The ammunition question

Hi Les
I don't think its a case of blame, or passing the buck either. The root cause? Depends how far back you want to go really. Frere? or even further?
Isolate the battle itself from lets say the 21st and a strong case can me made against Chelmsford, really for not being a leader when he should have in making correct decisions.
Take it from late afternoon on the 21st, blame Dartnel for disobeying orders in staying out.
From 3.30 on the morning of 22nd, blame Chelmsford for splitting his force, or even more blame Glyn for not looking after his left behind battalion.
From 7 onwards blame Pulleine for being a tad to laid back.
From 9 oclock blame Pulleine and probably his command staff for not chasing up the sightings.
From 10.30 ish Durnford for not taking command.
11.30 Durnford for leaving the camp
12.00 Pulleine for splitting his forces
1.00 Durnford for not riding like hell to get back to the camp instead of playing tag with the left horn
1.10 Pulleine for not adopting a compact defensive stand point.
1.20 The NNC for being in the wrong place at the wrong time.
1.25 Now think on this, two imperial officers that were on the firing line escape, how? One RA officer retreats with his guns and escapes, is that kosher?
1.30 The army is still fighting but, one officer rides of with the flag, two more follow with no more excuse than abandoning the field.
So blame away my friend, lots to choose from. Bottom line about the NNC, and Ive said they were in the wrong place at the wrong time, they did retreat passed the guns, passed Essex and passed Malindi and passed Stafford etc etc. Far to many accounts to disregard, that's not playing the blame game, its a historical recitation.

Love it Frank when you go all analytical and timeline!
' the blame game ' oh yes someone was to blame
all right, i wonder who? but its about the ammo, who
was saying what and when!

How many men would it be prudent to say had rifles and 70 rounds during the battle out of all those that took part.

I'm always amazed, how the blame is always put on the shoulders of the NNC.    Don't blame the Brits Blame the poor native regiment, located to the front, with one rifle to ten men. It appears to me that everyone is happy when it comes to the British retiring to the camp when their ammo ran out.

Let's face it, if the Britsih was fighting the ground they would have won, as they appear to have pumped more lead into it than they did the enermy.

Well seasoned old soldiers, every shot found its mark. Right!!!!!!!  

Hi Chard
Most certainly all the imperial forces and the mounted detachment, take the NNC and divide by ten, should give you a total that's probably as close as we could get to.

Les
Ive never believed that there was a shortage on the front line itself. Once the companies compacted and started to retreat there could very well have been some anxious moments. My key question has always been to those that profess to believe in the troops running out of ammo and that is: "How did 500 men get to the saddle from the front line if they had no ammo."
All the quotations, Smith Dorrien etc, and obsevations, Private Williams, are most probably true, but they need to be put into the context ( and yes, the time line)

CTSG
As I said earlier, its not about blame, you want blame look down my list of cock ups. The NNC were in the right tactical position to pursue a beaten enemy, not repell one. And since when has 'everybody' been happy retiring on the camp when their ammo ran out?"

Cheers

Cheers

Possibly because those covering them hadn't used up their ammuntion. Those retiring obvisouly had, that's why they were retiring. If you really believe ammo was getting to the firing line why did they fall back looking for more. And of course if they had left their positions before the Zulus had reach them, then it's common sense they would be infront of the Zulu's who would have been much slower as they had run a few miles before engaging them.

Sorry you don't make sense, who were doing the covering? The regrouping was a result of the final impi charge and the penetration of the line. What were they supposed to do stand and die? They made the obvious move, get back through the camp and potentially down the road to RD. If the retreat was only about ammo then why did they go past the 2/24th ammunition wagons?

Cheers

The fire lines would not have commence firing until the Zulus were in an effective range. Even if we said a thousand yards. Each man would have fired off his allocated rounds in just under 12 mins, based on your six per min. There must have been covering fire to allow your men to get back to the saddle. They wouldn't have had to stand and died if ammuntion was getting though, the telling fire from seasoned soldiers pumping six round per min, would have told on the Zulus.

My key question has always been to those that profess to believe in the troops running out of ammo and that is: "How did 500 men get to the saddle from the front line if they had no ammo."...Hmmm
my dear fellow, what on earth are you implying? you have dangled that bit
of bait out along with others a few times now Frank but nobody seem's to
want to take it! except me of course..

"Captain W.P.Symons, 2/24th Regiment, “An account of The Battle of Isandlwana and the Defence of Rorke’s Drift,” written at Rorke’s Drift March/April 1879, marked ‘PRIVATE. Read by Her Majesty the Queen, the Prince of Wales, the Duke of Cambridge, Sir Charles Ellice, Sir A Alison. The Intelligence Department ..........[It was] the desire of Her Majesty and of HRH Duke of Cambridge, that the account should not be published until after the death of Lord Chelmsford, and perhaps other persons mentioned.’  
    [ Courtesy RRW Museum, Brecon.]
Here it should be noted that Captain Symons was out with Lord Chelmsford’s force on morning 22 January. Quote from his report:

“ It now remains to be related what took place at the camp of Isandlwana hill. The details were chiefly collected from the few survivors who escaped.”
 
  Quote:” What made the line retire will be asked, it was without doubt the result of the following circumstances: first, and chiefly, the break-up and flight of the native contingent, second, the desire on the part of our officers and men to get close together or rally. Third, the failure of the ammunition supply. ...............In the first place then, the men had been firing hard and fast for nearly an hour, they commenced with seventy rounds per man and these must have been pretty well expended.. The reserve was in the wagons , at the nearest point 500 yards in their rear, every available  man was in the ranks, and there were no arrangements made for bringing up the cartridges to the firing line, and therefore, as has been already stated, the men had to renew their supply by running back to the wagons themselves. From this it is clear that our soldiers were getting short of ammunition and that there was some confusion and difficulty in getting more. ...............there were absolutely no arrangements whatsoever for bringing up spare ammunition. As already noted men were seen running back to the wagons to replenish their pouches. It may safely be concluded that the ammunition with the firing line was running short, and that this was one of the causes that lead to the break-up of the extended line and the koppie.”
 
It should be noted that Captain Symons 48 page report has very infrequently been quoted. [Permission required from Brecon.]
 More the pity, as it was compiled by Symons directly interviewing survivors, both from Isandlwana and Rorke’s Drift and is extremely detailed."

CTSG
Sorry but your stringing together a series of comments and extracting different meanings. Ive never mentioned a consistent fire ratio merely pointed out that 6 rounds per minute wasn't enough to stop the impi once they were motivated to charge the last 100 metres, any Zulu is going to cover that in seconds, not minutes. Even with buckets of ammo they were surrounded once that line was penetrated, they would never have held of the impi, proof of that is that they didn't, There had to be  form of direction. not just stand and blaze away and hope to G-D some one would come and help, that form was to get back to the RD road and potential safety. Look at the number of cairns/bodies on the saddle and slope to it, the 1/24th ammo wagons were in the middle of them as was the regimental reserve. They had all the ammunition they could want but they were driven of it into smaller and smaller groups and that's how they died.

Les
Yep, because there is no answer except the obvious one.

CTSg (Again)
Sorry you type faster than me. I have that report, and it was compiled exactly as you say, But, and there is a big but. It doesn't agree with the self same suvivors letters and communications. And it doesn't answer my key question.

Cheers

I see your point, but if they had, had enough ammuntion, they would not have been surrounded. Which takes us back to Ian Knights observation.

This is one of the posts I liked posted by John. It was never really answered, and his maths wasn't disputed.

John wrote:

"Subject: Re: The ammunition question   Sun Jul 22, 2012 1:32 am
I have based this on 1100 men with rifles at Isandlwana. I'm not sure how many rounds the Coloinal regiments carried with them ( per person)

So this calculations is only taking into account 900 British soldiers who we know we're allocated 70 rounds each.

70 x 900 = 63,000 rounds between them, without resupply. 

900 men firing 6 rounds each = 5,400 per minuite. 

Based on 1 man firing for 60 minuites he would require 6 x 60 =360 rounds 

Based on 900 men firing for 60 minuites. 360 x 900 = 324,000 with resupply 

So 324.000 take away the original 63,000 = 261,000 addional rounds would be required to keep the men supplied with ammuntion per hour.

But if we stick with the 63, 000 rounds which they had beween them at commencement of battle. And it is said approximately 3000 Zulu were killed at the battle, that leaves approximately 60,000 rounds unaccounted for. Not to mentioned those Zulus killed by artillery fire. 

This is just a rough calculation as I have not included the Coloinal units. 

So in a nut shell did they need a resupply. 900 seasoned men 70 rounds each. 63,000 rounds between them, 20,000 zulus"

Springbok, our do you suppose they managed to get back to the saddle?

xhosa2000 wrote:

hang it all qm you
dont want a reacquisition now do you" in my view that
is utter b.....ks, looking at the sheer mass of the enemy
you would imagine he would be slinging boxes off as
damned quick as he could! but no we are left forever with
the image of this vastly experienced officer as a slow
methodical automaton..but on who's say so.      

Here's what bothers me about those that dismiss Smith-Dorrien's anecdote as nonsense, (yet almost nothing else he writes.)

This was a guy who was so circumspect that in his memoir that he does NOT name the guy who stole a horse from him while he was fleeing for his life -- and that after SD went out of his way under duress to help the man (Hamer.)

So my question is, why would he be so vindictive as to relate that story -- sure to upset those who knew Bloomfield -- specifically naming names when he isn't even acidic about Sir John French later on?

Is it possible that SD was actually even more frustrated than he's relating with Bloomfield? Me thinkst so. I don't believe a shortage of ammunition impacted the Regulars, except insofar as they may have been undercut when the colonials with Durnford in the donga ran short. But I DO think SD must have harbored some sort of animus about how the 2nd Battalion's ammunition was handled until Bloomfield took one in the head for his troubles.

BTW, reading SD's passage about Bloomfield as testimony to the 24's coolness under fire is what's utterly nonsensical to me. Complete wishful thinking IMO. Irony was hardly inherent to the way Victorian gentleman (and especially officers) expressed themselves...with the exception of Oscar Wilde maybe.

[quote="Chelmsfordthescapegoat"]I see your point, but if they had, had enough ammuntion, they would not have been surrounded.

CTSG,

Nearly the entire right wing (or horn) of the Zulu impi was advancing virtually unimpeded behind Islandwana after the opening minutes of the battle. This is beyond dispute. How do you reckon that more ammunition would have prevented them from being surrounded. With the exception of a small group of men with Shepstone (all killed of course) there was not even a force to act as a speedbump.

So, I can't see your point at all.

xhosa2000 wrote:
hang it all qm you
dont want a reacquisition now do you" in my view that
is utter b.....ks, looking at the sheer mass of the enemy
you would imagine he would be slinging boxes off as
damned quick as he could! but no we are left forever with
the image of this vastly experienced officer as a slow
methodical automaton..but on who's say so.

springbok wrote..
My key question has always been to those that profess to believe in the troops running out of ammo and that is: "How did 500 men get to the saddle from the front line if they had no ammo."

Hiya 6pdr.. i would be interested in your take of the above!.

I suppose one could take the easy way out and respond: "By running like hell!"

But, again, I do not believe that the companies of the 24th ran out of ammo until the very last phase of the battle when they were fractured and surrounded. (Only Durnford's group ran out earlier IMO.)

So for all I know they formed company squares and made "an organized withdrawal." (Actually, if they moved in Napoleonic company squares, I think somebody would have mentioned...)

Somewhat overlooked in this discussion is the conduct of the withdrawing guns. In my heart of hearts I would guess, once they limbered up, the line dissolved and followed them toward camp -- at least until their officers or the Zulu checked their progress. But I can't prove it.

Sorry guys couldn't respond last evening Brazil v Mexico got in the way.
CTSG
Johns impressive calculation falls down in looking at the timing, it presupposes that 900 men would be firing none stop. There is testimony, and also some valid comments, that there were lulls in the firing as the Zulus took cover, also there was a rather large lull as the companies came down of the ridge.
Your Quote:
"I see your point, but if they had, had enough ammuntion, they would not have been surrounded. Which takes us back to Ian Knights observation."

In answer I would suggest you separate the two facts, being surrounded and having enough ammunition. We tend to want to look at a single reason for the defeat where as its a lot more than that. They were surrounded because the recall was sounded. The recall was sounded because............................. and that's where reality ends and speculation takes over.
Authors and historians have for years looked at different hooks to hang the defeat on. Morris was the Smith Dorrien quote, and his entire thesis does hinge on that. Mike Snook places the total blame on Durnfords with drawl. Other authors merely gloss over. The politically correct love the phrase: Zulu victory not British defeat.

My personal view is exactly what Ive posted above. But let me itemise it all.

Two companies plus the guns are sent of to the North East front of the camp because the perceived threat is coming from that direction ( it was' the colonials were being chased across the ridge)
The regiments withdraw from the ridge and are met by Younghusband who covers the retreat.
An NNC company is withdrawing, either off the ridge or from the conical koppie ( that's my preferred source)
The NNC takes position adjacent to an imperial company. ( There is testimony to that )
As the regiments come down of the ridge the fill the gap between Younghusband and the companies either side of the guns.
Pope takes position to the south of the guns and is re inforced by a made up company. ( Cooks bottle washers etc etc )
Durnford withdraws to the Donga
Pope extends to cover the gap.
The Zulu are forced into cover in the dongas, that all along the line except for in front of Durnford. There they retire behind the ridge.
A company moves forward to the front of the guns, blocking them from firing, and fires down in to Donga then withdraws. The pressure from the arriving chest reserve forces the lines forward, and the British back towards the beginning of the NNC camp.
The NNC become isolated and suddenly realise that the only thing between the Zulu and the troops is them.
Probably with the local equivalent of, " Sod this for a lark Im of", they retire in haste.
And here is the key issue, did the NNC merely want to retire as the troops had done or did they actually bolt?
I believe it was the first.
As they retired the Zulus took heart and charged forward, the NNC retreat became a route.
The bugles sounded and the artillery became isolated and then retired very quickly.
At that point there were very large gaps in the line through which the impi poured, the companies were surrounded and proceeded to edge back, in a squarish formation towards the relative safety of the saddle and the road to Rorkes Drift.
There is a distinct trail of cairns that marks that trail, practically nothing on the firing line, they increase as they get closer to the camp.
We don't know how long the fight on the saddle lasted but there is sufficient testimony on the fearceness of the rifle fire so again its my guess that some of the various groups did replenish, either from the 1/24th waggons or the regimental reserve.

6pd.
You cant outrun a Zulu, unless your a Kenyan marathon man.
I fully agree on the Smith Dorrien quote, he says that the object of mentioning the quote is to show the coolness.
I have a problem with the Symonds account in that the only suvivors he could have spoken to were the 5 officers and the troopers, all of whom confirm in statements that ammunition was being sent out to the line and again that there were, before the battle, men detailed as stretcher bearers and ammunition detail. He either didn't talk to SD, Essex and the rocket battery escapees or didn't listen.
Sure there was a mule running around with ammo strapped to its back, but was that the first load he was delivering or the second, or third etc?
Again there are a couple of accounts that mention the troops were running low but there are equal statements that say they were re supplied. Individual statements are just that they describe those small parts of the battlefield that the individual was concerned with, there is not one statement that encompasses the whole of the action.
The history of isandlwana is all about individual takes and ideas, we don't know what happened and until more evidence turns up, stay with your own thoughts.

Cheers

Springbok says:They were surrounded because the recall was sounded. The recall was sounded because............................. and that's where reality ends and speculation takes over.
(...)The Zulu are forced into cover in the dongas, that all along the line except for in front of Durnford. There they retire behind the ridge.
A company moves forward to the front of the guns, blocking them from firing, and fires down in to Donga then withdraws. The pressure from the arriving chest reserve forces the lines forward, and the British back towards the beginning of the NNC camp.
The NNC become isolated and suddenly realise that the only thing between the Zulu and the troops is them.
Probably with the local equivalent of, " Sod this for a lark Im of", they retire in haste.
And here is the key issue, did the NNC merely want to retire as the troops had done or did they actually bolt?
I believe it was the first.
As they retired the Zulus took heart and charged forward, the NNC retreat became a route.
The bugles sounded and the artillery became isolated and then retired very quickly.
At that point there were very large gaps in the line through which the impi poured, the companies were surrounded and proceeded to edge back, in a squarish formation towards the relative safety of the saddle and the road to Rorkes Drift.

Bonjour Springbok,
I don't see the retreat of DURNFORD's men (NNH) to the camp in your equation ...  
It seems that's for you it's not a key element in the recall....
The recall was sounded because the DURNFORD's troopers are retired in haste to the camp (running low ammunition or / and surrounded), Pope become isolated and the right of British lines "open"?
Sorry if i have not understood your analysis...
Cheers
Frédéric

Hi Frederic
:They were surrounded because the recall was sounded. The recall was sounded because............................. and that's where reality ends and speculation takes over
Im afraid that says it all. We don't know anything from that point really. Im sure your right and the Durnford withdrawl had an effect but I separate the issues into 3 separate portions. The fight on the Northern front, the Durnford withdrawl and the right wings approach.
At the time the Northern Front collapsed Durnford was already there ( see Essex). So if Pulleine had witnessed that, and he did ( see Gardner) it didn't seen to have to much affect on him as Durnford still had time to ride across the battlefield to the northern face and have a conversation with Essex as to the possibility of sending men over there. While that conversation was taking place the line broke ( see Essex). So it would seem that the line broke because of the pressure from the chest rather than the left horn. In the overall context yes the left horns advance played a part, but not in the line collapsing, instead it was significant in closing of the retreat .
The right horns effect was similar, they invaded the camp from the West and again closed of the retreat.

Just my humble opinion.

Cheers

So it would seem that the line broke because of the pressure from the chest rather than the left horn. In the overall context yes the left horns advance played a part, but not in the line collapsing, instead it was significant in closing of the retreat .
The right horns effect was similar, they invaded the camp from the West and again closed of the retreat.

Just my humble opinion.

Bonjour Springbok,
Not the analysis of the modern (and leaders) authors on the AZW!!!!!  
In a sense, your thesis is as closer to Coupland, Morris and Clammer (I.E: the line broke because the rout of the NNC) as those of Jackson and Knight (no ammunition shortage).
But interesting thesis...
To meditate (I.E: Your thesis)...   
Thanks.

frédéric

Hi Frederic
Never been one to follow the herd im afraid. But No I don't believe Im close to Morris, his thesis was based more on a perceived ammunition shortage. Coupland out and out blamed the NNC, as did French and Clammer.
Mike Snook has made a very valid point but in a different way from what he intended. He is emphatic in saying that a British Imperial Force would never let a colonial/Native force to occupy a part of a defence line. Im inclined to agree so that would re enforce my point that they were there by default rather than design.
I have theorised that there was a possibility that the NNC were moving backwards as the line contracted and only then were charged and broken by the impi. Theres a huge difference there, I also do not believe that the NNC was deliberately positioned at that point but occupied it by default.
To get to the point I have, meant looking at the finite time scale from Durnford leaving the donga to popping up on the firing line. If Pullein was so concerned about Durnfords withdrawl and its potential effect why did he not sound the withdrawl instantly instead of waiting for that not inconsiderable time that it took Durnford to get over to the firing line? And Im not saying Pullein was aware of him being there but just illustrating the time scale. The only answer there is that it wasn't that much of an immediate threat? Or possibly because the left horn had moved around to outflank Durnford it was out of sight from Pulleins position?
Always happy to debate

6pdr wrote:

Chelmsfordthescapegoat wrote:

I see your point, but if they had, had enough ammuntion, they would not have been surrounded.

CTSG,

Nearly the entire right wing (or horn) of the Zulu impi was advancing virtually unimpeded behind Islandwana after the opening minutes of the battle.  This is beyond dispute.  How do you reckon that more ammunition would have prevented them from being surrounded.  With the exception of a small group of men with Shepstone (all killed of course) there was not even a force to act as a speedbump.

So, I can't see your point at all.

The surrounding of the camp would not have been an issue if the men had been located correctly, along with ammuntion station setup near them affording an ample supply of ammuntion. Hours prior to the battle masses of Zulu were reported disappearing behind Isandlwana hill. Nothing was done to prevent a rear attack, until it was to late and with too little men. It is my opinion that the lines broke, due to the lack of ammuntion, forcing the men to fall back to the camp hoping to find ammunition ready and available. They mind set would possibly be, if the ammuntion not coming to us we will go to the ammuntion, a valid attidude for soldiers equipped with rifles and who were trained to killed at a distance.

Hi LH
Fully agree with the first part, and the middle bit, pity you buggered it up on the last bit though.    

Cheers

  

springbok9 wrote:

Sorry guys couldn't respond last evening Brazil v Mexico got in the way.
CTSG
Johns impressive calculation falls down in looking at the timing, it presupposes that 900 men would be firing none stop. There is testimony, and also some valid comments, that there were lulls in the firing as the Zulus took cover, also there was a rather large lull as the companies came down of the ridge.
Your Quote:
"I see your point, but if they had, had enough ammuntion, they would not have been surrounded. Which takes us back to Ian Knights observation."

In answer I would suggest you separate the two facts, being surrounded and having enough ammunition. We tend to want to look at a single reason for the defeat where as its a lot more than that. They were surrounded because the recall was sounded. The recall was sounded because............................. and that's where reality ends and speculation takes over.
Authors and historians have for years looked at different hooks to hang the defeat on. Morris was the Smith Dorrien quote, and his entire thesis does hinge on that. Mike Snook places the total blame on Durnfords with drawl. Other authors merely gloss over. The politically correct love the phrase: Zulu victory not British defeat.

My personal view is exactly what Ive posted above. But let me itemise it all.

Two companies plus the guns are sent of to the North East front of the camp because the perceived threat is coming from that direction ( it was' the colonials were being chased across the ridge)
The regiments withdraw from the ridge and are met by Younghusband who covers the retreat.
An NNC company is withdrawing, either off the ridge or from the conical koppie ( that's my preferred source)
The NNC takes position adjacent to an imperial company. ( There is testimony to that )
As the regiments come down of the ridge the fill the gap between Younghusband and the companies either side of the guns.
Pope takes position to the south of the guns and is re inforced by a made up company. ( Cooks bottle washers etc etc )
Durnford withdraws to the Donga
Pope extends to cover the gap.
The Zulu are forced into cover in the dongas, that all along the line except for in front of Durnford. There they retire behind the ridge.
A company moves forward to the front of the guns, blocking them from firing, and fires down in to Donga then withdraws. The pressure from the arriving chest reserve forces the lines forward, and the British back towards the beginning of the NNC camp.
The NNC become isolated and suddenly realise that the only thing between the Zulu and the troops is them.
Probably with the local equivalent of, " Sod this for a lark Im of", they retire in haste.
And here is the key issue, did the NNC merely want to retire as the troops had done or did they actually bolt?
I believe it was the first.
As they retired the Zulus took heart and charged forward, the NNC retreat became a route.
The bugles sounded and the artillery became isolated and then retired very quickly.
At that point there were very large gaps in the line through which the impi poured, the companies were surrounded and proceeded to edge back, in a squarish formation towards the relative safety of the saddle and the road to Rorkes Drift.
There is a distinct trail of cairns that marks that trail, practically nothing on the firing line, they increase as they get closer to the camp.
We don't know how long the fight on the saddle lasted but there is sufficient testimony on the fearceness of the rifle fire so again its my guess that some of the various groups did replenish, either from the 1/24th waggons or the regimental reserve.

6pd.
You cant outrun a Zulu, unless your a Kenyan marathon man.
I fully agree on the Smith Dorrien quote, he says that the object of mentioning the quote is to show the coolness.
I have a problem with the Symonds account in that the only suvivors he could have spoken to were the 5 officers and the troopers, all of whom confirm in statements that ammunition was being sent out to the line and again that there were, before the battle, men detailed as stretcher bearers and ammunition detail. He either didn't talk to SD, Essex and the rocket battery escapees or didn't listen.
Sure there was a mule running around with ammo strapped to its back, but was that the first load he was delivering or the second, or third etc?
Again there are a couple of accounts that mention the troops were running low but there are equal statements that say they were re supplied. Individual statements are just that they describe those small parts of the battlefield that the individual was concerned with, there is not one statement that encompasses the whole of the action.
The history of isandlwana is all about individual takes and ideas, we don't know what happened and until more evidence turns up, stay with your own thoughts.

Cheers

At what point did the Zulu lines waver, having to be enticed to continued with their attack. And what caused them to slow down and have second thoughts.

[quote="springbok9"]Hi Frederic
Never been one to follow the herd im afraid.
...necessity to have a solid "background" (experience of the subject) before!...as you... not yet my case!!!  

Mike Snook has made a very valid point but in a different way from what he intended. He is emphatic in saying that a British Imperial Force would never let a colonial/Native force to occupy a part of a defence line.
I have read this point in "can men die better". But he gives no  others examples in history under the Victoria era... and it seems to me that he is the only author on the AZW who says that/this.
I have to study others battles of the Victoria's era with colonial and british troops "mixed" to verify the relevance of this assertion (others examples or not in British history?).

I have theorised that there was a possibility that the NNC were moving backwards as the line contracted and only then were charged and broken by the impi.
So the british troops and the NNC didn't retreat exactly at the same time (precedent post).
The chest doesn't charge when the british troops contracted but just after when the NNC (isolated) were moving backwards?

I also do not believe that the NNC was deliberately positioned at that point but occupied it by default.
Julian Whybra is not agree with you (Chelsmford battle's plan before the beginning of the invasion).
The great majority of the others moderns authors had written the same thing (Chelsmford's Battle plans)...
The problem is that we don't know with certainty the position of all the troops of the NNC in the firing line....
(the authors are not agree on this point)
The strange point for me is that the survivors don't recall the position of the NNC (as Essex).
NNC troops, "unimportant troops" for the Bristish command at Isandhlwana?
It the answer is yes, this observation strengthens your point of view.

To get to the point I have, meant looking at the finite time scale from Durnford leaving the donga to popping up on the firing line. If Pullein was so concerned about Durnfords withdrawl and its potential effect why did he not sound the withdrawl instantly instead of waiting for that not inconsiderable time that it took Durnford to get over to the firing line? And Im not saying Pullein was aware of him being there but just illustrating the time scale. The only answer there is that it wasn't that much of an immediate threat? Or possibly because the left horn had moved around to outflank Durnford it was out of sight from Pulleins position?
It seems to be a relevant analysis.
But my background is insufficient....
I have to verify the exact chronology of the events during the battle (really inconsiderable time between Durnford's withdrawl retreat and the sound of the bugles?)
We don't know where was the position of Pulleine (near the firing line?) and we don't know the time of the events.
Cheers
Frédéric

In sequence !
The Zulu were pinned down by heavy fire in the dongas ( Popes comments as reported and also comments from the Nokhenke deserter )
The Zulus crept forward to within 100 yards (Mehlokazulu) ( Malindi )
The line was slowly withdrawn towards the NNC camp. ( Mehlokazulu)
The famous "Branch " motivation speech
The Zulu rush the line.
The NNC retreat (Malindi )
The Bugles sound ( Mehlokazulu )
The companies reform.( Uguku ) ( Mehlokazulu )
The Level of firing peaks. ( Uguku)

In terms of Ammunition supply a key point is made by Wilson in that he mentions ammunition being taken out to the line before Durnfords men got to the donga and before the main Zulu chest had descended from the ridge. Re enforced by Bickleys statement.......it was carried out to them by the Bandsmen and wagon drivers and other unarmed people about the camp. That was when firing had already commenced so fits in after Wilsons observations. Williams makes similar comments. As do Essex and Smith Dorrien.
Its pretty apparent, to me at least , that the line was being supplied from early on until the end and that when the line was reformed the level of firing became more intense, ergo there was still plenty of ammunition.
Then of course that retreat with very little loss of life, only rifle fire could have kept the Zulus at a distance that the throwing spears were ineffective, I should imagine though that by the time the individual companies got close to the saddle that the ammunition started to fail, the increase in the cairns points to that. And then a resupply that enabled that fierce firing that was reported by the Zulu and the continuous shouts of fire ( attributed to Durnford ).
Time to get ready to watch Holland up against Australia. For 90ths sake I hope its a repetition of RD.   
I m not attempting to sway your own view point  by the way merely pointing out issues that have formed my own.

Cheers Mate

Frederic
Your points are taken, I don't have time to give them the attention they deserve but will respond later.

I personally would not rely on any of
the surviving officer account's 55
officers all doing the same thing! that
is fleeing...Gardiner could/ would not
stop! everybody providing their own
tunnelled vision account! FWD's is
the best account i have ever read and
all authors post 1965 have taken his
lead nicking bits here..
nicking bits there to fit in with their own
agenda which is usually yet another
angle!! in order to feed from the
same trough, we all have our view's on
this particular massacre, the truth in my
eyes is oh so simple..and most of you
know what i was about to say next.......

Frederic
Your points are taken, I don't have time to give them the attention they deserve but will respond later.[/quote]

Springbok,
I have to study before!!!
Cheers

springbok9 wrote:

You cant outrun a Zulu, unless your a Kenyan marathon man.

Not in a fair race: particularly NOW!  But I might outrun a Zulu to a specific point if I had a big enough head start.  Begs the question, "How big a head start would you need?"

Quote :

I have a problem with the Symonds account in that the only suvivors he could have spoken to were the 5 officers and the troopers, all of whom confirm in statements that ammunition was being sent out to the line and again that there were, before the battle, men detailed as stretcher bearers and ammunition detail. He either didn't talk to SD, Essex and the rocket battery escapees or didn't listen.

This account boils down to grasping for straws in the wake of an inexplicable defeat.  He gives three reasons, all of which pursue the age old tactic of those in power blaming the victims of their folly. Naturally, the low guys on the totem pole are primarily at fault -- first and foremost the NNC. Unexplained is a specific reason for how/why those troops came to be deployed in places that would make such a disaster possible. Then there's "second, the desire on the part of our officers and men to get close together or rally." Gee, why would they need to do that? Well, by inference because they were deployed too far apart by Pulleine. That insulates British doctrine and/or Chelmsford plan of defense. And the ammunition excuse is an easy out too because it does not offend a powerful constituency.  The Commissariat provisions...it was NOT responsible for distributing bullets and shells on a battlefield. AFAIK that was left to the discretion of battalion officers. The reason that Smith-Dorrien ended up with the ammunition wagons is that as a Special Service Officer, he was low man in the hierarchy of officers...unless you count the quasi-noncom/quasi-officer quartermasters. In that light it's interesting that SD blamed Bloomfield...and inanimate objects.  (A screwdriver, a screwdriver, my kingdom for a screwdriver! For want of a nail...er...screwdriver.)    

Quote :

The history of isandlwana is all about individual takes and ideas, we don't know what happened and until more evidence turns up, stay with your own thoughts.

Right, which made Symonds' task of providing credible explanations simultaneously impossible and unassailable. A very convenient turning point discussed by Springbok and Frederick is the bugle call.  With apologies to Springy, who made me understand all this -- just a few MINOR questions about that single micro-event:

1) Did it occur or not? (there IS disagreement)
2) What tune was called?
3) Who authorized that call?
4) Relative to other events, exactly when did it sound? (this is absolutely key and we have absolutely no consensus)
5) Where was the bugler standing on the battlefield at the time?
6) Who was able to hear it?

Sources differ on all of those.  

Like the fruits from the poisoned tree, nearly everything downstream from the bugle call (assuming it even occurred) is therefore up for grabs. It's simply a matter of how your historical imagination frames it IMO.

Not in a fair race: particularly NOW! But I might outrun a Zulu to a specific point if I had a big enough head start. Begs the question, "How big a head start would you need?" Asks 6pdr...

On that day about 11 days, backwards to the starting point!.

springbok9 wrote:

The Zulu were pinned down by heavy fire in the dongas ( Popes comments as reported and also comments from the Nokhenke deserter )
The Zulus crept forward to within 100 yards (Mehlokazulu) ( Malindi )
[snip]
Then of course that retreat with very little loss of life, only rifle fire could have kept the Zulus at a distance that the throwing spears were ineffective,

Springbok,

I don't think I've read the testimony provided by Malindi. Where was he?

Perhaps I have merely forgotten, but did Mehlokazulu indicate that he or others were only 100 yards from the British when they were pinned?  I had formed the impression that the gap was greater -- like maybe 200 to 400 yards out -- where ever it makes sense for the Martini-Henry kill zone to have sent them to ground.  At 100 yards I think the Zulu might have inflicted more casualties on the British with their firearms than the cairns suggest. (I'm speaking here specifically about where Mehlo was situated in the left horn -- near the 7-pounders the terrain might have allowed them to approach considerably closer.)

And about those cairns...  You know that the bread crumb effect seems consistent with a route.  They are distributed similarly on the Little Big Horn battlefield but more spread out because there was cavalry involved...but generally: individuals-> penny packets-> clusters.  That's just how things seem to go when a force breaks and runs.  Also, I think we should remember that the cairns are simply markers of where bodies were interred.  It's hard to know what happened after the camp fell.  I think we have pretty good information of where the bodies were located months later, when the British were able to return to the battlefield and bury all their dead, but it's important to realize that a good amount of time had passed...and we are, after all, talking about decayed corpses.  Don't get me wrong -- I think they are reliable indicators as signposts that show the general flow of the battle, but they shouldn't be used to make ultra precise arguments IMO.

The Socaroos made a valiant stand.  They were one play away -- the difference between a ball striking a man's chest vs. his head -- from possibly scoring points.  Given what we saw in the first round of these two teams, that was truly superb...but alas, they won't be advancing now.

At what time were the NCC place infront of the camp. According to Mehlokazulu! There were no NNC in front of the camp.

I don't think I've read the testimony provided by Malindi. Where was he?

Bonsoir 6 pdr
Malindi of Capitaine Lonsdale's company.
These men were the iziGquoza, the emigré followers of King Cetewayo's rivals who made up James Lonsdale's n°9 cpmpany, 1/3rd NNC, which had been holding its position on the rocky rise between the two dongas, sandwiched lately between Captain Wardell's H Company, 1/24th and Pope's G Company, 2/24th
Source: Ian Knight Zulu Rising p.397 / account of Malindi / Chelmsford's papers NAM

The narrative of Malindi is quoted several times in "Zulu Rising" and  in the "Hill of the Sphinx" by FWD Jackson  for example.
There is a photo of him (probably) in "Hill of the Sphinx" (not from the "John Young Collection" but reproduced from Sir Richard Harrison's autobiography;!!!) 

Cheers

Springbok says:
To get to the point I have, meant looking at the finite time scale from Durnford leaving the donga to popping up on the firing line. If Pullein was so concerned about Durnfords withdrawl and its potential effect why did he not sound the withdrawl instantly instead of waiting for that not inconsiderable time that it took Durnford to get over to the firing line? And Im not saying Pullein was aware of him being there but just illustrating the time scale. The only answer there is that it wasn't that much of an immediate threat? Or possibly because the left horn had moved around to outflank Durnford it was out of sight from Pulleins position?

Springbok,

Facts:
-At the moment of the withdrawal of Durnford's troopers, a company of the 24th was actually on its way  down from the bastion to reinforce the mounted men but seeing them retiring it turned and took up a position just north of the road on the low ground facing the zulu left.(this would be Pope's company)
Someone had sent Pope's Company to reinforce Durnford before his withdrawal.
But we don't know who...
Pulleine? Melvill?other senior officer? ...Pope on his own initiative?

-Quartermaster Pullen of the 1/24th rounded up some soldiers among the fugitives and led them away to turn the zulus flank (left horn)
He asked Brickhill to get reinforcements from Col. Pulleine.
Brickhill didn't found him in the 2/24 camp.

-Durnford also didn't found him.

It's likely that Pulleine had gone to the firing line.

Hypothesis
After the reinforcement of Pope, the left horn is not any more a threat (for Pulleine) and Pulleine goes to the firing line  to face the chest and he didn't seen the retreat of Durnford's troopers (The left horn was it out of sight from the position of Pulleine in the firing line?)
Other possibility: Pope was not sent by Pulleine. Pulleine was already in the firing line and had never seen the danger of the left horn.

Weakness of these hyptheses:
-We know that Gardner and Essex went to find out the cause of the withdrawal of the Durnford's mounted men.
Who had sent them? On their own initiative?

Springbok, i am sure that you haven't forgotten that the uMbonambi were the first (for Cetewayo)to penetrate the ennemy lines, "to come the grip with them and stab the ennemy".
Or, the uMbonambi was in front of the Durnford's men, no?

Some thoughts

Cheers
Frédéric[/quote]

General Sir Richard Harrison, G.C.B.,C.M.G.
Recollections of a Life in the British Army
During the Latter Half of the 19th Century.
1908 page 187..i will post it later today
when i have access to my scanner.

Ulundi wrote:

At what time were the NCC place infront of the camp. According to Mehlokazulu! There were no NNC in front of the camp.

Not sure what you mean by "in front." Generally speaking there were both NNC troops (cavalry) and companies (infantry) spread across the battlefield "in front of the camp" throughout the battle.

I don't have access to my sources now but from memory... There were cavalry troops (Zikali's Horse?) with Shepstone scouting the northern escarpment at the outset of the engagement. Durnford had the Edendale Contingent and Hlubi's men (?)

A company of NNC escorted the rocket battery as it attempted to catch up with Durnford on the right...but they bolted early in the battle. In the center, as Frederic notes, were the iziGquoza of Lonsdale's 9th company, 1/3rd NNC. Other NNC detachments apparently filled gaps in the line before the 2 regular companies retreated down from the spur as well.
And then after the retreat back on Younghusband's position I believe that Stafford(?) brought up the NNC company that had been escorting Durnford's baggage train from Rorke's Drift.

Years after the war was over Mehlokazulu apparently liked to recount how he taunted one his opponents (Zikhali or Hlubi maybe?) as he chased him from the field...so he knew the NNC were there, for sure.

ymob wrote:

He [Pullen] asked Brickhill to get reinforcements from Col. Pulleine.
Brickhill didn't found him in the 2/24 camp.

-Durnford also didn't found him.

It's likely that Pulleine had gone to the firing line.

But Durnford went to the firing line and APPARENTLY did not find Pulleine there. Perhaps it was just a matter of bad timing but Pulleine's whereabouts are a mystery for the vast majority of the battle.

Quote :

Hypothesis
After the reinforcement of Pope, the left horn is not any more a threat (for Pulleine) and Pulleine goes to the firing line  to face the chest and he didn't seen the retreat of Durnford's troopers (The left horn was it out of sight from the position of Pulleine in the firing line?)
Other possibility: Pope was not sent by Pulleine. Pulleine was already in the firing line and had never seen the danger of the left horn.

I like your hypothesis. I think Pope may have moved on his own initiative. We'll see what Frank says, but you are right about the sight lines I think.

Quote :

Weakness of these hyptheses:
-We know that Gardner and Essex went to find out the cause of the withdrawal of the Durnford's mounted men.
Who had sent them? On their own initiative?

FWIW, we know from Smith-Dorrien and Essex that Essex went forward (acting as a line officer,) to the spur on his own initiative after a sergeant entered his tent and told him a battle was afoot. The commissariat officers had no specific responsibilities during a battle so he was a free agent. Of course Pulleine MIGHT have sent Essex to find something out for him, but then why didn't he mention it afterward? He was one of the 5 surviving officers and everybody was trying to figure out what had happened to Pulleine...

6pd The Bugle Call
There are two references to the bugle call, 1 Zulu and 1 Curling. Curling says it was the Cease fire that was sounded. We don't know when or where or even the timing. It has been speculated that the call started at one point and was then repeated, that makes sense to me. If you combine that with the Zulu description that on the sounding the firing stopped instantly. It makes even more sense.
The Cairns
Sure your spot on but they do give a graphic image of the course of the battle. Again combine that with the comments made when the field was revisited, "very few bodies were found on the firing line."
Curling does mention "starting to take casualties."

Ulundi
Its debatable, I think that the NNC were retreating and ended up there by default. Malindi says that his company was in place and joined by a company of redcoats. That was a slightly different place in the line but does show that the NNC, in this case the 1/3rd, were already in line. So possibly the same could be said for the other NNC detachment.
Don't forget that Mehokazulu was on the left horn side of the battlefield while the NNC we are talking about were in front of the chest, so highly probable that he wouldn't have been in a position to see them.

Ymob
Some bold statements there my friend.
Pope on the way down? Not according to Harry Davis; 'the infantry were on my immediate left but none on my right. Ergo Popes men were in place during the battle of the donga.
Mehlokazulu mentions that his regiment suffered under a cross fire from the colonials and the soldiers.
The only people that could order a Company around would either be its regimental commander, its adjutant or the camp commander surely? The 2/24th were out of camp, that would rule out Glyn or Clery, the obvious choice then would be Pulleine, via one of his minions.

With regard to 'Durnford didn't find him!' We don't know that.
He could have done. We do know that Durnford was seen on a track through the camp. Harry Davis sees him at the front of the Artillery camp, Jacob Molife says: 'the colonel rode straight on to the Generals tent at the upper end of the camp.'
At some time on this ride Gardner spotted Durnford and spoke to him. Gardner was told to stay with Pulleine ( Gardners statement ). Its then only an extention to suppose that gardner had been sent to find out what was happening with Durnfords force. Again by extention, Pulleine had to be in a position to see that side of the battle field. There are only two places, behind the eastern front or from the Head Quarters area. If he was behind Pope on the Eastern front and sent Gardner to see whats going on he would have missed Durnford who would have been riding of at a large tangent. My thoughts therefore would place Pulleine, right or wrong, at the HQ tent.
Durnford and Essex meet up on the firing line, Essex says he went there to check on the ammunition supply, theres no mention of Pulleine by him. It was during that meeting that the NNC started to rush past them.
uMbonambi
They were credited with being the first into the camp. The left horn when they were held up by Durnford moved towards the South, there is a ridge there that runs up from the donga to the koppie. The 1/24th camp was on the bottom slopes of that ridge/fold. Its feasible that the left horn used that natural feature to get around and into the tented camp area and so attack the southern flank, and also to be first into the camp.

What we do know is that Durnford got back across the camp to that flank to try and cover the left horn. Hamer says: '1 company and Colonel Durnford covered the retreat.' Mehokazulu mentions the same group of about 100 and identifies Durnford and the continual shout of 'Fire', so they did have ammo in order to: ' fire at a fearfull rate.'

But as always, " You Pay your money and take your choice."

Cheers
PS If there are any Spain supporters on the forum, you would last night have witnessed the end of a Golden era.

Hi Springy and Others
I've always been a little wary of the Ammunition question , I remember having some debates with Julian a couple of years ago on this very subject , quite possibly on pages 1 through to 4 ??? . I know there are references stating Ammunition was getting sent to the Firing line , my problem is , and will always be , just how much actually got delivered ? , probably no doubt some got delivered , but I believe not enough . As for those who were delegated to take it to the front line , how many of those chaps do you think actually decided to proceed , unarmed , to the firing line , I cant imagine the ammo carriers wielding a rifle which would be a severe hindrance , and certainly slow down the delivery ! . Human nature is the same all over , when you see , and hear , 25,000 angry zulu's wanting to eat you up , I think discretion may have been
the better part of valor in some instances , which I believe had an effect on the amount of rounds making their way to the front . Also , I doubt very much that all the companies received the same amount of ammunition from these people who were attempting to resupply the over extended firing line . I think those further out got less if any . The controlled fighting withdrawal which we speak of obviously happened , but my point is how many rounds did some of those troops have remaining , they took 70 from memory , at the start of the fall back who knows what each soldier had on their person , 20 , 30 . 40 ? , we'll never know , but this is why I think they managed to get back to near the camp , a controlled firing pattern during the withdrawal was put in place for the simple reason they had to make each volley count ! , they , in my mind , certainly had a lot less on their person while retreating , than what was in their pouches when they were wheeled out to the Firing line initially .
Cheers   90th

Hi Springy
Not sure if it was Boast in his Burial reports mentioned that those with him on the burial detail were given sacks to walk the battlefield and pick up all the bones they came across , these are later interred under the Cairns , so I'd say that not all those under the Cairns were necessarily killed at the very spot where the Cairns are today . A similar thing has happened at Little Big Horn from memory , Spurious markers etc etc .
90th   

Hi 90th
Have you been taking time out to watch some football? I wouldn't bet against Aussie for their last game against Spain.
I think the 'collectors' your referring to were the O'Connell party, prior to that was Bromhead and the final one was Boast

Cheers

Hi Springy
Yes I've watched both our games and been well and truly impressed , although we've lost them both , we have looked the better team in most of each game ! , also watched Germany - Portugal , Spain - Holland , England - Italy . Have had to get up at 2 am for a few of them then back to bed about 4am to get up for work at 6am ! , I think I'm starting to get tired , thinking about watching Eng - Uruguay a sleep in for me its on at 5am ! . For what its worth I think the Germans will win it ! . Will check who the ' Bone Collectors ' were with sometime tomorrow .
Cheers 90th

Hi 90th
Who needs sleep when the World Cups on, our games start from around 9 at night and go through to early hours of the morning so like you very little sleep.
Lieutenant M O'Connell of the 60th rifles was the gent who came up with the sack collection idea, around 1880 14th March, spent 5 days on site. ( With all the books in the world I still go for the big Silver Book every time, and it never disappoints )

Cheers

Les
I seem to recall a link between Malindi and Rider Haggard or have I got the wrong man?

Cheers

Thanks Springy as I'm not home so no access to the books I needed to look through , its a bloody good book that big silver one , I've been trying to flog it for years as you are no doubt aware ! LOL . It can be picked up for a reasonable price at times nowadays , although it can still be expensive as well !   . Just have to be on the right site , at the right time . Do you have ' Letters Of Fitzroy Hart - Synot ' , and if yes , what did you think of it ? . I'm currently reading Zulu War by D.C Moodie I'm fairly sure you have it ? . I'm waiting to see if I've won the thursday night lottery , if I'm successful I'll be in Cape town Saturday !!! LOL       
Cheers 90th

Same as 90th Frank, not near my stuff at the mo!
sure your right, i have a lot on Haggard will get back
to you!