Who was most culpable for the defeat at the Battle Of Isandlwana: Was Lord Chelmsford , Col Glyn, Col Pulleine, or Col Durnford.

Frank Allewell wrote:

Re the above posts on Clery.
Clery is not the innocent soul he seems to be garnering a reputation on the forum for.

Bonjour Frank,
I wait for months to read such a comment about CLERY.  
Cheers
Frédéric

Reposting this because it got a bit lost yesterday in the discussion on choice of camp site.

Frank/Frederic
Returning to "the missing memorandum" issue, LC's letter to Frere on 21 January (referred to by Frederic) says "I enclose a memorandum which I am sending to Durnford and Bray". Whereas the memorandum to Durnford about operating against the Matyanas was sent and delivered on 19 January and didn't say anything about protecting LC's lines of communication. Doesn't quite add up does it? The other interesting thing about LC's 19 January memorandum to Durnford is it says 'I have sent you an order to cross the river at Rorkes Drift tomorrow with the force you have at Vermaaks". By implication that too is a separate message, not the memorandum of 19 January.

Steve

rusteze
Absolutely!
A jigsaw with many of the vital pieces missing.
Julian Whybra

Good evening Julian
So we seem to have primary source references by Chelmsford to two missing communications from him to Durnford. One on or before the 19th - an order to cross the river at Rorke's Drift - which is related in some way to Chelmsford's memorandum about operating against the Matyanas and another on the 21st related in some way to protecting lines of communication.
Then, early on 22nd the order we know about, to come up to the camp (either Isandhlwana or Mangeni). Whatever those missing orders said, they maybe account for Durnford's certainty about what he had been asked to do by Chelmsford when he spoke to Pulleine and before he had reports of Zulu movements.

Steve

rusteze
I agree entirely. The question is where possibly might copies of those orders be if they were not destroyed. Copies of such orders should have resided with Clery, Crealock, Chelmsford, TNA, Blue Books, but I know of none surviving. If they were left at Isandhlwana then they are gone.
The originals, if they survived, I would expect to be with the other Durnford Papers at Chatham but there is no trace of them there (unless they fell down the back of a radiator). I suppose it depends on whose hands they might have passed through as to whether they were retained: E.Durnford, Fanny Colenso.

The fact that the 'covering' letter to Frère was delivered suggests that the two instructions should have been delivered to Bray at Sandspruit and Durnford at Rorkes Drift. Not beyond the bounds of possibility that they could have been carried by Shepstone. Considering that they should have passed through Crealocks hands, in his position of Military Secretary, there should have been a copy in his order book.
As the instructions were sent, outside of the regiment and column then I cant see copies being retained by Clery.
The wording is interesting, "I am sending", not "I have sent". There is then a possibility they were never sent, Chelmsford spent most of the day on outrides, possibly he expected to send them the following day and events over took him. I have seen the letter from Chelmsford to Frere and don't recall seeing any enclosure. That raises the possibility it was never written!
I don't believe the 'conspiracy' extended to such levels.

Frank
I don't particularly like conspiracy theories and generally view them with a critical eye though I am aware that no mention was ever made of Durnford's Instructions from 1879 to 1990 and that certainly smacks of something...
That said, I am rather inclined to believe that much was destroyed on the battlefield or subsequently by the weather or was simply thrown away as no longer being relevant or required (esp. after the CoI).

Hi Julian
Im just going back through the files, the only thing Ive come up with is a reference to a letter from Bray dated the 25th to the High Commisioner detaling the actions at Fugitives Drift. But that letter is also missing.

I was under the impression that Col Durnford was rather meticulous at keeping all the orders, instructions, memo's, etc that he received, and that he kept most of this type of thing with him on his person. Could it be that after his death that the Zulu's might have rifled his pockets and threw some things away (paperwork, etc), or could it be that who ever discovered Col Durnford's body, took various papers, etc, but never disclosed this to anyone, then later disposed of them?

Like Julian says, if the copies of these were left at iSandlwana, then they most likely will be gone for good.

In the unlikely event that these missing orders should ever be found, they just might throw some light on why Durnford told Pulleine that he would not be staying at the camp, then, along with the other prior orders, the pieces of the jigsaw would come together.

If the copy of that memorandum is anywhere its here:
DEPOT Papers Reported by the Historical Manuscripts Commission
(National Register of Archives)
DESCRIPTION Earl St. Aldwyn. Hicks Beach MSS
STARTING 1851
ENDING 1910
REMARKS See A Guide to Manuscripts and Documents in the British Isles
relating to Africa, compiled by N Matthews and MD Wainwright,
edited by JD Pearson (School of Oriental and African Studies,
University of London), p. 277.
SUMMARY Sir Michael Edward Hicks Beach, 9th Bt. and 1st Earl St.
Aldwyn (1837-1916), Colonial Secretary 1878-80, Chancellor of the
Exchequer 1885, 1895-1902, &c.
+ 1. Letters from Sir Bartle Frere. March 1878-August 1880.
(PCC/1-5).
+ 2. Letters from Sir Garnet Wolseley, with enclosures.
September 1879-April 1880. (PCC/6/1-28).
+ 3. Copies of letters to Sir Garnet Wolseley. 1879-80.
(PCC/8/1-7).
+ 4. Copy of letter of Lord Chelmsford to H.R.H. Duke of
Cambridge concerning the Battle of Isandhlawana. 25 April
1879. (PCC/9/1).
+ 5. Extracts from letters of Sir George Colley to Sir Garnet
Wolseley concerning his move against the rebel Boers and his
defeat at Laings Nek. 1881. (PCC/9/2).
+ 6. Letter from BP Douglas vindicating General Colley for his
defeat at the hands of the Boers. (Sheet 2 missing.) 27
April (1881?). (PCC/9/3).
+ 7. Letters from Lady Frere, written from Government House,
Cape Town. November 1878-April 1879. (PCC/10/1-13).
+ 10. Copies of letters to Sir Bartle Frere. 1878-80.
(PCC/22-4).

M Cooper
Re Durnford - it's more likely orders, papers were kept in a haversack or despatch case.

Frank
The reference you give refers to that portion of the archive in the Gloucestershire Archives or in the National Archives?

rusteze wrote:

Reposting this because it got a bit lost yesterday in the discussion on choice of camp site.

Frank/Frederic
Returning to "the missing memorandum" issue, LC's letter to Frere on 21 January (referred to by Frederic) says "I enclose a memorandum which I am sending to Durnford and  Bray". Whereas the memorandum to Durnford about operating against the Matyanas was sent and delivered on 19 January and didn't say anything about protecting LC's lines of communication. Doesn't quite add up does it? The other interesting thing about LC's 19 January memorandum to Durnford is it says 'I have sent you an order to cross the river at Rorkes Drift tomorrow with the force you have at Vermaaks". By implication that too is a separate message, not the memorandum of 19 January.

Steve

rusteze
Absolutely!
A jigsaw with many of the vital pieces missing.
Julian Whybra

Good evening Julian
So we seem to have primary source references by Chelmsford to two missing communications from him to Durnford. One on or before the 19th - an order to cross the river at Rorke's Drift - which is related in some way to Chelmsford's memorandum about operating against the Matyanas and another on the 21st related in some way to protecting lines of communication.
Then, early on 22nd the order we know about, to come up to the camp (either Isandhlwana or Mangeni). Whatever those missing orders said, they maybe account for Durnford's certainty about what he had been asked to do by Chelmsford when he spoke to Pulleine and before he had reports of Zulu movements.

Steve

Bonjour, I am sure it's relevant by i have found this order:

"I directed this Officer [Dunrford] to move one of his 3 battalions to watch and eventually cross at the gates of Natal betwween RD and the Umsinga mountain, while he and the mounted men and rocket battery were to join me with n°3 column. I directed the remaining two battalions to cross at Middledrift as soon as Col. Pearson with n°1 column had reached Ekowe".

Chelmsford to the Secretary of State for war 14/01/1879
(BPP, C2242, Enclosure 8 in n°20)

As you know, the 14 January, Chelmford's column was yet at Rorke's Drift.

Cheers.


Frédéric

Hi Frederick.

Yes, I also posted this order a long while back in one of the earlier DWHC threads. The battalion LC told Durnford to watch and eventually cross at the gates of Natal was Bengough's battalion.

Mr M. Cooper wrote:

Hi Frederick.

Yes, I also posted this order a long while back in one of the earlier DWHC threads. The battalion LC told Durnford to watch and eventually cross at the gates of Natal was Bengough's battalion.

Bonjour Martin,
Sorry.
Cheers

Frédéric

Hi Julian
As its Hicks Beech I would believe Gloucestershire. Im busy looking further at the moment, Im pretty sure Bromheads letter from the 22nd Jan is also there.

One for martin to sink his teeth into
Document 12 of 31
DEPOT NAB
TYPE Microfilm
REFERENCE MIC2/1/3/1-2/1/3/8
DESCRIPTION Lord Chelmsford.
STARTING 1862
ENDING 1906
REMARKS National Army Museum, London; 8 rolls; positive. Inventory
no. 1/1/8/2; catalogue and index (Addendum 1 of inventory
no. 1/1/8/2).
DISPOSAL + Correspondence relating to false accusation that Sir
Theophilus Shepstone removed papers from the body of
Colonel Durnford, 1886.

The other side of England from me.
Unless anyone else is nearer I'll look to see when I'm next over that way.

rusteze wrote:

Reposting this because it got a bit lost yesterday in the discussion on choice of camp site.

Frank/Frederic
Returning to "the missing memorandum" issue, LC's letter to Frere on 21 January (referred to by Frederic) says "I enclose a memorandum which I am sending to Durnford and  Bray". Whereas the memorandum to Durnford about operating against the Matyanas was sent and delivered on 19 January and didn't say anything about protecting LC's lines of communication. Doesn't quite add up does it? The other interesting thing about LC's 19 January memorandum to Durnford is it says 'I have sent you an order to cross the river at Rorkes Drift tomorrow with the force you have at Vermaaks". By implication that too is a separate message, not the memorandum of 19 January.

Steve

rusteze
Absolutely!
A jigsaw with many of the vital pieces missing.
Julian Whybra

Steve

Steve,

Do you know that 2 messages have been sent by Chelmsford to Durnford the 19 January?
You can read them in Drooglever p.193-194.
Cheers.
Frédéric

Hi Frederick.

You have nothing whatsoever to be sorry about my friend, it is a long while since I posted that particular order, so it is always good that someone posts it again as it gives others a reminder, and it might throw some light on the subject, and I was just confirming that the battalion which LC ordered Durnford to detach and which was to cross at the gates of Natal was Bengough's.

Hi Springy.

Mmmm!

Well, although 'Offy' might have been cleared of removing papers from the body of Col Durnford, don't forget the old saying, which of course is, "There is no smoke without fire", if you catch my drift.

Frederic.

Yes I have read the reference in Droogleever. It is not clearly worded and he gives no source reference. Droogleever seems to me to quote from only one of Chelmsford's two orders on the 19th, while referring to the fact that he had been sent a separate order to cross the Buffalo. Has Droogleever seen both orders?

Steve

rusteze wrote:

Frederic.

Yes I have read the reference in Droogleever. It is not clearly worded and he gives no source reference. Droogleever seems to me to quote from only one of Chelmsford's two orders on the 19th, while referring to the fact that he had been sent a separate order to cross the Buffalo. Has Droogleever seen both orders?

Steve

Steve,
I am pretty sure that there are 2 orders the 19 january.
I am not at home, i have only my note with me.
I have an another quote in saul David book.
I'll check tonight.
Cheers.
Frédéric

Steve,
According to my notes , you can find mention of the 2 orders (one or other) in:
-"Isandhlwana and the Durnford papers" by JW (R.E. MUSEUM 4901-44/1)
-Drooglever: "the road to Isandhlwana" p.193-194
-Laband john "Lord Chelmsford and the Zulu war" 1878-1879" (p.73)
-Saul David: "the heroïsm and the tragedy..." p.92-93 (pocket book)

I will check tonight.

Cheers.

Frédéric

Hi Frederic

You are correct. But what I am saying is the other order referred to by Chelmsford in his note to Durnford of 19 January ("I have sent you an order to cross the river at Rorke's Drift tomorrow with the force you have with you at Vermaaks") has not been found.

Steve

Hi Steve.

I can't put my hand on Ian Knight's book (maybe the Shifter has been on the prowl), but I am almost sure that Ian quotes that very same order in his book. I will have a look, and if I find it, I will post the page number it is on (paper back version).

I think that this little transcript from the Army Discipline & Regulations gives a little bit of insight into LC and his thoughts about his officers and men.

'He would ask their Lordships to notice the following words:— ‘of their high moral qualities of discipline, &c. … In those days, as at present, splendid success was only secured when really able and scientific generals commanded in the field. … It should never be forgotten that our Army that won Waterloo was pronounced by its Commander to be the worst he had ever commanded; whilst I think it will be freely admitted by the student of military history that the physique and discipline of the little Armies, which are now only remembered by reason of the misfortunes and calamities that overtook them, were often of the very highest order.’ If these views were carried out to their logical sequence, it followed that so long as a competent General was at the head of our Army, the troops might be inferior in physique, in drill, and in discipline—no matter, success to our arms must be the result. Did Wellington attach but little importance to discipline? Did he rely solely upon his own character and military attainments? Let their Lordships look back to his speeches, look back to his writings, and he (Lord Chelmsford) ventured to affirm that no great Commander had ever more fully recognized the absolute necessity of maintaining in our Army the strictest discipline that it was possible to enforce. Waterloo was won, not by the ability of the Commander, but by the discipline which was then ingrained in our military system, and which enabled our troops to bear, without flinching, "the long and hard pounding," to use the Duke's own words, which they were exposed to on that memorable day, and thus enabled the Duke, at the right moment, to make that counter attack which decided the fate of the day. He trusted that in any changes which were made in the Army Discipline Act, full consideration would be given to the effect which such changes would have upon the discipline of the Army.'

There are other paragraphs where LC discusses how the latest quality of men had improved, 'The Preamble of the Bill showed clearly the value attached to the maintenance of discipline; and he was under the impression quite recently that every member of the Profession to which he belonged fully recognized that the secret of success in war depended almost entirely upon the discipline of the troops.'

LC obviously placed great faith in the officers and men under his command, due in no small part to his faith in strict military discipline, Perhaps he expected to much of his officers e.g Pulleine, bless him, was stuck between a rock and a hard place, he comes across as a bit unsure of himself, he appears to lack confidence and lacks any ability to think for himself. I'm sure that LC would have known the strengths and weaknesses of his officers but orders are orders and LC would have expected his men to do the right thing. From what I have read LC is the person that most people feel is ultimately culpable but I don't feel that any one person should be held to account. Even with my limited knowledge on the subject I already understand that there were many failures and many bad decision made that contributed to the defeat at Isandlwanas.

Ps...go easy on me guys, this is the first time that I have expressed any kind of opinion on this forum.

Kind Regards

Hi Waterloo50

First, I think you have to know the context of the speech - presumably in the House of Lords? If so, has it a political aim of some kind?

Second, it is largely a statement of the obvious, you must have a skilled disciplined force if you are to succeed in armed combat. I cannot think of a senior officer who has ever said anything different.

Third, if this is before Isandhlwana they might have thought him a credible commentator. If it is after I do not think he would be regarded as a good example of what he is espousing. I agree though that a number of people fell short on that day, but we are attempting to identify who was most culpable in this thread and that has to be his lordship in my book.

Lastly, and a bit tongue in cheek, I thought it was Blucher and his Prussians who saved the day at Waterloo and not Wellington!

You carry on posting and fear not the response!

Steve

"Instructions for Officers Commanding Columns" for some clarification on Wheelwright's statement that he would push his defenders to the river as a diversion for Col. D and discovered a 'poser'. Reading the last line in Col. Pearson's instructions brought home the fact that AWD didn't really have an independent column, as such, from the start. "Colonel Durnford's column will form a portion of this column but will act separately. Daily reports will be sent from it to Colonel Pearson."[/b]

Source Michael Boyle RDVC. ( This chap seems to have access to some interesting material.

Hi Steve,

LC made his speech in the House of Lords 1881 'abolition of corporal punishment bill'. LC argued that he supported the bill but he was worried that without corporal punishment COs would be left only with the sentence of death as a choice for more serious crimes. I can't see any political aim in that other than LC looking after the soldiers. To me that seems like a man that cares for rank and file.

and as for your comment on 'Wellington and Blucher', I would so love to argue that one with you. Just for the hell of it.

Thanks for going easy on me

Waterloo/Dave

Kind Regards

Waterloo

Bulwer seemed pretty laid back about things, or did he have a good spin doctor?
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cheers

littlehand

Is there a source given for the quotations from Boyle?

As for the Instructions - how do you think they refer to the Wheelwright remark? I can't find any connection.

Not sure Julian. Here's the whole post, same source.

9 Jan 79, Colonial District Commander and Resident Magistrate, Umvoti County (Wheelwright) to Colonial Secretary.

"The river is very full now, and will probably keep so for some time. From information brought in by some of Bishop Schroeder's people it would appear that there is a chance of a revolution in Zululand and that the headmen of the nation seemed determined to arrest and give up both Sirayo and his people, and also pay the fine to the Natal Government. They represent Cetywayo as being in a very depressed state of mind, and apparently very much inclined to come to terms. If any reliance is to be placed upon what Schroeder's men say, there will be no resistance offered to our forces crossing the Tugela. However, I shall take the precaution to have a body of men assembled at each of the seven drifts named on my list on the day the native column crosses, both to take the attention of the Zulus from the crossing column, and also to be prepared to render assistance if necessary. News has reached me to-day of the crossing by Colonel Wood of the Blood River. I have seen Bishop Schroeder, and he appears to place great dependence upon the information brought in by his people. They say Cetywayo has given orders for all his younger men who are excitable to go up to him, and only the older men are to stay at the kraals along the Tugela, in order to avoid any risk of a collision with our forces. This all appears as if he did not wish war."

[I went back to "Instructions for Officers Commanding Columns" for some clarification on Wheelwright's statement that he would push his defenders to the river as a diversion for Col. D and discovered a 'poser'. Reading the last line in Col. Pearson's instructions brought home the fact that AWD didn't really have an independent column, as such, from the start - "Colonel Durnford's column will form a portion of this column but will act separately. Daily reports will be sent from it to Colonel Pearson." It would seem that "Zulu Dawn" did get that part right as far as his original posting to Middle Drift to "...observe their natural habitat...", he was to detach a battalion to Fort Pearson as soon as the invasion got underway and he was to move down and cross at the Lower Tugela only after receiving word that Pearson had reached the point where the road to Entumeni branches off and the area was already clear of Zulus. Of course these original orders were changed a number of times after 1 Jan. Still...]

11 Jan 79 Fannin to Colonial Secretary

"Yesterday a native I had sent into Zululand to gain information returned and made his report.

He penetrated about 20 miles into the country beyond the Tukanhla forest. The greater part of the men were at their kraals, the others having gone to attend the Umkosi dance.

A short time ago the King sent a message forbidding the border population assembling in arms and opposing the advance of the troops. Mabehla sent back announcing the arrival of Colonel Durnford's column here. The King sent again two days ago, reiterating his order not to resist. He said the troops were coming on a friendly errand, and were not to be molested. The women were to continue weeding the crops, and the cattle not to be removed from the kraals. The troops would come on to him. He would give up Sirayo and satisfy other demands, and there would be no war.

The people did not believe this. They ask why should the Government forces enter from so many different points if their errand is a peaceful one? On former peaceful missions they came at one point only. They have obeyed the King's order so far that they have relaxed their watch on the river. They do not now sleep at the ferry, as they have been wont to do of late.

My informant took note of one very significant act of the Zulus. Two very old men, named Manxobo and Bilibana, who live near the Tugela, and are unable to walk, have this week been carried away on men's shoulders to kraals on the edge of the Inkanhla forest for safety. Manxobo is Chief of the tribe living opposite this, Mahbelha, his son, being in charge. Bilibana is also a man of consequence."

11 Jan 79 Telegraphic - from Border Agent, Lower Tugela to Sec. Native Affairs -

"My spies just reported large Zulu force congregated at John Dunn's late residence, "Emangeto." Been gathering for the last three days, I believe. The information last three days I believe reliable. I have detained the Zulu messengers by order of officer commanding Lower Tugela column."

So, D-Day. Lord C's invasion is unopposed (he did, of course, take the precaution of sighting his guns and deploying for a 'hot' LZ!). Some of the intel, at least, seems to prove valid. He rides up to talk to Wood who's been been busy 'capturing' cattle with little opposition. No sign of a counter-invasion, little sign of a Zulu for that matter. Except down south at Dunn's place, 'large force', whatever that means. Could they be concentrating to the south east?

Little Hand
Thanks. Of course, the line "but will act separately" could be read as corroborating the fact that Durnford's WAS an independent command (whilst acting in tandem with Column No. 3). The very fact that he's bothered to write it, seems to underline the fact.
That said, ultimately, ALL the columns were subject to LC's will.

rusteze wrote:

Hi Frederic

You are correct. But what I am saying is the other order referred to by Chelmsford in his note to Durnford of 19 January ("I have sent you an order to cross the river at Rorke's Drift tomorrow with the force you have with you at Vermaaks")  has not been found.

Steve

Bonsoir Steve,
It seemed useful for me to draw your attention to this information.
Cheers.
Frédéric

Steve

It seems to me, as a freshie, that Lord C had a "relaxed & condescending attitude" towards the Zulus. And neglected his own standing orders by issuing vague orders & failing to ensure the camp was placed in a modicum of readiness. Col P was indolent. Col AW Durnford obviously believed the camp was in no danger, therefore he rode out on his own mission. The culpability is shared by all three, the greater degree going to the man in overall command.

Excellent observation, except the last bit! The Battle was contained within the vincinty of Isandlwana. Not 12 miles away where Lord Chelmsford was!

Pulleine was left in command of the camp, in the absence Col Glyn therefore the responsibility for the safety of the camp and the men within falls to him. His Down fall was letting Col Durmford interfere with command of the camp, army protocols dictates Durnford was senior, but others forget he was in command of and independant command. But still under orders of Lord Chelmsford.

Thanks CTSG I was kind of expecting to get mauled.

That's wasn't my intention. Just my opinion.

No you were & are a perfect gentleman.

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Perhaps the Zulu's have got it right. The Blame game Lord Chelmsford and Durnford.
Is just a side show.

This can be listened to on line or podcast. It doesn't work for me. Perhaps someone could work it out and let me know. Would be appricated.

I agree with CTSG that the actual direction of the battle ( war fighting), was conducted by the two Col's - acting indepentently of each other. To me there was massive failures of Command & Control & a clear set of instructions. Onwardly transmitted by General Officer Commanding. Now that may be down to Crealock - however the officer in command is ultimately responsible no matter that he actually may not have been directly involved in the debacle.Further compounded by not even the most rudimentary defensive precautions at the camp.

Unless LC thought over a thousand men with state of the art weapons, along with mounted units and artillery was enough defence,against men armed with spears and shields.

He probably did. However he was facing an incredibly disciplined & battle-hardened enemy. He was certainly briefed by John Dunn ( to whit, the booklet produced before hostilities). This is really what makes it all so fascinating, & the debates still raging are why we are on the forum.

Did LC really have time to ensure the camp was defended to our standard, after all he and all thought they were going up against the main impi. Did Glen have a walk around the camp to see or order defences, was it not Glyn who remonstrated with LC when LC first declined to assist Dartnell. I still say it was a collective cockup!
Was Pulleine's waiting for Durnford to arrive without doing anything.down to anyone else other than himself.

John Dunn gave a lot of advise?

In response to LCTSG

When Durnford arrived back at camp (Isandlwana) Pulleine understood that Durnford was to take command, however, Durnford, regardless of how he said it basically handed command back to Pulleine by telling him that he wouldn't 'intefere', I think that the confusion must have come when Pulleine believed that he had handed back command of the camp when he had reported the state of the troops and the orders that he had been given from Clery.

Whilst all this is going on Lord Chelmsford imagines that everything has been taken care of by Colonel Glyn. LC later claims that he 'refrained from sending any fresh instructions to that officer (Durnford) which might only have caused confusion'. So in admitting this he wouldn't have know which officer was in command of the camp, Clery even backs this up by stating that Chelmsford 'did not know what orders had been given to Pulleine'.

So we are left with no orders for Durnford and conflicting instructions for Pulleine.  The person who should shoulder the responsibility for the conduct of his officers in my mind is Lord Chelmsford and as has been stated on this forum before (army protocol dictates)

Regards

Waterloo

Waterloo makes several good points. It was a b***s up! Perhaps an Army,like a child, needs to learn it's lessons. In this case, for both sides a bloody & costly one. For littlehand I meant Lord C was provided with reasonably accurate intelligence of the composition & command of the Zulu Army he was going to face. Cheers guys everyday on this forum I genuinely learn so much. Your friend M-H

Waterloo
Small point for you to mull over. In Clerys written orders to Pullein ( Thought by Pullein to come from Chelmsford) he says you will take command while Col Glyn is out of camp, or words to that effect. The definite point was made that "you will be in command of the Camp". Interestingly when Durnford arrives he is given those orders to read, and does so ( There is eye witness testimony from Stafford to that). So Durnford has now read an order purportedly coming from Lord Chelmsford telling Pullein and now Durnford in no uncertain manner that he, Pullein is in charge of the camp. This is followed up by Durnford telling him that he will not interfere.
So Durnford knows that Lord Chelmsford ( he cant know any different) has issued a direct order, so no matter what protocol is or even what the army list says a field order has been given.
In view of the above would you still contend that Pullein knew that Durnford would assume command? Second point would Durnford knowing that instruction had been issued actually take command?

Its an interesting aside really.

Cheers

Bonjour à tous,
I am totally agree with you.
In these condtions, why did Pulleine propose spontaneously to Durnford to take command of the camp?
This was not logical: the rules of protocol did not require to Pulleine to do so. For example, at RD Chard took the command of the camp after the reporting of Zulu nearby and the risk of an attack.
It was not yet the case at Isandhlwana.
Cheers
Frédéric

Hi Frederic
I would say out of politeness really, Durnford arrives and Pullein makes the statement and then shows him the order. The officer class were gentlemen with all its conatations, remember Vereker giving away his horse.
RD was a different case it was firmly established before the senior officer left camp who was in charge while he was gone.
Just my thoughts.

Cheers

Bonjour Frank,
Politeness...Why not?
Maybe, it's possible with that we know about Pulleine's character.

About RD, CHARD didn't take the command of the camp before the arrival of the Zulus.
His command was "somewhere theoterical" before the risk of an attack by the zulus.
As at Rorke's Drift between Durnford and Spalding (20-22 January).

Cheers.

Frédéric

I.E: Thank you for your hypothesis.