Durnford was he capable. 4

ymob wrote:

springbok9 wrote:

Frederic
The comment, strengthen the camp were made by Clery referring to the original instructions issued by Chelmsford.
Cheers

I know that.
But it seems to me that we have ONLY the testimony of CLERY: No other testimony corroborate the testimony of CLERY on THIS POINT ("strengthen the camp") , isn't it?
Cheers.

"2nd Evidence.—Colonel Glyn, C.B., states: From the time the column under my command crossed the border I was in the habit of receiving instructions from the Lieutenant-General Commanding as to the movements of the column, and I accompanied him on most of the patrols and reconnaissances carried out by him. I corroborate Major Clery's statement."

littlehand wrote:

ymob wrote:

springbok9 wrote:

Frederic
The comment, strengthen the camp were made by Clery referring to the original instructions issued by Chelmsford.
Cheers

I know that.
But it seems to me that we have ONLY the testimony of CLERY: No other testimony corroborate the testimony of CLERY on THIS POINT ("strengthen the camp") , isn't it?
Cheers.

"2nd Evidence.—Colonel Glyn, C.B., states: From the time the column under my command crossed the border I was in the habit of receiving instructions from the Lieutenant-General Commanding as to the movements of the column, and I accompanied him on most of the patrols and reconnaissances carried out by him. I corroborate Major Clery's statement."

Bonjour Littlehand,

But CLERY was not present with CHELSMFORD and CREALOCK in the morning of the 22 january.
CLERY has on his own initiative written the order to PULLEINE (account of CLERY himself).
Cheers
Frédéric

Hi Ymob
Clery WAS with Chelmesford & Crealock in the early morning of the 22nd Jan , it was Clery from memory who took the message to Chelmesford's tent , after being told to do so by Glyn , who took no part in the following proceedings .
Cheers 90th

  " 1st Witness.— Major Clery states: I am Senior Staff Officer to the 3rd Column, commanded by Colonel Glyn, C.B., operating against the Zulus. The General commanding accompanied this Column from the time it crossed the border into Zululand.
   On the 20th January, 1879, at the Camp, Isandlwana, Zululand, the Lieutenant-General commanding gave orders to Commandant Lonsdale and Major Dartnell to go out the following morning in a certain direction from the camp with their men, i.e., the Native Contingent, and the Police, and Volunteers, part of the 3rd Column. On the evening of the following day (the 21st) a message arrived from Major Dartnell that the enemy was in considerable force in his neighbourhood, and that he and Commandant Lonsdale would bivouac out that night. About 1.30 A.M., on the 22nd, a messenger brought me a note from Major Dartnell, to say that the enemy was in greater numbers than when he last reported, and that he did not think it prudent to attack them unless reinforced by two or three companies of the 24th Regiment. I took this note to Colonel Glyn, C.B., at once, he ordered me to take it on to the General. The General ordered the 2nd Battalion 24th Regiment, the Mounted Infantry, and four guns, to be under arms at once to march. This force marched out from camp as soon as there was light enough to see the road. The Natal Pioneers accompanied this column to clear the road. The General first ordered me to write to Colonel Durnford, at Rorke's Drift, to bring his force to strengthen the camp, but almost immediately afterwards he told Colonel Crealock that he (Colonel Crealock) was to write to Colonel Durnford these instructions, and not I. Before leaving the camp, I sent written instructions to Colonel Pulleine, 24th Regiment, to the following effect:—" You will be in command of the camp during the absence of Colonel Glyn; draw in (I speak- from memory) your camp, or your line of defence"—I am not certain which-"while the force is out: also draw in the line of your infantry outposts accordingly; but keep your cavalry vedettes still far advanced." I told him to have a wagon ready loaded with ammunition ready to follow the force going out at a moment's notice, if required. I went to Colonel Pulleine's tent just before leaving camp to ascertain that he had got these instructions, and I again repeated them verbally to him. To the best of my memory, I mentioned in the written instructions to Colonel Pulleine that Colonel Durnford had been written to to bring up his force to strengthen the camp. I saw the column out of camp and accompanied it."

90th wrote:

Hi Ymob
Clery WAS with Chelmesford & Crealock in the early morning of the 22nd Jan , it was Clery from memory who took the message to Chelmesford's tent , after being told to do so by Glyn , who took no part in the following proceedings .
Cheers 90th

Bonjour 90th,
Right,
but GLYN took no part in the orders given by CLERY to PULLEINE.
GLYN was not present with CHELMSFORD and CREALOCK when CHELSMFORD gave the orders.

Cheers

Frederic
Quite right. We rely exclusively on Clery for what happened, as you comment Glyn took no part at all and the communication between Clery and Pulleine is confirmed by Clery for the content and then as Ive posted by Stafford and Cochrane. in one case the verbal passing of orders and then the physical passing and reading. So a confirmation that the orders did exist. There is also the corroboration that he, Pulleine, was ordered to draw in the camp ( repeated by Durnford in the hearing of Cochrane and Stafford). So Im pretty convinced Clery's version is confirmed, except for the 'reinforce the camp.'

Cheers

springbok9 wrote:

Frederic
Quite right. We rely exclusively on Clery for what happened, as you comment Glyn took no part at all and the communication between Clery and Pulleine is confirmed by Clery for the content and then as Ive posted by Stafford and Cochrane. in one case the verbal passing of orders and then the physical passing and reading. So a confirmation that the orders did exist. There is also the corroboration that he, Pulleine, was ordered to draw in the camp ( repeated by Durnford in the hearing of Cochrane and Stafford). So Im pretty convinced Clery's version is confirmed, except for the 'reinforce the camp.'

Cheers

Frank,
Many thanks for your answer.
Exactly my thoughts!!!: "CLERY's version is confirmed, except for the "reinforce the camp".
Cheers

Frédéric

Perhaps Clery originally said reinforce. But whatever he said wasn't what Crealock wrote. If LC hadn't changed his mind as to who was to write the order. We wouldn't be discussing this subject now.

Bonjour à tous,

Steve (Rusteze) and me have some interrogations on the reality of the version given by CLERY about the order to PULLEINE the 22 january.
This interrogation is about the sentence « reinforce the camp ».

As Frank (Springbok) says :
« We rely exclusively on CLERY for what happend as you comment, GLYN took no part at all and the communication between CLERY and PULLEINE is confirmed by CLERY for the content and and then as i have posted by STAFFORD and COCHRANE in one case the verbal passing of orders and then the pysical passing and reading. So confirmatin that the orders did exist. There is also the corroboration that he, PULLEINE was orderered to draw in the camp (repeated by DUNRFORD in the hearing of COCHRANE and STAFFORD). So i am pretty convinced CLERY's version is confirmed except for the « reinforce the camp »'.

So, it's plausible historically that CLERY:

1) Misunderstood the instructions given by CHELSMFORD about DUNRFORD
2) Had not told or written to PULLEINE that DURNFORD has been ordered up from RD to reinforce the camp.


Some thoughts about these 2 hypothesis

# Why CHELMSFORD has not requested the reinforcement of UPCHER or RAINFORTH Companies instead of the natives of DURNFORD (imperial infantry was most appropriate for the defense of the camp than the natives) ? (SNOOK version from memory)

# No designation in the order of the name of the Officer in charge of the command of the camp
For Mike SNOOK, it 's « glaring omission » (HCMDB  p.88)

# CREALOCK's message to DURNFORD didn't mention that he « reinforce the camp »

# The extreme caution taken taken by CLERY in his testimony to the court of Inquery (« i am not certain », « to the best of my memory », « i speak from memory ») to describe an event that occured just few days before.(the fear of contradiction?)
The others witnesses are not so cautious.

# No witness present à Isandhlwana (after the arrival of DURNFORD) confirms that the mission of DURNFORD is to reinforce the camp (STAFFORD : COCHRANE / « A Special service Officer ») / Not even PULLEINE, MELVILL and DURNFORD who has read the written order of PULLEINE (COCHRANE / STAFFORD)

as Steve has said 'Unless something new turns up, i guess we can only speculate ».

Cheers.

i know that MELVILL, PULLEINE and DURNFORD were killed at isandhlwana. I hope you understand my thoughts on this point (not easy for me in English / tesimony of Cochrane and others about PULLEINE, MELVILL and DURNFORD).

To be totally honesty, i have found a testimony which contradicts these assomptions but for me it is not admissible (Jabez MOLIFE / See the article "Durnford's papers" by Julian WHYBRA "Studies in the zulu war vol.1"/ I have not this book at hand actually)
Cheers

The reference to the "special service officer" (maybe COCHRANE for JW) can be found in "the cochrane account" by Julian WHYBRA.

Frederic
I would agree with most of your points. Clery's mention of the phrase: "reinforce the camp" is mentioned by him purely in the context of the communication requested by Chelmsford to be sent to Durnford. Therefore it would not feature in the document Clery/Pulleine. In terms of THAT document Clery stated that command of the camp would be with Col Pulleine while Glyn was out of the camp. ( Normal army etiquette takes prefence at that point.)
I do have the Whybra Vol 1 I will look at the Molife account to see whats eating you.

Cheers

springbok9 wrote:

Frederic
I would agree with most of your points. Clery's mention of the phrase: "reinforce the camp" is mentioned by him purely in the context of the communication requested by Chelmsford to be sent to Durnford. Therefore it would not feature in the document Clery/Pulleine. In terms of THAT document Clery stated that command of the camp would be with Col Pulleine while Glyn was out of the camp. ( Normal army etiquette takes prefence at that point.)
I do have the Whybra Vol 1 I will look at the Molife account to see whats eating you.

Cheers

Frank,
Thanks for your help and your analysis.
Cheers

Frédéric

Steve,

Our thesis is yet in life....
Cheers

frédéric

Frederic
If possible you should at some stage attempt to read Clery's letters ( Sonia Clark ) from the Brenthurst Press. They will give you a whole new opinion of the man, at least it did for me. Terrible gossip that he was he does come across as a very proper Englishman, and very honourable.
Steve is busy reading him so it would be interesting to get his take. ( intéressant d'avoir son avis ) Schoolboy French at best.

Cheers

springbok9 wrote:

Frederic
If possible you should at some stage attempt to read Clery's letters ( Sonia Clark ) from the Brenthurst Press. They will give you a whole new opinion of the man, at least it did for me. Terrible gossip that he was he does come across as a very proper Englishman, and very honourable.
Steve is busy reading him so it would be interesting to get his take. ( intéressant d'avoir son avis ) Schoolboy French at best.

Cheers

Frank,
I know this book.
it contains equally (i think) the letters of HARNESS...
It is often quoted by the authors on the zulu war.
I would like, indeed, to have a copy of "Zululand at War".
But this book is too expensive for me....

I don't think CLERY was a liar in the true sense of the term... as CHELMSFORD (for whom i have sympathy) and (maybe) CREALOCK.
But i don't forget that the disaster of Isandhlwana has no precedent in British History, with the exception of the retirement of Kabul...
It was a terrible situation for these men, for their name and their reputation...
Cheers
Frédéric

Frank
Your French seems to be excellent!

Frank,
As you know, I am not ready to exprim my thoughts on DURNFORD after his arrival at Isandhlwana (lack of Knowledge).
I am sure (as you) that he made "big" mistakes.
But, my thought actually is that most of his errors are induced directly or indirectly by the errors of CHELMSFORD (unlike you).
An another post, an another day...with a "big fight"
Cheers
Frédéric

Clery spent a lot of time and effort protecting Glyn, as I said an honourable man. Ive had a look at the Jabez Molife statements in Vol 1. I cant see what is concerning you? Can you be more specific?

Cheers

Clery ,comes across as a very proper Englishman..says Springbok,
not quite the Englishman Frank.                                  xhosa

springbok9 wrote:

Clery spent a lot of time and effort protecting Glyn, as I said an honourable man. Ive had a look at the Jabez Molife statements in Vol 1. I cant see what is concerning you? Can you be more specific?

Cheers

From memory, Jabez MOLIFE said that G. SHEPSTONE had read "aloud" the order by CREALOCK to DURNFORD and it contained the words "reinforce the camp".
Or, we know that it's not possible (as you know the order didn't contain these words)
I made an error of translation / interpretation?
Cheers

springbok9 wrote:

Clery spent a lot of time and effort protecting Glyn, as I said an honourable man. Ive had a look at the Jabez Molife statements in Vol 1. I cant see what is concerning you? Can you be more specific?

Cheers

Frank,

I don't say that CLERY was not an honorable man.
It's not the question (for me).
The "facts" don't prove with certitude that CLERY  said and wrote to PULLEINE (his testimony / Court Of Inquiry) that DURNFORD is coming "to reinforce the camp".
It is plausible from the analysis of the facts that it was not the case.
The rest is speculation.

Cheers

Would it be of any possible help if i scanned and posted
the actual pages from French, Clarke, and Drooglever..
showing all Durnford's order's as they were set out, and
then later recalled from memory, which include Clery,
Crealock, and Gosset on behalf of Chelmsford..xhosa

Not quite the Englishman indeed!

He was from County Cork.

JY

Perhaps some members can prove with facts (not speculation) that the order of CLERY contains effectively the mention "reinforce the camp'.
I will be happy to have certitude on this point.
Cheers

xhosa2000 wrote:

Would it be of any possible help if i scanned and posted
the actual pages from French, Clarke, and Drooglever..
showing all Durnford's order's as they were set out, and
then later recalled from memory, which include Clery,
Crealock, and Gosset on behalf of Chelmsford..xhosa

Bonjour Les,
Thanks you for your generosity.
Maybe GOSSET for me.
Cheers.
Frédéric

No problem, Frederic, i will dig it out and post
later,                                           xhosa

Les/John
'Englishman' used as an adjective  

Frederic
I see your point about Molife but we do know that phrase wasn't in the order so possible a statement made on reflection? Clery does state in the COI that Colonel Durnford had been ordered up to strengthen the camp. Surely that's in line with the initial instruction he had from Chelmsford, the one Crealock overheard and corrected. So potentially yes, it was in the orders to Durnford, I don't believe it was prely on the basis that also in those orders was the phrase that while Col Glyn was absent he, Pulleine was in charge of the camp. An oxymoron (le oxymora) and in such a short note hardly one AN ENGLISH OFFICER would have mistakenly used.

Cheers

It was Clery, who said That Gardner, had command of some men, but left them when it became to hot, and rode off.

[You must be registered and logged in to see this image.]


Posted on behalf of Springbok.

oxymoron or dichotomy? Bloedige english isnt 'n taal sy 'n mynveld

Thank you Pete
Frederic we were talking about the fragile mental state of Chelmsford, the cutting puts it with real clarity.

Cheers

Thank you CTSG for your substantial response to my post. As you know, I was set to let you have a reply yesterday but administrative difficulties intervened.

You raise some important issues and I am not setting out to demolish your theories - I am not sure I could. Neither do I want to try to address all of the aspects of this in one go because the posting will become over long and too dense to digest.

I want to set out what I think Chelmsford's philosophy was with regard to defeating the Zulu's , which I think goes some considerable way to explain why events happened in the way they did. I base much of what I say on the thoughts of Clery in the weeks following Isandhlwana which, I think, throw an important light on Chelmsford's thinking and that of many of the senior staff around him. I will also say a little more about the usefulness of Col. Snooks observations.

1. Chelmsford is confident in the ability of his force to defend itself, what appears to us now as negligence, for example in not bothering with a proper defence of the camp, is a deliberate policy on his part because he does not think it was necessary against the Zulu. This is the reason he does not bother to leave instructions for Pulleine when he leaves the camp early on the 22nd, he does not see a risk even if there is an attack. Clery does see a risk and takes responsibilty for giving a message to Pulleine because Glyn, who also had a wise head on his shoulders, has been sidelined (you might think Glyn gives in to that a little easily).

2. What Chelmsford is very concerned indeed about is bringing the Zulu to battle. And, having done so, not to give them the chance to run once an engagement has been achieved. He knows that he cannot pursue them across Zululand because they will easily outdistance his slow lumbering columns. He has no Imperial cavalry on which he can rely. He has large numbers of native horsemen, but they are widely regarded as unreliable in the face of a determined enemy and are only likely to press home an attack if they first see they are on the winning side. Incidentally, I don't think this has anything to do with poor training, they are not professional soldiers and their tribes have been decimated by the Zulu in the past. They are understandably terrified at the prospect of a strong Zulu attack (much more perceptive than their white commanders).

3. He also has very little time to bring the whole enterprise to a close because the British government are snapping at the heels of Frere, who is relying on the delay's in telegraphic communications with London to move against the Zulu before he is called to account.

4. To my mind, that is the reason Chelmsford makes a snap decision to take half his force out to join Dartnell early on the 22nd. Because the opportunity to engage that he is desperate for has occurred and he is determined to take advantage of it.

I turn now to the situation with Durnford.

5. I don't yet know the truth about whether Durnford took command of the camp. I agree that It  appears he was for a short time. But he also tells Pulleine that he does not intend to stay and so will not interfere. Notwithstanding the army's presumption that the senior man automatically takes command, I can see little difference in what Durnford did and said and what Chelmsford said (and did not do) in relation to Glyn's command of the column. Clery is of the view that it simply did not occur to Chelmsford and his staff that this would arise when they made their plan to follow Dartnell. I take that as another indication that Chelmsford did not intend Durnford to re-inforce the defence of the camp when he was ordered up with his horsemen. Chelmsford wanted Durnford to help him ensure the Zulu were properly engaged by using his horsemen. I do not say that Durnford then got that right, Like Frank, I cannot explain what he did in relation to the Rocket Battery. But overall I am firmly of the view that Durnford was not meant to remain at Isandhlwana.

Finally for now lets return to Colonel Snook's analysis.

6. I think Snook provides us with a very professional military analysis of the events of 22nd. But in reaching his conclusions about what might have been possible if different decisions had been taken on the day, I think you have to remember four things.

A. He had infinitely more time to analyse the whole battlefield than anyone had on the day.
B. He was under no pressure to make quick decisions about deployment.
C. He had the distinct advantage of knowing what had occurred back then and to reflect on it.
D. He was not looking through the eyes of a Victorian officer with all of the assumptions and prejudices that come with that.

7. Even with all those advantages of analysis, he only tentatively suggests that the battle might just have been won with the addition of Durnford's men, if all sorts of other factors worked in it's favour. I would add that it probably would also have needed rather more effective senior command than was available at the time and a more reliable force.

8. I think an opposing force of 20,000 ordinary men would have been a formidable enemy. A force of 20,000 Zulus at full charge is virtually unstoppable.

9. And had the attack been delayed by a day, to fall on the column as it wound its way towards Mangeni, the result would have been the same but probably with even fewer survivors.

So to end, I do not think Durnford was out of control when he went out after the Zulu, he feared they were retreating and he did exactly as Chelmsford would have wished in those circumstances. That's not to say that he or Chelmsford were right in their view of the abilities of the Zulu - plainly they were both wrong. And that's not to say that Durnford did not have a point to prove - he did.  But I do think that the scene had been set for the defeat in Chelmsford's tent early that morning, despite anything Durnford could have done. And I think Chelmsford's attitude towards the Zulu as a fighting force was set before he crossed the river at Rorke's Drift.

Now for a cup of tea!

Steve

Steve enjoy a well earned brew! my exception with that, is "Concerning
Durnford's abilities" in realizing his ( enemy's ?) abilities. i suggest that,
with the Colonials Durnford knew the capabilities of the Zulu all to well!
                                                                                        xhosa

Steve. Sorry for late reply, just collected the wife from her sisters. Rush this some what, as I'm off out again shortly.



Thank you CTSG for your substantial response to my post. As you know, I was set to let you have a reply yesterday but administrative difficulties intervened. 

You raise some important issues and I am not setting out to demolish your theories - I am not sure I could. Neither do I want to try to address all of the aspects of this in one go because the posting will become over long and too dense to digest.

I want to set out what I think Chelmsford's philosophy was with regard to defeating the Zulu's , which I think goes some considerable way to explain why events happened in the way they did. I base much of what I say on the thoughts of Clery in the weeks following Isandhlwana which, I think, throw an important light on Chelmsford's thinking and that of many of the senior staff around him. I will also say a little more about the usefulness of Col. Snooks observations.

1. Chelmsford is confident in the ability of his force to defend itself, what appears to us now as negligence, for example in not bothering with a proper defence of the camp, is a deliberate policy on his part because he does not think it was necessary against the Zulu. This is the reason he does not bother to leave instructions for Pulleine when he leaves the camp early on the 22nd, he does not see a risk even if there is an attack. Clery does see a risk and takes responsibilty for giving a message to Pulleine because Glyn, who also had a wise head on his shoulders, has been sidelined (you might think Glyn gives in to that a little easily).

I don't agree, Lord Chelmsford, didn't construct defences, because he didn't think it was necessary against the Zulu. The camp at Isandlwana had never been intended as a Permanent installation. We know from sources that the ground was totally unsuitable for trenching. And to construct a laager would have taken to long.  And the camp appears not to have been under threat at that stage. 

2. What Chelmsford is very concerned indeed about is bringing the Zulu to battle. And, having done so, not to give them the chance to run once an engagement has been achieved. He knows that he cannot pursue them across Zululand because they will easily outdistance his slow lumbering columns. He has no Imperial cavalry on which he can rely. He has large numbers of native horsemen, but they are widely regarded as unreliable in the face of a determined enemy and are only likely to press home an attack if they first see they are on the winning side. Incidentally, I don't think this has anything to do with poor training, they are not professional soldiers and their tribes have been decimated by the Zulu in the past. They are understandably terrified at the prospect of a strong Zulu attack (much more perceptive than their white commanders).

Agree some what!  Your view on the native soldiers  is probably in line with that of Lord Chelmsford's view, back in the day. Possibly why a lot of the native regiments were left at Isandlwana along with Civilians, and Bandsman. Possibly adding a bit of weight, that no one really thought the camp was in any danger. 

3. He also has very little time to bring the whole enterprise to a close because the British government are snapping at the heels of Frere, who is relying on the delay's in telegraphic communications with London to move against the Zulu before he is called to account.

Like you say, Lord Chelmsford was confident, that he could beat the Zulus, and want to do it has quickly as possible to bring the war to an end, and with the modern weaponry of the day, I guess we can see why he would confident.
State of the art rifles, cannon, and seasoned soldiers. 

4. To my mind, that is the reason Chelmsford makes a snap decision to take half his force out to join Dartnell early on the 22nd. Because the opportunity to engage that he is desperate for has occurred and he is determined to take advantage of it.

Can't argue with that, as that was the original game plan was to win a war! 

I turn now to the situation with Durnford.

5. I don't yet know the truth about whether Durnford took command of the camp. I agree that It  appears he was for a short time. But he also tells Pulleine that he does not intend to stay and so will not interfere. Notwithstanding the army's presumption that the senior man automatically takes command, I can see little difference in what Durnford did and said and what Chelmsford said (and did not do) in relation to Glyn's command of the column. Clery is of the view that it simply did not occur to Chelmsford and his staff that this would arise when they made their plan to follow Dartnell. I take that as another indication that Chelmsford did not intend Durnford to re-inforce the defence of the camp when he was ordered up with his horsemen. Chelmsford wanted Durnford to help him ensure the Zulu were properly engaged by using his horsemen. I do not say that Durnford then got that right, Like Frank, I cannot explain what he did in relation to the Rocket Battery. But overall I am firmly of the view that Durnford was not meant to remain at Isandhlwana.

We have eyewitness accounts that show, Durnford for whatever reason did taking command when he arrived at the camp. 
If Chelmsford had wanted Durnford to help him ensure the Zulus were properly engaged, why did he order him to go to the camp. Why not order him to meet up with him directly nearer the plan of action. If we look at the order, it contains enough information to let Durnford know what the game plan was. 

"You are to march to this Camp at once with all the force you have with you of No. 2 Column. 

Major Bengough’s battalion is to move to Rorke’s Drift as ordered yesterday. 2/24, artillery & mounted men with the General & Colonel Glyn move off at once to attack a Zulu force about 10 miles distant. 
J.N.C. 
If Bengough’s battalion has crossed the River at Hands Kraal it is to move up here (Nangwana Valley).” 

Would it not have be easy to say you and Bengough. If he had intended Durford to join him. 

Why Order Durnford to the camp, if the engagement with the Zulus was going to take place 10 miles away. 
Question. As we know via Springbok, when Durnford left the camp, in the pretence of protecting Lord Chelmsford rear, why did he go off in the opposite direction, a question I have asked many times. 
Again I have said many times, Durford prime task was to reinforce the camp. Or strengthen. Either way, he was not ordered to assist Lord Chelmsford. 
"He was down, because he was left behind, but we shall see" 
Partly responsible for the lost of the camp. 

Finally for now lets return to Colonel Snook's analysis.

6. I think Snook provides us with a very professional military analysis of the events of 22nd. But in reaching his conclusions about what might have been possible if different decisions had been taken on the day, I think you have to remember four things. 

A. He had infinitely more time to analyse the whole battlefield than anyone had on the day. 
B. He was under no pressure to make quick decisions about deployment. 
C. He had the distinct advantage of knowing what had occurred back then and to reflect on it.
D. He was not looking through the eyes of a Victorian officer with all of the assumptions and prejudices that come with that.

7. Even with all those advantages of analysis, he only tentatively suggests that the battle might just have been won with the addition of Durnford's men, if all sorts of other factors worked in it's favour. I would add that it probably would also have needed rather more effective senior command than was available at the time and a more reliable force.

8. I think an opposing force of 20,000 ordinary men would have been a formidable enemy. A force of 20,000 Zulus at full charge is virtually unstoppable.

9. And had the attack been delayed by a day, to fall on the column as it wound its way towards Mangeni, the result would have been the same but probably with even fewer survivors.

So to end, I do not think Durnford was out of control when he went out after the Zulu, he feared they were retreating and he did exactly as Chelmsford would have wished in those circumstances. That's not to say that he or Chelmsford were right in their view of the abilities of the Zulu - plainly they were both wrong. And that's not to say that Durnford did not have a point to prove - he did.  But I do think that the scene had been set for the defeat in Chelmsford's tent early that morning, despite anything Durnford could have done. And I think Chelmsford's attitude towards the Zulu as a fighting force was set before he crossed the river at Rork's Drift.
I would always go with Henderson's take on Durnford based on he was there, and saw Durford for first hand. And you can't get a better source than that.

The books written on the AZW are down to personal preference.  Col Mike Snook in my eyes, is probably the best. For years many have put his work down, because he has the ability to fill the gaps, with logical thinking. There's a lot we will never know about the battle, but at lease Col Snook presents avenues that can lead to us making our own conclusions to what may have happened. And form what I have seen form Col Snook on other site, he puts up a mighty fine argument when it comes to the Battle of Isandlwana. 

Steve Appoligies I will add more, but not a good day for me, regarding time.    ignore the spelling. Trying to type, with her shouting come on!! yadder yadder!

That's a good question. Why wasn't Durnford order directly to the engagement area, if he was to operate with LC. Why operate from the camp.

xhosa2000 wrote:

No problem, Frederic, i will dig it out and post
later,                                           xhosa

Les,
Please stop your research,
Finally, I am sure i have it somewhere.
Sorry for the inconvenience.
Encore Merci.

Frédéric

And if Durnford had been called to assist LC, how would the RB have kept up. 10 miles on foot not good.
Durnfords wagons at the camp with ammuntion supplies. He could not have dragged them along. It took them ages to get from RD to Isandlwana. Logistically it would have been a nightmare for Durnford to have assisted LC. From the camp point of view 250 Additional men mounted, RB. Ammuntion. In hindsight enough to reinforce or Strenthen the camp.

springbok9 wrote:

Thank you Pete
Frederic we were talking about the fragile mental state of Chelmsford, the cutting puts it with real clarity.

Cheers

Frank and Pete

Many thanks for the post.
I am sure i haven't a copy of it.
Cheers

Frédéric

CTSG

Thank you for that. I note that you are going to say some more, but I will respond to what you have said so far.

First I have to say that I do not think there is a yawning gap between us. I think we could reach agreement on Chelmsford's initial attitude to defending Isandhlwana with a little effort.

But we are probably each left with a different view when it comes to the order to Durnford and what Chelmsford's intention was. We agree, I think, that it was ambiguous. So, like Col. Snook, we need to fill the gap with some logical thinking of our own. I take the view that it is logical to go with Chelmsford's key concern, which was attack and not defence. His earlier order to Durnford had been in that vein, and he new Durnford's strength was as a mobile force. I see no reason to believe that he had changed his view on how best to use Durnford - particularly as he was himself going on the attack.

As I said in my previous post, I do not contend that Durnford got that right when he did leave, but I do believe he was acting in the spirit of Chelmsford's intentions. There is, as you say, much that we will never know. And the true meaning of those orders to different parts of Durnford's command may be in that category. But to say that it was clear that Durnford was meant to defend is to use today's logic because we know what happened. Not Chelmsford's strategy at the time.

For my part, I am more than happy for others to contribute.

Steve

Admin wrote:

[You must be registered and logged in to see this image.]


Posted on behalf of Springbok. 

Just piggy backing on Springboks artical.

[You must be registered and logged in to see this link.]

Some didn't think he wanted to jack it in after Isandlwana. 2 months after the event.

When it's come down to the issuing of orders to Col Durnford. Who are we most likely to believe. Clery or Crealock.

health of CHELMSFORD:

For Drooglever (the road to Isandhlwana / p.192), the detoriation of his health is obvious just before the battle of Isandhlwana:

"The incident [the rubuke / DUNRFORD / 14th January] had undoubtedly strained the good relationship between Chelmsford and Durnford and might well have contributed to Chelmsford's deterioration in health shortly before 23 [?] Janvier, making him tired and forgetful. This was later to have serious consequences on the clarity of orders for Durnford".

Unfortunately, no source was given by DROOGLEVER.

Cheers

Frédéric

Merci, Frederic, thank you!

Forum members have commented in the past, why,
do i regularly scan and post sections from book's,
some of which can be seen as outdated as modern
historians persuade us that new information has 
come to light that must change our views on certain
events..my posts may and most probably do seem
random to some people..but always in the forefront
of my mind is..the topic in question, so i post ' in
the round ' keeping in mind at all times the ' big
picture '. 

There is two camp's for either Chelmsford or Durnford!
i have of course nailed my colours to the mast..i
think AWD discharged his duty's on the 22nd of Jan
faithfully and to the best of his ability..he understood
the order he was given and carried them out to the
letter, until events overtook him. and that was that!

His Lordship, on the other hand, is a different matter!
his conduct in the immediate after math of the Zulu
Massacre of the camp at Isandhlwana  bears close 
scrutiny! the pages i post from Gerald French are an
obvious attempt to absolve his lordship of any blame
whatever not just for Isandhlwana, but his conduct
throughout the whole Zulu Campaign..

All i ask is, that they be read closely to see if any part
of it ' jarr's ' with your own understanding of events.
i post without ego..as stated before i am not in the least
afraid of being wrong in any way shape or form..i would
welcome correction and learn from it..to build my under-
standing of this wonderful subject.                   xhosa

[quote="xhosa2000"]Merci, Frederic, thank you!

Forum members have commented in the past, why,
do i regularly scan and post sections from book's,
some of which can be seen as outdated as modern
historians persuade us that new information has 
come to light that must change our views on certain
events..my posts may and most probably do seem
random to some people..but always in the forefront
of my mind is..the topic in question, so i post ' in
the round ' keeping in mind at all times the ' big
picture '. 

Les,
Like many other members of this forum (see the post "Merry Christmas" by Springbok), I am sincerly grateful to you.
You  have probably the most amazing collection of books in this forum.
Les, no "argot" today?
Cheers

Les,
I have the same opinion of you about the work of FRENCH
Cheers.

Frédéric

As all-way's Frederic you completely disarm me! i have
a couple of books yeah..but nothing to write home about. 

Glad you are in agreement about french..sycophants are
anathema to me, i instinctively hated such a human 
trait as soon as the  phrase was understood by me!
                                            cheers ears inabit  xhosa

Yes " argot" is an integral part of me, thank god..enrichment?.

Gosset, sets the tone nicely!.

[You must be registered and logged in to see this image.]