Who was most culpable for the defeat at the Battle Of Isandlwana: Was Lord Chelmsford , Col Glyn, Col Pulleine, or Col Durnford.

Chelmsfordthescapegoat wrote:

Well Done Springbok.. Now you have thrown. Spanner in the works. How do you expect Steve, Martin, Ymob to answer that! There are no sarnario's or what if's in your post, just plain common sense thinking. Be very carefull Martin was in the Maffia (The Mob)

Seriously Good post.

Bonjour CTE,
I have nothing to answer.
It's a good analysis.
I am not agree with all thé arguments, but it's not a problem for me.
As i Saïd previously, it's just a debate, i am not fighting.
Cheers

There is a relevant analysis on thé subject of thé conception of thé chain of command by Chelmsford in thé book "Victoria's General's" by John laband . Hé gives some answers to thé failure of thé chain of command.
Cheers

impi wrote:

Reading some of the members posts, lt look's like they really do believe that Chelmsford should have issued and checked every order. As CTSG says.  What was the point in having commanders?

PQs artical makes sense!

Impi,
Sincerly, it's a very relevant question.
Cheers

Good post Frank

The thrust of Frank's piece gives me no particular problems either.

Far from a spanner in the works, its main contention, that so far as Pulleine was concerned the order came from Chelmsford, is exactly what I said. We are in total agreement that Pulleine should have responded to the order and, as PQ says, he did not. Of course Glyn got to know about Chelmsford's decision to split the force, but he was cut out of the process by Clery and Chelmsford. You would expect him to have been consulted and then left to organise the move and the defence of his column. There is no evidence that Glyn did any of this.

I see nothing so far that addresses my main contention that Chelmsford left an inadequate force when he split the column and was therefore most culpable for the events that followed.

Steve

Hi all,
During the first campaign, before the Isandhlwana's disaster, there was a failure in the chain of command with ambiguous orders.
it is so true that even today we are still debating the significance of the Crealock's order, why Clery told Pulleine he will command the camp during the absence of Glyn (in view with the order to Durnford), what had chelmsford in mind regarding the mission of Durnford, how Durnford understood his order.
So the question, who is culpable for this situation?
Cheers

Reading Springy's take on events, he says 'as Clery should have done' regarding Clery's own written orders to Pulleine, but if as Frank says 'he should have done' then why then did Clery say that he knew he would be in trouble for doing that without authorisation?

Something that keeps nagging me (and no I don't mean Mrs Shifter), is why did Durnford tell Pulleine on his arrival at the camp, that he would not be staying? Surely by saying this to Pulleine, Durnford must have believed that LC wanted him elsewhere.

I have always said that Pulleine could and should have done more, he was rather inept with the position that he had been left in, and maybe other officers should have offered advice, but they didn't.

I am still with Steve on this one, and believe that the buck stops with 'his arrogance' LC.

Hi Guys.
What ive atempted to do is really the same as Peter Q has done, take a backward step and look from an army point of view, Peter is ex army.
There are and always will be some very valuable arguments to counter.
Martin I would suggest that Glynn SHOULD have issued the order, and didn't. Clery did and obviously seeing the remarks made by Crealock earlier in the day realised that he had/was actually issuing an order to a senior officer. As Pulleine was convinced of his orders, he would have to have been convinced that they were issued by either Glyn or Chelmsford. That's possibly a reason Clery suddenly took fright, he had seriously overstepped the mark.
Martin your second point is a major point, Durnford said that really before he knew what was happening in the camp, that intimates he had a pre determined course of action. The fact that he had sent of twice to Chelmsford asking for orders, and not received them also ways in with the same argument. So yes a valuable counter point and one Im afraid that at this stage is unanswerable.
Steve we are thinking very much on similar lines but your main point deserves a much fuller response than I can come up with at present. So a rain check there please my friend.

The interesting thing about the last couple of 'debates' has been a few very new and refreshing arguments that I personally have found really interesting and generally and moved debates forward.

Well done the forum and well done Pete for hosting Peter Qs argument.

Thank you Frank for a considered response, I look forward to your further thoughts. I agree that we have managed to move the debate on a little and hopefully we can get even further with input from PQ and others such as yourself.

Steve

Hi Springy.

Saying that LC had attached himself to No3 column and usurped command of it from Glyn and rarely consulting anything with him, he more or less forced Glyn to take a back seat and become a spectator, so I would have thought that LC should have left orders for Pulleine? However, as Julian once pointed out, although Clery knew he was in the wrong by issuing an order to a senior officer, Pulleine must have thought that it came from LC and simply accepted it as such.

About Durnford saying to Pulleine that he was not staying at the camp, I agree with you that by him saying that, it intimates that he did have a pre-determined coarse of action, and that he must have believed that LC wanted him elsewhere, and the orders prior to that of the 22nd do throw some light on this (Bengough,pincer, Matyanas, etc), but it seems that there could well be a missing link in the chain somewhere, and like you, I often wonder why Durnford sent out to LC asking for orders but never receiving anything, but either way, it does look like Durnford believed that LC wanted him elsewhere, otherwise why would he say to Pulleine that he wasn't staying at the camp, rather odd don't you think mate?

Hi Martin
Yes I do agree. Im just not 100% convinced of 'the prievious orders' issue. There is a missing link, it could very well be the George Shepstone trip from the 21st. A piece in the puzzle that would I believe connect to that was Durnfords re action when he received the orders on the morning of the 22nd......a ha just as I expected........... Why would he expect anything really? He had been called up to RD, he was down, for a reason I suspect. Could that be a feeling that he was becoming a side lined player? But then Shepstone goes of to Isandlwana and returns baring who knows what, but it was sufficient to motivate Durnford to ride of to procure some wagons. So at that point there was no urgency to be ready for a fast move towards the front. But he receives the note and reacts almost with a sense of knowledge? He was fully aware of the roll that Chelmsford had outlined for him before Shepstone got back from iSandlwana, but it didn't excite him, didn't motivate him to be on his toes ready for a quick charge to the front line. So potentially that roll wasn't going to be in the short term. But he was still expecting something hence his exclamation, "just as I thought". Why that phrase? And then BEFORE he got to iSandlwana he had a roll in mind, why? Could it have been influenced by his meeting on the road with Chard?
These are the things that puzzle me more Martin, these tell tale nuances.
Sorry for waffling on but Im sitting waiting for the rugby to start and Im bloody bored..........

Cheers Mate

Despite his previous orders, his wagons were not ready to move in thé morning of the 22 january.
Cheers

Quite right Frederic, doesn't that suggest yet again that he wasn't prepared for a rapid move?

Frank Allewell wrote:

Quite right Frederic, doesn't that suggest yet again that he wasn't prepared for a rapid move?

Fully agree

Hi Frank.

So it does appear that there could well indeed be a missing link. I wonder if Shepstone came back on the 21st with just a verbal order, or if Durnford kept any written order with him, but was somehow lost or even taken from his body afterwards and has never been disclosed?

Regarding the orders prior to the one on the 22nd. LC could be very indecisive and often changed his mind about things, so by telling Durnford that he wanted him and Bengough to support him in an action against the Matyanas, he could well have changed his mind yet again and given Shepstone either a verbal instruction or a written instruction that has since become lost. Makes you wonder don't it mate?

Enjoy the rugby buddy.

Just a comment:
in a letter addressed to Frere on January 21, Chelmsford evokes a Memorendum that he sent to Durnford the same day.
This Memorendum was never found.
Cheers
Frédéric

If something is missing from the chain of communications to Durnford (and I agree his actions and reactions to events make that look a very attractive proposition) then it can surely only have originated from Chelmsford or his staff. Pulleine clearly was not in the picture. That being so, someone who survived must have been aware of it but said nothing. Much as I distrust Crealock, and criticise Chelmsford's willingness to go along with the Durnford blame game, I don't think they were in the business of covering up relevant orders in there entirety. That would have been very risky indeed and a tad more dishonest than I think even they actually were.

Steve

Frank Allewell wrote:

Quite right Frederic, doesn't that suggest yet again that he wasn't prepared for a rapid move?

LC wasn't prepaired for a rapid move. At that point everything changed. All prior orders no doubt were put on the back burner.

That is very interesting Frederick, if LC sent a memorandum to Durnford on the 21st and it was never found, that could tie in with what I was saying ealier. And I wonder if this memorandum was delivered to Durnford by Shepstone on the 21st?

Good find Frederic. Chelmsford says he is sending the memorandum to Durnford and Colonel Bray (who was coming up from Greytown to Helpmaaker with 25 ammunition wagons). The memorandum supposedly shows the arrangements Chelmsford is making for moving forward. Interesting too to note that John Laband says French left out that particular sentence from the letter when he reproduced it in Chelmsford's biography.

Steve

Good thinking Steve.

Could it be that if the memo sent by LC to Durnford was the one delivered by Shepstone, that it could well indeed be the missing link we are puzzled about. But this memo was never found, yet Chelmsford confirms in a letter to Frere on the 21st that he sent such a memo to Durnford.

I don't think I would put it past Crealock, or even LC, to cover something up that could be very telling, don't forget that they organised a web of lies and deceit and dumped the blame onto Col Durnford, so if there was something in the memo that could have condemned LC, then surely it would be safer to conveniently dispose of it.

The plot thickens.

I think the problem with that is the memo was going to two people, one of whom survived, so difficult to suppress. Bray was coming up with just 22 men according to IK. They would be safe until they got to Rorke's Drift but from then on would need a more substantial escort - perhaps a role for Durnford? (he wouldn't have been best pleased though). Bray was with the 4th King's Own, do we know whether their archives have been searched? I would guess they probably have. Crealock's lost order book again?

This is quite interesting
[You must be registered and logged in to see this link.]

Steve

Hi Steve.

It's just a thought, but I wonder if LC worded the memo differently to the two recipients?

Interesting stuff from 4KO, however, I will need to get my magnifyer to read the letter.

Who sent the message via Garner to Col Pulleine?

Ray LC according to Gardner's statement in the COE.

Steve/Martin
Im pretty sure the memo sent to Bray and Durnford was the note outlining Chelmsfprds plans for the action against the Matanyas.

Cheers

Ray, John. Surly by LC sending orders to Pulleine it confirm that LC acknowledges Pulleine was in command, no matter who wrote the order.

rusteze wrote:

CT

I think you said you had Snook"s book. Have a look at page 89 for his take.

Steve

Can't put my hands on it at present. But here's something from Col Snook. Which I feel is a good time to post, with reference to this topic.

"It is not and has never been the convention in the British service to court martial people for losing, nor to 'flog' general officers.

The constant darting back and forth between cinema (fiction) and history (a one-time reality) really underscores the current poor level of discussion and debate, and the slide into fantasy which if not checked will, in my opinion serve to ruin this forum. Some are just making it up as they go along.

Both Lord Chelmsford and Colonel Durnford took crassly stupid and culpable decisions in the period 21-22 January. Both had character defects and flaws of temperament. One paid for his own [and his superior's errors] with his life, the other with professional and reputational ruination. Both , not one or the other, but both bear a share of the blame, with the balance overwhelmingly tipped against Lord C, who appointed Col D to field command, where others would not have done so, and put him at the point of decision at precisely the wrong moment.

There was no cover-up - only a failed attempt at one - a function of embarassment, shock and cognitive dissonance on the GOC's part. There is no smoking gun for conspiracy theorists to trot out. It was not convincing, was effectively restricted to the GOC and his MS [a two-man cover-up?], it made absolutely no headway, and was rejected out of hand by the military establishment in London at the time. The AG on behalf of the C-in-C wrote to Lord C as early as the spring of 79, before the war was even done, firmly laying the blame for Isandlwana at his Lordhsip's door. The general was removed from his command and never commanded soldiers again; that is what happens to failed generals in the British service. No injustice has therefore been done to Col Durnford.

After that there was a rather undignified squabble between the Durnford-Colenso faction, who would allow of no blame attaching to their hero, in which they were quite wrong, and a Chelmsford faction, led by himself [now sacked, derided and humiliated], who would allow of no blame sticking to their man, a viewpoint which is every bit as flawed, if not more so. But that is all it was - a squabble between two factions both of whom occupied militarily and intellectually flawed positions. It was all resolved a long time ago. People are arguing here as if they can change the judgement of history. It is not possible - the Duke of Cambridge, as C-in-C of the British Army, decided, and promulgated his decision in 1879. Lord Chelmsford was the principal culprit and was sacked. The Duke has been dead for an awfully long time and is not likely to change his mind any time soon.

Any narrow-minded refusal to accept that Colonel Durnford behaved irresponsibly and impulsively in the face of an overwhelming enemy force, when a calmer head might have stood the British side in better stead, is just not founded in history, reality or, most importantly, the military art.

A historian is somebody who interprets events through a keen and comprehensive knowledge of the totality of the sources and the associated historiography. If one has only a partial or a feeble grasp on the sources and the literature, one would be well advised to regard oneself as a novice and look to benefit from the knowledge of others, rather than make ridiculously dogmatic assertions which have no grounding in history and cannot be sustained on the basis either of bona fide source evidence or closely reasoned balance of probability. It is possible to acquire a reasonable grasp on the theory, art and science of war as a civilian by dint of a couple of decades of serious study [a learning process which a great many members of this forum have put themselves through, or in many other cases are part-way through] - but not without it. Until one has acquired such a mastery of the subject, one is a learner (a perfectly respectable thing to be) and should comport oneself accordingly"
Source: RDVC

CTSG.. Try reading the comments after MS posted that. Not sure any member on here, needs to reply to your last post. It's already been done..

Some wise words there, particularly paragraphs 3 and 4 which is pretty well exactly what I have been saying, even to quoting the CinC. Shame it is spoiled by the arrogant nonsense about who is entitled to express opinions - apparently confined to MS. Now, to get back to the point you were arguing, when you find the book read the passage I suggested. Snook is very good but also very flawed - as are we all.

Steve

MS wrote:

A historian is somebody who interprets events through a keen and comprehensive knowledge of the totality of the sources and the associated historiography. If one has only a partial or a feeble grasp on the sources and the literature, one would be well advised to regard oneself as a novice and look to benefit from the knowledge of others, rather than make ridiculously dogmatic assertions which have no grounding in history and cannot be sustained on the basis either of bona fide source evidence or closely reasoned balance of probability. It is possible to acquire a reasonable grasp on the theory, art and science of war as a civilian by dint of a couple of decades of serious study [a learning process which a great many members of this forum have put themselves through, or in many other cases are part-way through] - but not without it. Until one has acquired such a mastery of the subject, one is a learner (a perfectly respectable thing to be) and should comport oneself accordingly"
Source: RDVC[/quote]

My God! (Trotter's spirit )
Amen

You are spot on Steve when you say,

"spoiled by the arrogant nonsense about who is entitled to express opinions-apparently confined to MS"

That is just one of the reasons why I chucked his book to the depths at the back of the bookshelf.

Hell, talk about throwing bunches of flowers at ones self, how self righteous can some folk be

ymob wrote:

MS wrote:

A historian is somebody who interprets events through a keen and comprehensive knowledge of the totality of the sources and the associated historiography. If one has only a partial or a feeble grasp on the sources and the literature, one would be well advised to regard oneself as a novice and look to benefit from the knowledge of others, rather than make ridiculously dogmatic assertions which have no grounding in history and cannot be sustained on the basis either of bona fide source evidence or closely reasoned balance of probability. It is possible to acquire a reasonable grasp on the theory, art and science of war as a civilian by dint of a couple of decades of serious study [a learning process which a great many members of this forum have put themselves through, or in many other cases are part-way through] - but not without it. Until one has acquired such a mastery of the subject, one is a learner (a perfectly respectable thing to be) and should comport oneself accordingly"
Source: RDVC

My God! (Trotter's spirit )
Amen[/quote]


Nice one Frederick.

Quote;

Snook.

"The AG on behalf of the C-in-C wrote to Lord C as early as the spring of 79, before the war was even done, firmly laying the blame for iSandlwana at his Lordships door. The general was removed from his command and never commanded soldiers again".

And quite rightly so.

Everything change early hours 22nd Jan. New orders were issued, it's those orders that should be discussed not prior. I'm going with Mr Quantrill " Pulleine " he was left in command. And senior officers knew he was, along with everyone on the Battlefield. Garder even suggested he should disobey the Generals orders.

What do you mean by 'bigger picture'

I was addressing other comments, please tell me where the 'bigger picture' is about that


Many of us agree that Lt Col Pulleine could and should have done a lot more than he did long before the arrival of Col Durnford. And it is also well known that LC addressed the order brought by Garner to Pulleine, meaning that LC must have known that Pulleine was in command back at the camp, therefor did he have something else in mind for Col Durnford, and could it be related to the prior orders? Is that why Durnford said to Pulleine that he was not staying at the camp, because he must have believed that LC wanted him elsewhere for him to say that, and could the reason be related to those prior orders? And don't forget that Durnford sent Shepstone to see LC on the 21st, so could Shepstone have brought back an order that has not yet been discovered, or if it was, was it disposed of?

There are many avenues to go down before getting to the truth, however, it would seem that most folk agree that Pulleine was the main culprit for the loss at Isandlwana, however, Pulleine was not the one in overall command of the forces in South Africa, and he was not the one who decided to split No3 column and go off on a wild goose chase. And Pulleine was not the one issuing obscure orders and dithering on decissions, and he was not the one who kept on changing his mind at the drop of a hat, that person was LC, and it is therefor LC who must shoulder the responsibility as he was in full command and therefor is the most culpable.

Martin wrote:

therefor did he have something else in mind for Col Durnford

No he had nothing in-mind for him other than move to the camp. Reinforce, while LC was dealing with Dartnells problem. There is no mystery or hidden agenda relating to Col Durnfords order.

He may well have been quite happy to move to the camp, like everyone else, no one considered the camp was going to be attacked. When Durnford arrived it wasn't what he expected. Nothing as we know had been done, covered by PQ's post.
No one knows what was said in the conversation between Pulleine & Durnford, we have snippets not the full conversation. It may well be that Durnford just got fed up with Pulleines attidude, and his lack of comprehension on just how serious the situation was.
What Durnford did after was his downfall.

Frank/Frederic

Returning to "the missing memorandum" issue, LC's letter to Frere on 21 January (referred to by Frederic) says "I enclose a memorandum which I am sending to Durnford and  Bray". Whereas the memorandum to Durnford about operating against the Matyanas was sent and delivered on 19 January and didn't say anything about protecting LC's lines of communication. Doesn't quite add up does it? The other interesting thing about LC's 19 January memorandum to Durnford is it says 'I have sent you an order to cross the river at Rorkes Drift tomorrow with the force you have at Vermaaks". By implication that too is a separate message, not the memorandum of 19 January.

Steve

rusteze
Absolutely!
A jigsaw with many of the vital pieces missing.

Good evening Julian

So we seem to have primary source references by Chelmsford to two missing communications from him to Durnford. One on or before the 19th - an order to cross the river at Rorke's Drift - which is related in some way to Chelmsford's memorandum about operating against the Matyanas and another on the 21st related in some way to protecting lines of communication.

Then, early on 22nd the order we know about, to come up to the camp (either Isandhlwana or Mangeni). Whatever those missing orders said, they maybe account for Durnford's certainty about what he had been asked to do by Chelmsford when he spoke to Pulleine and before he had reports of Zulu movements.

Steve

Hi all,

I asked a question sometime ago about the changes in the British army, Admin responded by stating that there was a book called '“Regulations Field Forces South Africa 1878 by Command of Lieutenant General Lord Chelmsford C.B.' published in Pietermaritzburg, November 1878.
It covers everything (Encampments, Commissariat, Transport, Ordnance Store, Field Hospitals, Sanitary Precautions, Postal Arrangements, Horses, Sick Horses, Remount Depot, and Natal Native Contingent.' I was wondering about the 'Encampments' part of the book, does it throw any light on what Chelmsford would have expected an encampment to do in hostile territory. Could the answer to a lot of the debates on this forum be hidden within the text somewhere. I guess what I'm asking is 'was there a clearly defined procedure that officers and men would have done as if it was second nature? the command structure and responsibility for who does what and when has to be in that book.

Waterloo

Waterloo50

See page 254 of Zulu Rising which sets it out pretty well. In a nutshell, the Regulations applied to permanent camps, not temporary stopovers as Isandhlwana was meant to be. Chelmsford did not think it was necessary and would take too long. It appears Glyn, who was commanding the column was unhappy at that but overruled. The Regulations were revised after Isandhlwana.

Steve

Hi Steve,

Nothing mentioned on page 254 but I only have the paperback.

Dave

As Julian says, "A jigsaw with many of the vital pieces missing".

So if LC confirmed to Frere that he did send a memo on the 21st to Durnford, could it be possible that Shepstone brought it back with him on the 21st after seeing LC?

Either way, it does appear that Durnford was sure that LC wanted him elsewhere, and said as much to Pulleine, ie; not staying at the camp.

And if there are two missing communications from LC to Durnford, could it also be possible that they were conviniently disposed of by someone as yet unknown?

Yes, you are right Steve, Glyn did show concern regarding laagering, but he was overruled by LC.

Poor old Glyn, he gets his command usurped by LC, and then gets overruled by LC when he shows concern about laagering the camp, seems that LC was showing him who was the boss.

waterloo50

It's on page 254 of the hardback. About 20 pages into chapter 15 -"Give the matter to us".

Steve

Okay, I have found the section on Regulations for field forces in South Africa,1878. Its on page 294 if you have the paperback.

Regards

Waterloo.

Letter from Clery to Sir Archbald Alison 18th March 1879
A small book of field regulations was published here for guidance in the field in which the advisability of entrenchments and wagon laagers is alluded to, but when Colonel Glyn asked about making a wagon laager, the General pooh-poohed the idea altogether, remarking in a jocular way,"why it would take a week to make one."

Regulations, Field Forces in South Africa, Pietermaritzburg, 1878
19. The camp should be partially entrenched on all sides.

Cheers

From Rev George Stegman
Mr Kruger impressed upon him, Chelmsford, the absolute necessity of laagering his wagons every evening.............
Took Mr Paul Bester, at Sir Bartle Freres request, to the General. He urged the same precautions.

Historical Records of the 24th. Regiment from its formation in 1689.
When a field officer expressed his strong misgivings to the staff officer whose duty it was to point out the ground to be occupied and remarked that the broken ground was no protection, and there was not even a piquet in the rear. "Well sir, " was the answer, "if you are nervous we will put a piquet of pioneers there."
I believe that the above shows a bit of duplicity on the part of Clery. It was he that positioned the regiments and was responsible for the sarcasm. It makes a mockery of the letter to Alison posted above in which he tends to want to cast aspersions and yet he himself was partially responsible.
This statement if frequently attributed to Chelmsford but is very clearly attributed to Clery.

Re the above posts on Clery.
George Mansell NMP in a letter to Edward Durnford was asked by Clery to accompany him and Harford to choose the new camp site. Mansell objected to the position for a number of reasons and told Clery he "didn't like it one bit."
'Clery seemed rather annoyed at my differing from him and said, "No this will do. You take your videttes away in front and post them."
A little later Mansell had posted the videttes when another NMP officer, Phillips, was sent by Clery to relieve him. Clery objected to Mansells positioning, in particular one on the ridge behind the camp saying, "My dear fellow those vedettes are useless there, the rear always protects itself.

Clery is not the innocent soul he seems to be garnering a reputation on the forum for.

That Glyn never took any active part in the column preperation to move is rather disputed in a note to Bellairs from Glyn 16th April 1879 where he describes preparations for sending out food as, "I did make arrangements" the personal pronoun is used elsewhere in the same note...... "I acted in compliance" etc.
So Clery and Glyn where actively involved in affairs of the regiment.

Cheers