I don't forget that Durnford was the commandant of an independant column.

Cheers.

Frédéric

I think the seniority question was more of an Army Custom rather than a protocol.
We know, Durnford was supposedly acting independantly, and was in command of a native unit. So would he really have been expected to have taken command of the camp which contained British infantry. if it was protocol why did a disagreement insue between Pulleine & Durnford?

Ulundi wrote:

I think the seniority question was more of an Army Custom rather than a protocol.
We know, Durnford was supposedly acting independantly, and was in command of a native unit. So would he really have been expected to have taken command of the camp which contained British infantry. if it was protocol why did a disagreement insue between Pulleine & Durnford?

Bonsoir Ulundi,

Obviously, i misspoke, sorry.

Durnford was an Officer in the R.E, so he could command British infantry as senior Officer in the camp.
For example see Chard, also a RE Officer at RD.

Cheers

Frédéric

instead of senior Officer, i should write the highest ranking Officer. In truth, i wonder if that means something for the members of the forum (translation in English)...
Sorry.

Cheers

Frédéric

But Chard wasn't acting independantly or in charge of a Native company, nor was he a commander of a column. He was under the command of Spalding.

Chard1879 wrote:

But Chard wasn'tvacting independantly or in charge of a Native company, nor was he a commander of a column. He was under the command of Spalding.

and Spalding watched the "list of seniority" (between him and Chard) before to give him the command of the post during his absence.
The fact that Durnford was at the head of Native troops is not a problem.
Remember, he was also at the head of the the rocket battery, Royal Artillery.

Cheers

Pulleine at the arrival of Durnford, made any difficulty to give to Durnford the command of the camp (Cochrane's account / Stafford's acount).
But it's not the subject of the discussion in progress, so i prefer to stop here.

Cheers.

Frédéric