Liars in the Zulu War?

Hi Gary (90th)

I am only guessing at this, but if the zulu accounts were recorded by British or colonial officers, I don't think that they would have written down anything about being 'conned', 'lured', 'fooled', 'tricked', or anything like that, as it would not be the 'proper thing' to say, after all, what would the people back home think if they knew that an imperial force had been 'duped' by an almost naked army of natives carrying spears and shields (if you see what I mean).

Hope you are well mate.

Martin.

Hi Martin.
Yes mate I'm well , I can see your point , but I would think there would have been much mention of this being the case going down through the zulu oral history ,
lets not forget that they are / were very big on that aspect of preserving their history in regard to important or famous instances.
cheers 90th.

Sorry guys its a non starter.
There is no recorded attempt to draw Durnford from the camp, it was his own decision based on the sound of firing nothing m ore than that. Durnford split his force to try and get some sort of intelligence on the reported movements, all of which were on the ridge/plateau. IF there was a decoy movement surely it would have been to lure him up onto the high ground and at the impi? Not across the plain.

Regards

Hi all

Anyway if Durnford had survived the Battle of Isandhlwana, it would have made a sacred liar in addition.

poor Pulleine



Pascal

Pascal MAHE wrote:

Anyway if Durnford had survived the Battle of Isandhlwana, it would have made a sacred liar in addition.

Can you expand, your english is bad hear


Cheers

Hi all

Well, as I said, there is much mention of Ntshingwayo's use of ploys and deceptions in Lock and Quantrills book, however, that just might be the way that they see it. Either way, the movement of the zulus towards Chelmsford, drew Durnford from the camp to investigate where they were going, and this movement by the zulus could well have been another of Ntshingwayo's deceptions to draw Durnford away from the camp, couldn't it? Or there again, was it just a stroke of luck that because the zulus seemed to be heading in Chelmsford's direction, Durnford thought they were trying to attack him or cut him off?

Col Durnford did remark to Jabez Molife, "If they are going towards the General we must stop them at all hazards". This is not just said in Saul David's book, it is also said in Ian Knight's book Zulu Rising, so Durnford must have been convinced that the zulus where heading towards Chelmsford. Now, if they HAD been heading towards Chelmsford to attack him, and Col Durnford had stayed at the camp, and not attempted to investigate or try to cut them off, then he would have been guilty of neglecting his duty, therefore he had to find out where they were going, after all, he was in command of his own independent No2 column, it was Pulleine that was in command of the camp, so Durnford was not disobeying any orders from Chelmsford, if anything, he was trying to protect Chelmsford.

I repeat, Pulleine had done very little to investigate the numerous reports of zulu activity around the camp, it was Col Durnford that did at least attempt to find out about all this. Pulleine did nothing to re-organise some sort of proper defences, and Durnford was surprised by this when he arrived at the camp, and to my mind, this is what the row was about in the tent. I also believe that even if Col Durnford tried to advise Pulleine about re-organising his defences, Pulleine would have been that stubborn not to take Durnfords advice, and would stick to the plan ordered by Chelmsford.

Pulleine was the instrument of his own and the camps downfall, not Durnford, and Chelmsford was the instigator of it all. To try to lay the burden of blame at the feet of Col Durnford is a total injustice. Crealock and Chelmsford between them tried to blacken the name of a very gallant officer, and should have been totally ashamed of themselves.

Martin.

While I can readily believe that feints and ruses were part of the Zulu tactical arsenal (as they are with every army), some of the abilities being attributed to them on this post are almost super-human.

I was not aware that the Zulu generals were hovering over the battlefield in a dirrigible, conducting sweeping tactical redeployments at whim, nor that each Zulu force had been issued with Clansmen radios.

We will never knowthe exact movements of the Zulus that day, but the string of events suggests to me that what we are seeing is Imperial scouts stumbling upon Zulu units either stationery or moving into their "forming up" positions, and Zulu attempts to withdraw from sight.

They were not supposed to attack on the 22nd but their hand was forced once the main impi had been discovered.

Also the Zulus would have to make some redepolyments by the simple fact that the British had split their forces.

Definitly didnt have Clansmen radios, reception on the plain is really bad.

:lol:

Hi all

Pulleine only obeyed the orders of Chelmsford.

Durnford, being the highest ranking officer in the camp, did nothing more than Pulleine, and he ordered him to nothing.

And we must stop with the stratagems of the Zulu on January 22 ...
The two battles of 22 were accidentally triggered the same way ...



Pascal

60thRifleman

I would suggest that you read what the authors themselves have written in their books about this, rather than make uncalled for sarcastic remarks about their theories.

Pascal

Like you say, Pulleine only obeyed Chelmsfords orders, however, if he had used his common sense, he could and should have re-organised the defences long before Col Durnford arrived. He had plenty of reports of zulu activity in the area, but did nothing about it, the man was totally inept, and through his own stubbornness at sticking to Chelmsford's orders, he became the instrument of his own and the camps downfall.

Just because someone has written a book doesn't make them an expert or have any greater insight than anyone else who has read around the subject. Some authors carry more weight than others, I grant you, but show me the evidence for these contentions.

Nearly every army in every age has found planning and controlling the movement of "soldiers" once the enemy shows up, very, very difficult. Trickiest of all these "manoevres" is the feigned flight, which often has unforseen consequences.

I am very sceptical of these claims.

If I was sarcastic I was not intending to be disrespectful.

Mr M. Cooper wrote:

Like you say, Pulleine only obeyed Chelmsfords orders, however, if he had used his common sense, he could and should have re-organised the defences long before Col Durnford arrived. He had plenty of reports of zulu activity in the area, but did nothing about it, the man was totally inept, and through his own stubbornness at sticking to Chelmsford's orders, he became the instrument of his own and the camps downfall.

Large bodies of natives wasn' t worrying, Wardle had been 10,000 with just his company. No one knew the main Zulu
army was anywhere near the camp, it was getting attacked by Chelmsford. He had reports of thousands of Zulu advancing sometimes retreating, but could see nothing. He followed orders, he can't disobay, its a victorian army, at that point no one knew the whole camp and most of the people in it would die. How would he know the orders he had been given wouldn't work ?



Cheers

Hi DB.

Chelmsford disobeyed or ignored his own orders about laagering, and chose not to bother with this at Isandlwana (big mistake). He also wrote this.

"When a column is acting separately in an enemy's country I am quite ready to give it's commander every latitude, and would certainly expect him to disobey any orders he might receive from me, if information which he obtained showed that it would be injurious to the interests of the column under his command"

Therefore, he (Pulleine), could have disobeyed Chelmsfords orders, but chose not to do. He had plenty of reports about zulu activity in the area, and common sense should have told him that he needed to do something about the situation, but again, he chose not to do.

Yes, he ASSUMED that Chelmsford was engaged with the zulu army at Mangeni, but did not know this for certain. For all Pulleine knew, Chelmsford could already have been ambushed and defeated, and the large bodies of zulus that had been reported, could well have been the vanguard of a very large army on it's way to Isandlwana to destroy the rest of No3 column.

In this sort of unknown situation, Pulleine would have done better not to dilly and dally around through complacency, he should have taken the bull by the horns, disobeyed Chelmsfords defensive orders (as he could have done with the clause above), and set up some better defences.

:

Mr Cooper

You have quoted a section from a priavte order sent to durnford that pulliene wouldn't know about

The original sent to durnford has not been recovered.


Cheers

Hi DB

I would have thought that a clause such as this would have been in the standing orders, as it applies to ALL column commanders, not just to Col Durnford.

Hi Mr Cooper

Pretty sure it isn't, there for Pulliene couldn't disobay orders.



Cheers

They were not supposed to attack on the 22nd but their hand was forced once the main impi had been discovered.

Also the Zulus would have to make some redepolyments by the simple fact that the British had split their forces.[/quote]


This is all of the old, conventional theory.

The Zulus were opportunists. They would have certainly brought their attack forward a day, if the opportunity presented itself, as it did, when Chelmsford's column split away.

Question is, did the Zulus deliberately draw Chelmsford's column away by putting up a big show against Dartnell's patrol 11 miles away, fooling him and Chelmsford into thinking this was it, the main impi?
I think this was indeed a deliberate ploy, in order to draw a large chunk of the camp's force away in order for a deliberate assault on the camp, which is what they were interested in. Or, it was to get the camp into a column on the move, in order to attack it whilst in this weakened formation.

The conventional theory is all about portraying the disaster at iSandlwana, as British mistakes and Zulu opportunism and luck. (Much more palatable to British sensibilities in Victorian England; no credit to be attributed to Zulu out-thinking and out smarting the educated English public school officer).

For anyone who hasn't studied it yet, read "the missing five hours." Download the pdf, print it out and read it.

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Hi DB

Well, in the way that the clause is written, it certainly applies to all column commanders.

ie; when A column, not, when YOUR column, give IT'S commander, not, give YOU, expect HIM to disobey, not, expect YOU to disobey, orders HE might receive, not, orders YOU might receive, which HE obtained, not, which YOU obtained, under HIS command, not, under YOUR command.

So the way it is written it applies to ALL column commenders, not just to Durnford, and therefore should have been in the standing orders.

Either way, Pulleine didn't know if Chelmsford had been ambushed and/or defeated, and should have used his common sense and set up some better defences.

Don't think there is any evidence for a decoy.

Still don't know why none of the Zulu's Mitford intervied didn't say they changed plans.



Cheers

Mr Cooper

The part is in a letter to Durnford, Not standing orders, Pulliene wouldn't know about it.


Chelmsford had left on surposed good inteligence to attack the main Zulu Army, over the morning firing was heard
coming from the direction taken, which confirmed he was in action.



Cheers

Drummer Boy 14 wrote:

Don't think there is any evidence for a decoy.

Still don't know why none of the Zulu's Mitford intervied didn't say they changed plans.



Cheers

DB14, this is an easy one. Fear of death, duress.
Mehlokazulu when interviewed following his capture after iSandlwana was VERY guarded in his answers when interrogated due to the fact that he feared he'd be put to death. His answers pretty much denied any intent to delierately attack - let alone trick - the British force at the camp.
Years later, when interviewed and no longer under threat of death, was much more open and truthful no doubt, with is answers.

Tasker

Surely then those interviewed in 1883 by Mitford should have said the same ??

Why wait, if the attack started at 5am then why at 11:40 was nothing happening ??



Cheers

Drummer Boy 14 wrote:

Tasker

Surely then those interviewed in 1883 by Mitford should have said the same ??

Why wait, if the attack started at 5am then why at 11:40 was nothing happening ??



Cheers

DB14, how long do you think it would take to stealthily form up 20,000 Zulus into a start line?
As for the ordinary warrior, he would not have been party to any plans or tactics. (Need to know). He would have just followed orders and done what he was told to do, go where he was told to go.

Tasker

TMFH suggests the whole army was out of the Valley and on the move, clealry if this
was the case the men would know were they are going.



Cheers

Quite true.
But not necessarily the whys or the whens.

If the Zulus were capable of such stunning tactical finesse at Isandhlwana, why did they spend the rest of the war hurling themselves at British squares and laagers?

That is like asking, Why did the British Army continue walking, line abreast, towards German trenches and machine guns from 1914 to 1917.
:sleep:

And the Germans, Russians, Italians, Austro-Hungarians etc. !!! Lack of tactical flexibility !!

So we both agree then?

I really am open minded on this but I need some evidence to be persuaded to your way of thinking.

And have a :sleep: back !

I can't provide you with the evidence you need, here on this forum, you really need to do the reading and the thinking for yourself. The evidence is all there if you read it. Read it and form your own opinions.

After Chelmsford had decided to disobey or ignore his own orders on laagering at Isandlwana (and we all know the result of that mistake), the second invasion was very different, they laagered every time, that is why the zulus spent the rest of the war hurling themselves at them. As tasker says, the evidence is there if you read it, then form your own opinions.

Hi Tasker .
I agree with DB14 , the attack on the camp for mine was a more a case of good luck than good management , the zulu were opportunistic and took their chance when basically forced into it . Your statement '' Years later , when interviewed and no longer under the threat of death , was much more open and truthful no doubt , with his answers . ''. If thats the case 1883 would have been ample time for him to come clean , if he needed to do so !. I dont think he was hiding anything , he said it as it happened .
No ruses or elaborate plans set in place to make fools of the British army Cicra 1879 . I believe and will do , till someone can show me evidence to the contrary that the zulu's were pushed into the attack after being stumbled upon by Raw and Co . Also for the record , I'm not a firm believer in the M5Hrs . I admit I've briefly skimmed over it a year or so ago on the RDVC Forum .
But this is why there are forums , books etc , people can / have / will / do have differant ideas - and there is nothing wrong with that , it would be fairly boring if we all thought the same thing wouldnt it !.
cheers 90th.

Hi all

1-The attack on the camp has been caused by the orders of Durnford at his NNH... she was not planned for Zulu, ditto for the Nyezane, it is also because of the NNC, it all started ... The Zulu were forced to fight on 22, by accident ...

2 - The Zulu discovered by Dartnell were not there to deceive LC, but they were preparing to join the main impi ... Then they stayed on site to avoid attracting attention to the main impi ...

3-The Zulu always attack the same way, because their military system is rigid and they have not been able to adapt as the Xhosa, Matabele, ect ...

4- the theory of the missing five hours, is a beautiful ........ invented to excuse Durnford.

5 -l LC is deceived by Dartnel and Durnford by himself.The evidence is that he believed that the Zulu, would attack LC.

6 - The original topic is about the liars, well, if Durnford had survived, he would have told a mass of lies , on his responsibility ...



Pascal

Pascal

No need for Durnford, the NC would have found the army anyway, and they did.


Trooper Barker

We saw a large army sitting down




Cheers

If they had not found the zulus, there would not had a battle the 22...



Pascal

Saying the battle was Durnford's fault is like blaming the rising sun. No sun no battle! .

Well, joking aside. Sending his mounted contingent to scout the area when the whole situation was completely unclear to the British was the most responsible thing to do and would actually have been the very first task of those who set up the camp. No sensible decision can be made when your reports are conflicting as they were that day and all of his actions reflect that in my opinion.
After all he was called in as reinforcement in a critical situation and potentially commandant of the force. It wasn't only wise or advisable but his very duty to collect information on the whereabouts of the enemy. That Durnford's troopers stirred up a hornets nest is nothing they are to blame for. In fact, it happened most certainly only that late because of earlier failures to reconnoitre properly.

I don't subscribe to Pulleine being inept and useless either. At least not in the hours prior to the battle. For someone who must have thought that he was facing substantial numbers of the Zulu, but certainly not the whole army, he did quite well and I doubt that his orders were deemed inappropriate or suicidal by the other officers. We can't - of course - know, but it's not unlikely to me that the tactic was developed consensual and it's only retrospective wisdom on behalf of those who questioned it later.

Besides that, I think there were two further basic assumptions for Pulleine's decision to send the companies out that far. First, it was thought that the Zulu would invariably attack in their bull head formation and, secondly, it was conventional "wisdom" that sustained volley fire would break any attack no matter how determined.
And, fourth, being perfectly clear that the camp was too large and impossible to defend Pulleine had to break the enemy attack as early as possible; at a point of time where it hadn't developed to such an extent as of being impossible to deal with for a force as small as his. The only thing Pulleine is to blame for is failing to have a backup plan for a situation which was probably thought to be entirely hypothetical.

That said, he was certainly not alone in that attitude and supported by the fact that neither the camp site was topographically suited for a laager nor the arrangement of the wagons had been made to make one in the first place.

all the best,
Dave

The attack on the camp has been caused by the orders of Durnford at his NNH... she was not planned for Zulu, ditto for the Nyezane, it is also because of the NNC, it all started ... The Zulu were forced to fight on 22, by accident ... The Zulu discovered by Dartnell were not there to deceive LC, but they were preparing to join the main impi ... Then they stayed on site to avoid attracting attention to the main impi ...The Zulu always attack the same way, because their military system is rigid and they have not been able to adapt as the Xhosa, Matabele, ect ...The theory of the missing five hours, is a beautiful ........ invented to excuse Durnford. LC is deceived by Dartnel and Durnford by himself.The evidence is that he believed that the Zulu, would attack LC.The original topic is about the liars, well, if Durnford had survived, he would have told a mass of lies , on his responsibility ...



Pascal

Pascal

The NNMC who discovered the Zulus had been sent out to scout the groud were all morning reports
of Zulu activitey had occoured. That is a good desicion and most men would have made it.

This was before he heard of the Zulus going at attack Lord C.

The Natal Carbineers would have found the army anyway.

Cheers

It's not the NNMC but the NNH :lol:

It was not NNH till after Isandlwana.

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Before isandhlwana and at isandhlwana , it's the NNH look ES...



Pascal

While virtually everyone back then used informally the term NNH, the mounted force was evidently and clearly designated as Natal Native Mounted Contingent. It was only after the disaster at Isandlwana that troops No. 4 (Edendale) and No. 5 (Hlubi's Horse) of the NNMC were reorganised as the NNH under Lt. Cochrane. The three troops known as Zikhali Horse (No. 1 - 3) became Shepstone's Horse.

Sources:
Castle, I.: Zulu War - Volunteers, Irregulars & Auxiliaries MAA 388. Oxford: Osprey Publishing 2003.
Laband, J. & Knight, J.: The Anglo-Zulu War, 1879. Archives of Zululand. Vol. I. Archive Publications International 2000, p. 282.
Laband, J.; Singer Thompson, P. & Henderson, S.: The Buffalo border, 1879: the Anglo-Zulu War in northern Natal. Durban: Dept. of History, University of Natal 1983.
Smith, K.I.: The commandants: the leadership of the Natal native contingent in the Anglo-Zulu war. University of Western Australia 2005.
Snook, M.: Notes on the Composition of the British Force at Isandlwana.

The original official name of the mounted men under Durnford's command was the Natal Mounted Contingent, also known as the Natal Native Mounted Contingent. Evidence for this is to be found in several General Orders, e.g. No. 204, dated 22nd November 1878, National Army Museum, 6807/386-26-13; No. 209, dated 28th November 1878, Times of Natal 2nd December 1878; No. 228, dated 18th December 1878, Times of Natal 20th December 1878 (NNMC). This list is not exhaustive.

The first evidence of a Native Horse is to be found in GO No. 53, dated 9th March 1879, Times of Natal, 12th March 1879:

In addition to the seven NNC battalions, Durnford also raised a 6-troop regiment of Natal native horse which wasreferred to as the Natal Native Mounted Contingent - or ‘the Mounted Contingent’ for short but the name change to Natal Native Horse occured in January before Isandhlwana.



Pascal

thinredline and drummerboy
I am sorry but you are wrong. A number of authors (all the secondary sources thinredline quotes) have stated that this unit was officially called the Natal Native Mounted Contingent and that it underwent a name change to the Natal Native Horse AFTER Isandhlwana.
There is no evidence for this. It was certainly created under the name Natal Native Mounted Contingent (as drummer boy states) but the last date by which it is so called in any source is 20th December 1878.
Likewise Drummer boy's quoting the 'earliest NNH reference' as 9th March is also wrong. Both the Times of Natal and the Natal Mercury newspapers referred to the Natal Native Horse and used the acronym N.N.H. in the immediate aftermath of Isandhlwana (24th and 25th January 1879 respectively); the surviving N.N.H. officers (Barton, Davies and Raw) referred to their unit by that name in their reports; and, more importantly, there is also a Return of Troops in the Field (PAR, CSO 681 dated 6th January 1879 and signed by Durnford himself) showing those at Kranz Kop in which the N.N.H. is referenced. Another surviving N.N.H. officer (Henderson) used the term ‘N. N. Horse’ on a contemporary map showing troop dispositions. It is illogical that in the wake of such a disaster the military would have been concerned with a name change.
It is thus self-evident that this name-change occurred in the period between 20th December and 6th January and that this unit fought at Isandhlwana as the Natal Native Horse.
If you can prove that any of this is incorrect then please do so. I would be pleased to have my knowledge updated.

I don't wish to become engaged in the subject matter of this topic because I don't want to be plagiarised but as a word of advice those of you citing Saul David's book and Mike Snook's website and book as sources are misguided. Only primary evidence is a source. Secondary works are not sources. Saul David and Mike Snook have done no research on the Zulu War (please cite the papers and learned articles they have written! You can't because there are none!) but they have written popular histories which is not the same thing at all.

Quote :

Only primary evidence is a source.

Well, I'd be fairly disappointed if the sources I gave didn't use primary sources to draw their conclusions. But even if not there's still no proof for an official name change and it remains basically conjecture based on the widespread use of the term NNH that one must have happened.

As to the name change being illogical in the wake of such a disaster, I don't doubt they were up to the task.

You see thinredlineMOD and DB14 , once again I was right ... :lol:

And remember , in history , only the first sources are valid ... :lol:



Pascal

You see thinredlineMOD and DB14 , once again I was right ...

Ho hum :sleep:
First time for anything i suppose

Sorry not the first time , not the last time and not for nothing :lol: