Durnford was he capable. 4

springbok9 wrote:

Ymob
Sorry Frederic you commented on a question I failed to answer/avoided? Sorry I cant find it, ask again my friend.
Always willing to impart or make up

Cheers

Oh,my God ! my dance's professor glissed on the wood floor!!!

'''''Its just a jump to the left''''''''''''

No fair Springbok: "You put your hands on your hips..."

6pdr wrote:

No fair Springbok:  "You put your hands on your hips..."

Why not a "french-cancan" with his mother-in-law?
Springbok, how much the photography?

ymob wrote:

#Three possibilities for me,

To me coping is another possibility. (But to be fair to Frédéric this may be what he meant by #3.)

We have powerful grieving relatives looking for a psychologically satisfying explanation and a dead leader--who was not a member of the local tribe--and who was virtually bereft of political allies (especially post Boundary Commission) after the disaster.

Not saying Henderson didn't witness somewhat erratic behavior. Just explaining why he might have interpreted it a completely different way from someone like Molife.

Both are putting a label on the same symptoms of excitement and stress. Where they came down might well simply reflect their prior assumptions about the man.

There is no absolute truth, no matter what it "says" in a primary document. Sorry CTSG but there is no removing interpretation from history...primary, secondary or whatever. Objectivity is merely the confluence of subjunctives so considering possibilities and gauging probability will always be necessary.

ymob wrote:

Why not a "french-cancan" with his mother-in-law?

Because, I'm afraid Springbok is in a Time Warp:

[You must be registered and logged in to see this link.]

90th wrote:

Hi CTSG
I'm not sure if you are wanting to criticise Durnford over his handling of the Bushman's Pass affair , Durnford was basically on a hiding to nothing ,  he had orders which forbade him to open fire or shoot first ! , he had to wait till he was under fire before he was able to defend himself or his men . The blame for Bushman's Pass should be attributed to whoever issued Durnford with that order , Sir Benjamin Pine ?? (not sure who it was ), whoever issued that order to Durnford , is , in my humble opinion , solely responsible for what transpired . Although the  '' order giver ' wasnt there , he's certainly to blame , just because someone isn't present , it doesn't mean they can't , or shouldn't be held accountable ! . Sounds familiar doesnt it ????

Cheers 90th

Good point 90th. Perhaps that why, he wasn't keen on following orders at Isandlwana.

Which orders were those chard?.

LORD CHELMSFORD'S ACCOUNT OF THE DISASTER AT ISANDULA.
Mount Ida Chronicle, Volume X, Issue 592, 5 February 1881, Page 1


[You must be registered and logged in to see this image.]

Springbok, came across ths artical. I'm possibly mistaken and it wasn't you who made reference to Shepstone not meeting with Durnford. LC seems to be of the same opinion. As you can see in the artical, LC says it was impossible for them to had met as they went in opposite directions. But it's possible that Durnford told Stepstone to use his name to get reinforcements. I could be reading it wrongly, what's your thoughts.

That confirms Stepstone asked for reinforcements. But did Durnford send him with that message ?. Or was he as LC suggested just using Durnfords Name.?

Taken from Chelmsford's paper's..edited by Matt Gosset.

xhosa2000 wrote:

Taken from Chelmsford's paper's..edited by Matt Gosset.

What was the date on those papers

Blind alley.  This is a precis and not the actual report or the actual words.
The original says that he asked "in the name of Colonel Durnford" i.e. with his authority

Thanks for that Julian.

Did Stepstone ride in twice for assisitence. Because in Brickhills account the words Stepstone spoke were complelely different?

Morning Folks, hell but you lot stay up late.
impi
Shepstone came down with one message.
Littlehand
Shepstone used Durnfords name to ask for the back up. Shepstone was up on the plateau to the North and North East. Durnford was down in the Quabe Valley, probably a mile or so to the east of that with the iThusi ridge separating them. So I would doubt very much that Shepstone met with Durnford.

Cheers

He most definitely did not.

I thought you had work to do?

Hi Springy
Can you show me the source where Shepstone asked for back up using Durnford's name ? , I'm not home so dont have all the information readily available
90th

Morning 90th
Not at present, Im back with the ladies in white uniforms. have a look at Gardners statement. He mentions, and this is from memory, that Shepstone rode in and said they were falling back and needed re enforcements and used Col Durnfords name at that time.
Possibly some one else will be able to assist.


Cheers

It's in Gardner. Look there. Must dash.

However Brickhill was present and as impi says. Brickhills says different. Look at Brickhill's account.

d Evidence.—Captain Alan Gardner, 14th Hussars, states: I accompanied the main body of the 3rd Column as Acting Staff Officer to Officer commanding 3rd Column when it left the camp at Isandlwana on the 22nd January, 1879. I was sent back with an order from the General between ten and eleven A.M. that day into camp, which order was addressed to Colonel Pulleine, and was that the camp of the force out was to be struck and sent on immediately, also rations and forage for about seven days. On arriving in camp I met Captain George Shepstone, who was also seeking Colonel Pulleine, having a message from Colonel Durnford, that his men were falling back, and asking for reinforcements. We both went to Colonel Pulleine, to whom I delivered the order. Colonel Pulleine at first hesitated about carrying out the order, and eventually decided that the enemy being already on the hill on our left in large numbers, it was impossible to do so. The men of the 24th Regiment were all fallen in, and the Artillery also, and Colonel Pulleine sent two companies to support Colonel Durnford, to the hill on the left, and formed up the remaining companies in line, the guns in action on the extreme left flank of the camp, facing the hill on our left. I remained with Colonel Pulleine by his order. Shortly after, I took the mounted men, by Colonel Pulleine's direction, about a quarter of a mile to the front of the camp, and loft them there under the direction of Captain Bradstreet, with orders to hold the spruit. I went back to Colonel Pulleine, but soon after, observing the mounted men retiring, I went back to them, and, in reply to my question as to why they were retiring, was told they were ordered by Colonel Durnford to retire, as the position taken up was too extended This same remark was made to me by Colonel Durnford himself immediately afterwards. By this time the Zulus had surrounded the camp, "the whole force engaged in hand to hand combat, the guns mobbed by Zulus, and there became a general massacre. From the time of the first infantry force leaving the camp to the end of the fight about one hour elapsed. I estimated the number of the enemy at about 12,000 men. I may mention that a few minutes after my arrival in camp, I sent a message directed to the Staff Officer 3rd Column, saying that our left was attacked by about 10,000 of the enemy; a message was also sent by Colonel Pulleine. The Native Infantry Contingent fled as soon as the fighting began, and caused great confusion in our ranks. I sent messages to Rorke's Drift and Helpmakaar Camp that the Zulus had sacked the camp and telling them to fortify themselves.

Thanks Guys
90th

Yet again, I'm confused. Where does it say Stepstone said in "Durnfords Name"

Brickhill doesn't mentioned Durnford. When Stepstone asks for assisitence.

Gardner says, "Captain George Shepstone, who was also seeking Colonel Pulleine, having a message from Colonel Durnford, that his men were falling back, and asking for reinforcements."

So who is saying in Durnfords name.

LC says they couldn't have met because they went in opposite directions. Agree it is confusing.

ctsg / Chard
That's why I asked Springy for his reference regarding Shepstone '' Using '' Durnford's name , I dont ever remember seeing it , I will have to chase up Gardner's account later today .
90TH

90th wrote:

ctsg / Chard
That's why I asked Springy for his reference regarding Shepstone  '' Using '' Durnford's name , I dont ever remember seeing it , I will have to chase up Gardner's account later today .
90TH

Rough timeline:

~10AM Durnford arrives in camp.
~11AM Durnford sends Shepstone & Zikhali's horse to scout northeast.
~11:30 Durnford leaves camp with the rest of his native cavalry southeast.
~12:10 Shepstone returns to camp. Gardner arrives at about the same time; also with a message for Pulleine.

Durnford and Shepstone didn't see one another after parting at ~11AM, though the former did return into the camp after ~1PM followed by his troops at ~1:30PM.

So, for the sake of clarity, from here on in you might offer a specific time you are proposing they met because they certainly did interact prior to Shepstone's reconnaissance. (I have no idea about using Durnford's name but i was getting confused with when people meant.)

Hi 6pdr
I'm not concerned if Shepstone and Durnford met up again after Shepstone's deployment to the ridge , on the left of the camp , ( possibly they did ? ) all I'm wishing to clarify is if Shepstone , when rode back into camp , after the initial siting of the zulu army , did indeed state he wanted reinforcements and used Durnford's name in an attempt to procure them . I cant remember Gardner's account or any account stating this occurred , I'll ferret out Gardner's account later today before I go out , I have a lovely sunny day ( 24 celsius ) and plenty of Cold beers to knock over at my old Cricket Club , our Xmas catch up , it'll be a biggish day !!
Cheers 90th

Well I checked Gardner's statement , he does say and I quote '' On arriving in camp I met Captain George Shepstone , who was also seeking Colonel Pulleine , having a MESSAGE from Colonel Durnford , that his men were falling back , and asking for reinforcements '' . That is a little different to the way it was portrayed to my way of thinking earlier in the thread , to me it was portrayed as Shepstone said HE wanted the reinforcements using Durnford's name , if the word '' message '' was stated it would've been more clearer ? . That clears that up !
90th

90th wrote:

Hi 6pdr
I'm not concerned if Shepstone and Durnford met up again after Shepstone's deployment to the ridge ,  on the left of the camp , ( possibly they did ? ) all I'm wishing to clarify is if Shepstone , when rode back into camp , after the initial siting of the zulu army , did indeed state he wanted reinforcements and used Durnford's name in an attempt to procure them . I cant remember Gardner's account or any account stating this occurred , I'll ferret out Gardner's account later today before I go out , I have a lovely sunny day ( 24 celsius ) and plenty of Cold beers to knock over at my old Cricket Club , our Xmas catch up , it'll be a biggish day !!
Cheers 90th

Well then, have fun!! This can certainly wait. Why would Shepstone ask for reinforcements? Somebody mentions that Shepstone said something to the effect of, "I don't mean to sound hysterical, but I just saw a lot of Zulu on the other side of that ridgeline and they'll be coming this way soon," but I don't recall him asking for reinforcements.

I thought that account came from Gardner but maybe it was Brickhill.

From what I gather it's unlikely that Shepstone encountered Durnford later in the battle.  Gardner did.

It was Brickhill. If he had used Durnford name, did he without the knowledge of Durnford. But like the rest I cannot find any reference to Stepstone mentioning Durnford in request for reinforcements.
And what 90th posted is the same as Gardners account above.

I cant understand the semantics being argued.
Gardner says, "Captain George Shepstone, who was also seeking Colonel Pulleine, having a message from Colonel Durnford, that his men were falling back, and asking for reinforcements." That's as clear as daylight. Shepstone has requested reinforcements, he has brought in Col Durnfords name to bolster that request !
There was no message from Col Durnford, there couldn't have been they were far apart with the iThusi ridge and a mile of plateau in between.
When the impi was spotted Shepstone returned to camp. Is this the point that it is inferred that he met with Durnford, and got his message? If not then when (Quote 90th : I'm not concerned if Shepstone and Durnford met up again after Shepstone's deployment to the ridge , on the left of the camp , ( possibly they did ? )
No possible about it, improbable is the correct term. If it is argued that after the discovery he rode across to find Durnford, read Hamer, he rode back with him." George Shepstone (and myself) rode back as hard as ever we could back to the camp and reported what we had seen." Most certainly no message from Durnford via Shepstone was possible.
We are then left with the bald statement using Col Durnfords name and reporting that his, Shepstones, men were falling back ( This could not refer to Col Durnfords men falling back because he was still way out of sight down the Quabe valley ) and requested reinforcements. ( Again they couldn't have been reinforcements for Durnford, if they were then Pullein sent them to the wrong place, onto the ridge )
I opened the post with the word semantics. Its apt.
Shepstone asks for reinforcements, throws in Durnfords name to bolster his request. Gardner has just got back to camp, he left early hours of the morning and really has no idea that Durnford was ever in camp ( unless a kind 24th officer mentioned it ) he has no idea where Durnford is, he does know that Shepstone is part of team Durnford and possibly interprets Shepstones request as being a message, rather than a request. ( more semantics.)
Frankly I don't see the point of this.

Cheers all

springbok9 wrote:

he [Gardner] has no idea where Durnford is, he does know that Shepstone is part of team Durnford and possibly interprets Shepstones request as being a message, rather than a request. ( more semantics.)

That's what I think. And wasn't there also a case (earlier in the morning) of Gardner, or somebody, ASSUMING that Vause had been in combat previously when really Durnford had sent him back to escort in the slower moving elements of his column (wagons, rocket battery etc...) Again, a verified primary source being misleading because the mind is not a camera, it is a pattern matching device and it fills in the blanks when it doesn't have a complete picture.

Quote :

Frankly I don't see the point of this.

Hi ho, hi ho, off chasing lacuna we go. Twicky wabbits, snipes and the Jabberwock...same as it ever was.

Looking at LH post of the artical from the newspaper. LC says in regard to Shepstone and Dunford meeting.

"Therefore the only Supposition is that Col Durnford must have given Capt Shepstone instructions when "SEPARATING" that if he came into difficulties he was to use his name and go back and ask for reinforcements."

Now we know that Durnford had requested the same of Pulleine just before he rode off. So perhaps Pulliene knew that the message could have only come from Durnford. Therefore allowing the reinforcements to go. Just a thought.

What exactly did Durford do at Isandlwana!

Chelmsfordthescapegoat wrote:

What exactly did Durford do at Isandlwana!

To which I would respond, what exactly do you (or does anybody) mean by reinforcements in this case? Because Shepstone's patrol had gone WAAAYYY beyond any possible line of defense associated with the camp. So where were those reinforcements supposed to set up?

Doesn't really answer the question. As I said I'm trying to get my head around, what did he really do, apart from interfear with Pulliene's command. And the more I look at the command structure that was destroyed on Durnfords,arrival the more I'm inclined to have second thoughts that Col Pulliene had any real part to play in the diaster of the camp infact he was possibly just as confused then,as we are today looking back one the events. As Gardner says Pulliene looked quite complexed as to what to do. Then you have riders coming in requesting movements of men, in the name of Durnford. Who as we have been told many times by Historians that he handed command back to Pulliene when he rode out to meet the Zulus. So poor old Pulliene, is trying to get his head around the situation, only to find that orders are being chucked around further a field.

Pulleine, could have done a lot more prior to Durnfords arrival. TMFH is a good source to read, which lists events leading up to Durnford assuming command. I'm guessing Durnford would have been equally confused as to why nothing had been done, the same as many are confused looking back on events today. Pulleine as his part to play!

But as we know, Pulleine did not expect the whole Zulu Army
to descend on the camp, he was a temporary caretaker if you 
will..Durnford's arrival changed none of that, as most now accept
Durnford did not assume command, he was a commander of an
independent force..

Chelmsfordthescapegoat wrote:

Doesn't really answer the question.

True. It asks a question rather than follow your deflection.

Quote :

As I said I'm trying to get my head around, what did he really do, apart from interfear with Pulliene's command.

He sent out the patrols that detected the presence of the enemy force.  He then delayed the left wing of the enemy force for as long as possible so that some of his compatriots could escape from the cul de sac that would eventually doom them.  A better day's work than most that afternoon.

Quote :

And the more I look at the command structure that was destroyed on Durnfords,arrival the more I'm inclined to have second thoughts that Col Pulliene had any real part to play in the diaster of the camp infact he was possibly just as confused then,as we are today looking back one the events.

Incline as you will Durnford sought to keep things simple by leaving Pulleine in command. Noticing Pulleine's abject passivity he mounted his own reconnaissance in furtherance of his instructions to screen Chelmsford's detachment.

Quote :

As Gardner says Pulliene looked quite complexed as to what to do.

As would anybody under the contradictory instructions issuing from CHELMSFORD who was simultaneously expecting him to stay and go while the enemy massed on his flank.  

Quote :

Then you have riders coming in requesting movements of men, in the name of Durnford. Who as we have been told many times by Historians that he handed command back to Pulliene when he rode out to meet the Zulus. So poor old Pulliene, is trying to get his head around the situation, only to find that orders are being chucked around further a field.

This is a particularly desperate reach CTSG.  All we have is somebody supposing after the fact that somebody else MIGHT have used Durnford's name in requesting "reinforcements."  Even if that were true (which is unlikely, but disproving hearsay is nearly impossible which is why it's not allowed in a court of law,) it would hardly absolve Pulleine of blame for undermining his defense under direct threat of attack. Or to put it another way, who under Pulleine's command would accept such specious reasoning as an adequate excuse for their deaths? The reality is however that Pulleine never had a hope because of utterly flawed reconnaissance.  They were dead men because Chelmsford had such little regard for the power of his enemy.

It would be reasonble if he had taken his fact finding mission involving just small patrols of mounted troops. The right tools for the right job - but he didn't. He involved two companies of NNC, and the rocket battery, the main body of the NNMC, and would have involved two companies of the 24th had he been allowed to get away with it - in all cases the wrong tools for the job. Worse than that, he ordered Pulleine to give him his best support in fighting forward in the plain, instead of leaving him alone to get on with the close defence of the camp in accordance with his original orders.

His last order was to pack up and follow..20/20 hindsight
is all very well 135 years later, none of what you say
applies! we have to deal with what did happen, and not
what should have happened.                               xhosa

CTSG
There is nothing in Durnford's original orders which spoke of
"close defence of the camp in accordance with his original orders".

Chelmsfordthescapegoat wrote:

It would be reasonble if he had taken his fact finding mission involving just small patrols of mounted troops. The right tools for the right job - but he didn't.

He deployed his command as an independent column commander. And in that he was merely following the (admittedly flawed) example set by Chelmsford of conducting "reconnaissance in force." Given that he had troops suited to that sort of duty I don't understand your objection.

Quote :

He involved two companies of NNC, and the rocket battery, the main body of the NNMC, and would have involved two companies of the 24th had he been allowed to get away with it - in all cases the wrong tools for the job.

I'll concede the 12 strong man rocket battery was a poor decision. He should have left them in camp because they could only slow him down. That was subtraction by addition (like SMS Blucher at Dogger Bank.) And without the rockets, he wouldn't have needed to send the NNC companies either. But IMO the NNMC fit the task assigned to them perfectly.

Quote :

Worse than that, he ordered Pulleine to give him his best support in fighting forward in the plain, instead of leaving him alone to get on with the close defence of the camp in accordance with his original orders.

This is unfair. First because he asked Pulleine rather than ordering him. Second because Durnford had no orders to defend the camp. He was supposed to be defending Chelmsford. Also finally because it would only make sense to blame him like that if he KNEW a huge attack (from the northeast instead of the southeast) was forthcoming; but even then the ultimate responsibility would lie with the General for having his force split before a far numerically superior foe.

6pdr wrote:

Chelmsfordthescapegoat wrote:

It would be reasonble if he had taken his fact finding mission involving just small patrols of mounted troops. The right tools for the right job - but he didn't.

He deployed his command as an independent column commander. And in that he was merely following the (admittedly flawed) example set by Chelmsford of conducting "reconnaissance in force." Given that he had troops suited to that sort of duty I don't understand your objection.

Quote :

He involved two companies of NNC, and the rocket battery, the main body of the NNMC, and would have involved two companies of the 24th had he been allowed to get away with it - in all cases the wrong tools for the job.

I'll concede the 12 strong man rocket battery was a poor decision.  He should have left them in camp because they could only slow him down. That was subtraction by addition (like SMS Blucher at Dogger Bank.) And without the rockets, he wouldn't have needed to send the NNC companies either.  But IMO the NNMC fit the task assigned to them perfectly.

Quote :

Worse than that, he ordered Pulleine to give him his best support in fighting forward in the plain, instead of leaving him alone to get on with the close defence of the camp in accordance with his original orders.

This is unfair. First because he asked Pulleine rather than ordering him. Second because Durnford had no orders to defend the camp. He was supposed to be defending Chelmsford.  Also finally because it would only make sense to blame him like that if he KNEW a huge attack (from the northeast instead of the southeast) was forthcoming; but even then the ultimate responsibility would lie with the General for having his force split before a far numerically superior foe.

Please please show me where it says Durnford was defending LC

Prior order from Chelmsford. Here's one for you now. Please show me where it says he wasn't.