The companies on the ridge

This is a page from the original Penn Symons Report. In the main text he is very clear as to who ordered out the companies of Mostyn and Cavaye. In the 'footnote' he casts doubt twice on the Essex statement.
My issues would centre around who were the 'other' survivors that gave opinions.

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Regards

Bonjour Frank,
To my knowledge, the (Penn) Symons's report was never published in its entirety (apart extracts from a Frank Emery's booklet).

But, the Mainwaring's report about "the last survivor" has already been published, I have a copy somewhere.
Cheers
Frédéric

If the Mainwaring's report is dated 1895, it has been published in « The Noble 24th » by Holme (I am not at home).
Cheers

Hi Frederic
I hadn't seen it before, would be good to know if it is in Holmes.
I spent a couple of hours reading the Penn Symonds report from the original, it brought home all the drama rather more than reading as a re type. And I agree the only other sections I had read were from Emery.

Regards

Frank,
It's in Holme.
See my answer ("the last survivor at Isandhlwana).
Cheers
Frédéric

Who was Durnford's staff officer?

Hi Ray
Cochrane would fit the bill.

Cheers

But can we take it that Dumrford had ordered Cochrane to do so ?

Hi Mr G
I doubt if Cochrane would have the power to issue an instruction without the back up of Durnford.

Regards

"From Lieut. W. F, D. Cochrane, 32nd LightInfantry, Transport Officer, No. 2 Column, to the Assistant Adjutant-General, Head-Quarters^ Pietermaritzburg. / s . Pietermqritzburg, SIE; ' Febi-uary 8th, 1879i IN compliance with your request, I have the honour to give the account of the battle of Sandhlwana from my own personal observation, and from the information which I have received from reliable sources. On the morning of.- the 20th January, 1879, No. 2 Column, to wli'ich I had been appointed Transport Officer, was stationed as follows:— Nos. 1 and 3 Battalions of the 1st Kegiment Native Contingent', and one Mounted Troop under Captain Cherry, 32 ud Light Infantry, at Kranzkop No, 2 Battalion of the same regiment."

"Under Major Bengough, 77th Regiment, near Sands Spruce, five troops Mounted Men, Russell's Bucket Battery, and two Companies of the 1st Battalion 1st Regiment Natal Native Contingent, at Helpmiakaar. Colonel Durnford was commanding this latter portion in person; Capt. Shepstone and I were with Colonel Durnford. Early on the 20th Colonel Durnford marched to. Rorke's Drift, crossing the river by means of the Pont, and establishing himself in a camp about half a mile from the river. Here we remained during the 21st. Capt. George Shepstone rode to Sandhlwana Camp and returned same day. Lieut. Smith Dorrien rode also to the camp, and returned with a despatch on the morning of the 22nd instant. Colonel Durnford was on the road to the Dutch farms, on the Biggarsb.org, for the purpose of commanding the Dutchmen's wagons when the despatch reached him. I was with Colonel Durnford, and he remarked to me, "Just what I thought: we are to proceed at once to Isandlwana. There is an Impi about eight miles from the camp, which the General moves out to attack at daybreak'." Colonel Durnford returned to Rorke's Drift Camp at once, and marched for Isandhlwana at about 7.30 or 8 a.m. My orders were to see all the wagons inspanned, start them all off, and hand them over to Conductor McCarthy, and then join Colonel Durnford. I complied with these instructions, and arrived at the isandhlwana Camp with Colonel Durnford about 10 or 10.30 a.m. Having made all the necessary arrangements f jr his Column, Colonel Durnford Look over the Command from Colonel Pulleine, 1st Battalion 24th Regiment, who gave him a state of the troops, which were: 2 Guns, Royal Artillery, under Major Smith; 5 Companies, 1st Battalion 24th Regiment; 1st Company, 2nd Battalion 24th Regiment; a few mounted men, and, as I understand, some of Lonsdale's Contingent, numbering about 250 (of these numbers I am not quite certain), and the verbal orders, which were, " To d'-fend the camp." The news was, that a number of Zulus had been seen since an early hour on the top of the adjacent hills, and that an attack had been expected ; and in consequence, the following disposition of the troops had been made:—The Natives of Lonsdales Contingent were on outpost duty on the hills to the left; the guns were in position on the left of the camp; the Infantry were turned out, and formed in column in the open space in front of the General's tent. The wagons, &c., were inspanned. Constant reports came in from the-scouts on the hills to the left, but never anything from the men on the top of the Isandhlwana Hill, that I heard. Some of the reports were. " The enemy march in force behind the hills on the left." " The enemy are in three columns." " The columns are separating, one moving to the left rear, and one towards the General." " The enemy are retiring in every direction." Upon this latter report, Colonel Durnford said he would go out and prevent the one column joining the Impi, which was supposed at that time to be engaged with* the troops under the General. He asked Colonel Pulleine to give him two companies of the 24th to go with the Natives. Colonel Pulleine objected stating that he did not think he would be justified in sending away any men. as his orders were " To defend the camp" Colonel Durnford said, "Very: well! perhaps I had, better not. take. them. I 'will go with my own men." Previous to this, Colonel Durnford on hearing that one column of the enemy was moving towards the left rear, had reinforced the baggage guard (which at that time consisted of one Company Native Contingent), with one troop of mounted Natives: .and I understand that Captain George Shepstone was sent back with this party. Colonel Durnford now sent two troops on the hills to the left, under Captain Barton, Natal Native Contingent, and took with him to the front the remaining two troops, and Russell's Rocket Battery, with a Company of the Natal Native Contingent under Captain Nourse, as escort to the battery. Going at a canter, the Rocket Battery and escort were soon left behind. Having proceeded between 5 and 6 miles, a mounted man came down from the hills on the left, and reported that there was an immense Impi behind the hills to our left, and he had scarcely made the report when the Zulus appeared in force in front of us and to our left; they were in skirmishing order, but 10 or 12 deep, with supports close behind. They opened fire at us at about 800 yards, and advanced very rapidly. We retired some little way, taking up a position in a " donga," or water-course, of which there are several, across the plain in front of Isandhlwana. We retired steadily in skirmishing order, keeping up a steady fire for about 2 miles, when we came upon the remains of the Rocket Battery, which had been cut off and broken up; there was a hand-to-hand engagement going on with those that remained. The left wing while retiring was wheeled up to the right and drove the Zulus back, who were not in very large numbers just there at that time. It appears that Captain Russell, whilst following up with the Battery, perceived some of the enemy on his left, he fired three rockets with some effect, this was followed by a volley from the Zulus, the Native Contingent retired, the mules were frightened, and disorder was caused. The enemy seeing this ran down the hill and attacked the Battery. Captain Russell was killed. As they mounted men retired towards them, the Zulus ran back to their cover. The retreat was continued until we arrived at a "donga," about half a mile in front of the camp. Here a few mounted men, Carbineers, Natal Mounted Police, &c., reinforced our right. A stand was made here, but we were eventually driven in and the camp was taken from the left. It appears that the mounted men on the left became engaged on the hills about the same time as we were engaged on the flat, and I was informed 'that they held the Zulus back; but my opinion is that the right of the enemy were only engaging the troops, and did not intend to advance until their left had worked round; and I believe also that Captain -Shepstone (who, after the arrival of the baggage, took the troop of mounted natives he had used as escort, on the hills to the left rode down to the camp, and asked in the name of Colonel Durnford for assistance. This Colonel Pulleine gave him by detaching two Companies of the 24th, a little to the left front. These, together with the mounted men and Lonsdale's Contingent, fell back into the camp, and, in spite of the artillery fire and the steady musketry of the infantry—who were in good position amongst the stones and boulders to the left, and left centre of the Camp, and who stood their ground most gallantly—the enemy steadily advanced. A general move was made towards the mountain, to take up a last position, but it was too late, the Zulus were too quick and fleet of foot, they caught up the men on foot before they could reach the new position, completely overpowering them by numbers, and assegaing right and left. The guns moved from left to right across the camp, and endeavoured to take the road to Rorke's Drift; but finding this in the hands of the enemy turned off to the left, came to grief in a " donga," and had to be abandoned. There was not time to spike them. Major Smith was wounded, but managed to get down to the Buffalo, where, I understand, he was sliot. A few mounted men and a good many natives managed to escape from the camp, but had to ride hard over very rough country to the Buffalo River, a distance of about five miles, under fire from the enemy the whole way. The ground was so bad for horses that the Zulus on foot were able to run as fast as the horses could travel. I should judge that more than half the number that left the camp were killed before they arrived at the Buffalo, and many were drowned, there being no drift, the water running rapidly, with large boulders and deep water alternating. The officers who escaped consulted together on the road, and decided to form a laager at Helpmakaar. The fighing lasted from about 11.30 a.m. till 1 p.m., as near as I can judge. There must have been at least 15,000 Zulus, besides the Reserves, and I should compute the numbers killed at from 2,000 to 2,500. The Zulu system of attack, as represented. in the Zulu pamphlet, is easily traceable. The main body being opposite the left centre of the camp; the horns thrown out to the left rear and right front. Had the Zulus completed their scheme, by sending a column to the Buffolo River to cut off the retreat, not a man would have escaped to tell the tale. As far as I am personally concerned, when I got back to the "camp with the mounted men who had now been driven out of the " donga," I found that the enemy had rushed the camp from the left, and were engaged hand to hand with the Infantry, who were completely overpowered with overwhelming numbers. I saw that all was over. I made in the direction which I had seen taken by the mounted men, guns Royal Artillery, and the Natives on foot. I was cut off by the enenif, who had now reached the line of retreat; but with a good horse, hard riding, and good luck, I managed to reach the Buffalo River. The Zulus seemed perfectly fearless ; they followed alongside, having desperate hand-to-hand fighting with those retreating, mostly our Natives .on foot. Many of the enemy were killed between the camp and the river. On several occasions they were quite close to me, but I was fortunate enough to escape whilst others dropped at my side. They fired at us the whole way from the camp to the river, but having mounted the bank on the opposite side we were safe. I made for Helpinakaar by order of Captains Essex and Gardner, and assisted in forming a laager,

I have, &c., (Signed) W. F. D. COCHRANE,
Lieut. 32nd Light Infantry, Transport Officer,
No. 2 Column

Surly Cochrane would have stated that he Col Durnford order him, to order the two companies out?

Symons said "the urgency of the request from Durnford's staff officer". This must be referring to Shepstone coming in for reinforcements. That is far too late for the sequence of events for the sending out of Cavaye and mostyn.
Anyway we KNOW that Cavaye went first and was followed by Mostyn. Symons's statement comes right if he'd only written that "one" company was sent out and not "two" as stated.

Hi Julian
The interesting point for me was not really who sent the companies out, rather my old hobby horse of WHERE they went. Symonds in his footnote really stresses his disagreement with Essex and seems to indicate this view was supported by others. And who would have been his supporters?

We have to be careful with Penn Symons don't we? He calls Essex's evidence "circumstantial' yet Essex was there while Penn Symons was with Chelmsford. I also take Julian's point that he fails to separate the despatching of Cavaye's and Mostyn's companies. Having said he doesn't "quite" agree with Essex he tells us no more. I think it is marginal and might just be about an officer of the 24th wanting the final say.

Steve

Hi Steve
I would to an extent disagree with your final summation. PS is  at pains to point out that Essex is most clear but is not the same as many other survivors. So its not his own opinion he is giving merely reporting facts. I would agree he doesn't separate the two companies departure, that being said the comment on agreement doesn't apply to his own thoughts but what has been presented to him.
We do know that there is not one account that can be read and accepted verbatim, but because there are these discrepancies does not mean they must discarded or viewed in a bad light. Its up to the historians to separate conjecture and assumption from confirmed fact. Without returning to the books I cant recall any statement on the two companies being sent that do agree. In fact according to Chelmsford at least one never came back at all.
Cheers

There is a bit of a difference. Essex was there on the ridge. He carried the orders from Pulleine. He spoke to Cavaye, his friend. He met Melvill. He would have known at close quarters what was going on. And he would have known better than anyone else who left an account.
I.e. It is factual not reportage, not opinion, not hearsay.

Hi Julian
I don't believe I said as much, however Most of the Essex report is unconfirmed. PS doesn't offer an opinion based on his own experience he merely confirms that the Essex account does differ from others, unknown. So yes his account is reportage but based on accounts as told (heresay for sure) but does that make it any less acceptable? There are some areas of Essex evidence that are at odds with common reasoning, in particular his descriptions of the positions of the companies on the ridge. We have spent the last 130 odd years having to accept and rationalise the entire right horn attack to accomadate his version, and that against every bit of common military sense.
But coming back to the point I made in response to Steve, I don't believe it is a 24th officer wanting the final say.

Chard1879,

In the Cochrane statement you added on 7th July, you highlighted in in red a comment regarding two troops. I am curious as to why you highlighted the comment, have you confused two troops of Native Horse with two companies of British infantry?

Could you please explain so I can understand reasoning for adding the statement at all?

John Y.

It is very hard to gauge the meaning of words when there is so little to go on. Who else spoke to PS is intriguing but he obviously gave it some credence. I find two things he said as quite difficult.

First his use of the word "circumstantial" in relation to Essex's evidence - I think we would say it (or most of it) is direct evidence - what is he getting at?

Second, his use of the word "many" in relation to other accounts told to him - given the small number in the first place I find "many" as overblown, perhaps to make a point?

Steve

Hi JY
The Highlighted piece to me seems certain that its referring to the two Native Horse troops , it states under the command of Barton , Barton certainly wasn't in charge of Cavaye or Mostyn's Co's ( It also says troops , not companies ) troops refer to mtd men , Companies for infantry as far as I'm aware . Barton was sent there with I think Roberts who was the other officer in charge .
90th

Hi Steve
You've highlighted the two enigmatic components of PSs statement. The word cicumstantial seems to indicate that Essex wasn't there for the whole period covered by his evidence, he observed portions and possibly filled in the gaps. Secondly the 'many', I do wish he had expanded on that. There are as we know a lot of mentions of the companies, most at variance with each other. Are these the 'many' refered to? And again what sections are at variance?
I sense a deep investigation of the nuances of the Essex statement (s) about to start.
One particular section of his evidence has, amongst others, always intrigued me and that's the section that portions of the company withdrawl was hidden from him, virtually impossible if the line was in the accepted position. There are a number of other issues that come across as disjointed. But that's a whole other string. By the way he gets his left and right badly mixed up at one point, either that or he deserted the area he had been given responsibility for.
But as I started out with those two enigmatic areas that is the core of the debate.

Cheers

Frank

Can you post the preceding page of PS's report so we can get the full flow of his statement about the companies?

Steve

90th,

Correct which why I am querying it with Chard1879, as I think he is confusing Captain William Barton and his two troops of Native Horse with two companies of the 1st/24th.

I'll reply to your e-mail shortly.

John Y.

Page 41 Steve
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Interesting point here as well. Seems Pulleine turned down the request for backup by Shepstone. If you consider who was potentially part of that command group, and who survived it should point towards at least one source/deep throat for PS.

Cheers

Thanks Frank. PS writes this as though he was a witness to events. "Captain Shepstone was pale and excited as he stated his wishes'. Maybe so but PS didn't see it. Who has told him that?

Earlier on the page he uses words to the effect that Durnford was blinded to danger by his bravery. Aimed at drawing criticism away from officers of the 24th?
All subsequently reflected in his editing of the Regimental history.

Do we know who this report is addressed to?

Steve

Steve I spent an entire morning reading the original report. Its an amazing document, especially holding it and reading it as it was written, Without trying to dramatise it was a 'tingling' sensation being virtually ther. Ive read many many accounts and books but Ive never been as riveted as that morning. The account flows of his pen with massive conviction, there are obviously areas of 'gap filling' and im sure points made that don't relate to actual fact but the document as a whole is eminently believable.
He pulls no punches and lays blame where it should be, within and with out the Regiment.

I know what you mean. I had similar sensations reading the reports at Kew. Why is this one at Brecon by the way? Perhaps a Regimental document and not a War Office one?

I have been looking carefully at Essex in the light of what PS says. Will put pen to paper later.

Steve

The problem with Essex Steve is that we believe implicitly his report and try to blend everything else into it, ignoring the abnormalities. Just for the hell of it re tune your mind to accept all the other reports and then blend Essex into that framework. It changes things radically. The positions of the companies on the ridge, the retreat from the ridge, why did we get a 'blue on blue' , who sent the companies onto the ridge, his own retreat from the battlefield. How did he pick up the sarcastic sobriquet of 'Lucky Essex'.
Its just an exersize Ive been playing with for a number of years of isolating a survivors evidence and then taking a fresh look at things.
cheers

An interesting view, Frank, but I'm not sure of its validity. The historian's aim is to make all the evidence fit unless of course it can be shown that something has been doctored, tampered with, or deliberately slanted (and there's no suggestion of that with Essex's accounts).
The soubriquet 'Lucky', Essex first gained after his Majuba escape. I'm not aware that it emerged earlier nor that there was any sarcasm implied when it did.
Might a better approach be to examine Essex's accounts alongside those of others who were on the ridge and left accounts: Raw, Vause, etc.?

One passage of Essex's report that might be labeled as "circumstantial" by PS is when he describes the falling back of Mostyn's left and the stand at the foot of the slope.

He says - about five minutes after arriving with Mostyn's company he is informed by Melville that a fresh body of the enemy is appearing in their rear (I take it to mean the Zulu chest?). Essex is sent to the left extremity of Mostyn's company to organise their falling back. He then returns to the centre portion of Mostyn's company but finds it has already gone down the hill (the implication being that he could not see that happening from the far left of the line). He follows the company back down the hill (with some difficulty because he is mounted). He then says "I found two companies of 1/24th drawn up at about 400yards distant (from the camp?) in extended order and Captain Younghusband's company in a similar formation in echelon on the left." Then he goes for extra ammunition.

So, two points at which he cannot really see what the companies are doing - when he is at the left extremity of Mostyn organising the fall back and when he moves off for ammo. Incidentally, it is perhaps coincidental that he should describe Younghusband as being in echelon with Cavaye/Mostyn and PS uses the same word to describe the attack formation of the two companies going towards the ridge. Is PS conflating Younghusband's move with that of Mostyn/Cavaye?

Steve

rusteze
Might Essex not mean simply that while he was riding across to Dyson and organizing with him their slow withdrawal, he had not NOTICED (rather than physically SEE) the withdrawal of the rest of F coy?

And yes, Symons may well be conflating Younghusband's move with that of E & F coys.

There are actually 3 groups on the ridge , Dyson and his section are also sent further left of Cavaye and Mostyn onto the Tahelane Spur ? .
90th

Julian
As I said, just an exercise, but a really interesting one that throws up interesting situations. I have as you suggest put Essex to the test against Raw, Nyanda etc. There are significant gaps, and its those gaps that consistently bring me back to the position of the line.
I agree with Steve, the distance between the left and centre of Mostyns company is not huge. The bowl of the ridge is a curve, its the merest of glances from the left/West end to see the whole line. Its a point that seems to agree with my dissatisfaction with the company position. Its an ongoing demon Im wrestling with Im afraid.
Personally if Essex applied for a job at my company I wouldn't hire him.

Well, you might reconsider, he's a pretty lucky chap! And what an interviewee!

Why do I always picture Essex on the cover of a Harry Flashman book?

It might well be that he had not noticed the centre withdrawing (from what Frank says it is physically viewable had he looked) but Essex clearly does not know it has happened because he goes back expecting them still to be at the crest. So he has lost sight of that particular movement of the bulk of F company.

On another tack, do we know who sent Melville up to Essex to warn of the zulus appearing at the rear of the companies and what was said? I can't recall.

Steve

I notice, on Ian Knight's Facebook Group page, that another copy of Penn Symons account has turned up and has been purchased by a military museum in Doncaster called "Ashworth Barracks". Speculation is that it could be Pen Symons personal copy of his original text held at Brecon and seen by Frank. Might become a bit more accessible if so?

Steve

Hi Steve
As far as Im aware the original has never been photo copied. My own copy is actually photographed. The original is rather fragile and I wouldn't imagine it could stand the strain of a Photostat machine. A lot of the old documents are in similar state. One old photo album was so bad I actually refused to open it.
An ex curator did type out a copy, that copy is available I believe.
It would certainly be of interest if PS had in fact written out a second copy. Cant understand why he would do that as the original was in fact his personal copy.

Cheers

Hi Frank

There are some photographs on Facebook. It looks like a copy of the typewritten version, not manuscript.

Steve

Rusteze
It may be the original typewritten report ? .
90th

After PS returned to England his hand written report was sent to Queen Victoria, she kept it for some time, I believe around 3 months. It was returned by one of her staff with the instruction it shouldn't be made public till Chelmsfords had shuffled his mortal coil. I am told that the first time that any 'outsider' had access to the report was Emery, even then he was only allowed to comment on various portions. I have applied in the past on numerous occasions for access, as have more illustrious luminaries than I, only to be turned down.
Again Im informed by a rather impeccable source that the only typed copy, other than the Emery extracts, is the one done my the ex curator and which is available from the museum. I would hesitate to refer to it as sanitised as that gentleman is a forum member.
Steve let me have a link to the facebook page and I will compare it to that typed version I hold.

Regards

It describes very accurately the copy I hold, statements by Williams etc. But the copy prepared by Major Everett is copyright to the museum. Most strange!
Interestingly I hold some documents from Smith Dorrien that are typed in Blue in a very similar/same type style so potentially this is a very old typed copy or a rather well done 'antiqued' volume.
Another area of comparison is that the original hand written notes are over 63 pages, as is this typed copy.
There are a number of pointers that indicate PS returned to the hand written copy to either amend or add notes to. It would be really interesting to see page number 10/11 to see if there is a footnote. If there is, the typed copy would have been done well after the original, if there isn't it would indicate it was done very shortly after the hand written account. There are a few other pointers but if anyone can get the holders at the Ashworth Barracks to have a look it could be interesting.

Frank

You have the  link. You will see that the copy has been specially bound in leather and has a gilt title on the front (not readable in the picture), hence I suppose the speculation that it was Penn Symons copy. I doubt very much that it is the typed version produced by the then curator at Brecon which must be reasonably recent. The fact that it has come up for public sale and is now in another museum must make it more readily available I would think. It seems to me that Brecon was being overly parochial about something that cannot possibly now be embarrassing to anybody. Worth asking Doncaster whether they are going to make it public - why would they not?

Steve

Steve
Yes, I discounted the Brecon copy as being involved. Its highly possibly it was PS own copy, for what ever reason he would have then had his 'personal copy' typed out. Just cant figure that. There is of course a further possibility that it was brought about around the time of the Historical Records of the 24th Regiment, that was around 1892. So this particular edition could have belonged to Paton or Glennie, to extrapolate further of course, it could have been Atkinsons from 1937 ish. As I pointed out earlier if the extra notes are in the type written copy it would tend to restrict the dates a tad.

Cheers

I have raised a few questions with Ashworth Barracks.

Steve

Steve I hope you enquired about the map ? If it is an integral part of the publication it puts the date of publishing after 91. If not I wonder why its part of the package, possibly the original owners has a tie back to the regiment (s) that took part in the exercise.

Morning Frank

Didn't think about the map! Will feed it into the conversation if it occurs. In the meantime, have come across this which is interesting (and contains same map). No sign of Penn Symons but the manoeuvres were commanded by Evelyn Wood.
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Also found the auction site, but tells us nothing more.
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Steve

Interesting read but nothing to really to tie the map to PS, so just an add in to the sales parcel I would imagine. One name that stands out is Bonham Carter, I would imagine an ancestor of Helen.

Frank did you see my PM?

Morning Pete
Yes I did and Ive followed up, Im just waiting for a reply. It ties up with another source.
Thanks Mate

Good afternoon,

Firstly, many thanks for posting the photo of the Penn Symons manuscript, nice to see the original document. Apologies for commenting on this thread after such a while, it's the first opportunity I've had to log in for some time.
I have been meaning to get some copies of various things from the Regt. museum for some time, Mr Davies did ask for a list to determine the feasibility however, life got in the way and I have yet to reply. A little question for Mr Allewell if you would be so kind, you have said the original has (or was) been denied access to people, did you finally get permission to view it and take the above photo?
The document is one of the items I was going to inquire about. Is it therefore likely I would be only be able to get the typewritten copy (which I understand is not 100% verbatim) rather than a photocopy of the original (which you believe has never been done)?
It is a shame such an important document is restricted, even the Official Secrets Act generally operates to the 100 year rule.

Many thanks,

Bill Sherriff