Durnford was he capable.1

It seems to be a case of when the cats away the mice will play. (Chelmsford being the Cat!!)

Durnford and Pulleine thought they would have a nice day basking in the Sun, and it was the Good Lord Chelmsford that was going to see action. In a nutshell Durnford and Pulleine were caught with their pants down. Maybe we should be practical, and just blame the Zulu’s for the disaster.

The Zulus quite rightly dont see it as a British defeat but as a noble Zulu victory. Thats how it should be, the arrogance of the Victorian military wouldnt allow them to conceed a bunch of savages could defeat the might of the Imperial Army. Hence all the excuses to cover there collective rear ends ( sorry littlehand they didnt have the advantage of those pieces of hide). Rusty screws, ammo boxes swollen in the wet, spies in the camp, Impis drugged with canobis, to much smoke, the NNC running away......etc. Bottom line? One hell of a clever Zulu commander and lots of courage.

Regards

G'day Springbok9 :)

springbok9 wrote:

I agree Durnfords better course of action would have been a swift return to camp, but would that extra, 20mins max have made a difference with the line up of the troops.
Pullein committed his forces based on his instructions laid down by Chelmsford in standing orders. He had allready made it quite clear to Durnford he wasnt going to deviate from his orders.
So a swift Durnford return would have been interesting, would he have rested control and enforced a different battle plan?
There wasnt enough time to lager, probably his only option would then have been to form a square with a supply of ammunition in the centre. To get to that, two options, move the men to the ammo or the ammo to the men. Not a lot of time for either.
Even then, would the troops on the ridge have had the time to get back and join the square or been isolated?I believe a critical mistake was sending the troops onto the ridge, its debatable that this was a Durnford order, I think it probably was. Those troops when returning to join the line had probable expended a large amount of their ammunition, in volley fire on the ridge and individual fire on the retreat. Once in the line they were at an immediate dissadvantage and would have probably been the first to experience ammunition shortages on the fighting retreat through the camp.

I believe that at the time Durnford had been confronted by the Zulu left and made his retreat to, and stand in, the donga, Cavaye and Younghusband's companies had already retired back down from the ridge and had 'refused the left flank' - as far as the base of Isandlwana hill. According to one of the officers reports these two companies had been resupplied with ammunition.

When the right did collapse the vast majority of the men in companies other than 'G' and 'C' did get back onto the 'Saddle' area, as shown by the cairns and some rough maths, remembering also (What must have been) a fighting retreat by the men with Anstey, as their last stand contained around 60 men then a significantly larger number must have set off down the 'FD' .

Given that then I would suggest - in absence of better knowledge of when the two companies came back off the ridge, in relation to Durnford's situation at the same time - that there was, possibly, enough time for all the companies- who as I understand it were not actually in contact until Durnford's rush back to the Donga - to retire (fast) but in good order and not becoming mixed up with the Zulu.

I do not believe that this would have altered the outcome however, there were just too few of them to hold the Zulu off, expecially while overlooked on both sides from high ground from which the Zulu could fire down into them (and the Zulu's outgunned as well as outnumbered them).
It should be remembered that at Ulundi with a much bigger, better prepared force formed in square the zulu managed to get with 50 yards of the square.

springbok9 wrote:

Thats the enigma of this battle, more questions than answer and a hell of a lot of what ifs.

And, also probably why so fascinating?

After all to those of us familiar with the casualty rates of the Somme or Passchendaele 'battles' the death of a thousand or so soldiers is a quiet day in France. Almost ten times that number were cut down in the pathetic 'diversionary' attack at Fromelles in July 1916.

Almost worth a topic in itself, why does this battle fascinate us so much compared to say a battle in the Crimea or Soudan ? :)

In all I have read on this it is always the timeline that causes the most issues, exactly what was happening to who/when/where.

Anybody care to attempt a timeline or at least a sequence of events putting each companies position related in time with Durnford's moves/ positions?

Cheers
Aidan

old historian2 wrote:

Why is the Battle of Isandlwana known as a (Blunder)

Is it because we had far superior firepower? But was defeated.

Was it because of the mix-up or miss understanding regarding the orders to Durnford ECT?

Or was it because the British underestimated the opponent.



I’m not sure it fair to say it was a blunder, when the men at Isandlwana stood their ground and fought to the last, there was far great number of the enemy killed, than on the side of the British. Did the Zulu’s see it as a British Blunder in 1879.Or did they see as Brave men that fought like lions.

Actually the Zulu had (I have seen figures of between 5,000 and 15, 000 firearms) at the battle, they just weren't very good with them unless at quite close range. It should be remembered that the majority of casualties at RD were in fact bullet wounds not stab wounds.

The reason it is a blunder is not to take anything away from the bravery of the Zulu warriors, but quite simply because if Chelmsford had followed basic military precautions, or even just followed his own orders, the victory would have been to the British - the battle of Nyezayne on the same day is instructive on this point.

As to the relative casualty figures, during the 'Black Hawk Down' incident in Somalia the US forces killed vastly more Somalians than were killed on the US side- it was still a blunder though (or a series of mistakes and complacency that are not that dis-similar incidentally).

And to CTSG - as far as I am concerned the topic is about Durnford - GIVEN the situation he faced AS A RESULT of Chelmford's failures.

The topic was locked because of this continual problem of having to refute your attempts to use/misuse every possible post including taking parts of them out of context to use as 'support' for your completely untenable position.
Please desist from this and any comments regarding the situation in camp from Durnford's arrival are welcome. No offense meant of course :)

I think we are past the who was responsible for them being in this situation to who/what could have got them out of it (if any)

I guess the 7th Cavalry charging to the rescue - oh, wait, they had already had their own version

Mike Snook has formulated a time line, very interesting one at that.
The situation of the companies on the ridge is a topic all on its own, there is a large school of thought that says they didnt get down.
Chelmsford alludes to it as do many other suvivors and Zulus.
Assuming however they did get back to the firing line. The only comment I know of that mentions Cavaye being replenished is a reference from Essex. I dont know how much his evidence can be credited. His early departure would have been a major source of embarrasment.
I would disagree on the comment that all the companies, excepting C and G, made it back in good order. There is a lot of evidence to suggest a Company went down in the tent lines of the 2/24th ( Uguku
of the umCijo) The uMBonambi were credited as being first into the tents. To do that they would have had to get through the A company defence area.
H company had a massive distance to travel from the Rocky Ridge area ( CS Wolfes body was identified there by Bassage). They had iNgobamakhosi behind them and would have had to fight through them, some 6000 Zulus. Their cairns are below the saddle area.
The balance as you sumise would have got back to the saddle and eventually the trail.
I dont have any recolection of Younghusband being on the ridge? Cavaye Mostyn and Dyson yes.
Whilst they were on the ridge/retiring Durnford was busy on his fighting retreat, the guns were in action against the impi chest coming of the mountain at a 3000 range. Hence my comments, the time lag between Durnford getting back and the companies coming of the hill was miniscule.
I concur with your comments re the allocation of reponsibility.

Regards

There seems to be 3 main players in this discussion. Chelmsford, Durnford and Pulliene. Where doe's Glyn fit into this. For someone who was in commard he didn't have much to say at the court of enquiry.

"Colonel Glyn, C.B., states: From the time the column under my command crossed the border I was in the habit of receiving instructions from the Lieutenant-General Commanding as to the movements of the column, and I accompanied him on most of the patrols and reconnaissances carried out by him. I corroborate Major Clery's statement."

What doe's he mean "I was in the habit of receiving instructions from the Lieutenant-General Commanding" He had no backbone by the sound of it.

hi MrGreaves.
Please refer to one of my earlier posts , page 10 . Glyn DID ASK CHELMSFORD to laager the camp . The Good Lord
DECLINED saying it isnt worthwhile and there isnt time . Glyn cant possibly be blamed as he did attempt to follow the
standing orders but was put down by Chelmsford , as ctsg has said ' he should have laagered the camp anyway ! '
Dont know if you have been in the military but you dont get put down by the overall commander and go off and do what he
has just TOLD YOU NOT WHAT TO DO . Glyn was with Chelmsford at all times , so he has no
complicity in the demise of the camp . Very harsh ' no backbone by the sound of it ' . You must remember it was the Victorian
army and you did what you were told or you would be replaced or demoted . Glyn to me is blameless as he did try to follow
the orders .
cheers 90th.

Mr G/90th
Exactly, 90th. Glyn was appointed as column commander. Chelmsford moved into his column as army commander but appropriated command of the column, along with his staff, Crealock etc. They took over the day to day running of the column, in a lot of well documented situations, not having the military courtesy to defer to Glyn. Its also documented that in the aftermath an attempt was made to involve Glyn by Crealock, its then Mr G that he made the statement you refer to.

Regards

springbok9 wrote:

Mike Snook has formulated a time line, very interesting one at that.
The situation of the companies on the ridge is a topic all on its own, there is a large school of thought that says they didnt get down.
Chelmsford alludes to it as do many other suvivors and Zulus.
Assuming however they did get back to the firing line. The only comment I know of that mentions Cavaye being replenished is a reference from Essex. I dont know how much his evidence can be credited. His early departure would have been a major source of embarrasment.
I would disagree on the comment that all the companies, excepting C and G, made it back in good order. There is a lot of evidence to suggest a Company went down in the tent lines of the 2/24th ( Uguku
of the umCijo) The uMBonambi were credited as being first into the tents. To do that they would have had to get through the A company defence area.
H company had a massive distance to travel from the Rocky Ridge area ( CS Wolfes body was identified there by Bassage). They had iNgobamakhosi behind them and would have had to fight through them, some 6000 Zulus. Their cairns are below the saddle area.
The balance as you sumise would have got back to the saddle and eventually the trail.
I dont have any recolection of Younghusband being on the ridge? Cavaye Mostyn and Dyson yes.
Whilst they were on the ridge/retiring Durnford was busy on his fighting retreat, the guns were in action against the impi chest coming of the mountain at a 3000 range. Hence my comments, the time lag between Durnford getting back and the companies coming of the hill was miniscule.
I concur with your comments re the allocation of reponsibility.

Regards

Thanks for the response Springbok9, I have Snooks book on order but won't get it till late September /early October - same with 'Zulu Rising'.

As the companies did get mixed up with the zulus while trying to retire through the tent area I assumed casualties there (and I didn't suggest they all got back 'in good order' but rather a scramble with casualties of greater or lesser degree) - , but wasn't aware that the whole of 'A' might have gone down there. 'H's last stand is fairly close/in line with Durnford's so assumed they took up position there by design.

I stand corrected on Younghusbands 'C' being on the ridge - got myself confused a bit there :lol:

But given 'G' got nowhere near the saddle, 'C' fell on the slopes of Isandlwana and 'H' as already discussed - if the two companies on the ridge 'E' and 'F' never got back off the ridge - and 'A' also fell before reaching the saddle ... then we are out of companies, who was doing the fighting on the upper Saddle/Nek and who was with Anstey in his fighting withdrawal? The maths get us again !!

This is the timeline I have :

22nd January 1879— 1200hrs. Cavaye & Mostyn on Tahelane commence firing at Zulu right horn due North of camp.
22nd January 1879— 1230hrs. Main battle starts. Durnford withdraws to Donga.
22nd January 1879— 1345hrs. British squares broken up in Nek. Chelmsford starts back to camp from Mangeni Falls.
(So sometime between 12:30 and 13:45 Durnford's command is outflanked and withdraws causing the general retirement onto the Nek - anyone know what time that occurred ?)
22nd January 1879— 1445hrs. Main British resistance broken and last stands at a conclusion.
(Which means that an hour passed between the 'British Squares' being broken up and the last man falling in the camp area? - that's a long time).
22nd January 1879— 1530hrs. Last British resistance falls in Manzimnyama Stream. (Presumably around 14:45 something around 80-100 men with Anstey used their firepower to force their way down the FD to the position where - the ammunition expended - the last 60 or so men stood and died 45 minutes later)

Thoughts, observations/corrections welcome :)

Gretings Aidan
One time we are sure of, and it makes a good anchor point, is the eclipse. That was at its height at 2:29.
At that time a warrior of the uNokhenke said" the sun turned black, and THEN we got into the tents. He was with the right horn.
Another pointer is that Durnfords watche stopped at 3: 30. That of course proves little in that it could have just run down. But its pretty evident that the battle raged on after Durnford died, Possibly with Anstey up to 4 oclock.
No doubt C company did get back to the saddle, along with E and F. There is the theory that they joined up with Durnford and Pullen in a defensive square. That square would have been retreating back to the saddle, through the wagons and could then have split, Durnford moving towards the base of Blacks Koppie, Younghusband and a portion of C company moving up the scree slope and the balance with E and F forming a square in the saddle..
That makes sence with the cairns. Dont forget that the skeletons were collected together and then buried and re buried, so they were moved all over the saddle. The large cairn on the side of the mountain does not contain bodies, its merely a marker of Younghusbands last stand.In addition a car park was constructed and an observation deck ( now gone ). The maths should work looking at that scenario. The proverbiable skunk in the outhouse is as allways, what happened on the ridge? And thats something thats consigned to history.
Throw into that mix George Shepstons part in things. I seem to recall that he came down of the ridge around about the guns position. His body and those of his troop lies behind, westeern slope, the mountain. A possibility would be, Pullein spotted the right horn and sent Shepstone to link up with the exposed left flank of Younghusband, allowing him to spread around the Northern slopes and fire down on the right horn. When Younghusband was forced back that would leave Shepstone exposed so he then kept the mountain at his back and moved to his left, thats where he rests now.

Regards

Sorry Aidan
Forgat to add, Essex puts the Guns crash at 1:30, given a 10/15 min dash from the firing line would put the beginning of the collapse at around 1:15

Regards

Quote :

And to CTSG - as far as I am concerned the topic is about Durnford - GIVEN the situation he faced AS A RESULT of Chelmford's failures.

The topic was locked because of this continual problem of having to refute your attempts to use/misuse every possible post including taking parts of them out of context to use as 'support' for your completely untenable position.
Please desist from this and any comments regarding the situation in camp from Durnford's arrival are welcome. No offense meant of course

No offense taken.

And please except my apologies, I was just getting bored waiting for the discussion to get back on to a level plain, instead of scenarios and what if’s.

Maybe we should ask Admin if we can add a “what if” forum.

Gent’s you need to look at the facts available to us, the good Lord Chelmsford tasked the court of enquiry to establish the facts of what took place that day. We are lucky enough to have these facts as told by those that were there on that day 22nd Jan 1879. Scenarios and what if’s. Don’t come in to it, all you are doing is distorting the truth of what you think took place. The fact of the matter is the Good Lord Chelmsford was under no obligation to carryout an inquiry, this could have been done back in England but he wanted the facts quick so they would not be forgotten and were still fresh in the minds of those that were called upon to give evidence. Unfortunally there is little or no evidence to suggest they were not telling the truth. (If there is I would very much like to see it) So to end this post would someone be so kind as to tell me why Captain Essex's Evidence is not creditable. I personally feel his statement was detailed and gave a clear understanding of what took place that day. He gives a clear indication of what was taking place in the camp and details about those he saw making towards the fugitives trail.

Unfortunally CTSG the facts you mention are not true accounts of what took place that day. They are accounts made to keep Chelmsford content, so his reputation was trashed back in England. Springbok & Aidan are putting forward some very good points that have revived this discussion, which I did not think possible.

You are obliviously obsessed with Chelmsford, or by him, but you are doing exactly what he did, no one else’s point of view on Isandlwana counts. You need to go right back to the beginning when Chelmsford arrived in South Africa, and not just the incident at Isandlwana. You talk a lot about disobeying of orders. Chelmsford disobeyed orders when he invaded Zululand; look at the statement on the home page.

“Lord Chelmsford invaded Zululand without the knowledge of the British Government in the hope that he could Capture Cetshwayo, the Zulu King, before London discovered that hostilities had begun”

CTSG. It does appear that certain individuals that gave evidence at the court of enquiry regarding Isandlwana, did have a bit more to say many years after the event, or in Curling’s case letters.

I think its fairly understood and agreed that there was quite a lot of censorship during the enquiry. It was a case of says the right things or don’t say nothing.

Don’t forget the men that escape could have gone down in history as cowards, for leaving the battlefield.Most of them that gave evidence at the enquiry were officers. Chelmsford had them all under his thumb, he could have quite easy have ruined that reputations back in England along with their family’s reputations.

Put yourself in their place, would you have try to discredit a man as powerful as Chelmsford, with the friends he had, including the Queen of England.

I have no doubt whatsoever that new evidence will eventfully come to light by some of the others that gave evidence at that enquiry. Curling’s letters only came to light a few years ago after being discovered in a loft in Ramsgate Kent.

So when you say. “We must stick to the facts” (Court of enquiry ) well in this case that’s just not possible if we want to hear what really took place that day.

If the court of enquiry was a fast!!! Why was on not assembled back in the England. Looking at one of CTSG posts, regardless of whether it was Chelmsford fault or not the disaster at Isandlwana did followed him to the grave.

I cannot see what Chelmsford had to gain by holding his own enquiry. He would have known under Military Law, that the evidence established would not have held up in the case of who was to blame. So it appears to me the whole exercise of assembling the enquiry was a complete waste of time.

Yet it seems to have done the job, because most of the evidence today is based on the statements given at this enquiry. I have been looking for accounts from Chelmsford, in later years on how he felt about the lost of all those lives but so far I can find nothing. So I asked myself who would take a burden like that to his grave.

Impi. There was no need for a court marshal to held back in England, there was no point. The Good Lord Chelmsfords fact-finding mission had established the facts, which by all accounts seems to have won over public opinion back in England. Chelmsford was under a great deal of pressure not only was he planning for a war against the Zulus, but there were signs of rebellion by Chief Sekukuni who was threatening peace in the north as well as keeping an eye on the Transvaal Boers who were showing signs of rebellion. So I guess he was just left to get on with his job. ( Which he was very good at )

Chelmsfordthescapegoat wrote:

Impi. There was no need for a court marshal to held back in England, there was no point. The Good Lord Chelmsfords fact-finding mission had established the facts, which by all accounts seems to have won over public opinion back in England. Chelmsford was under a great deal of pressure not only was he planning for a war against the Zulus, but there were signs of rebellion by Chief Sekukuni who was threatening peace in the north as well as keeping an eye on the Transvaal Boers who were showing signs of rebellion. So I guess he was just left to get on with his job. ( Which he was very good at )

No historical basis at all to prove any of the above

Quote :

The Good Lord Chelmsfords fact-finding mission had established the facts,

I'm not agreeing with CTSG. But he doe’s have a point. Why was no court of enquiry held back in England? Surly if there was any doubt that the disaster came about due to the incompetence of Chelmsford, the government would have insisted on a proper enquiry.

Hi Dave
Chelmsford was a peer of the relm, he was questioned apropriatly by the Field Marshall commanding and by his equals in Parliament.
His defense was he wasnt at the battle.
He was protected by his syncophants. Crealock et al.
He gagged Harkness by virtue of his appointment.
The Horseguards wanted to pursue him but were stopped by the Queen.
Instead he was put out to pasture.

All verifiable facts.
CTSG is wont to ask for facts. They are there, look them up.
Not one of the historians will back Chelmsfords decision making capacity. On the contrary look at the aray against him, Knight, Lock, Quantril, Snook, Laband, Greaves, Rattray. Enen our own resident historian Saul Davids.The most eminent and knowledable writers of our time, and who does CTSG quote against them.............. non other than the Red Baron's own biography, pretty thin oposition.
The comments of the Field Marshall Commanding are so apropriate, once a Chelmsford suporter he backed down when the evidence was presented and had the Adjt General write a pretty damning private letter to Chelmsford, effectivly calling him an inconpetent. I that letter various questions were asked. The answers left Horse Guards fuming and led to a 6 point condemnation. It was very clearly spelt out that Chelmsfords tacticts from day one were at fault.
Again all verifiable facts.

Regards

Quote :

On the contrary look at the aray against him, Knight, Lock, Quantril, Snook, Laband, Greaves, Rattray. Enen our own resident historian Saul Davids.The most eminent and knowledable writers of our time,

But the information they wrote, in their books must have come from somewhere.

Quote :

Enen our own resident historian Saul Davids.The most eminent and knowledable writers of our time,

:lol!: :lol!: :lol!: :lol!: :lol!: And just when I thought this topic was becoming sensible.

Dave
It does indeed come from some where. Look at the source material, its all available.

Regards

Saul David.
Professor of War Studies at Un iversity of Buckingham.

This is the kind of information that’s really appeals to me. It’s from someone who was there and who kept a daily dairy of the events in his life. I particularly like this entry as it gives us an insight it to what they were thinking about Isandlwana, so even after all these years I think we have all been discussion the disaster and who’s to blame along the right lines. So no matter how the Historians play with the truth as long as we have accounts from those like Lt Wilfred Heaton the blame will always be attached to the ones we so often speak about. Lt Wilfred Heaton did not take part in the Battle of Isandlwana, but he certainly spent some time in the months after talking to the survivors, like Dorren Smith.

27th May 1879
"I have had one or two letters lately in which people have said “they were glad to see my letter in the Irish papers.” My hair stood on end simply and the combined locks ect parted: well it’s all very well now I know who did it and I’ve written a snorter, but seriously, I hate people putting private letters in print and I was awfully put out by having a disjointed rambling scrawl sent to be criticized and laughed at by everyone; a letter which was only intended to let my people know the various little items of the march after we were ordered to front, and two companies), and good many others, know certain things concerning Lord Chelmsford’s actions on the 22nd Jan which if they were raised abroad would simply dam him in the eyes of the world and cause his recall in double quick time. So, if I had been foolish enough to let the cat out, even in a private letter, the publishing therefore would have caused, most likely, a most awful row. All I can say is I sincerely hope he won’t command us and what I say is perfectly true: and that is that Col Durnford was partly to blame, in extending and so weakening his line against such enormous masses. But that Lord Chelmsford could have saved the camp, if he had the sense of the youngest militiaman in service, and attended to men who knew what was happening that day and not shut his eyes and relied on his own wretched knowledge of what was going on."

Absolutey agree.

Quote :

"and not shut his eyes and relied on his own wretched knowledge of what was going on."

I suppose he is trying to say Chelmsford was like most of the old generals and did not like change and preferred to do the old way. And I agree again, that is good to get an insight into what this young officers thought of Isandlwana. I get the impression he was worry about the his letter someone had posted in the Irish newspaper in the event of it coming to the attention of Chelmsford than having to serve under him. So the thoughts of those days was the blame was with Chelmsford & Durnford. (No mentioned of Pulliene)

Chard
That depends on who you read really.
Wood and Buller blamed Chelmsford.
Ellis blamed Chelmsford.
The Chelmsford Cabal blamed Durnford.
Forbes Blamed Chelmsford.
Gerald French Blamed Durnford
Since then virtually every Author of note has blamed Chelmsford.

CTSG blames everyone else both in and out of South Africa at the time, before and since.

I believe, as VERY often stated, The root cause of the war was Frere. The root cause of the defeat was Chelmsford. The root cause of the loss of the actual battle was Pullein and Durnford in that order.

Quote :

CTSG blames everyone else both in and out of South Africa at the time, before and since.

:lol!:

Nice one Spingbok.. However!!!

I too have a copy of this book Lt Wilfred Heaton dairy, But it must be understood that this was the observations of one man. Wilfred Heaton makes many entries but you have to read between the lines. For instance he mentions meeting Spalding just after 2:20pm on the 22nd Jan,along with some that had escape from Isandlwana he throws in a few officers names, and then states Melville & Coghill escaped with the colours. No one knew of this action at that time. So my point is although he was there, I do believe some of the entries in his dairy were based on what he heard or what others said to him like Smith Dorrien. As for his letter in the Irish paper, I have spent sometime looking for it, but to no avail, His opinion regarding Chelmsford again I believe instigated by others leaving him to enter this in his dairy. He doe’s however mention Durnford.

Quote :

“Col Durnford was partly to blame, in extending and so weakening his line against such enormous masses”

This we all agree with, and its good to see that it was noted back in 1879. Again Gentleman my argument is “The Good Lord Chelmsford did not take part in the Battle Of Isandlwana” He left the camp in command of others. If someone could explain to me why he should be held accountable then please tell me. (There’s an old saying, which sums up those in command that day at Isandlwana. (When the cats away, the mice will play) But don’t lets get up set over spilt milk. So stop bumbling about what the historians say. Look at it from a logical point of view. (If that’s possible) Have a good day....

CTSG
Sorry but still laughing.
Quote" I to have a copy of this book William Heaton Dairy, and: When the cats away ........... Is there something about milk running through this thread? :lol!:
However I do believe you have a point about some of the entrys being after thoughts.

Regards

Incidently I have seen the news paper article thats refered to, just cant remember where. We need 90th and his encyclopedia like memory.

Quote :

Wilfred Heaton makes many entries but you have to read between the lines

Surly you can say this just about everything that has been written about Isandlwana.

Forgetting Durnford and Pulliene. I would like to ask you this question...

To what extent do you think the defeat of the British Army by the Zulu at Islandlwana in 1879, was due to the mistakes made by Lord Chelmsford?

Hi springbok.
I dont remember reading the letter Heaton send to the Newspaper . Is it in his Diary ? . Sorry having a seniors moment
and no disrespect meant to any seniors who may happen to fall across this post .
cheers 90th.

CTSG. "He shut his eyes and relied on his own wretched knowledge"

90th
I have a feeling it was in Emery. I will have to do some searching.
CTSG
Its a tad naive to put forward your present arguement that because Chelmsford wasnt there he can have no blame.
Im not aware that Nixon was at the Watergate.
I dont recall Hitler as ever being in Belsen
In similar vein Johson wasnt at MiLai.

All of them laid the groundwork for their subordinates to make the mistakes. So to with Chelmsford, he had defacto control over the column. It therefore passes that he aproved the siting of the camp. His standing orders on defence were obeyed. He made the cardinal error of splitting his forces. His orders/lack of orders or leadership created a vacuum of control. His orders were unclear and impresise.All major factors in the debarcle.
regards

Hi Springbok.
I will check Emery tonight as off to Dads and no computer access .
Cheers 90th.

When they arrived at the camp, it was very clear that the digging of trenches was near impossible due to ground condition; I have never read an anything that suggests that the officers present disagreed with the Good Lord Chelmsford. All officers present had the right to say they were not happy with his arrangements regardless of rank. There was obviously not a strong opinion, or they were quite content to except things has they were. With regard to splitting the force, what else was he supposed to do? Dartnell had reported they he had found the main impi, there was no time to move the whole camp, so he did the next best thing he split his force, again I have read nothing to suggest the officers disagreed. All was well when the good lord left to assist Dartnell. So the situation now is that the good Lord had left another officer in command of the camp. The responsibility of that camp now falls to him; The Good Lord Chelmsford was no longer present he had gone.

If we take into consideration the sightings published in the missing five hours transpiring from 05:30 hrs on wards. The situation around the camp has now dramatically changed; it is now the new commander of the camp who should have stepped up to the mark and put in place was ever was needed to maintain the health of the camp, nothing of consequence was done although there seems to have been ample time in which to fortified. When reinforcements arrived an argument ensued as to who was in command, after which one left the camp therefore compounding the problems even more.

Digging trenches is neither here nor there, if its defence there are other options, mutual supporting Sanguins, Lager etc. Thats not the issue really, the siting of the camp is. Chelmsford was a man who wouldnt take advice/critique his record in the eastern cape and the early stages of this war speaks for his ascerbic responces to any dissent. Look at the letter he sent to Durnford for a 'perceived infraction' therefore his officers were not in mind to contradict him. As it was his Aide de camp was aproached by a number of officers voicing concerns, Smith Dorian, Hamilton Brown, Dunbar etc and were all rebuffed. Its not therefore sufficient to take a small point in isolation and wave it as proof, Chelmsford would brook no critisism.
So the wrong camp site was chosen, no attempt was made by Chelmsford to leave it in a secured state, all the responsibility of the C in C. Its also pointless to point at Pullein and say that he didnt either, the time he was in command as oposed to the time Chelmsford was bares no comparison.
Other officers had been ripped to shreds, Dunbar included, for daring to question Chelmsfords authority so who amongst them was going to stand up and be shot down. Certainly not Glyn or his staff.
Chelmsford had built his column as a ponderous unwieldy mass he had ignored the locals advice as to the countryside he faced, dongas streams etc. If he had not sent out so many of his troops, Dartnel etc but instead a series of flying columns, a la Buller, his armed recconasonce would have been able to cover more ground faster. Leaving the bulk of his force as a cohesive unit. As it was he did what no other General would do, split his force in enemy territory in the face of a highly mobile and superior numbered enemy. An enemy he didnt have a clue as to its location. He ignored all the pointers and intelligence trusting in his own unsupported beliefs.
Its for these reason that the world of AZW accademia has laid the blame fairly and squarly on Chelmsfords shoulders, you and the French are the exception. And French was castigated for altering evidence attempting to prove his point. So my friend that leaves you as the last of the dinosaurs.

Regards

I’m sorry you can’t keep using they were scared of Chelmsford routine. Are you saying that the disaster at Isandlwana was purely down to the fact, that no one had the heart to question Chelmsford? About his choice of camp.

Over simplification. Put that into context with the balance of my argument.

Regards

Quote :

Over simplification. Put that into context with the balance of my argument.

1) Look at the letter he sent to Durnford for a 'perceived infraction' therefore his officers were not in mind to contradict him.

2) As it was his Aide de camp was approached by a number of officers voicing concerns, Smith Dorian, Hamilton Brown, Dunbar etc and were all rebuffed.

3) Other officers had been ripped to shreds, Dunbar included, for daring to question Chelmsford’s authority

Fear of the good Lord Chelmsford...


Whatever arrangements were made at Isandlwana before the Good Lord Chelmsford left, he believed to be right. As I have said before the only mistake he made was his choice of command in his absence. It was he, who was going out to face the Zulu Army.

Lt Wilfred Heaton “his own wretched knowledge of what was going on."

He gave every officer under his command the right to disobey his orders if needed.

Quote :

"When a column is acting SEPARATELY in an enemy's country I am quite ready to give its commander every latitude, and would certainly expect him to disobey any orders he might receive from me, if information which he obtained showed that it would be injurious to the interests of the column under his command."

If Pulleine & Durnford had pulled it off that day, and defeated the Zulu’s at Isandlwana even with as you say the unclear orders, Chelmsford would have been the best thing since sliced bread. But because those under him failed, you rest the burden with the Good Lord. Strike-Out It’s quite clear that none of you on this forum can contribute without the work of the historians; you do not have the capability to see the truth for what it is, and cannot except the fact that the Good Lord was not there. And that was the trouble back then small-minded people. CTSG. Please stop the personal attacks on other members.

Hi Springbok.
No mention of Heaton or any of his Letters in ' The Red Soldier ' by Frank Emery .
cheers 90th.

Hi Springbok.
Checked all my books and papers today and couldnt find any mention of Heaton or the letter which we think was sent and
published by the Irish Times ? .
cheers 90th.

Hi 90th
I will spend some time looking for the article, one day I need to get around to a filing system.

CTSG
Source evidence, commentators of the time and historians are all we have. When they are all read it comes down to forming ones own opinion. Because the world refuses to accept your opinion doesnt mean its right or wrong, its what you believe and your entitled to that belief. Conversely dont castigate others for reading the same data and forming a different opinion.
Keep the teddy bear in the cot.

regards

Hi ctsg.
I love the friendly banter but seriously ............. We have to base our work on the word of Historians otherwise you shoot us down
with ' Where's your proof ' . I suggest in the most cordial manner that you being so dogmatic in the belief of The Good Lord being
blameless has certainly clouded your judgement . It's getting to the point where you seem to be acting in the same way as the
Good Lord did while at Isandlwana , listening to those who had some doubts on the site and there ability to hold the said site ,
with the tactics he had decided they should act upon . No -one could speak agains the Good Lord's plans as they would have
no doubt been shipped back to a supply depot or worse back to England with no chance of promotoin . Promotion in the army
was and no doubt still is the only way to make a Quid ! especially in Victorian Times . As I have said all along their are others
to blame along with the good Lord so he isnt in the S - - t alone . One notable ............. Crealock , he seems to have been involved
in some of the argy bargy , especially his dressing down of Dunbar and others over the course of the war . It seems to me that sometimes he seems to have thought he was running ' The Show ' .
cheers 90th.

Sorry I must have missed the whole concept of this forum. I thought we were discussing the Anglo Zulu War of 1879. Based on what actually happen. But your saying the discussions should be base on what the Historians say.

How do you know what happened? First hand knowledge?

So The Good Lord Chelmsford invades Zululand. Isandlwana is selected as the ideal place to camp. Its quickly established that the of digging trenches was out due to the hard ground and Laagering would take to long. We must not forget Isandlwana was never intended to be permanent camp.

No one knew that the Zulu’s had moved into the valley five miles away. (No one) Nothing was happening that would cause concern to anyone including The Lord Good Chelmsford. The camp was set-up and everyone when about their daily business.

A message is received from Major Dartnell stating he had found the Zulu Army. Still nothing was happening to suggest Isandlwana was in any danger. Chelmsford then decided to go to the assistance of Dartnell taking half the column with him. No body protested with regards to splitting the column, because there was nothing to concern them. Pulleine was left in command. The Good Lord Chelmsford rides out of the camp. It’s worth mentioning at this point.

1. When The Good Lord Chelmsford rode out nothing was happening in or around the camp and all was well.
2. The Good Lord Chelmsford like everyone else was un-ware of the Zulu’s in the valley
3. When The Good Lord Chelmsford left, it was only with the intension of assisting another officer who seemed to be in trouble.

No one expected the main Zulu army to be in close proximity of the camp, that day. No one. Including the Good Lord Chelmsford. The Zulu’s had completely out manoeuvred the British and put themselves into a position that would give them a Zulu Victory that day on the 22nd January 1879. With regards to the orders, that argument will hopefully continue for another 130 years. But when The Good Lord Chelmsford, left the responsibility fell to those left in command. The concern of what should have been done is of no consequence at that time the Good Lord Chelmsford left.

Its what took place after he left? We will never no the truth about what took place between Pulleine and Durnford but whatever took place caused Durnford to make the decision to leave, maybe this was out of anger but whatever the reason was it was this action and his treat back to the camp that caused the firing line to become over extended which contribute to the lost of the camp.

We all agree that if the men had been pulled back to the camp sooner things may have been different, unfortunately they wasn’t this was another fatal error made by the officer left in command.

Messages were being sent to The Good Lord Chelmsford but these were un-clear and when Milne climbed to the top of the hill with his telescope he saw nothing to suggest the camp was under attack. The Good Lord had even sent a message to Pulleine to pack up camp and join him. Proving again that there was no concern about the camp at Isandlwana. Mistakes were made but I cannot see how the Good Lord Chelmsford was responsible for a disaster that he no part in because he was not there. The blame falls with those left in command and who failed to make the right decisions at a point when decisions needed to be made.

Hi ctsg.
When the Good Lord sent the message to Pulleine and you say there was nothing to alarm him , well the return message from
Pulleine states ' Staff Officer - Report just come in that the zulu's are advancing IN FORCE from the left front of camp . 8.05 am.
H.B.Pulleine . Hallam -Parr took the note , scribbled the time of receipt on it - 9.30 am - and handed to Clery . Clery of course should
have reported to Glyn , but he had tired of the pretence of following protocol ,and took it STRAIGHT to the Good Lord . Hallam -parr
states ' He returned it to me without a word . I said ' What is to be done on this report ' He said ' There is NOTHING to be done on
that '. Well to me he damn well knew everything wasnt Rosy at Isandlwana . In your point of no-one knew the zulu army
was so close .......... Why was that so ? . The Good Lord hadnt followed his own report of Dec 78 . ( 17 ) By day the camp should be
guarded against Surprise by Vedettes thrown out at some distance on all surrounding points of observation . Another of your points ,
Dartnell NEVER ONCE said he was in trouble , he wanted the re- enforcements because he wished to ATTACK the zulu in the morning with white troops and not the NNC. You also write there were no concerns but I can tell you I have mentioned this time and
again , Glyn suggested to Chelmsford that the camp be Laagered , the good lord replied ' IT'S NOT WORTHWHILE ' .
Here is another who had concerns , 21st Jan The Veteran Major Dunbar , who was out on Picquet duty , expressed reservations
to an un-named staff officer about the broken ground at the rear of the mountain , " Well Sir " , replied the staff officer , " If you are
nervous we will put a picquet of the pioneers there " Dunbar's reaction to this new slur is not recorded . Later , Melvill said to the same officer " I know what you are thinking by your face , Sir ; you are abusing the camp and you are quite right these zulus will
charge home , and with our small numbers we ought to be in Laager or at any rate be prepared to stand shoulder to shoulder .
Sorry ctsg you points hold no validity , but this is a forum and each to his own . If anything your points tend to show the complacency
which lead to the whole affair , which for us is a good thing otherwise we wouldnt be having this discussion and more than likely
the whole zulu war would be consigned to a dusty and musty death in a library where no one would care , and there certainly wouldnt
be the interest as there is today.
cheers 90th.

ps. The references here are from Ian Knights big Silver Book on Isandlwana and R.D . 22 /23 Jan .