Crealock's notebook.

Hi John,
Thanks for picking up the typo , it should be 22/01

90th/Julian
Thanks for responses . I think there would be more clarity for all if we could pin those numbers down. On the other hand perhaps I am putting too much store in what LC said pm 22/01 in what have must have been a considerable state of shocked trepidation and dismay, for his part.

Added to this, my mind keeps on mulling over exactly how many riflemen there were actually defending the camp. This comes about because it is recorded that amongst the 1.2/24 numbers there were many non combatant cooks, bottlewashers, wagon drivers, bandsmen, general hangers etc,etc on who were actually dismantling the camp whilst the action was on. This is born out by Mehlogazulu's account of many enemy being killed in and around and under the wagons. The annals also record that the 1. 2/24th companies were all below strength.

If anyone has good data on this it would be useful to share it.

regards

barry

Hi Barry.
There is mention in any book I've read on Isandlwana that the companies were indeed well down on the company strength of 100 from memory . 65 - 80 seems to be what I remember the historians quoting . It didnt matter what plans were put into place on that day as in the scheme of things there simply wasnt enough Imperial Infantry to hold the camp against the overwhelming numbers that the zulu committed to the fray .
Cheers 90th

Has anyone got a copy that can be post of the orders from LC showing what must be done when entering Zululand, The ones that show what formation is to be used, when attacked.

Ray .
It may be on here already and from memory it was a while ago .
Cheers 90th.

Barry this is a list of those killed, Just need to workout how many survived.

[You must be registered and logged in to see this link.]

John
The link you have given is inaccurate and contains many errors.
The number of men killed was 1,333.
177 survived (possibly another 4)
The fate of another 704 is unknown.
Total 2,218.

Thanks Julian.

Barry, total count bottom of Julians post.

impi.

Pete (Admin), said that it would be helpful to analyse the orders (in other words, to show what they meant), this I have attempted to do. No need for the sarcy remarks impi mate, I am only trying to be helpful.

Originally posted by Impi.


Looking at this from Zulu War Historian/Author John Young. Is could be used as a time-line.

!On 1st January, 1879, Durnford received orders from Lord Chelmsford ordering him to remain at the Middle Drift until the invasion, scheduled for the 11th January, was under way. When Durnford would be expected to co-operate between Pearson's Number 1 Column, which was to cross at the Lower Drift, and Colonel Richard Thomas Glyn's Number 3 Column, which was to ford the Buffalo River at Rorke's Drift.

On the afternoon of 11th January, Durnford paid a visit on Lord Chelmsford, who had now attached his headquarters to Glyn's force. He acquainted the General with some intelligence gleaned from messengers loyal to the Lutheran Bishop Hans Schreuder, before returning to his designated position.

At this time rumours and counter-rumours as to the Zulu dispositions were rife. Schreuder wrote to Durnford warning him of a threat of a Zulu incursion over the Middle Drift. Durnford received the message on 13th January. He hastily wrote a dispatch to Chelmsford apprising him of the supposed threat, and that he intended to meet the enemy on the Zulu side of the Middle Drift.

At 2 a.m. on 14th January, Durnford roused his men, and readied them for a forced march at 4 a.m. As Durnford was on the summit of Kranz Kop preparing to descend into the valley leading towards the drift a galloper from Lord Chelmsford met him.

The dispatch from Chelmsford was forthright and to the point:

Dear Durnford,

Unless you carry out the instructions I give you, it will be my unpleasant duty to remove you from your command, and to substitute another officer for officer for the commander of No. 2 Column. When a column is acting SEPARATELY in an enemy's country I am quite ready to give its commander every latitude, and would certainly expect him to disobey any orders he might receive from me, if information which he obtained showed that it would be injurious to the interests of the column under his command. Your neglecting to obey my instructions in the present instance has no excuse. You have simply received information in a letter from Bishop Schroeder[sic], which may or may not be true and which you have no means of verifying. If movements ordered are to be delayed because report hints at a chance of an invasion of Natal, it will be impossible for me to carry out my plan of campaign. I trust you will understand this plain speaking and not give me any further occasion to write in a style which is distasteful to me.

Chelmsford.

This is where it seemed to fall apart for Durnford. Could it be LC couldn't trust him anymore????


The following day Durnford was ordered to the vicinity of Rorke's Drift, with a few companies of his N.N.C., five troops of the N.N.H., and a rocket battery under the command of Brevet Major Francis Broadfoot Russell.

On 19th, Durnford received further orders to relocate the force under his immediate command to the Zulu bank of Rorke's Drift. On the 20th Number 3 Column reached Isandlwana.

On 21st, Lord Chelmsford sent out a two-pronged reconnaissance to ascertain the whereabouts of any Zulu forces. Elements of the reconnaissance came into contact with Zulu forces late in the afternoon. Messages were passed back to Chelmsford at Isandlwana requesting reinforcements.

In the early hours of the morning of Wednesday, 22nd January, 1879, Chelmsford made the decision to divide Number 3 Column, leaving one half at Isandlwana, whilst marching out with the other to meet the Zulu threat.

At 3 a.m., Lieutenant Horace Lockwood Smith-Dorrien, of the 95th (Derbyshire) Regiment of Foot, a special service officer detailed to transport duties, was ordered to return to Rorke's Drift. He carried orders for Durnford, instructing him to the camp at Isandlwana with the forces at his disposal.

Durnford received the orders at about 7 a.m. Durnford moved on towards Isandlwana with his mounted troops, having given orders for his infantrymen to follow on"

John
I don't see what point are you trying to make by posting this? Also there are elements left out.

An overview of the orders, issued to Durnford. Barry gave one above.

HI Barry

I've never read any report that says the camp was being packed up while the attack was taking place ? were did
you come by this ?

Remeber Pulleine was given the order to pack the camp, and he ignored it becuase of the attack - Gardner.



Cheers

DB
Indeed!

Barry/John
i rather think the men being killed among the waggons and tents would have been elements cut off from the Wardell-Dyer coys as the tried to get back.
There would have been men in the camp - about 50 artillerymen and about a dozen servants and men on guard but the servants all took up post to the left of E coy (according to Williams) and began firing away. He also says that everyone else left in camp was involved in taking ammunition up to the line. Every soldier would have had a rifle and I imagine as the battle progressed every soldier got to use it.

And also, Pulleine was heard by Higginson to order every man who could fight to be marched out of the
camp and onto the firing line.


Cheers

Quote :

And also, Pulleine was heard by Higginson to order every man who could fight to be marched out of thecamp and onto the firing line.
Cheers

Where's this from DB.

Its In Jackson's book, Knights and Snooks, they all qoute from one of Higginson's account.





Cheers

Quote :

There would have been men in the camp - about 50 artillerymen

Brickhill makes mention of Artillierymen coming into the camp, and then making off on their toes.

They were the one's manning the battery on the firing line, and would have most likely been looking for
a horse than have to hold onto the guns any longer.


Cheers

He mentions a gun coming in, and as soon as they were in the camp they legged it. Not looking for horse's


Back to the other post. You say "Knights and Snooks" they all qoute from one of Higginson's account.
Which books does this Come from.

Well Snook only wrote one book on Isandlwana, and Knight's Zulu Rising.

And why else would they jump off the gun ? They could see the battle was lost.



Cheers

Deleted Off Topic

Quote :

DB And why else would they jump off the gun ? They could see the battle was lost.

Click on link scroll to Brickhills account page 4 chapter 2
[You must be registered and logged in to see this link.]

They were running to get away like the rest of them.

All
Not all those working the guns could ride on the limber - they had to run alongside.
Admin
Apologies. I was trying to lend DB some support in a jocular manner, not in the least rude to anyone. He sometimes has a lot of stick to take because of his age but he is consistently accurate with his factual remarks. I wanted to offer my support.

Not all those working the guns could ride on the limber - they had to run alongside

Thought of that. But Brickhill's says " Jumped Off" Going by Zulu Dawn. "Thrown Off". Very good stuntmen in that film!!!!

Julian. Perhaps i can have some support as i'm only 15

Ulundi
One gun came to a halt in the camp - so I imagine the gunners would have jumped off and run.
The other gun threw most of the gunners off as it went up the saddle and down the other side - when it went into the ravine and crashed the remaining gunners were thrown to the ground.

Wasn't the ravine away from the camp area.. Where Curling was!!!!!

Yes, on the far side of the saddle behind Stony Koppie.

I though this conversation was about the camp.

Ulundi
You asked about the account which mentioned the gunners running through the camp. I was seeking to clarify for you the final position of the two guns so that you could match the account to the location.

The order in Crealock's notebook to Durnford. It didn't contain the word strengthen.
Is there anything out there from Crealock in his later years, which hints at, or alludes to, whether HE unfortunately left this word out accidentally, or whether this word was ever, actually uttered by LC ?

Not that I know of.

We will have to take Clery's word, as to what was originally supposed to have been included in the order, as said before Crealock never disputed Clery's account.

Thanks Julian.
Crealock appears to be showing some contrition in informing Edward Durnford of his final order to Anthony, in which the word "strengthen" is absent. Can only think he was trying to absolve Anthony and clear the guilt on Edward's mind.

Chard1879 wrote:

We will have to take Clery's word, as to what was originally supposed to have been included in the order, as said before Crealock never disputed Clery's account.

Fair point.
The other point of view is that Crealock was willing to sacrifice his reputation and take one for the team in covering of LC's arse.
As 90th points out, the word strengthen could easily have been slipped in later (once LC had got his story stright with Clery) in this post-battle account. Crealock's notebook contained the actual pre-battle order, and there was definitely no mention of the word "strengthen" in it. He is unequivocal in this to both Edward Durnford and Major Jekyll. Are we to assume Crealock was THAT incompetent, as to omit such a small but crucial word?
I have yet to be convinced either way.

Or perhaps LC was covering Crealocks backside. Not forgetting Crealock lost his note book, not realising or hoping it wound be found. He could have told LC he had written the word " Command" did LC take his word for it. Considering Crealocks position. Did LC blame Durnford because he took Crealocks word for it, that he had written take command....... Did Chelmsford ever comment on the recovery of Crealocks note book and the contents regarding that day.

Was it not a case of having to believe him, after all he had lost the evidence on the battlefield.

Chard1879 wrote:

Or perhaps LC was covering Crealocks backside. Not forgetting Crealock lost his note book, not realising or hoping it wound be found. He could have told LC he had written the word " Command" did LC take his word for it. Considering Crealocks position. Did LC blame Durnford because he took Crealocks word for it, that he had written take command....... Did Chelmsford ever comment on the recovery of Crealocks note book and the contents regarding that day.

Lots of great unknowns here.
I doubt LC would have felt any compunction to cover Crealock's back.
I am starting to think that Crealock MIGHT have had a lot more to do with it all than what first appears !?!?!

I don't suppose, anyone has seen this report. Because it certainly wasn't published a week later, not even a year later.


SOUTH AFRICA—THE ZULU WAR— GENERAL CREALOCK'S REPORT.

HC Deb 26 February 1880 vol 250 cc1437-81437

SIR EDWARD WATKIN
Asked the Secretary of State for the Colonies, Whether the Report of General Crealock 1438 upon the operations of the First Division in the Zulu War was not forwarded home by Sir Garnet Wolseley last summer; whether such Report was not printed, with maps attached, last autumn; and, if so, why the Report and maps were excluded from recent Papers, and, in fact, suppressed, until a Question was asked in the House; and, whether he can give a date before which the Report and maps will be issued to Members, in pursuance of the promise of the Secretary of State for War?


SIR MICHAEL HICKS-BEACH
General Crealock's Report was duly forwarded home by Sir Garnet Wolseley, and was received in this country last autumn. Being very voluminous, it was printed at the time for the use of the War Office, and, being so printed, was marked "Confidential." A copy was forwarded to the Colonial Office, from which, by mistake, the word "Confidential" had not been erased. I had arranged last spring with my right hon. and gallant Friend (Colonel Stanley), that if among the Papers forwarded by him to the Colonial Office there were any which, in his opinion, should not be published, they should be marked "Confidential;" because, being the channel through which despatches to the War Office were presented to Parliament, I had often felt a difficulty in deciding whether Papers of a professional or technical character were fit for publication or not. Therefore, as this Report was so marked, of course I did not publish it. I trust the hon. Member will feel, after this explanation, that his use of the word "suppression" has not been justified. The printers inform me that the Report will be published in a week.

Confidential

OK. Of course. Norman's Crealock's brother Henry, commander of the first division would have been a man of some influence. Good that Norman had him on his side.

The Crealock brothers, ie; John North and Henry Hope, were both disliked by Sir Garnet Wloseley, he called them both 'snobs'.

It is also interesting to note that John North was known as 'the wasp' and that Wolseley described him as Chelmsford's 'evil genious'.

It would appear that Wolseley knew that Crealock had 'set up' Col Durnford in the cover up.

Maybe he should have been called 'Creeplock'.

QUESTION. OBSERVATIONS.
HL Deb 02 September 1880 vol 256

LORD STRATHNAIRN
rose, according to Notice, to call the attention of Her Majesty's Government to Lord Chelmsford's statement in the House of the evening of the 19th August, 1880, as compared with his despatch dated Pietermaritzburg, 27th January 1879, on the Isandlana disaster; and to ask Her Majesty's Government to place on the Table of the House further Papers on the question if they are in possession of information differing from the despatch quoted, together with a map (with proper scale of distances) of the ground on which the Headquarter Camp was pitched, and of the hills above and near it; and to submit certain mistakes in the operations in Zululand; and also to move for a Return of the ages and length of service of the soldiers and non-commissioned officers of the 1st and 2nd Battalion of the 24th Regiment. The noble and gallant Lord said, that in his Notice he called the attention of Her Majesty's Government to Lord Chelmsford's despatch, dated Pietermaritzburg, January 27, 1879, as compared with his speech of the 19th of last month, which elicited cheers from some of their Lordships. But in the despatch it was said of the 24th Regiment:— So long as they kept their faces to the Zulus the enemy could not drive them back, and they feel in heaps before the deadly fire poured into them. But when the Zulus got round the left flank of these brave men they appear to have 1026 lost their presence of mind, and to have retired hastily through the tents, when immediately the whole Zulu force surrounded them, they were overpowered by numbers, and the camp was lost. The plain English of this was that they misbehaved before the enemy. But in his speech the noble and gallant Lord (Lord Chelmsford), reciting the same events, said—"What could they do more than they did, and that was to die like gallant soldiers?"

LORD CHELMSFORD
observed, that the noble and gallant Lord was not reading his despatch, but some printed report; and if he was going to found any charge upon it he ought to quote from the actual words of the document.

LORD STRATHNAIRN
said, he must leave the noble and gallant Lord to reconcile those two opposite statements, and would only observe that they were not calculated to promote devotion or discipline among soldiers. He proceeded to submit to their Lordships what, in his humble opinion, were mistakes in the operations in Zululand, and which, he thought, were amply sufficient to account for Isandlana and other mishaps. First, the columns invading Zululand were too far distant from one another for mutual support and communication, especially in so difficult and unknown a country as Zululand. For instance, Sir Evelyn Wood's, the fourth column, was 35 miles distant from Colonel Glyn's headquarter No. 3 column, and, consequently, the fourth column acted independently. The result of this was that 20,000 Zulus were enabled to pass through the interval and post themselves, on the 21st of January, unobserved, under the crest of the height commanding the left front of the camp at Isandlana, and fell like an avalanche on the left flank of the camp next day, the fatal 22nd. Of course, if this dangerous ground had been properly reconnoitred, it was more than probable that that great calamity would never have occurred. Secondly, the position of the camp at Isandlana was commanded, as had been shown by an excellent authority, who had visited the spot. He said— I spent many hours in examining the position of the camp, and I emphatically repeat that the camp is dominated by hills to the right and loft (a little to the right and left) rear which were within pistol-shot. There was a glacis sloping away from the front towards the open plain; but 1027 what man in his senses could expect an enemy to advance over that when he could approach a flank under cover of a range of hills? Archibald Forbes, in his article in The Nineteenth Century, said something to this effect—"I challenge any soldier of experience to say whether any more inherently vicious position could have been chosen." He (Lord Strathnairn) certainly considered that any disinterested person who had sufficient military knowledge to entitle him to give an opinion at all must, after seeing the ground, entirely coincide with Mr. Forbes. Their Lordships had only to look at the map to be convinced of the justice of these views; and it was this hill-commanded camp which, by the orders of the Commander-in-Chief, was not to be left, but to be defended. If instead of that order he had previously directed that that camp, and all other camps in the line of operations, should be in safe positions to be fortified, either by intrenchments with obstacles or with waggon laagers, we should not have been the victims of surprises or defeats. Such as it was, the camp could only be defended from outside. Thirdly, reconnaissances should have been made of the position of the enemy above and round Isandlana to any extent. The Commander-in-Chief did reconnoitre the positions to the left front of the camp, but did not go far enough or thoroughly enough; for he stated that he saw a few Zulu horsemen, who could only have been an outpost or a patrol of the 20,000 men, and he should have done all he could to take these men or follow them, or, with a reconnaissance in force, to ascertain where their main body was. If he had done so, he would have ascertained the position of the 20,000 Zulus, and been enabled to counteract their dangerous flank manœuvre. He (Lord Strathnairn) had practical proof of the advantages of this reconnoitring in Syria and in India. Fourthly, the camp with all its contents should have been intrenched, as he had already said, with engineering obstacles to protect it, arrest the enemy's advance, and expose them to the scientific and deadly fire of the English artillery and infantry, Fifthly, the warning that the Zulus had shown themselves in force to the left front of the camp, given not only by the firing which was heard from the direction of the camp, but by messages re- 1028 ceived by the noble and gallant Lord and officers under him from the officer commanding the camp—

LORD CHELMSFORD
asked the noble and gallant Lord to quote his authority for that statement, for it was the first he had heard of it. If the noble and gallant Lord quoted his authority the House would know what reliance was to be placed on that information. It was perfectly new to him.

LORD STRATHNAIRN
said, he would not have made that statement to the House without authority. The noble and gallant Lord's own despatch stated that firing was heard, and that the noble and gallant Lord himself sent an aide-de-camp.

LORD CHELMSFORD
said, the noble and gallant Lord was entirely mistaken, as he did not say anything of the kind in his despatch.

LORD STRATHNAIRN
said, he was going to add that when this alarm had been heard, when messages had been received from the camp, and when the firing had been heard, the noble and gallant Lord should have caused the immediate return of the reconnaissance party to the camp, a distance of 9 or 10 miles, running two miles and walking one on the Prussian system of alarms. But, so far from that, a detachment with guns, under Colonel Harness, who had actually seen the combat and was marching to the camp, was ordered not to go there. He need hardly observe that under all the circumstances of the case which he had detailed, and which, he ventured to think, should certainly have occurred to the Commander-in-Chief, to leave the camp unintrenched, dominated by dangerous ground, and deprived of half its garrison, as seen by the watchful Zulus, was an invitation to the enemy to attack it. Sixthly, it would have been better not to have taken the lamented Colonel Durnford, so valuable an Engineer officer, from his special duties of superintending the fortifications of camps and of strongholds for ourselves. And it was only justice to that gallant officer's memory to represent that he had to cope with almost unexampled difficulties on taking over the defence of an indefensible camp against an enemy overwhelming in numbers, with remarkable military instinct, and holding positions insufficiently reconnoitred. The death of this gallant officer, 1029 with some brave soldiers of the 24th Regiment, rivalling their brothers in arms at Rorke's Drift, some brave Natal Volunteers, and Native levies, while holding the important neck of land which covered the retreat to Rorke's Drift, was a fitting close of a life of devotion to the Service. While he lamented the dead, he was happy to notice the distinction that had been won by many officers who had played conspicuous parts in the campaign, among the most prominent of whom might be mentioned Sir Evelyn Wood and Colonel Buller. It was eight or nine years ago that he (Lord Strathnairn) drew their Lordships' attention, in a long speech on military education, to the disadvantages of the British system of mechanical drill without an object—that was, without the elementary or higher rules of strategy; and he had since never failed, at the cost of their Lordships' patience and indulgence, to press it upon the House. He would not, however, detain their Lordships any longer on that occasion, particularly as the Commander-in-Chief was not present, but would at once move for a Return of the ages and length of service of the soldiers and non-commissioned officers of the 1st and 2nd Battalions of the 24th Regiment.

THE EARL OF CAMPERDOWN
said, he had no doubt that the noble and gallant Lord who introduced this matter was actuated with a desire to forward the interests of the Public Service; but a discussion upon such a subject in their Lordships' House was, he thought, very much to be deprecated. Whatever might be the merits or demerits of the way in which the campaign was conducted, the campaign was over, and that was not the place for recording a calm and safe judgment on the matter. The plan of the General commanding had formed the subject of a military Court of Inquiry; and an aimless discussion of this sort was not only unfair to the noble and gallant Lord (Lord Chelmsford), but was also calculated to create a mistaken impression out-of-doors.

LORD VIVIAN
observed, that the noble and gallant Lord (Lord Strathnairn) had not censured the noble and gallant Lord who had conducted the war in South Africa. The statement that had been made on another occasion had practically challenged the noble and gallant Lord to recur to the subject. He regretted, how- 1030 ever, the difference that had arisen between the two noble and gallant Lords.

THE EARL OF MORLEY
said, he could not but think that the noble and gallant Lord (Lord Strathnairn), for whose military reputation he had great respect and admiration, had pursued an inconvenient and irregular course in again bringing this subject forward. The present Government, however, were not called upon to pronounce any opinion whatever on the matter. Eighteen months had elapsed since the events to which the Motion referred, and he looked upon the affair as entirely closed. The proper course for the noble and gallant Lord to have taken would have been to have brought the question before the House when the late Government, who had the whole circumstances within their knowledge, and who dealt with every circumstance as it arose, were in Office. Under the circumstances, Her Majesty's Government were not prepared, even if they had them, to produce any further Papers on the subject. They considered that the matter was entirely closed, and that there would be no advantage to the Public Service to produce Papers upon a vague Motion, directed to no practical and definite end. With regard to the Return asked for, such a Return was impossible, because the documents relating to the 24th Regiment were lost in the war. He regretted that the matter had been revived; and he deprecated any further discussion of a matter so technical, and which could not be adequately discussed in such an Assembly as this.

LORD CHELMSFORD
regretted that the noble and gallant Lord (Lord Strathnairn) had not given any authority for the statements he had made regarding his (Lord Chelmsford's) conduct when in command of the South African Forces. The speech of the noble and gallant Lord had taken him completely by surprise; because he could not discover by the Notice of Motion that the noble and gallant Lord intended to reopen the questions that had so very recently been discussed by the House. When on a previous occasion he had endeavoured to give a full, true, and clear account of the Isandlana disaster, his narrative had been based, not upon information exclusively possessed by himself, but upon the evidence of eyewitnesses, whoso statements had since been published in the newspapers. His 1031 account had been taken from evidence published in The Times of March 17 and 22; and he now challenged the noble and gallant Lord to say whether all the details of his speech were not borne out by that evidence. The noble and gallant Lord had quoted authorities to whose words the House would probably not attach very great importance. The noble and gallant Lord had referred to the statement in an article by Mr. Archibald Forbes in The Nineteenth Century. But to show how fallacious some of the statements were, he need only point out the inaccuracy of the story related in reference to Colonel Harness. Colonel Harness had himself referred to the incident in an article in Frazer's Magazine, and had given quite a different account; and, as a matter of fact, the statement that he was in a position to afford relief to the camp was quite incorrect. He (Lord Chelmsford) was on his way to the camp—it must have been between 3 and half-past, the whole affair being over at 1 o'clock—when he saw Colonel Harness about 500 yards from him, moving off in the direction of the camp, being then 10 miles distant from Isandlana. Major Cosset, his aide-de-camp, asked him if he should go and stop the battery, and he said—"Yes; he could not understand why they were moving." And yet in the public prints there had been an accusation that Major, now Lieutenant Colonel, Gosset, prevented valuable reinforcements going on to the camp, and was almost accountable for the disaster. There was not a particle of truth in the story. Another important statement made by the noble and gallant Lord had reference to the number of messages which he asserted he had received from the camp on the day in question. In point of fact, he only received one message from the camp in the course of that day, which was that mentioned in his despatch, which had been sent to him at 8 o'clock in the morning, and which was received by him at 9.30, which merely gave the information that a body of the enemy had been noticed in a north-westerly direction. From half-past 9 o'clock until he reached the camp on his return not a single message, if any were despatched, had reached him. His statement on this point was fully corroborated by Lieutenant Colonel Croalock, his 1032 Military Secretary, in his letter recently sent to a London newspaper, in which he gave a distinct denial to the story that several messages had been received. The noble and gallant Lord, in referring to his despatch, had declared that he had reflected upon the gallantry of the 1st and 2nd Battalions of the 24th Regiment by stating that they had run away from the enemy. He had made no such reflection upon that gallant body of men. He wrote that despatch immediately after arriving in Pietermaritzburg, five days after the disaster. In it he stated that— One company went off to the extreme left and has never heard of since, and the other five, I understand, engaged the enemy about a mile to the left front of the camp, and made there a most stubborn and gallant resistance. So anxious was he that the Government at home should receive a true and faithful account of what had occurred that he wrote the whole of the despatch with his own hand; but he must confess that, on calm consideration, he should have altered the the paragraph in it to which the noble and gallant Lord had referred, because it was, perhaps, capable of an interpretation which he had no idea would be placed upon it, and which he did not intend should be placed upon it. He much regretted that it had given pain in some quarters. He never intended that the smallest impression should be left on the minds of anyone that he reflected on the conduct of the 24th Regiment. The paragraph said— When, however, the Zulus got round the left flank of these brave men, they appear to have lost their presence of mind, and returned hastily to the tents, that had never been struck. He would not have used the term "brave men" had he intended to have reflected upon their courage. What he had in his mind at the time he wrote that paragraph was that the men of the 24th Regiment, finding that the Zulus had worked round their flank, and that it was hopeless to remain where they were, had retired hastily with the view of taking up the stronger position which they should never have left. In his opinion, under the circumstances, it would have been better for them to have remained where they were, and to have fought it out on the spot without attempting to retire. They had been fighting an enemy outside their camp, 1033 and it was hopeless for the poor fellows to expect to get back.

LORD STRATHNAIRN
asked if the men retired by the orders of their officers?

LORD CHELMSFORD
said, that it was so stated in the evidence. They were ordered back to take up a final position under the hill, which they ought never to have left, and they endeavoured to do so. That was the reason they turned their backs to the enemy; not that they ran, or attempted to run. In self-defence, he was compelled to refer in detail to the six mistakes which it was alleged by the noble and gallant Lord had led to the disaster at Isandlana. In the first place, he denied that the invading columns were too far apart to render each other mutual support. A reference to the map would show that the position taken up by the columns, having regard to the long frontier line, was the only one that could be properly adopted. With reference to the position of the camp, he defied the noble and gallant Lord to show that the account he had given of its position was inaccurate in any particular. The map which had been placed in the Library of the House, and which accurately described the ground near Isandlana, corroborated that account. With regard to the charge that the ground occupied by the enemy on the day in question had not been sufficiently reconnoitred previously, as a matter of fact, it had been carefully reconnoitred on the day before without the Zulus being discovered. Lieutenant Browne, 24th Regiment, and a party of mounted Infantry, went out by his (Lord Chelmsford's) orders in the direction from which the Zulus advanced, and he must have passed close to the spot where they bivouacked that night. He saw, however, no traces of a large force, simply because they were not there till after dark that evening. On the morning of the attack the vedette was placed, as usual, three miles in advance; and he gave notice of the approach of the enemy long before the actual attack was made, and which, therefore, could not be characterized as a surprise. The enemy did not advance from the direction of the mountains to the north of Isandlana; but from the eastward two of their columns, however, moved along the top of these mountains and came down upon the camp that way. In reference to 1034 the statement that the camp should have been intrenched, he had already stated that the ground in the neighbourhood of the camp was so rocky that it was absolutely impossible to make even shelter-trenches round the tents. When the party subsequently came to bury the poor men who had fallen in the battle, they found it almost impossible to dig a shallow grave, owing to the small amount of earth. Nor were there any trees with which to make abattis. The troops had, in fact, to carry their fuel with them. With regard to the assertion that on receiving the message that the camp was attacked, he should at once have returned with his force to its assistance, he had already explained that, by some extraordinary fatality, he never received such a message, if it had ever been sent. All he could say, standing before their Lordships, who, he believed, would give him credit for telling the truth faithfully, was, that neither he nor any of his staff received more than the one to which he had referred at half-past 9 in the morning; and the fact that he immediately sent a messenger back to Colonel Pulleine was a refutation of the charge brought against him. The sixth mistake alleged was that it would have been better if he had allowed Colonel Durnford to continue to discharge his special duties of superintending the fortification of the camp. In reply to this, he could only say that the fact of his sending for Colonel Durnford was evidence that he wished to have him close at hand in order that his advice might be available on engineering questions. Furthermore, he was much indebted to Colonel Durnford for the organization of the force of mounted Natives, which was entirely due to the personal influence which the gallant officer had with the Native Tribes. As far as the formation of the columns of invasion was concerned, the question was a purely technical one, which could not be satisfactorily discussed in their Lordships' House. To justify the strategy which he had adopted, it would be necessary to have a large map; and he would, in fact, have to give a lecture. He would only say that in his view a division of the force into three bodies was absolutely necessary, and was not too much to cover a line of close upon 300 miles. He would, however, be perfectly prepared to discuss the point with 1035 anybody who was interested in the subject. He looked back to the campaign with mixed feelings—regret at the loss of the gallant men who fell, and for that sad day of Isandlana, but with pride at what had been accomplished. When the nature of the country in which the troops were operating—the fact that, for military purposes, it may be said to have been a terra incognita—and the numerous difficulties of supply and transport which had to be overcome, were taken into consideration, the six months from January 11 to July 5 could not, he contended, be considered but a short time for the campaign to be brought to a close, and would contrast very favourably with the duration of former Kaffir Wars. He could not but think it unreasonable to say that undue delay had arisen in consequence of the steps which he thought it necessary to take in order to secure the completeness of the expedition. In conclusion, he thanked their Lordships for their attention, but regretted that he should have been called upon to make this explanation.

LORD STRATHNAIRN
said, he was very much surprised that the Under Secretary of State for War should have persistently refused to give any further Returns relative to the short-service system; and it appeared to him that there was a complete union between the Government and the Front Opposition Benches in their resolve not to inquire into the effect of that system, and not to produce the Report of Lord Airey's Commission, which everyone knew was a complete exposure of it. He denied that the noble and gallant Lord had said a word of refutation of the charge he had brought, and the fact remained that 20,000 Zulus were allowed to lie in ambush so near the camp and to assault it as they had done. Whatever might be said, there were not the necessary precautions taken to protect a camp in which most of our stores were.

---