The Battle of Mangeni

Hi Guys, inmates and chronic sufferers of AZW obsession

Here's one for you.
Supposing the Indunas had followed Cetshwayo's instructions at Isandlwana  and not attacked the camp but fell on Chelmsford's party as it was strung out across the landscape. Would they have  destroyed it piecemeal? How would the senior officers (Durnford and or Pulleine)  have reacted to the loss of so many men including their chief? Could the party have coalesced into a unit and hung on till reinforcements (Durnford again) arrived to save them? Would Durnford have been able to save them and become the hero of the Colony and the Empire?

What do you think?

Kick it around a bit just for fun.

Best regards to you all

24th foot

Hi 24th foot..

Supposing the Indunas had followed Cetshwayo's instructions at Isandlwana and not attacked the camp.....

Not attack the camp?. i like the overall premise of your question, as you
say ' just a bit of fun '.. but at what point do you suppose the Zulu were
not going to attack that ripe juicy plum layed out so beautifully for them!.
I hope you get a decent response, and Durnford does ride to his lord-
ship's rescue and the camp can mobilise and send every man with a
rifle on horse and on foot...streaming in Durnford's wake! Hmmm.. all
those men caught in the open running toward's up to 20, 000 maddened
Zulu warrior's..oop's. i cant let my flight's of fancy imagine an outcome
that does not end in a similar fashion..20, 000 Zulu's catching that column
at that time ( pre the awful lesson... duly learned ) in the open...
then i think the Zulu would have done the lot of them. cheers xhosa

I fear Les is right. The only way that an attack on Chelmsford's column might have been endured (for a while) is if the six companies of 2/24th, the mounted infantry and the four guns could come together in a defensive laager. But even then they only had 70 rounds a man and one days supplies. In reality, Chelmsford seems to have done precious little scouting around the column as it proceeded, other than towards Dartnell's bivouac, so he probably would not have had much notice of an attack. And he splits his force again leaving the 2/24th and the guns to catch up (the guns never did) while he presses on with mounted men towards Dartnell. Although he reaches Dartnell's position by 6.30 his main column is way behind. So the possibility of him concentrating his defence, should he be attacked, never arises. Even had he been able to do that, he would need rapid re-supply from Isandhlwana which, by wagon, is probably 3 hours away and with 20,000 Zulu in between it could not happen. He consistently underestimates the tenacity of the Zulu and the continuous concentrated firepower required to blunt their determined attacks. Even at Ulundi, with hugely increased firepower, he struggled to turn them back. Had it happened at Mangeni he was doomed. From a Zulu perspective, taking out the General and all his staff would have been a far greater victory than taking the camp. Durnford's meagre force and Pulleine's slow moving companies and wagons would have been irrelevant.

Steve

Interestingly time would be the issue in looking at any scenario on the plain. If you break the morning down into say three segments.
4 to 5am
The column, for want of a better description, would have been probably some where of the mouth of the Quaby valley but on the opposite side of the plain. If the Zulu had then attacked at the 'time of the horns', dawn, they would have been easily seen exiting the valley or coming around the side of Quabi hill. Probably 5 to 6 kilometres in plain view, that would surely have given the column time to form a cavalry receiving square. Even though there were only 70 rounds per man I would probably have a good bet on the British causing some absolute mayhem across that open ground. Chelmsford of course wouldn't have been part of that action, he had rode on ahead and would have been a good few kilometres down the track to Mangeni.
5 to 6
The odds would start to favour the Zulu. At this point the artillery had become separated and were guarded by a single company, hardly enough to resist for long. But again the Zulus would have been visible for a long time coming across the plain and would have given that small force a chance to form square. The balance of the force would have been on the uphill slope leading out of the basin and could have either marched back to possible give some form of diversion or gone into a square themselves, Chelmsford arrived at Mangeni around 6 and would have had a grandstand view of the action from the lip of the basin. Quite possibly he could have unleashed a significant colonial mounted force to create a touch of havoc amongst the advancing impi.
6 onwards. The column was then badly split with sections going to the North towards the Silutshane valley ( Chelmsfords breakfast spot) Russells men going of to the plain to the North near siphezi, the NNC going over the hills and the various companies split in a number of directions. That would have been a total massacre as the impis hunted the groups down one by one.
As to being reinforced from the camp the only viable way that could have happened would have been by a determined and fast moving mass cavalry, and that just didn't exist. Durnfords arrival at 10 to 10:30 would have just in time to watch the retreating Zulus, either heading back to the hills or quite possibly towards the camp.
The Camp
If the impi had attacked in the early morning spot the whole spectacle would have been visible from the camp but I doubt they would have been in a position to help and would possible have gone into defensive mode themselves.
There is really no fixed answer of what could or would have happened, victories tend to hinge on small circumstance so Les and Steve could very easily be correct in their summations.

One things for sure, Chelmsfords Bacon and Eggs would have been less than palatable.

Cheers

Morning Frank, very good to hear from you.
It is very difficult to put yourself into Chelmsford's mind set because we are strongly influenced by what we know happened at  Isandhlwana.  But he repeatedly makes clear that he is determined to bring the Zulu to battle and in doing so he seems willing to place his forces at considerable risk at every turn. He was not stupid, even if he was arrogant (no more than most at the time), and you wonder how he could believe that such limited numbers of troops could so easily prevail. He knew he did not have sufficient forces and yet he persists with three columns and then splits his force even further into penny packets.  I find it a real enigma that he took so much trouble to disseminate information about Zulu structures and attack strategies before the invasion and yet seemingly ignored it all in practice. A very strange man - even stranger than Durnford I think.

Interesting point about the effect of timing. Given what we know of the Zulu dispositions on the plateau and in the Ngwebeni would they really have been in a position to stream out of the Quabe as early as 6.30? - I would have thought later was more likely when, as you say, Chelmsford's force was more strung out. Might the companies at the camp been able to deploy sufficiently far out to engage the right horn in its flank as it attacked the Harness group?

Regards
Steve

Hi Steve
Nice to be back again.
Cant help but agree about Chelmsford. Without doubt he knew chapter and verse of the Zulu startegies but rather than ignoring them I think he wasn't worried about them or there effect so discounted the effects. Subtle difference really.
If you look back on the timings when Durnford met the impi coming up the Quabe that impi had probably taken somewhere between 15 and 20 minutes to get from the starting point, either point X or ngwebini, and they were possible half way down the valley. So yes if they were aroused at their traditional time, 'the time of the horns' then they would have had ample time to get onto the plain by say 5.30 ish. As to the tactical aspect of it yes a later attack would have probably been more beneficial, but aren't we really stretching hindsight to its limits?
Harness would have been a fare distance from the camp at that time, probably close to the place that the NNC and Maorie took cover later in the day. Horribly everything that could have taken place at that mythical battle would have been highly visible from the camp, just as much as it was for Maorie watching the real battle unfold.
It would be probably beneficial to put ourselves into Ntshingwayos mind, he gets woken up at 4 oclock and is told that the English are leaving the camp. Are they all leaving, just a few, where are they going? That must have happened, but whats his train of thought from that point? In our hyperthetical situation when would he have elected to chase them? Then back to reality, did his spies actually give him that data and if so again what did he do with it? What was his mindset that he elected to wait around until 11? The missing 5 hours comes into play maybe?

Cheers

Possibly a good time to thank all the well wishers for their messages over the last few weeks. My daughter did pass them on.

Regards

Frank

Hi guys,
Thanks for your thoughts. I think it would be highly likely that a serious defeat would follow an ambush as I suggested. The problem from the Zulu commanders perspective would be springing the trap. ie choosing the best moment to strike. The warriors having taken snuff and been emotionally 'wound up ' would find it difficult to sit quietly, like Wellington in Spain,  while the enemy become more and more  vulnerable. I suppose they could all face the other way but that's stretching it a bit. Its pretty certain that even if His Lordship and party all fell,  HMG would still send Sir Garnet and reinforcements so the end would be the same, just delayed a little.
Best regards
24th foot

Hi All,
What might have been, is an interesting question.
However, according to Insp Mansel's report a section of the Zulu Impi did try and attack an NMP patrol, but the enemy came off second best, losing about 60 to the bullet.
The difference was that the colonials ( NMP, NC, NMR) unlike the imperials , were very well versed in the Zulu body and horn battle tactic and withdrew as soon as they saw it forming. The colonials then opened heavy fire from a safe distance putting the attackers to flight.
Amongst the enemy dead that day was one of Mehlogozulu's sons. There were no colonial fatalities.

regards

Barry

Hi Barry
Fully agree, even Gardner commented that a squadron of cavalry would have turned the day. So in the 'what if' situation the colonials at Mangeni had combined with Russells force etc it would have been a game breaker.
Cheers

Cavalry proved effective against defeated and demoralised Zulus. Would a hundred or so mounted men have been as effective against a couple of thousand attacking Zulus? Durnford fought a retreating battle, but there was no suggestion that he could stop the enemy.

Morning Eaton
I think the Boer proved how effective a mounted force could be on a number of occasions in Natal and the Transvaal. Mzilikazi in particular learned a few lessons.
Barry makes a good point in the efficacy of Mansells men on the Mangeni plain. The Zulu forces had to get within a throwing distance to try and inflict damage whilst the mounted men could wheel in, fire, and wheel out again.
The comparison with Durnford has to be put into context really, he elected to defend a retreat to get back to the camp. I wonder what would have happened if he had decided to charge forward? Interesting idea?

Cheers

Bonjour,
Frank, happy to hear again from you.
An historian wrote that Durnford with his mounted men used at Isandhlwana the same tactic as the Boers.
Gardner mentions a charge of a British Cavalry squadron, not mounted infantry (Imperial units) or Colonial units (white or black). All these units with their own qualities and defaults were responding to different needs. It seems to me that a cavalry charge facing an ennemi in attack position involves a sword or a spear.
The mounted troops with LC before Isandhlwana had not such weapons and were not trained for this specific type of combat (charge).
For example the FLH was equipped with swords long after Isandhlwana


Cheers.
Frédéric

Morning Frederic
Your quite right, in terms of swords, but the point Barry made was the use of colonials with their knowledge of the Zulu and Zulu tactics could have made a difference in our hypothetical situation. The colonial and the Boer used the same principle, circle in towards the enemy fire a volley and circle out. All the time out of range of the throwing arm. It did work, as evinced by Mansel. But yes I would agree they weren't a traditional Cavalry force versed in the sabre and lance.

Cheers

Frank Allewell wrote:

Morning Frederic
the point Barry made was the use of colonials with their knowledge of the Zulu and Zulu tactics could have made a difference in our hypothetical situation. The colonial and the Boer used the same principle, circle in towards the enemy fire a volley and circle out. All the time out of range of the throwing arm.

Cheers

Frank,

I don't think it's a "hypothetical" situation.
Durnford used the same tactic (it seems to me).

Cheers.

Frédéric

Just a precision:
If barry evokes the 21 January, no shots were fired between Mansel's troopers (less than half a dozen men) and the Zulus.
Cheers.

Frédéric

The perennial difficulty in halting and turning a Zulu attack is judging where the tipping point is. I tend to agree with Frederic that the mounted men were essentially a scouting or follow-up force once an attack had been substantially halted by concentrated gunfire. But judging just how prolonged and concentrated that gunfire needed to be was always underestimated. When the odds are 20 to 1 it had to go on for a considerable time and be relentless. Any pause, whether to fall back or obtain ammunition, would quickly bring the Zulu within spearing distance and once that happened the chances were that weight of numbers would carry the day. It seems to me that Durnford is a good example of what happens to a small mounted force in the face of thousands of attackers, they delay the onslaught marginally, they fall back and do so again but with diminishing success, and eventually they stand but succumb.

Steve

Bonjour Steve,
Totally agree.
Unless the Zulus were discovered and attacked at a much farther distance (from the camp) by mounted men?
Cheers.

Frédéric

...from the camp IN LAGGER (another fight's rule from the Boers).

As 24th foot says its just for fun, please take below
with a pinch of salt.

[You must be registered and logged in to see this image.]

Frederic

I think your earlier point is an important one. These are not cavalry, they do not fight from their horses with sword and lance. In this case the horse is simply a means of moving quickly between engagements on the ground. Dismounted, they are no different to infantry troops in terms of their impact on the enemy. They can, as you say, engage an enemy further from the camp but they do not have the firepower to decisively and permanently stop such a large body. If a properly re-inforced base position has been constructed (even a make shift arrangement as at RD) then the mounted men can buy time to allow a credible defence to be mounted. Equally, they might allow early engagement by artillery. But in both instances the firepower needs to be concentrated and sustained with ample ammunition, food and water at hand to achieve the tipping point at which the losses sustained by the attackers outweigh their will to press on.

Steve

Steve,
It seems we have the same view!

Cheers

frédéric

Exactement mon ami!

Steve

Hi All,
I see from some of the debate in this thread that some real argument is being lost in translation.
What is being debated IS a hypothesis, ie what might have been.
Now the point I and others were making is that the mounted men in the colonial forces ( NMP, NC, NMR) were mounted riflemen, not lancers. They were trained to shoot from the saddle as well as fixed positions .  In this regard they had taken a few leaves out of the Boer book on tactics. Remembering that Swart Uys the Brit- centric Boer leader from  Newcastle had operated with them against the Zulus a number of times. The armed Uys followers never numbered more than about 30, and his very existence,  in old age was testament to his considerable military prowess.
Now Dartnell's remit on the day prior to Isandlwana was seek out and harry the enemy. Which is what he did, breaking up an attack looming against his troops, and killing some of the enemy. The withdraw, shoot and run tactic employed by the colonials confused the Zulus and those who could, fled the heavy enfilading fire laid down on them.
Now the point out of all of this is that if that harrying force, employing these tactics, were just a little larger the Zulu's  would not have had the easy success which they had at Isandlwana.
Finally, no part of the above discussion includes the NNC, as it is my view that they were a follow-up force, crudely armed, mostly on foot, intended to put paid to wounded and chase stragglers back . Generally, their presence caused more problems than gave solutions.

regards

Barry

Frederic
I think Barry refers to the action of the 22nd. John Maxwell estimates the force they chased as 400 to 500.
Steve
I think Redvers Buller would disagree with you. He used his force, along with Raafs rangers as an attacking force, July 3rd. I believe he used that raid to 'scatter' a Zulu force and did actually contemplate charging onto Ulundi. Rather glad he didn't Im not to sure if he would have got to far but the point I make is that he did consider his mounted men as an attacking force as well as defensive.
The various Boer commanders, from De Wett, Smuts, Retief and even Andries Pretorious fought many skirmishes from horse back. I don't have access at present but Im sure the then very young Paul Kruger spoke of going on commando and the attacks carried out.
The denoument of course would be the Charge of the Light Brigade, cant argue around that one.

Cheers

Bonjour,
Barry,
I read gain your previous post and the answer from Frank and i don't think "that some real argument is being lost in translation".  I disagree totally with your comments in your last post, but i can't prove my view and you can't prove your view. I really think your are unfair with the behaviour of the NNH at Isandhlwana.
Frank,
It's the problem: the 22 january the Zulus in the Mangeni didn't attack the British forces " in chest and horns" and the 21 January no shot were fired between the Dartnell's men and the Zulus'in the Mangeni.
Cheers
Fred

Morning Frederic
The issues are being clouded. The original post selected a hypothetical situation of the column being attacked on the move. I made a comment that a massed colonial force, mounted would have had an effect on a charging impi.
The issue isn't as you have quite correctly pointed out that were minimal casualties on the Zulu side but rather the potential of the colonial forces being a threat to an advancing Zulu impi. Barry, I would believe, has emphasised exactly what the colonials were capable of. They were brought up on horseback and taught to shoot at a very early age. They were also extremely familiar with the Zulu attack formation and respected it a lot more than the British forces that had not had that exposure and indeed were lead to believe by their commander in chief that the Zulus were not really a threat.
Ive re read Barrys post and Im trying to see a negative comment on the NNH?
In terms of the attacks in the Mangeni: On the 22nd January a group of 400 to 500 Zulus were dispersed by mounted colonials.
Symonds "The Zulus drew in line on a low ridge shields to the front as though meditating resistance but changed their minds and made for a high hill etc." Does that not indicate how effective a charging force of armed men could break up an attack?
Cheers

Frank

Bonjour Frank,

First point :
Eaton wrote
« Cavalry proved effective against defeated and demoralised Zulus. Would a hundred or so mounted men have been as effective against a couple of thousand attacking Zulus? Durnford fought a retreating battle, but there was no suggestion that he could stop the enemy ».

Your answer was : « I think the Boer proved how effective a mounted force could be on a number of occasions in Natal and the Transvaal. Mzilikazi in particular learned a few lessons.
Barry makes a good point in the efficacy of Mansells men on the Mangeni plain. The Zulu forces had to get within a throwing distance to try and inflict damage whilst the mounted men could wheel in, fire, and wheel out again.
The comparison with Durnford has to be put into context really, he elected to defend a retreat to get back to the camp. I wonder what would have happened if he had decided to charge forward? Interesting idea?

Please, see my answers of yesterday in this context.

2nd point ; About the qualities of the Volunteers and Police:
I didn't dispute their individuals qualities  and I don't forget their courage and their sacrifice at Isandhlwana.

Third point : About the NNH :
It's me who wrote the first of this subject about Durnford.
The answer of Barry was : « Hi All,
I see from some of the debate in this thread that some real argument is being lost in translation.
What is being debated IS a hypothesis, ie what might have been......Finally, no part of the above discussion includes the NNC, as it is my view that they were a follow-up force intended to put paid to wounded and chase stragglers back . Generally, their presence caused more problems than gave solutions »
The subject of the NNC has not been discussed in this thread: I understood rightly or wrongly that Barry was referring to the NNH of Durnford.

4°) About your point:”The original post selected a hypothetical situation of the column being attacked on the move. I made a comment that a massed colonial force, mounted would have had an effect on a charging impi.”
I don' have an opinion on this point.

5°) One of the argument which support the thesis was a mounted colonial force could be effective was “Barry makes a good point in the efficacy of Mansells men on the Mangeni plain”.
This argument for me is not relevant for the reasons given in my previous posts.
The 22 January, I repeat, the Zulus didn't attack the British forces in their traditional attack formation (chest and horns).
Furthemore, according to Zulu's testimonies, they were suprised to see the British forces in the Mangeni.

As usual, happy to be corrected.


Cheers.

Frédéric

Morning all
In this hypothetical discussion I think we need to agree what is likely to be happening at Mangeni. I am assuming that the full force that fell on Isandhlwana is now falling on Chelmsford's half column (is Chelmsford's force all together in a defended camp or is it still in transit along the trail?). The argument about the impact of a mounted colonial force is not, to my mind, whether it would have some effect (it plainly would) but would it have been decisive. Would it have achieved my "tipping point" that turns back the 20,000? I see no evidence based on earlier performance (which I recognise you guys know far more about than I do) that it could do that against such enormous numbers. Raising the Charge of the Light Brigade is very apt. I have no doubt at all that the colonial mounted force would have displayed the same bravery and resolve, but they would also have been riding into the jaws of death would they not? I can see that wheeling, firing, and wheeling again prolongs the opportunity to inflict casualties while staying out of range, but how many would you need doing that against 20,000 to turn back the flow? Surely Durnford's tactic, in similar circumstances, is the more likely one and with similar consequences.

Steve

Even if not in transit, Chelmsford's force might not have been in a particularly defensive position. The troops would likely just have arrived and may not have been well organised to see off the Zulu army.
I suppose much would depend upon how much warning they got of an impending attack.

Hi Steve. Somewhere in the dim recesses of the mind is a battle that was fought between the Boer and either the baPedi or Mzilikazi where around 100 horsemen turned an army of around 8 to 9000. It was probably more in frustration that the impi turned and 'retreated' being stung with a pretty solid volley time after time and not being able to catch the horsemen took its toll.
There was an interesting situation when Piet Retief visited Dingaan and his small squad of men rode around an assembled impi shooting at full pace, firing just for effect, Dingaan christened them 'the wizards'. So there was a bit of superstition about the horsemen. Just a digression.
Its always the problem with hyporthetical discussions, the options are so wide it comes down to an individual thought, possibly that's why I never got into gaming.
BUT, if I had the choice of 100 mounted colonials or a 100 imperial soldiers out in the open I know where my hard earned cash would be wagered.
Cheers
PS Quite an exciting 1st Test going on in Aussie.

I just see carnage!.. the mounted men would run out of
ammunition. and either be forced to flee. assuming that
they were not fully encircled..if they were, the Zulu's
would be hamstringing the horses and doing the riders
to death..in the original question his Lordship's force were
stung out all over the place, remember the Zulu watched
Chelmsford out of the camp...they knew where everybody
was... the British certainly did not.. it's a bit of a non start-
er really, if Chelmsford and staff managed to get all his
forces together and make a strong stand against the impi
he say's he was most anxious to get to grips with.. then
leaves his force facing the 20,000 warriors..how long would
his ammunition last!!!. bearing in mind he left the reserve
at Isandhlwana.....and he has to wait for support from
the camp.. maybe the the Zulu would have mopped up his
Lordship's command then turned to deal with what must be
coming from the camp..

In the battle between the Boer and either the baPedi or Mzilikazi:
-What was the tactic used by these natives ("chest and horns" as the Zulus)?
-All the Boer were mounted (not having to defend men on foot not protected by a "laager")?

If the tactic used by the natives was similar to the Zulus and there were Boers on foot (not protected by a "laager"), this example could be relevant in the hypothetical scenario (" the column being attacked on the move" in the Mangeni).
But it seems to me that it is not the case...
Cheers

Frederic
Mzilikazi was a Zulu.
The instances I refer to are battles fought outside a laager, hence the reason I pointed to them.

Cheers

Frank,
Oh, oh!
Very interesting!
Please, do you know the year of the battle (I'll do research to learn in detail the reasons of the Boer's victory and try to understand why it did not work with Durnford at Isandhlwana)?

Cheers.

Frédéric

Frederic, as an example:
Eric A Walker: A History of South Africa 1928.pp203
"If the men were out unhampered by waggons and families, where there was room to ride up within range, fire, retire to re load and then fire again with the heavy roers ( Elephant Gun) which kill at a great distance,'till the enemy gave way as at the route of the Matabele in the Marico battle.'
The Matabele were a portion of the Zulu nation that rebelled against Dingaan and were lead out of control of Dingaan to settle in the Transvaal. They were driven out and eventually settled in Rhodesia.
Hope that helps.

Cheers

For all that this discussion is hypothetical, it does serve to illustrate the key tactical issue that confounded the British. At what point of pressure would a Zulu army be deterred? Your examples of earlier Boer experiences must have lent weight to the idea that quite small displays of firepower and manoeuvre would be sufficient to disperse sizeable Zulu forces, if done correctly. But we know Chelmsford did not wish to disperse the Zulu forces but to defeat them so his challenge was to balance his attacking force to achieve that. It turns out he miscalculated badly. It strikes me that the Boer objectives had always been to frustrate an attack to the point where the native enemy got fed up and went home - it does not appear to me that the Boers were trying to defeat a nation in battle, but relieve pressure on their farms and expand territory. The British aim was fundamentally different and that (together with the scale of the Zulu army) is perhaps why the Boer tactics would not work in the AZW context.

I get used to watching the cricket during the summer when lunch is at lunch time and tea in the late afternoon. I cannot get into the business of 2.00am starts and all over by 9.00am! Cricket is meant to be civilised (well, apart from when its in Aus).

Steve

Thank you very much, that's help.

Cheers

Frédéric

I.E: Two days ago, I purchased a copy of a "The last Zulu King" by CT Binns (thread: "Hypothetis on the position of the Zulu reserve") and for my "personal culture", "Some Zulu Customs and Folklore" by Samuelson.

Enjoy the CT Binns Frederic, its a useful addition.
Steve
90% correct, there were a few circumstances, as mentioned by Eric Walker. The Groot Marico battle actually lasted for 9 days. The Boer chased the Matebele harassing them virtually out of the Transvaal.
In terms of Chelmsfords, everytime I think of him getting back to the battlefield Im reminded of a poster I saw years ago of the Tay bridge disaster with a train going over the edge and a little man looking down saying s**t.

Cheers

I tend to agree with the analysis by Steve about LC.
But during his fighting retreat, it does appear to me that Durnford was trying to relieve pressure on the camp not to destroy the Zulus facing him. So rings in my hear the question raised by Steve: at what point of pressure would a Zulu army be dettered.
Cheers.

Hi Guys
Fantastic stuff gents! Just what I was hoping for. My opinion for what its worth is that there would have been general slaughter and like Isandlwana and Hlobane survival depended 100% on having a fit horse. I love the discussion about the effectiveness of mounted infantry. They would be mobile infantry rather like self-propelled guns. Mobile, but static to fight. It reminds me of Little Bighorn. Reno's charge with sabres had great impetus, but faced with large odds hesitated and fell back. They ended up fighting as infantry but on a hilltop rather than in a donga. It's ironic that Custer's self-confidence (or arrogance) whilst fighting aboriginal warriors leading to his downfall was less than three years before Isandlwana. The British its seems had no monopoly on overconfidence.
Thanks again

Best regards

24th foot

Bonjour Barry,
I misunderstood your post (yesderday: 5.31 a.m.)
Sorry.
I.E: Thank you Frank
Cheers
Frédéric

Frederic
This is worth exploring, Im opening a separate string.
Quote: "But during his fighting retreat, it does appear to me that Durnford was trying to relieve pressure on the camp not to destroy the Zulus facing him

Cheers

Hi Frank
Have you been unwell ? , if so , I hope you are back on the mend . In reply to one of your earlier posts about Buller on the 3 rd July , I'm not sure he attacked the Zulu on that day to be honest , I think it was a scouting patrol in which was following up some cattle and herd boys , he was very nearly ambushed by that set up , and would probably have been overwhelmed ! , he was lucky to have noticed it was a trap before it was to late for him and his men , as it was he lost 3 or 4 in the process ?
cheers 90th

Morning Gary
Started feeling better after watching the end of the test match. Was that not the best run out you have ever seen?
Isnt your next trip very soon?

Cheers

Hi Frank
Luckily for me I was marching around Zululand and missed the Test , I got back home last night . I've read about the run out but haven't had the pleasure ! .
Cheers 90th

90th wrote:

Hi Frank
he (Buller) was lucky to have noticed it was a trap before it was to late for him and his men

Bonjour,
Exactly, his action the followind day is interesting with this thread.

Cheers

Gary
Did you get to Cetswayo's grave site? If so send me the photos and I will publish them.

Hi Frank
We did .... but it's going to be the subject of a paper , which will show it's in a different spot as the accepted area , it isnt far from the accepted area , we had Capt Godson's Map ( 1st KDG'S ) from the Intelligence Dept book , this shows we were in the correct spot , Binns is in the wrong place , wrong side of the river ! . So therefore I've been asked not to elaborate on the Forum , we are hoping to head back in Nov to do some poking around , from which the paper will be finalised , so as they say .... '' Watch this space '' .
Cheers 90th