Who was in charge at iSandlwana

John you cant speculate what the orders were supposed to say ! , if they were supposed to say Reinforce the camp they should've plainly said so , it wasnt stated , so it's not '' Probably '' what should've been ordered . Durnford was told to move to the camp and that's it , end of story .    . All well and good after the fact ( disaster ) to throw in ' reinforce ' or ' Take Command ' which have been thrown around ever since the disaster happened .
90th

Who was in charge at iSandlwana Today at 9:19 am Reply with quote
Sorry Les, I thought you was well versed in the eyewitness accounts of Isandlwana. ...
sorry ray. misunderstanding, when i said source i meant the physical piece, the typewritten
text seems familiar.

Can't see where the argument is regarding this take command issue, Okay Crealock never wrote that, but Dunford did take command regardless, so was he yet again disobaying orders. ?

ray i have it, in a box, somewhere i have typewritten accounts of
survivors, its about time i looked them out, no football for me today.

Ray
There are around 11 reports of Durnfords arrival, a lot at different times. If you do a time analysis of the message being sent from iSandlwana and the subsequent events then Brickhill is very wrong. Not many people owned watches in those days, mainly just the officers hence the degree of variation.
the only time for Durnfords arrival that fits ALL the facts is 10.30 ish.

Cheers

Well it does say, Durnfords horse arrived, perhaps Durnford did arrived earlier.

so was he yet again disobaying orders. ?..no he was not! the last written
order he received was the one which begins.. You will march to camp..

On the 11th Jan 1879, Durnford met with LC at RD, and LC delivered orders personally to Durnford. We know this because LC wrote to Frere confirming it.

LC sent the following to Frere.

"I directed this officer to move one of his three battalions (Bengough's) to watch, and eventually to cross at the gates of Natal between Rorke's Drift and the Umsinga mountain, while he (Durnford) and the mounted men and rocket battery were to join me with No 3 column".

This confirms that LC had ordered Durnford to join HIM (CHELMSFORD) with No 3 column.

Then this on the 19th from LC.

No 3 column moves tomorrow to iSandlwana hill and from there, as soon as possible to a spot about 10 miles nearer to the Indeni Forest.
From that point I intend to operate against the two Matyanas if they refuse to surrender.
One is in the stronghold on or near the Mhlazakazi Mountain; the other is in the Indeni Forest. Bengough ought to be ready to cross the Buffalo R at the gates of Natal in three days time, and ought to show himself there as soon as possible.
I have sent you an order to cross the river at RD tomorrow with the force you have with you at Vermaaks.
I shall want you to operate against the Matyanas, but shall send you fresh instructions on this subject.
We shall be about 8 miles from RD tomorrow.

This is the order that LC refers to above.

You are requested to move the troops under your immediate command viz; mounted men, rocket battery and Sikeli's men to RD tomorrow 20th inst; and to encamp on the left bank of the Buffalo (in zululand).
No 3 column moves tomorrow to the iSandlwana Hill.
Major Bengough with his battalion Native contingent at Sand Spuit is to hold himself in readiness to cross the Buffalo at the shortest possible notice to operate against the cheif Matyana, his wagons will cross t RD.

As you can see, LC wants Durnford and Bengough to co-operate and support him in the action against the Matyanas.

Then on the 22nd Durnford gets this.

You are to march to this camp at once with all the force you have with you of No 2 column.
Major Bengough's battalion is to move to RD as ordered yesterday.
2/24th, Artillary and mounted men with the Genera and Col Glyn move off at once to attack a zulu force about 10 miles distant.

Now read these orders and then have a think about it. You can see that everything is in gear for the move against the Matyanas. There is no mention whatsoever about Durnford either 'taking command', 'reinforcing', 'strengthening', or 'supporting Pulleine'. Everything is worded in such a way that the orders are telling Durnford that the action against the Matyanas is under way, and that is why Durnford told Pulleine that he would not be staying at the camp, because LC wanted Durnford to support him. Note also that LC said he would issue fresh instructions regarding the Matyanas, but he never did, and there were no fresh instructions at the camp, so as far as Durnford is concerned he is to co-operate and support LC, and that is just what he was doing.

After the loss at iSandlwana, LC and Crealock both realised that they had made a blunder, so they had to try to find a way out and have a scapegoat, and who else but the dead Durnford, after all, he could not say anything could he?

Before jumping the gun and blaming Col Durnford, read the orders, try to understand what they are saying, and put yourself in Col Durnford's position, what would you have done?

"Major Bengough's battalion is to move to RD as ordered yesterday.
2/24th, Artillary and mounted men with the Genera and Col Glyn move off at once to attack a zulu force about 10 miles distant"

Bengough's as ordered yesterday.

Durnford fresh order.22nd Jan 1879

"You are to march to this camp at once with all the force you have with you of No 2 column."

Where does it say Durford as ordered yesterday.

Martin your only posting your interpretation of the order, not for the purpose it was sent.

The order Durnford received, was not the original LC intended to be sent, Crealock send his own interpretation of the order. Which you have posted above. If Clery had send the original it would have stated "strengthen" the camp, or words to that effect.

I did say TRY to understand what they are saying, obviously you are not even trying.

   Good night Martin!

Just some of the well known Historians who say in their publications that Durnford was to "reinforce" the camp, and I'm confident there's more.

Knight
Laband
Young
Gillings 
Latham

Just some of the politicians that said there were weapons of mass destruction in Irac.
Bush
Blair
Mitterand.......................

Still doesn't make it right
And all those authors you listed say very clearly that it was Chelmsfords intent, not one says it was contained in the orders. And that's about right, Im pretty sure it was Chelmsfords intent, just wasn't transferred that way.

Cheers

And I think, that was the case Springbok. The same as you. If we can get that right, the discussion can move on.

Its pretty apparent quite honestly, as Ive said earlier. Clery's recolections are pretty clear as to what he was told by Chelmsford. Crealock got the wrong interpretation and sent of what he THOUGHT Chelmsford had said. Hence the cock up. IF Crealock had got it right and Durnford had then gone swanning of he would deserve to be castigated, and again it would have taken away all the ambiguity from the situation. The order delivered exactly as Clery heard it would have been the exact order needed. So no I don't blame Chelmsford for that ( many other things yes ) so put the blame exactly where it belongs, Crealock for not doing his job properly.

Just my thoughts.

Zulu Dawn, been on about 5mins uk channel 5.

Chelmsford, Clery, Crealock, and not forgetting Glyn.. no we can not
move on so easily..it was a shameful cover up, a mans reputation was
to be besmirched and tainted for all time, and for a very long time that
was the case..history in recent years have reappraised the honourable
Durnford and agree he executed his orders to the very best of his ability
and in keeping with the finest traditions of his Corp's. any attempt to
air brush over 1. the orders and interpretation does not wash..this aspect
is to serious for that!. 2. some attempt to pigeon hole and slant events to their
own advantage, putting it in a box, as it were, and then having the temerity
to proceed to tick that box..to this day no one know for sure the truth of
the events as they unfolded..nor more the motivations behind them. there
is a lot more to be uncovered on this..agreement is unlikely to ever be reached.

To all the members
Probably the biggest single and most frustrating aspect of this forum is the level of emotion the members bring to any discussion. These are events that unfolded 135 years ago, not yesterday, and I spend a great deal of time analising dissecting and computing every single aspect. But its a hobby no more and no less, it doesn't dominate my emotions and it shouldnt do so. To be able to try and unwind the mysteries of the mid January period of 1879 requires, demands, a totally dispassionate approach something most of the forum members are incapable of doing.

When a single aspect is proposed for discussion that single point soon becomes lost in a welter of extraneous details and eventually into some really childish behaviour. The only way that a serious discussion can be moved forward is by taking point by point and effectively doing a forensic analysis of actual events and evidence. This topic is very typical of that approach, its a single simple question that got hi jacked into lengthy diatribes on cover ups bitter recrimination and name calling.

Im going to take a break from the forum for a while and let you guys enjoy the sarcasm insults etc.

Have fun

Well said Frank.

The argument has gone around in circles to arrive back at its start point over two weeks ago, which was that the order passed to Durnford by Crealock was ambiguous and probably did not reflect Chelmsford's actual order. Nothing further has been achieved in terms of casting any light on events because, beyond the ambiguity, all is speculation, lots of posturing and hot air.

Don't stay away too long.

Steve

Springbok wrote:

Im going to take a break from the forum for a while and let you guys enjoy the sarcasm insults etc

Springbok just as the discussion takes a turn you decide to take a break. We have established and agree all bar one, that the order sent to Durnford reflected that he was required to reinforce the camp. Back in the day the same line of thought was applied.
Which brings us to the fact, although a Hero of the day, to some, he did infact disobey orders.by  Leaving the camp, not only did he weaken the camp further, his actions on his fall back costs many lives. He knew the ways of the Zulu only to well, but chose to meet the Zulu in the open, he failed and the consequence we know only to well. He has to play his part in the lost of the camp. But agreed, for me and always has been,the order sent by Crealock was a major part in the down fall.
I was watching the coldiz story today, and the British officer said this. ( I know they were actors)

" I am the senior British officer, although I wish I wasn't. But it by job to stop officers making fools of themselfs" for some reason Dunrford came to mind.

To all intents and purposes, all the talks, instructions and orders (including that of the 22nd), between LC and Durnford, are showing that Durnford and Bengough are to co-operate and support LC in the action against the Matyanas.

The supposed correct order that was meant to have been sent to Durnford, was NOT sent. And the order he received did not say anything about taking command, reinforcing, strengthening or supporting Pulleine, however, he would no doubt have been deemed as taking command due to him being senior officer on his arrival, but he did tell Pulleine that he was not staying at the camp, which shows that he had interpreted the order of the 22nd as being part of his previous orders to co-operate and support LC.

However, due to the incompetence of both LC and Crealock, who make a big cock up between them and do not send the correct order, it is Durnford that gets landed with the blame, and is made the scapegoat for trying to protect LC's rear.

Maybe if Horace Lockwood Smith Dorrien's horse had had an accident on his way to hand over the order of the 22nd, then maybe Durnford would not have received it, Durnford would then no doubt have sent a runner to find out what had happened, who might then have come back to not only report the disaster at iSandlwana but also to the remainder of the column under LC, but no doubt there would still be those who would have blamed Durnford for it all.

Martin wrote:

Maybe if Horace Lockwood Smith Dorrien's horse had had an accident on his way to hand over the order of the 22nd, then maybe Durnford would not have received it, Durnford would then no doubt have sent a runner to find out what had happened, who might then have come back to not only report the disaster at iSandlwana but also to the remainder of the column under LC, but no doubt there would still be those who would have blamed Durnford for it all.

Or he might have acted on prior orders, thus making you speculation correct.

Which brings us back to the start on who was responsible for the lost of the camp.

Durnford, LC, Pulliene and Crealock!

And don't forget my Great, Great Grandad, also died at Isandlwana!

Mr M. Cooper wrote:

Maybe if Horace Lockwood Smith Dorrien's horse had had an accident on his way to hand over the order of the 22nd, then maybe Durnford would not have received it, Durnford would then no doubt have sent a runner to find out what had happened, who might then have come back to not only report the disaster at iSandlwana but also to the remainder of the column under LC, but no doubt there would still be those who would have blamed Durnford for it all.

I've had a similar thought. Smith-Dorrien recognized later that he had been put in a very vulnerable position carrying that message. What if the accident he met with was a Zulu patrol of some sort? It was definitely not a secure area to be wandering through alone. Also, a MAJOR effort was made (by Henderson?) to catch up with Durnford who was headed in the opposite direction from Isandlwana at the time. Had Henderson/Shepstone been more lackadaisical in their response (by not taking the initiative to pack up camp without orders, for example,) it was ENTIRELY feasible that Durnford would have missed the battle...making it harder to blame him.

[quote="impi"]

Martin wrote:

[color=#FF9933]
Or he might have acted on prior orders, thus making you speculation correct.

For the record, Durnford was out trying to steal...er..."round up" more transport wagons when Henderson tracked him down. That would tend to suggest he was not looking for excuses to exceed his brief, as is so frequently suggested. It is true that he jumped at the chance to get involved in the campaign (what self-respecting professional soldier would not have been?) but he certainly believed he was only following orders in doing so. His forces had finally been summoned into the fight as he fervently believed they ought to have been. (So did Shepstone btw, or he would not have packed up the camp off his own bat) Events were to prove Durnford more right than he knew...

No he and his troops, we're summoned to the camp! Not the fight. LC was doing that. As expected, Durnford being senior took command, that we know. Pulleine never have mounted infantry available to him, Durnford did and had the ability to scout around, which he did, but there was no need to leave the camp and meet them in the open. Perhaps LC had lost confidence in Durnfords abilities.

impi wrote:

Pulleine never have mounted infantry available to him, Durnford did and had the ability to scout around, which he did, but there was no need to leave the camp and meet them in the open.

Impi -- look at nearly ANY map of the camp and you will see, between the tents of the 1/24th and the R.A., an area marked "Mounted Men," "Colonial Cavalry" etc... Those men WERE available to Pulleine, but he did not use them to scout; nor did he make aggressive use of lookouts like Durnford ordered almost immediately upon entering the camp.

Also, for the record, there is a difference between "mounted infantry" and "cavalry." Russell was commanding 3rd column's mounted infantry, such as it was. Durnford was commanding (mostly) indigenous forces, some on foot and others of whom were mounted.

I thought Russell was in command of the RB

Possibly 30 I.M.I. remained at Isandlwana, possibly under Capt. Bradstreet command. Not intended for scouting.

Gardner.Eye Witness account.

"Leaving the mounted men who were under Captain Bradstreet, I returned to Lieutenant-Colonel Pulleine who had previously told me to remain with him. Shortly afterwards, observing the mounted men retiring, I rode back to ascertain the cause. Captain Bradstreet told me he had been ordered to do so by Colonel Durnford, who soon afterwards told me himself that he considered our position too extended, and wished to collect all the troops together"

impi, 24th, If you are looking for someone to blame, then look no further than Chelmsford.

6pdr, correct, he was out looking for transport when the order arrived, thus proving that he was not spoiling for a fight. And you are right, he was obeying his orders, you only have to look at all his previous talks, instructions and orders to see that. He was ordered to co-operate and support LC in the attack on the Matyanas, there was nothing in the order of the 22nd to countermand that. He had been following up behind LC, and therefor the move up to the camp was in accord with that.

impi, if LC had lost confidence in Durnford, then why did he want him to co-operate with him and support him. And if the supposed correct order had been sent to reinforce the camp, then LC would have known that Durnford, with being the senior officer there, and by military protocol, he would have been in command, so if LC had lost confidence in Durnford, do you really think that LC would have wanted him to take command over Pulleine and the imperial troops at the camp? No! and that is why LC wanted Durnford and Bengough to support him in the attack against the Matyanas, and that is also why Durnford told Pulleine that he would not be staying at the camp, he was following up LC to be close by to support him. So when the report came in about zulus heading in LC's direction, he was heard to say "if they are heading towards the general, we must stop them at all hazards", so by going to find out what they were up to, he was obeying his orders by supporting LC and attempting to cover his rear.

Martin you are down, because you are left behind. Read, read your posts, you have stated the same many times. I respect, that you see it different from everyone else, but you need to look at the percentages of those that agree he was sent to the camp to reinforce. Your bringing nothing new, your being repetitive. Lord Chelmsford along with the others had a part to play in the diaster. He is not totally to blame as you would like him to be!

Martin wrote:

"if they are heading towards the general, we must stop them at all hazards",

Springbok has said many times if were the case, he would have been going in the wrong direction!!!!!

And it has been answered why he did that.

Barton and Raw were sweeping from the left, Durnford went out over on the right to outflank the reported zulus and then sweep over towards Barton and Raw to trap the zulus between them and himself.

LOL!

Nice one impi, no mate, I am down because there was no cricket, rained off.

Good to see you still have a sense of humour! Is only a discussion forum, we ain't going to change history!

Sense of humour,,,,Bah Humbug

I am also down because Mrs Shifter has moved some of my AZW books, and I can't find out where she has hid them, I have told her that 'This Means War', but she takes no notice.    

Anyway lads, this old misery guts is off up the wooden road to bedfordshire.

Totally  

Night lads.

Dave wrote:

I thought Russell was in command of the RB

Two different Russells.

LT-COL JC Russell of 12th Lancers commanded Number 1 Squadron of Mounted Infantry. As a member of #3 column he reported to Glynn, or that day Pulleine.

The Rocket Battery was commanded by a Brevet Major -- FB Russell, who was in the Royal Artillery. He reported to Durnford in #2 Column.

impi wrote:

Possibly 30 I.M.I. remained at Isandlwana, possibly under Capt. Bradstreet command. Not intended for scouting.

Nice try Impi, but you just wrote:

Quote :

Pulleine never have mounted infantry available to him...

which is simply dead wrong. The IMI were not the only mounted force available to Pulleine either. There was also the Buffalo Border Guard, the Natal Carbineers, and the Natal Mounted police. Altogether he had at least 110 mounted men available but it took Durnford's arrival to activate any sense of alertness.

Quote :

"Leaving the mounted men who were under Captain Bradstreet, I returned to Lieutenant-Colonel Pulleine who had previously told me to remain with him. Shortly afterwards, observing the mounted men retiring, I rode back to ascertain the cause. Captain Bradstreet told me he had been ordered to do so by Colonel Durnford, who soon afterwards told me himself that he considered our position too extended, and wished to collect all the troops together"

Spouting out of context quotes doesn't make your case any stronger. This was at a different point in the battle and does nothing whatever to disprove that it was Durnford, not Pulleine, who put the camp on the qui vivre.

6pdr wrote:

Spouting out of context quotes doesn't make your case any stronger.

Gardner.Eye Witness account (Primary source) How's that out of context. Impi was replying to your post where you say Russell was in-command of the IMI

Summary of Unit Strengths
Column Staff 7 & 11
HQ and 5 x Coys 1st/24th 16 & 398
90th Regt (att 1st/24th) 0 & 6
G Coy and Rear Details 2nd/24th 5 & 171
N Battery, 5th Bde, RA (2 x 7 pdrs) 2 & 71
Rocket Battery 1 & 9
RE 2 & 5
No 1 Sqn Imperial Mounted Infantry 0 & 31
NMP 0 & 34
NC 2 & 27
NMR 2 & 12
BBG 1 & 7
2 x Coys 1st/1st NNC 5 & 318
2 x Coys 1st/3rd NNC 11 & 231
3 x Coys 2nd/3rd NNC 9 & 328
5 x Troops NNMC 6 & 257
Army Service Corps (ASC) 0 & 4
Army Hospital Corps (AHC) 1 & 10
Army Medical Department (AMD) 1 & 0
Native Pioneers 1 & 10
Black African voorloopers, grooms et Unknown but approx 300 approx
White civilian contractors, interpreters etc Unknown but estimated 2-3 doze
Total [not including civilians] 71 & 1,940 [approx]

I could be wrong but I make it 50

(Not sure on what mounted forces Durnford brought with him. Perhaps someone could list his forces.

Source Mike Snook

These were with Durnford ?

No. 1 Troop – Lt. C. Raw }
No. 2 Troop – Lt. J.A. Roberts } (Zikhali’s Horse)
No 3 Troop – Lt. W. Vause }
No 4 Troop – Lt. A. H. Henderson (Hlubi’s Basutos).
No 5 Troop – Lt. H.D. Davies (The Edendale Troop)

No. 2 Column: Corps

Rocket Battery
1st Battalion 1st Regiment Natal Native Contingent
2nd Battalion 1st Regiment Natal Native Contingent
3rd Battalion 1st Regiment Natal Native Contingent
Sikali's Horse
No. 3 Company Natal Native Pioneers

"Narrative of the Field Operations"

Dave wrote:

6pdr wrote:

Spouting out of context quotes doesn't make your case any stronger.

How's that out of context.

Because that quote refers to an event DURING the battle and has nothing to do with reconnaissance before the battle. Randomly spewing a quote without regard to its temporal order makes it "out of context." And btw, regardless of Russell, the point remains that Impi doesn't seem to grasp the difference between the mounted elements in the two columns. One the one hand you have native cavalry (2nd) and on the other colonial cavalry (3rd) and mounted infantry. The colonial cavalry should have been put out scouting by Pulleine, but he remained passive.

Dave wrote:

I could be wrong but I make it 50

Well, Norman Holme in Appendix 3 of THE NOBLE 24TH makes its it 110. Even if we credit Snook over Holme (I bet that just sent a shudder down the spines of the professionals here,) fifty men on horses is still enough to send scouts to look over the next set of hills. To the extreme detriment of the camp, that wasn't done before Durnford arrived and conducted himself like a competent professional soldier.

old historian2 wrote:

No. 2 Column: Corps

Rocket Battery
1st Battalion 1st Regiment Natal Native Contingent
2nd Battalion 1st Regiment Natal Native Contingent
3rd Battalion 1st Regiment Natal Native Contingent
Sikali's Horse
No. 3 Company Natal Native Pioneers

"Narrative of the Field Operations"

Well, if it does not also include the Hlubi Troop (aka Basutos) under Henderson and the Edendale Contingent as part of the "Natal Native Horse" then I would suggest that TOE has been superseded in the fullness of time.  Also btw, strictly speaking I believe the Pioneers (under Andrews) were a part of the 3rd Regiment of the NNC which was with 3rd Column at the time.  They were not with Durnford in other words -- not that it much matters for the purposes of this discussion since that's ten men who were not mounted.

Not sure any of this really matters! However it does show as, been stated before, the officers in command, hadn't got clue how to position their men. We have evidence that both Durnford and Pulleine were dishing out orders at the same time but not in unison!

Dave wrote:

Summary of Unit Strengths

No 1 Sqn Imperial Mounted Infantry 0 & 31
NMP 0 & 34
NC 2 & 27
NMR 2 & 12
BBG 1 & 7


I could be wrong but I make it 50

One reason for the disparity is that you've list the Natal Mounted Police (NMP) but not put them in the total. You listed them as 34 so Spick's number is now at least 84, btw.

i'm In no way a professional, still shuddered.

Was there NMP there prior to Durnfords arrival.

6pdr.,

6pdr wrote:

Well, Norman Holme in Appendix 3 of THE NOBLE 24TH makes its it 110. Even if we credit Snook over Holme

Just because something is in a book with Norman Holme shown as the author, I think you will find that the detail in Appendix 3 is clearly taken from Appendix A of F.W.D. Jackson's 1965 work Isandhlwana, 1879 - The Sources Re-examined.

As to Mike Snook he appears to estimated how many 1st/24th soldiers were in the 1st Squadron Mounted Infantry to have reached that figure. Let's not forget part of that number - at least ten men - formed Gardner's escort back to the camp and obviously would not have been available for any recce that this being muted here.

John Y.