Islandwana by Dr Greaves

Just received this book today from Amazon.co.uk.
Thank you Dr Greaves for providing a degree of balance and pragmatism when discussing who is to blame for Islandwana.
You are of the school that believes that Pulline and Chelmsford must bear the majority of the blame. I particularly enjoyed the fact that Col Durnford's orders are reproduced and that you have managed to lay that old cananrd to rest about how he was supposed to defend the camp. The Col is exonerated by this book.

Quote :

The Col is exonerated by this book

Maybe in your's and the authors eyes. To many your Col: Disobayed simple instructions. The orders you mentioned in the book, just happen to have parts missing. Thus those orders are worthless when it comes to establishing the truth. However if you are happy with the authors conclusion, then he has done his work well.

Well I am delighted with this particular book.
Are you suggesting that the author has altered the documents.
That is quite a serious allegation and you should report it to the publishers.
I have been through the book and the evidence against Chelmsford seems to be quite convincing.

Eric, no the orders haven't been altered in any way, that'd have defeated their purpose for inclusion in the book. As an aside, why is Chelmsford termed a scapegoat mentioned in the above username ?

Colin J have you read Dr Greave's book.? I have been going through it this afternoon. It has lots of useful information about things I would not have thought about like the rates of TB and syphiliis in the British population etc. I think it is an interesting book.

Eric. Is this the only book you have read on the Zulu war. Perhas you could feel in the missing parts of the so called orders. Now that would be interesting.

There is no need to make a statement like that.
I have read several other books including HCMDB, the latest Ian Knight as well as Zulu Victory by Ron Locke and Quantrill?
Perhaps you can help me fill in the missing bits as you seem to have some information about them.

I am not looking for a problem but I seem to have some how upset you. There is really no need for comments such as yours.
I am simply commenting on a book by a well respected author.

Eric. I think CTSG is saying " the order in question as parts missing, can not be counted as they do not indicate the full nature of the order. I think you have miss-read his question.

But I asked him that.
If the author has deliberately left out parts of the order then that is a very serious thing indeed.

Eric, they mean the condition the orders were found in age has decayed them some what.

Oh I see.
Well in that case I apologize.
Although DR Greaves does state that the original orders have been weathered and points out that some parts are illegible.

Julian Whybra could shed some light on this.

Eric. Perhaps I should apologize. Looks I jumped the gun. Which has been brought to my attention. There is a copy of the order in-question on the forum (Somewhere)

Hi Ctsg.
I believe your right but I dont know where it is either . I'm fairly certain there aren't any '' Missing '' parts though to
the orders !!. I will check more thoroughly once I get home from work later today .
cheers 90th.

Hi all i believe the photo is in Durnford is he capable

If I recall they were found in a draw, forgotten about. But i do believe the page was stuck together with blood and damaged when opened. Could be wrong..

Thanks Drummerboy.
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Hi all i am off to the Royal Engineers museum in a few weaks and have asked if i can see his papers. Does anybody know who took his papers and how they ended up in the museum as i have heard a lot of theries

CTSG
You do on occasion refer to the instruction/admonishment sent from Chelmsford to Durnford. That letter was part of the package found on Durnfords body, the page in question is part of that package. Its possible that that particular page was the order from Spalding instructing Durnford to move up to RD.
The orders received by Durnford from Chelmsford/Crealock are in one pieceand perfectly readable.

But then again you knew that that.

regards

Db
There is no mystery over the passage of the papers.
They were found on Durnfords body by Trooper A Pearse of the Carbiners. ( There is evidence to point to Surgeon Longhurst having a part to play but he consistently refused to discuss his role)
On the 25th June 1985 His brother ( F Pearse of 14 Cole St PMB) wrote to the editor of the Natal Witness in responce to an article in that publication. The papers were passed from the Natal Witness to Lt Col Luard CO of the Royal Engineers, Natal.
After his aborted action against Shepstone the papers were sent to the RE Chatham. There they were kept/abandoned until the late 60s/70s when they were fully opened.

Regards

Thanks very much Spinkbok9

I may as well post this here.
I have read Col Snook and Dr Greaves as well as Ian Knight and Lock and Quantrill
There seem to be two broad schools.
One blames Durnford for leaving the camp and precipitating a disaster. These claim Col Durnford was a reckless foolhardy man who was unable to follow orders. These authors suggest that Durnford was supposed to take command of the camp from Pulline. His failure to do this resulted in the defense of the camp becoming over extended and Pope's company being exposed on the right and cut off.
Others blame Chelmsford and Dr Greaves is in this group. These authors point out that Chelmsford gave his column commanders very poor standing orders. He comments that the deployment of Pulline's men at Islandwana was almost identical to that of Pearson at Nyezame 50 miles away on the same day.
Col Snook is of the anti Durnford group. Whilst he also criticizes Chelmsford he definitely blames Durnford for riding out to meet the left horn rather than taking command of the camp. He claims it was clear cut that Durnford should have taken command.
We will all have to draw our own conclusions. I have decided in which camp I am .

What I find interesting in Dr Greave's new book is the fact that Chelmsford standing orders were followed by both Pearson and Pulline and resulted in the British army suffering two major reversals in one day. Hs diagrams on page 133 and 134 are quite revealing. The General laid down the tactics he wanted hs commanders to follow and they did. To their detriment. Pulline who according to Dr Greaves was more an administrator than fighter paid for this with his life.

I have read all comments with interest. I am not sure where the blame ultimately lies but the general complacency and lack of respect for the Zulus ultimately led to this defeat.

Never again were the Zulus taken lightly in this war. I do believe that Chelmsford and Durnford each have responsibility for the calamity but also good old Pulleine was shown to be out of his depth too. The latter was unable to respond to a growing danger and had chances to pull his troops back in order long before the situation became perilous.

Interesting debate.

For the sake of discussion Ive argued from both 'camps'.
I am convinced there are no camps with valid arguments that can lay the blame on a particular individual.
Errors in judgement abounded over the period.

Wrong column structure
Wrong camp site.
No adherence to standing orders ( fortifications! These were only implemented on a daily basis during the second invasion, so the appologists that like to claim it was impractical really have no argument.)
Total lack of flexibility in dealing with a threat.
Insufficient inteligence gathering.
Wrong dissposition of forces.
Divided senior command.

Put names next to all those issues and you will be hard put to find an innocent party in the command structure.

Regards

Hi Springbok9



Intelligent conclusion!



Regards



YMOB

Hi All.
Just wish to clarify that Adrian Greaves '' Isandlwana '' is a new edition of the one first published in 2001 by Cassells , it's
now published by Penn & Sword . He has made some amendments to this edition . This info kindly sent by a friend .

Eric . Thank you for mentioning the '' Standing orders '' I've mentioned these many times but some more than likely
have yet to see or read them , and as you pointed out Pulleine & Pearson set up their defensive positions according
to these orders which again I will say were distributed in Either Nov / Dec 1878 !. Again if anyone wishes to see the orders
or the plans , do yourselves a favour and purchase '' The Journal Of The Anglo Zulu War Historical Society ' 5th Edition .
I saw it for sale on ebay uk earlier this week . These journals are very good and are well worth collecting , I have all 16 Hard
copies much info inside .
cheers 90th.

Hi All.
Low and behold , look what I found !. For those who havent read them and should read them . .

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cheers 90th.

Both Pearson at Nyezame and Pulline at Islandwana deployed their troops in a similar disposition.
So two columns on the same day fifty miles apart used the same tactics both with less than favorable outcomes.
These arrangements could not have been co-incidence.
Kord Chelmsford must have given these instructions to his commanders.

Didnt Pearson win the battle of Nyezame ?




Regards DB14

But Pearson, had the Naval Brigade equipped with the new Gatling Gun, which really did do some deadly work. And he didn't have to contend with 20'000 Zulu's +

Agree with OldH. It was the first time the Gatling Gun was used by British forces. Pearson commanded No 1 column, which consisted of around. 5000 The Zulus had around 6000 so the odds against were not as dire as No 3 Column's

i remember reading that the gatling gun repeatdly jammed and the wheel broke and didnt do much service throught the battle?



Cheers DB14

The diesel boom broke, but was repaired by Young Midshipman Coker. Who then used the Gatling Gun to deadly effect.

Thanks 24th

Nyezame forced the coastal column to go to ground at Eshowe. They were effectively besieged there for about three months.
So as I understand it Nyezame was hardly a triumph of British arms.
Both columns used the same tactics and both came off badly
Maybe if Pulline had a Gatling gun it would have been two near misses rather than one disaster and one close call.

Hi All.
The Gatling gun wasnt a real triumph at the Nyezane , it did work ....eventually , but I think from memory the danger had passed
It was used toward the end of the conflict .
cheers 90th .

Quote :

"A naval company and two companies of Buffs with a Gatling gun and 7-pounders moved up to the knoll, opening up across the advancing Zulu column. Thus, when the Zulus emerged from scrub and began their assault on the camp, they were taking heavy fire on both their flank and front of their force. The Zulus wavered and then withdrew the way they had come."

I think the Gatling played an important part in dispersing the advancing. Would be interested to see any resource with reference to the jamming of the Gatling.
The only problem I believe was with the diesel Boom.

Quote :

Both Pearson at Nyezame and Pulline at Islandwana deployed their troops in a similar disposition.

Eric. Could you go into more detail. Hopefully you can explain what these similarities are.

EH.

Elizabeth
I am quoting directly from Dr Greave's Book Isladlwana: how the Zulus humbled the British Empire. It is published by Pe and Sword Books and was released this month. On page 132 and 133 Greaves states. "At exactly the same time as teh attack on Islandwana Col Pearson and his number 1 column were advancing into Zululand etc Greaves then produces two line drawings depicting the deployments of both columns. In both cases the flanks were pretty much up in the air ( my understanding). On the 24 January Wood used a similar deployment at Hlobane this time successfully. Greaves states that the orders from Chelmsford to the column commanders ( Puelleine, Pearson Wood, Rowlands) are currently lost and cannot be reviewed. He implies that Chelmsford was keen that these not come to light in any way as they would have undoubtedly cast a bad light on him. Greaves states on page 134 that Pulleine's and Durnford's records and reputation should now be seen as exemplary and beyond reproach. Puelleine was never much or a battle field commander and he obvioulsy lacked teh experience of Wood or Pearson who managed to snatch victory from defeat despite their poor deployements.
I will try and scan in the relevant paragraphs and diagrams next week when I am at work and either send them to admin or try and post them myself.

Hi Elizibeth .
I posted the booklet for sale on ebay uk , either Tuesday or wednesday , which is a photocopy of the orders given to column
commanders in either Nov or Dec 1878 . Ian Knight also mentions this in his work . If you have 5th Edition of the journal of the
azw historical society they are in there also . Both Pearson and Pulleine set their defences as laid out in the standing orders .
I have a very limited knowledge with computers but if anyone has these publications they may be kind enough to post it. If I get a
chance tomorrow I'll post the Gatling Gun scenario at Nyezane .
cheers 90th.

CTSG

You do realise that the photo you posted is not the right order.

According to Crealock he wrote around 4 lines to Durnford for him to come to Isandlwana.

That order containes well over 12 lines of writing, it doesnt add up sorry mate wrong order.

No parts missing to real one anyway

Cheers
DB14

Eric wrote:

Both Pearson at Nyezame and Pulline at Islandwana deployed their troops in a similar disposition.
So two columns on the same day fifty miles apart used the same tactics both with less than favorable outcomes.
These arrangements could not have been co-incidence.
Kord Chelmsford must have given these instructions to his commanders.

Similar disposition - sounds like they used standard operational procedure/ standard infantry tactics.
A CO simply can not say (and i would guess, would never have said) "if you get into a contact, you will deploy your men thus...."
The deployment of the men would have to be dictated by the commander on the ground, based on the situation they are confronted with and developing around them.

I take your point Takser.
I am simply relaying what Dr Greaves wrote in his book.

Hi Tasker .
I need to correct you on your point '' A CO simply cannot say ( and i would guess , would never have said ) '' If
you get into a contact , you will deploy your men thus....... ''. That is EXACTLY WHAT HE DID SAY ! . I dont
know how many times I've mentioned this before , but here we go again . In the Good Lord's ( Chelmesford for ctsg ! ) standing orders of Nov 1878 HE SETS OUT THE DISPOSITION OF THE TROOPS IN CASE OF AN ATTACK . These orders are available often on ebay also in Vol 5 of ' The journal of the AZW hIstorical society .
So it is certainly no coincidence that Pearson & Pulleine set up the same way albeit many miles away from each other and no form of instant communication. Tasker you also need to realize this is 1879 and what the CO said
simply happened . No disrespect meant or inferred to your good self .
cheers 90th.

The Orders are not incomplete as has been stated in this thread. I have photographs of the originals; text was lost or disintegrated over the years but it was legible and the CORRECT text is published in our article.
I cannot agree with Eric - it is my opinion that this new book is not good. It does not add to the sum total of our knowledge of the battle. Annotations are lacking. There are errors. The inclusion, as just one example, of the forged Pulleine-Cavaye order as 'fact' is reckless in the extreme. How can a professional historian take such a thing seriously? Eric, read Jackson's Hill of the Sphinx, read Knight's Zulu. You'll be better informed.
In the meantime I'd be pleased to answer any questions about the discovery of the Durnford Papers in so far as I am able.

Are these papers, Readable? Yes or No. Or have they become so dilapidated with time its impossible to really say what is written.

They have been conserved, are perfectly legible and available for viewing by the public.