iSandlwana a forum timeline times

Is it the general opinion of our experts that the attack was planned for the 23rd and not the 22nd? The time line makes no mention that the attack on the 23rd is conjecture.

There are numerous accounts in the Zulu statements that the 23rd was seen to be the better day to attack , due to the dead moon , also there were many warriors which hadn't been doctored in preparation for the Battle .
90th

90th

Thanks,

I think that the timeline is an excellent piece of work and I have no wish to pick holes in something that has clearly taken a lot of effort and time to construct. I remember the debate over TMFH, It appeared at the time that not everyone agreed on the 23rd. I am aware that the evidence for a planned attack on the 23rd outweighs the argument for an attack on the 22nd. I was really wondering if the timeline should indicate this. In other words an attack for the 23rd is not carved in stone.

Hi Waterloo
The Timeline I think has been well rehearsed , but the trouble is it's just to difficult to say , or state , with any clarity , what happened when , and where , those who have taken part in exercise certainly don't want me , or anyone else denigrating their hard work , so I won't . Many of the historians don't agree with the TMFH , and for what it's worth neither do I , I've been to the places and stood on the ground , I'm happy to leave it at that .
90th

90th,

I hope that I do not come across as denigrating anybody's hard work, I simply felt that the date of the intended attacks is open to debate and should be noted. I have never been to Isandlwana and I'm not likely to for at least another year, I'm hoping that my opinions are considered as valid as other members despite that fact.

Hi Waterloo
No your fine , if anyone was coming across as denigrating the findings it was me , not you . I also don't want to put down their hard work , but I'm not sure it can prove anything conclusively , as it's all supposition , and yes I agree with you , it probably should be noted that the attack was planned for the 23rd and not the 22nd . Nyezane was the same day but I seem to recall the warriors there had undergone their pre battle rituals , happy to be corrected
90th

Waterloo , Ian Knight and Paul Marais are hosting a tour in May to some of the Battlefields , they are also doing one in March 2017 , I'm hoping to be on both with some luck
90th

90th,

Finances permitting, I should be able to attend the March 2017 tour. I'm keen to get over there.

I see no difficulty at all in adding alternative views to the timeline so long as they are flagged up as just that and hopefully give some kind of reference as to source. What we want is a commentary for each stage. There is nothing sacrosanct about what appears now (and if someone thinks there is they can say so). We need more participation not less and too much is missing from the record for it ever to be definitive anyway. Nobody should feel constrained in saying what they think and why they think it. I will be turning to Frank's latest iteration over the holiday and I hope others do too.

Steve

New member - late comment.
The issue on the planned Zulu attack (22nd or 23rd) is troubling for me. Based on many of the posts above re; observations on large Zulu movements in the early hours of the 22nd, how does this reconcile with a planned attack on the 23rd? Just trying to better comprehend both sides of the issue.

Thanks

Brillio, give this a read. Click on link below, let us have your thoughts. Looks like you have hit the ground running. Always good to see new members posting.

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Thanks 24th - I will do that.

When you have had a chance to absorb Lock and Quantrill's "Missing Five Hours" paper you might also want to read Mike Snook's response to the 22/23rd issue. There was a lengthy and knowledgeable debate on the RDVC forum at the time involving L&Q and other authors. Snook's alternative scenario is set out in his post of Thursday Sep. 19th 2013 at 11.01 am ( there is a long string of posts on the subject, but just scroll down a bit). In my view, Snook sets out a credible alternative view to L&Q. But see what you think.
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Steve

Thanks Steve - looks like I have a lot of reading to do.

Enjoy the debate, things really start to pick up when Mike Snook debates the position and timings of the Nokenke, Umcityu, Umbonambi, and Ngobamakosi regiments. It is also interesting to read how these very knowledgeable historians debate with one another and how they come to a solution/agreement, especially over the annotated details of Map 2. Mike Snook is very skilled in the way he manages to offer a differing view point on the intended dawn attack.

Refreshing isn't it. I find Snook quite convincing on this, if not on some other things. He does pen a good post.

Steve

I keep checking back on the TMFH Forum/Debate to see if anyone had restarted it but there is nothing new added. Julian Whybra wrote in his post 26/9/13 that he would be commenting on the debate and perhaps adding further comments regarding Hamer's missing maps. I was interested to hear Mr Whybra's thoughts on the debate and to see if he had anything new to add to it. What was his opinion on the evidence put forward by Qauntrill and Snook, he did add a few corrections in his last post which led me to believe that he may put forward a different point of view.  It could be that the debate dried up or reached a conclusion elsewhere on that particular forum and I haven't seen it. I have read and re-read the 21 pages of the debate and I was hoping to see how the whole thing progressed.  In light of the fact that the MFH debate ended its probably a useful exercise to go back over the old posts and see what forum members here thought about TMFH.

Snook ruined the discussion. Most of what he says is in the form of sarcasm. If the context of what Snook says, is to be believed then you are not reading TMFH in the right context. All sources have been named and verified by L&Q. The problem is L&Q researched the resources, Snook is firing from the hip!
Read TMFH from start to end digest and then come up with logical answer. Don't rely on hasbeen Historians. L&Q are at the top of their game, along with Knight, Jackson, and Greaves, Laband.

Chard1879,

Its always worth reading TMFH, I agree that L&Q are at the top of their game and I agree with you that Knight et al are also up there with the best but I think we need people like Mike Snook to challenge new ideas as and when they are presented. As for Snook shooting from the hip, I thought that his argument was well presented and he avoided making any assumption, If you read the debate you will note that he points out when he is hypothesising. I have to admit that Mike Snook took the debate of track for a while because he was trying to establish the accuracy and the detail of the maps, but its just as well he did.. Its a shame that the debate dried up, I would like to have seen Julian Whybra add his thoughts. I will say this about Mike Snook, he does his fieldwork and his research, he has long distinguished military career behind him which in my opinion adds an extra dimension to his writing.

Snook argues for the sake of it. The debate stopped due to his attitude.
Nothing has been posted that shows TMFH is incorrect!
That renders Snooks argument invalid!

Just a quick quote from TMFH debate
MIke Snook stated:
' Peter Quantrill and I enjoy a mature and entirely cordial relationship and correspond privately as friends and fellow historians. We share confidences together and we seek each other's opinions. The debates we used to play out here were stimulating games of mental chess for us, and were interesting and entertaining for those who followed them as well as for those who 'got it' and joined the debate in the same vein. Both Peter and I are old soldiers, he a Gurkha-sahib and me a Anglo-Taff; we have both seen much and neither of us is so foolish as to regard the Battle of Isandlwana as anything other than a historical conundrum and a curiosity - getting to the bottom of it is our hobby...perhaps you could say our obsession, though I would like to think that in our respective cases it has been an entirely healthy obsession.

It so happens that we don't agree on certain points of acute detail.....no matter. The battle happened 131 years ago and is of absolutely zero importance to the modern world, (though that is not to say it was not an important event in shaping South Africa and determining the destiny of the Zulu people). The place itself does have bona fide modern importance as a heritage site and a tourist attraction, but what Snook thinks about this point of detail from 1879 or Quantrill thinks about that one, does not ultimately, in either case, matter a hoot. People will not die, governments will not fall.....it does not matter.'

I thought that this quote was worth a mention, I really don't think that the debate dried up because of Mike Snook.

Chard just because no-one has posted anything disagreeing with TM5H doesn't mean that it's correct , if you read Smith he isn't a fan , I know Knight isn't convinced along with Laband , and I also think JW isn't convinced either . From where I stood at one stage during Nov , with Ian Knight , describing parts of TM5H , I'm certainly not convinced either . It is far to difficult to put into words , being there puts it into the proper perspective . Save your pennies , get there and see for yourself , then make up your mind
90th

TM5H

I not disputing people don't agreed, I can see that for myself. But those that don't agree with TMFH, haven't show anything to backup their argument. TMFH has provided primary evidence.

This discussion is just about whether or not the attack was intended for the 22nd or 23rd and how that affects the timeline, nothing more.

The only primary evidence for that is from a single Zulu source and it was discovered and discussed long before L&Qs TMFH, which is mainly about where the Zulu start points were, based on their discovery of a new map. Snook's (and others) assessment of the intended date of attack is different to L&Qs and he makes a convincing argument based on exactly the same primary evidence. Nobody is dismissing the whole of TMFH.

All I said was read the arguments and make up your own mind. I fail to see how you can disagree with that!

Steve

Look at the reports coming in from various sources, regarding movements of Zulus very early in the morning. Why would the Zulus be moving in such large numbers and in view, if the attack was planned for the 23rd. I made up my mind when TMFH first came to light.

Yes, I agree that has to be explained. The counter argument is that the right horn had a lot further to go to its start points than either the chest or the left horn and so it had to start to move the day before if a co-ordinated dawn attack on the 23rd was the plan. The other argument is why on earth would they attack at mid-day if they had the choice? The key factor is they were confronted by Durnford's scouts on the plateau and went early as a result. I think that is plausible. It might also be argued that they had seen Chelmsford leave just before dawn on the 22nd and quickly revised their plans to take advantage - but there is no primary evidence of that which, if true, is surprising.

Steve

And still all of you give the Zulu no credit at all.....could they have adapted
there plans,why yes of course they could/did!!!!. they were doctored at
Ulundi..remember?.

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Les

"And still", where did that come from? Please give us the source of the quote.

Steve

No problem Steve, the quote come from me!, i'm quite prepared
to believe that you are one of the more enlightened ones who in
the final analysis believes that Chelmsford's campaign failed in
the first instance through a combination of arrogance and a failure
to grasp the massive undertaking he was embarking apon, the
sheer logistical effort it would take to prosecute a war against an
enemy he thought he knew so well, and yet was doomed to failure
so early in the campaign, as stated before to list his Lordships
failures presents no problem, there are literally many dozens of well
respected author historians who have reached pretty much the same
conclusion's.. We are talking about the battle of Isandhlwana.. The
Zulu watched the Central Column from the moment it crossed the drift,
its spies were in and around the camp, seemingly at will, the General
was lured away from the camp! Ntshingwayo saw his opportunity and
adjusted his tactics accordingly..result, an astonishing victory.. but
only astonishing to western eyes, the Zulu knew what they were doing.

I see a lot of people ' playing devils advocate '. and its to them i addressed
the ' and still '. i am all for the notion that people who have in the past
said one thing, but on other occasions play the advocate.. but to what end?.
are they afraid that all that is to be said on the battle, has indeed been said.
would that be so terrible.

My concern about the "all knowing Zulu" idea is what happened later. When faced with a larger force under LC they collapsed very quickly and the nation was neutered. The undertaking was not that massive in the final analysis. I don't for a moment condone the imperial attitude or objectives at the time, but that isn't ameliorated now by having an overblown idea of the capabilities of the Zulu army. They could not win in the end however brave.

As for playing devil's advocate, there is perhaps an element of that but it draws out interesting comments and for myself I have learned some new things. So long as it is supported by examples it is worthwhile I think. The forum has been an enjoyable place and while it would not be terrible if it ground to a halt because everything has been said, it would be a shame. Don't you think?

Steve

Yeah Steve, i agree with all that.. We know the Zulu initially got
lucky, the British then got organised..fini.

Chard ,Xhosa, cleaned up for the last time.
If there is a repeat, you will both view the forum with a guest status, meaning you will not be able to contribute to discussions.
Ruining others entertainment, will not be tolerated.

Your latest posts have been moved to the ring section.

rusteze wrote:

My concern about the "all knowing Zulu" idea is what happened later. When faced with a larger force under LC they collapsed very quickly and the nation was neutered. The undertaking was not that massive in the final analysis. I don't for a moment condone the imperial attitude or objectives at the time, but that isn't ameliorated now by having an overblown idea of the capabilities of the Zulu army. They could not win in the end however brave.

As for playing devil's advocate, there is perhaps an element of that but it draws out interesting comments and for myself I have learned some new things. So long as it is supported by examples it is worthwhile I think. The forum has been an enjoyable place and while it would not be terrible if it ground to a halt because everything has been said, it would be a shame. Don't you think?

Steve

When you consider the weapons the Zulu were up against in other battles and the final battle it's no wonder they collapsed. At Isandwana they faced MH rifles, cannon and rocket's the latter two not having much impact on the Zulu. Later they faced fortified positions with all of the above with the added bonus of the Gattling Guns and mounted imperial units.
At Isandlwana the Zulus got lucky when the force was divided and left unfortified, again with a an added bonus of having LC leaving two incompetent officers in charge.

I'd like to ask members' opinions on the particular timing of one event at Isandhlwana.  
The event was mentioned in the first post of this thread but was excluded thereafter.  I think it's a crucial event, key even, because much else is referenced from it, occurring either before or after, or simultaneously with it.  
I'm referring to the time of the SECOND alarm i.e. Fall in and Column call.
Please don't 'shoot from the hip' and cite the first primary source you come to.  Absolutely don't quote from published authors' work UNLESS they've footnoted their primary source.  That will just clog the thread and add to the confusion.  
I've spent a lot of time researching this time (since this thread began in fact).  Have a look at several accounts from different quarters, be prepared to be confused, and try to reach some sort of probable but evidenced conclusion about its timing.

Looking at various accounts, the time mentioned by quite a few relating to the second call is 12:00hrs

Curling state's that..page 73. Clarke's Invasion of Zululand.

Julian wrote:

Please don't 'shoot from the hip' and cite the first primary source you come to.

To get to the right answer what else is there apart what we have from some survivors. Most stating the same time?


SMITH-DORRIEN
"At about 12 a.m. the Zulus, who had apparently fallen back behind the hills, again showed in large numbers.!

Crealock
"Lieutenant-Colonel Cecil Russell, 12th Lancers, now joined us, and informed me that an officer of the Natal Native Contingent had come to him (about 12 noon, I think) when he was off-saddled, and asked where the General was, as he had instructions to tell him that heavy firing had been going on close to the camp"

Curling say's12:00

Essex say's 12:00

Julian

You're right that it needs careful unpicking, and when you confine yourself to primary sources alone it does become confusing. We have said before that people did not necessarily have accurate time pieces (or any timepiece) and that must be a factor that works against accuracy (at least in our terms). We are also working in a timeframe that is no more than about 5 hours or so in total.

Against all those caveats my initial view is that Gardner's statement is the most credible. But he actually says he arrived with Pulleine's orders between 12.00 and 1.00, met up with Shepstone and they both go to see Pulleine.  Shepstone tells Pulleine that Durnford is falling back, the 24th are ordered to Fall In, and a company is sent up onto the ridge in support. But there is an hour long period when that might have happened.

Curling says that he "turned out" about 12.00.

Brickhill is also vague, he says all hands prepared for action shortly after breakfast and remained so until 12.30. He also says that the natives came in between 8.00 - 9.00, he took them to Durnford (that early?). Later he says that he "found the whole army formed up" following the arrival of Shepstone and Gardner but gives no time.

Abraham the wagon driver makes an interesting reference to a 'white mounted volunteer" coming in. And soon after "mounted kaffirs" left the camp. He heard firing and the "red soldiers formed up". No timings.

Lt Davies arrives at the camp (with Durnford), he says "everybody under arms".

Pt. F Bickley 1/24th says the first Fall in and Column Call was at 8.00. An hour later Durnford rides in, after 1 1/2 to 2 hours the men were dismissed, but shortly afterwards fell in again. At that time No 5 Company were sent onto the hill to support Durnford. That could give a time of 10.30 or so.

Pt J Williams 1/24th says the picquet came in at 9.00 and the Column Alarm was sounded. They waited orders for 1/2 hour, stood under arms for 3/4 hour and then stood down. Then there was heavy firing to the left which he joined in with and expended 40/50 rounds. No timing but pretty early.

I want to believe the two Privates of the 1/24th who, you might say, were directly involved in the stand tos and stand downs. But I suspect they didn't have the means to tell the time. So I come back to Gardner, but even he has a flexible hour.

Best I can do at the moment.

Steve

rsuteze
Interesting exercise isn't it?

Dave
You've misunderstood.  That WASN'T what I asked for.  It's the time of the second Fall in I am after.

Interesting exercise isn't it?...you say Julian.

How about adding some context.. xhosa

It is an interesting exercise. I am in no doubt that there was a short period when the men had been stood down and then stood to again. But was that as early as the two Privates say ( and Brickhill). Or do we go with the officers and what they said (largely) at the so called inquiry? It is a bit surprising that Pulleine did not order the alert untill Durnford was in retreat. As you say, many other events hinge on that timing.

Steve

In the belief that it would be the officers that did actually possess time pieces I could be tempted to look more closely at their testimony. There is of course no guarantee that those time pieces were correct.
Curling puts the call out as 12 oclock and mentions that Smith arrived as they were turning out, and as they were mounted rode out before the infantry. Smith and Gardners return is timed. When Gardner was presenting the column orders to Pulleine Shepstone rode up with the news from the ridge. Higginson arrived shortly afterwards and he notes passing Cavaye heading up the hill.
That rather than the actual time tends to place a sequence of events and would appear to say that the troops were already turning out ( possibly to the parade area rather than column, Private Williams) when Gardner and Smith arrived back. That being the case it wasn't Shepstones breathless warning that caused the turnout but rather the sounds of the gunfire from the ridge.
Essex tends to corroborate the timing when he says he headed up the hill about 12 oclock and passes Cavaye en route.
So all around the 12 oclock mark the toing and froing seems to tie together.
Curling again mentions that just as the men were about to get dinner the call out sounded and as anyone that's ever served in the British army will confirm, Dinner is at 12.
I would therefore say that if Gardner etc did arrive at 12 then the call out occurred around 10 to 15 minutes prior, but if we accept the call out at 12 then Gardner etc arrived around 12:10 or so. Private E Wilson places the call out as 15 minutes later, so possibly a 12:15 call out?
Steve
There were two call outs, when Durnford arrived in the camp the men were standing to, it was at his suggestion they were stood down but had to stay armed.
Chard 16th July 1879
When I arrived at the camp the troops were in column about a mile or so out of camp. Before Durnford came up there was scarcely anybody in camp.
Curling
About 7.30 on that date a large body of Zulus were seen on the hills to front of the amp, we were ordered to turn out.......

Hi Frank

Yes, I don't disagree that around the 12.00 mark seems most likely. But don't quite get the sequence if Durnford arrives 10.30 - camp empty. Durnford stands them down (and they return to camp?) - shortly after alert given again (12.15?) following Gardner's arrival and Durnford has left by then and is in retreat. Seems a big gap in timing somehow.

Steve

Hi Steve
When Durnford arrived all the troops were stood to, he/Pulleine recalls them but wont allow them to take any equipment of.
From then:
Company sent to the ridge.
Two mounted companies sent to plateau
Rocket battery sent out
Durnford leaves
All the above within around an hour or so
Cheers

Yeah, but Company sent to Ridge, two mounted companies sent out, Rocket Battery sent out, Durnford leaves, gets some way out, retreats. Gardner arrives. And still 24th not stood to?

Steve

Xhosa

Thanks all for contributions. Xhosa, the context is this. I’ve always had an uneasiness about the timing of the second Fall in and Column call. Most writers place this at 12 for the reasons Frank has said. I recently came across an unpublished known survivor’s account of the battle (one who wouldn’t have had a watch) and in the process of authentification I had cause to look again at the timing of this second Fall in. As has been said, without watches all timings are (wild, even) estimates. Also, all timings were estimated a few days (or in some cases years) later when interviewed and so time became conflated or expanded in the memory. Even if a man had a watch and noted the time he could have had no regard for its later importance and placement in his memory.
At the time events were happening the men had no reason to note the time UNLESS they happened to have set it against another event (e.g. as Durnford arrived, just before dinner, when some horsemen arrived) or UNLESS they recalled that it was a ridiculously short time such that they hadn’t time to have dinner/unsaddle a horse/get to a tent. So, important are potentially watch-owning officers’ contemporary statements and ORs’ contemporary statements where the 2nd Fall in is placed in a chronological context.

The time of the first Fall in is beyond doubt. Whitelaw arrives at camp 7.45, The Fall in was sounded about 8.00, Pulleine’s message to LC is dated at 8.05. There is no disagreement.

The 2nd Fall in as a response to Shepstone’s message/Durnford’s retreat according to
Capt. Gardner’s testimony might be placed 12.10-13.00,
Lieut. Curling’s about 12
Lieut. Davies found the camp already under arms when he with Durnford’s arrived.
Pte. Bickley had the 1st Fall in at 8.00, Durnford arriving at 8.30, dismissal 9.30-10.00, 2nd Fall in very shortly after.
Pte. Williams had the 1st Fall in at 9.00 and dismissal after an hour and a quarter at 10.15. The 2nd Fall in he placed at 11.00 by which time Durnford’s force has arrived.
Pte. Wilson had the 1st Fall in at 8.00 and dismissal 10.30-11.00 when Durnford’s force arrived. Soon after E coy was sent up the spur but the others told to get their dinners asap. A quarter of an hour after dismissal the 2nd Fall in occurred i.e. 10.45-11.15 long before Shepstone/Gardner arrived.
Trpr. Barker has Whitelaw delivering his message about 8.00, Swift & another delivering a message to camp about 9.00, and himself a& Hawkins delivering a third message to camp about 11.00 but meeting the RB en route. Barker’s account is written in 1911 and clearly confused.
My new account has the 1st Fall in at 8.00, dismissal at 10.30, and the 2nd Fall in very soon after some horsemen arrived and before he could get some dinner at about 11.00.

Brickhill’s (dated May) has one Fall in from breakfast to 12.30 (clearly wrong).

The 2nd Fall in as a response to a white mounted volunteer’s message according to
Abraham was followed by mounted Kaffirs’ departure

There were times when I began to wonder seriously if there were not in fact three Fall ins at 8.00, 11.00 and 12.00. There weren’t of course. So the question arose how do you reconcile a clear memory of a very short time-elapse after the dismissal with the 2nd Fall in?
i.e.
Fixed time 8.00 1st Fall in
Dismissals ranging from 10.00, 10.15, 10.30, and 11.00
A very short time-elapse of a quarter of an hour before the 2nd Fall in, YET Durnford’s force has just arrived AND dinner is about to be served (at 12.00).
A 2nd Fall in resulting from Shepstone message and Durnford’s retreat at 12.00.

You see the problems? Blind adherence to a 12.00 2nd Fall in requires dismissing of a lot of evidence and sequences of events in up-until-now seemingly trustworthy survivors' accounts. I'm prepared to go along with that but it concerns me nevertheless and I wanted to know what others felt. And that's the context for my post.

Hi Julian
Im unsure of the fall in as a result od Shepstones message.
Curlings letter of the 21st gives the distinct impression that the fall in hd sounded, before Smith arrived back. Smith arrived back with Gardner, Gardner bumps into Shepstone and they deliver the messages more or less together. Ergo the alarm had been sounded before that meeting.
" Major Smith arrived as we were turning out"
Im still looking for the statement that attributes the call out to the sound of the firing.
Bickley in terms of timings are wild guesses, even his arrival time for Durnford is out by a couple of hours.
Durnford seems to have been the prime motivator for the dismissal, IF he arrived at the estimated time of 10:30 the dismissal could have happened within a 15minute period.
AS above I discount the second fall in as a result of Shepstone I would attribute it to the firing from Raw etc on the ridge. Sound coming from the top of the Quabe valley to the camp, if any, would be very muffled but coming of the ridge a lot sharper. Just my thoughts.

That's interesting Julian. Is your new account a junior rank? If so, that's three that put the timing of the second Fall in earlier and I become even more inclined towards their testimony, despite probable lack of timepieces.

Steve

I would caution on the testimonies of Bickley Wilson et al. They aren't written by the men themselves but rather dictated. There are four I think all written on the same page in the same hand and looking at the flow at the same time. This would suggest some strong collusion and sharing of memories. just a note of caution.

rusteze and Frank
Then you'd be in good company. L&Q in their timeline at the end of the book ZV place the dismissal at 10.45 and the 2nd Fall in at 11.00 without giving any reasons for it. Neither is either event or a reason for them mentioned in the text. Curious.
And so, one wonders what was the reason for a 2nd Fall in at 11 a.m.????? Zulus on the hills??? As a ready back-up for Durnford once he moved out????
And if 11.00 is RIGHT, then what mess does that make of all those survivors' accounts which hinge events around a 2nd Fall in being at 12.00??????
Now you begin to see MORE of the problems!!!
Rusteze, the a new account is a junior rank and probably without a watch.