Durnford was he capable. 4

And is it not interesting that there is no other figure
but Durnford from the Isandhlwana debacle that is
remembered so loyally and fiercely?. where are all
the eulogy's to Crealock or Thesiger?         xhosa

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Would anyone care to pick through this! how many times are we informed
Durnford took command! and near the end it states that..Durnford's well 
ordered ( my words ) retirement had the effect of unifying the camps
defence...all edited by Gosset. this is what Chelmsford presented to the
world..                                                                               xhosa

Extract from 
RESOLUTION. ADJOURNED DEBATE. [SECOND NIGHT.]
HC Deb 28 March 1879 vol 244 cc1991-2090 1991


COLONEL CHAPLIN  
"In cases like the disaster at Isandlana the tendency was to find a scapegoat, and the one selected on this occasion, he regretted to say, was Lord Chelmsford. It was painful to approach this subject, for they must criticize the acts of the dead as well as those of the living. It was natural to throw all the blame on the General commanding, and in almost every instance it was right to do so if his orders were obeyed. Now, the hon. and gallant Member for East Aberdeenshire said that on the night of the 21st of January the Zulu Army was two miles from the camp at Isandlana. He could not tell where the hon. and gallant Member got his information from; but having carefully studied the Blue Books without finding any information as to the whereabouts of the main body of the Zulu Army, he came to the conclusion that it was much nearer 20 miles distant on that night. Anyone who had seen the Zulus on the path knew well the enormous distances they could travel without intermission. The first intimation of large bodies of Zulus was at half-past 7. Colonel Durnford arrived at half-past 10. The distinct orders left by the General were that Colonel Pulleine should "defend the camp;" and had those orders been obeyed, and not distinctly disobeyed, the disaster, which they all deplored, would never have occurred."

Chard1879

It is helpful to post these extracts. But it would help even more if you would let us know what you think about this particular politician's view and why.

Regards

Steve

Totally agree with him, it's like some on here have said. The order was to defend the camp. Whatever Durfords personal agenda was, wether he stay or left, he should have ensure the stores that were needed for the invasion into Zululand we're protected. As LC had intended when he said defend the camp. Senior command back home, obvisouly had trust in LC see below!



HANSARD 1803–2005 → 1870s → 1879 → April 1879 → 22 April 1879 → Commons Sitting → SOUTH AFRICA—THE ZULU WAR—THE DEFEAT AT ISANDLANA—H. R. H. THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF AND LORD CHELMSFORD.
QUESTION.

HC Deb 22 April 1879 vol 245 c837 837
MR. E. JENKINS asked the Secretary of State for War, Whether it is true that the following telegram, stated to have been published by Lord Chelmsford, was forwarded by His Royal Highness the Commander in Chief to Lord Chelmsford on February 13th, soon after the receipt of the news in this Country of the disaster at Isandlana:— Duke of Cambridge, London, to Lord Chelmsford, Petermaritzburg.—Have heard by telegraph of events occurred. Grieved for 24th and others who have fallen victims. Fullest confidence in regiment, and am satisfied that you have done and will continue to do everything that is right. Strong re-inforcements of all arms ordered to embark at once.—Feb. 13th.

COLONEL STANLEY Yes, Sir; it is quite true.

Thanks for that. I often feel with politicians comments that, like now, they say what their party tells them to say, don't you?

Steve

And not only that, which of course holds true back then. just as it does now!
the fact is Cambridge went to town on Chelmsford in no uncertain manner.
the C in C was by no means satisfied with Chelmsfords vacillation's..even
though the old boys network eventually did its inevitable dirty work..
Chelmsford came to realize that one could not needlessly sacrifice one of
the country's finest regiments with impunity..                              xhosa

springbok9 wrote:

Frederic
If possible you should at some stage attempt to read Clery's letters ( Sonia Clark ) from the Brenthurst Press. They will give you a whole new opinion of the man, at least it did for me. Terrible gossip that he was he does come across as a very proper Englishman, and very honourable.
Steve is busy reading him so it would be interesting to get his take. ( intéressant d'avoir son avis ) Schoolboy French at best.

Cheers

From FWD JACKSON, "Hill of the Sphinx" p.9
"A recent writer has described him as " vain, able, critical of friend and foe, egotistical and amusing"
Note 24 p.11: Clarke, "[Zululand at ] War, p.27 (the Editor's own description).
Cheers.

Yes " argot" is an integral part of me, thank god..enrichment?.[/quote]

Certainly, i have a Thought for the author and filmaker Marcel Pagnol.
Cheers

Hmmm, could anyone closer to home be described in such a way
as Clery was   as TC said.." Thank you very much"  i would
claim most if not all those attributes. my constant fear is to be 
thought dull...                                                          xhosa

We can all give a personal opinions about politicians, but it's good to get a view of what they were discussing back then. Only months after the event. Which of course carries on today, perhaps not with politicians, but with simular sites to ours. And there are still two camps. Lord Chelmsford & Col Durnford.


HC Deb 28 March 1879 vol 244 cc1991-2090

"SIR CHARLES RUSSELL appealed to the House for indulgence for a short time while he defended an old comrade and an absent man. He meant Lord Chelmsford. He promised the right hon. Baronet that he would meet the question as fairly as he had himself met it, and he would be more moderate in his language and more considerate of those who were unable to defend themselves. The first charge brought by the right hon. Baronet against Lord Chelmsford was that on the 4th of January he took over from Sir Bartle Frere the responsibilities of the position, or, in plain language, that he obeyed the orders of his superior. With regard to the plan of the campaign, the right hon. Baronet had criticized that with great severity; but, unfortunately, he was not possessed of what he was pleased to call "a well-informed military mind." The plan of that campaign was submitted to competent military authorities in this country, and was approved. The difficulties which Lord Chelmsford had to face were not of his own creating. After he had crossed the Tugela and got to the camp at Isandlana, he remained there making some 2024 reconnaissances, and with practically his whole Force. He did not, therefore, think it necessary to intrench the camp, and he (Sir Charles Russell) ventured to challenge the right hon. Baronet, who had spoken of that as a single instance, to point to a single case where a General moving with his whole Force had ever in Cape warfare intrenched his camp. He would go to the length of saying that even small detached parties did nothing of the kind. That was well known in Cape warfare, and he defied the right hon. Baronet to show one instance in which a laager defended by British troops had ever been taken. Well, Lord Chelmsford, hearing that the enemy was somewhere to the North-East, went with a large Force in search of him, and some time after he left he became engaged with a Force, and was occupied four hours in driving back that Force. When he left the camp, he sent a written order to Colonel Durnford to come up and take the command of the camp. The witnesses differed as to whether the order directed him to "strengthen" the camp; but he wrote by his military secretary to Colonel Pulleine to give the camp over to Colonel Durnford, and to "defend the camp." Lord Chelmsford had left before daylight. Now, as he should have to cast some reflection upon those who were dead and gone, and who had nobly died in discharge of what they conceived to be their duty, he trusted the House would not think he was in the least degree dealing to the memory of those gallant men so cruel and unjust a blow as that which the right hon. Baronet had dealt to the living. But the House would agree with him that, however much they might respect the memory of the dead, they were not entitled to give them that respect at the cruel expense of the living. His gallant friend, Lord Chelmsford, after he had left the camp before daylight—he spoke from memory, and without his notes, for he little dreamt that in a discussion of a Motion in which all mention of Lord Chelmsford's name had been left out a discussion of this sort would take place. He was not, therefore, prepared by reference to his marked Blue Book to give chapter and verse for everything he said; but he assured the House that he would state nothing that he could not prove. After Lord Chelmsford left the camp, Colonel 2025 Pulleine had notice that the enemy was accumulating in force on heights about four miles off. He assembled his Force and put them to the east side of the camp, keeping them under orders for some time, when they were sent to their parades. At 10.30 Colonel Durnford arrived and took the command of the camp. It was abundantly evident that some discussion took place between Colonel Durnford and Colonel Pulleine. Colonel Durnford said he had seen some of the enemy on his left flank, and he asked for a couple of English companies with which he would go out and look for them. "No," said Colonel Pulleine, "I dare not do so, for my orders are to defend the camp," and that, Colonel Durnford's aide-de-camp said, was repeated over and over again. Ultimately, as if the poor fellow had a strange presentiment, Colonel Durnford said to Colonel Pulleine, "If I get into difficulties will you come to my rescue?" They had the testimony of one survivor of the rocket battery which accompanied him that Colonel Durnford attacked the enemy, with the result they all too well knew. Had the troops remained in camp and a laager been formed, which could have been done in half-an-hour or an hour—had the orders received been obeyed and the camp defended—the defence would have been complete and perfect. But it was said that the General sent back Captain Alan Gardner with an order to intrench the camp. He did so, but that was when he had found another camping-ground, which he determined to leave to Colonel Glyn, and in sending back for ammunition and provisions he added—"Intrench your camp." And why? As long as he had his mounted force at the camp he was sufficiently strong; but when he sent the order the force was divided. Let them now look to what occurred at Rorke's Drift. There they had an hour's notice that the enemy were about to attack, and that the camp was to be defended. Did Lieutenant Chard say—"Give me some men, and I will go out to meet the enemy?" He did not; but he and Lieutenant Bromhead set about throwing up defences, and they succeeded in repelling what was in proportion a larger Force than that which made the attack at Isandlana. Thus it was clear that where the men obeyed and clearly understood the General's orders, the defence was com- 2026 plete. Another point on which the right hon. Baronet made an attack on his (Sir Charles Russell's) absent friend was as to an alleged want of feeling which he showed when he left the camp at Isandlana before daylight on the morning after the disaster. But why did he go before daylight? He did so for two reasons—first, because he felt obliged to hasten to the assistance of the little garrison at Rorke's Drift; and, secondly, because he very properly wished to spare his men the horrible sight of the mutilated corpses of their comrades; for he need hardly remind the House that in African warfare it was notorious that the Zulus never left a wounded man living on the field. Where the wounded were not carried off for more brutal purposes, they were killed on the spot. If, indeed, Lord Chelmsford had incurred the risk of further loss, he would have deserved some small portion of the blame which the right hon. Baronet imputed to him. Let him remind the House of Lord Chelmsford's career. He had served the country for 35 years; he was present in the Crimea and attained the medal and clasp. His high courage was known to him and to everyone else who saw Lord Chelmsford, and they would give him credit for great capacity. Then, again, he served in the Indian Mutiny and attained the medal, and as Assistant Adjutant General he accompanied the Abyssinian Expedition and was present at the taking of Magdala; and in one of his despatches Lord Napier of Magdala said he desired to speak "specifically of his great ability and great energy." Was the man who had thus served his country, and who one day met with a disaster for which, in his conscience, he believed—and he said it on his honour as a gentleman—Lord Chelmsford was utterly irresponsible, to have his career in life cut short because charges such as they had heard, and which were incapable of being sustained, were, in his absence, made against him? If so, they were going to take a course which would not only be a grave injustice to the General himself, but also to the Forces that served under him. He did not quite understand the allusion of the right hon. Baronet to the case of Admiral Byng? Did he understand him to mean that they were to have such another murder?"

xhosa2000 wrote:

Forum members have commented in the past, why,
do i regularly scan and post sections from book's,
some of which can be seen as outdated as modern
historians persuade us that new information has 
come to light that must change our views on certain
events..my posts may and most probably do seem
random to some people..but always in the forefront
of my mind is..the topic in question, so i post ' in
the round ' keeping in mind at all times the ' big
picture '. 

There is two camp's for either Chelmsford or Durnford!
i have of course nailed my colours to the mast..i
think AWD discharged his duty's on the 22nd of Jan
faithfully and to the best of his ability..he understood
the order he was given and carried them out to the
letter, until events overtook him. and that was that!

His Lordship, on the other hand, is a different matter!
his conduct in the immediate after math of the Zulu

Massacre of the camp at Isandhlwana  bears close 
scrutiny! the pages i post from Gerald French are an
obvious attempt to absolve his lordship of any blame
whatever not just for Isandhlwana, but his conduct
throughout the whole Zulu Campaign..

All i ask is, that they be read closely to see if any part
of it ' jarr's ' with your own understanding of events.
i post without ego..as stated before i am not in the least
afraid of being wrong in any way shape or form..i would
welcome correction and learn from it..to build my under-
standing of this wonderful subject.                   xhosa

It's okay posting images from books, but I think we have to remember, the authors of theses books were not at Isandlwana. And many can only give their personal opinions. I can't see how a debate can be maintained based on books. Primary source evidence needs to be use, if we are going to make headway.

24th wrote:

That's a good question. Why wasn't Durnford order directly to the engagement area, if he was to operate with LC. Why operate from the camp.

Does anyone have a reasonable reply to this question. I can't think of one.

If anybody were to ask me!. why, Durnford was not ordered to the
Mangeni, i think i might reply..that he was not ordered to! if he had!
being the excellent officer and soldier he undoubtedly was! he would
have complied straight way. the fact's remain unchanged till the end 
of time he was not..he had his orders and carried them out to the
very best of his ability..to move to the camp with his full force..but
of course its a moot point..it never happened. but nobody has asked
me.                                                                              xhosa

John wrote:

Martin, if as you say Durnford left the camp to protect LC rear, why did he go off in the opposite direct?

John.

This has been answered before quite a few times, but still gets asked time and again.

Col Durnford did NOT go in the opposite direction. IE; LC went due east, Col Durnford went due north east then turned north. Obviously this was to put himself between LC and the Zulu's that had been reported has heading in the direction of LC.

i think we all know what you think of Durford, but that doesn't really answer the question. Tactically it would make more sense to have Durnford close by not 10 miles away, if LC had intended to use him against the Zulus he went to engage. Springbok, Steve, 90th Julian, John Young, CTSG. can you give a reason as to why he would want Durnford so far away.

Mr M. Cooper wrote:

John wrote:

Martin, if as you say Durnford left the camp to protect LC rear, why did he go off in the opposite direct?

John.

This has been answered before quite a few times, but still gets asked time and again.

Col Durnford did NOT go in the opposite direction. IE; LC went due east, Col Durnford went due north east then turned north. Obviously this was to put himself between LC and the Zulu's that had been reported has heading in the direction of LC.

So why did he want Durnford to go to the camp 10 miles away from the intended action.

Because LC wanted Bengough and Col Durnford to perform a pincer movement to flush out the zulu's and drive then towards the waiting LC, that is why LC ordered Durnford to detach Bengough and send him another way via Sandspruit.

Infected the whole British High Command, from the top down!!!
that all changed after Isandhlwana..boy did it change. Chelmsford
never under estimated the Zulu again!,,point of fact he went on 
to over compensate, which in itself makes that point.  xhosa

Mr M. Cooper wrote:

Because LC wanted Bengough and Col Durnford to perform a pincer movement to flush out the zulu's and drive then towards the waiting LC, that is why LC ordered Durnford to detach Bengough and send him another way via Sandspruit.

Drive the Zulus towards LC. Chelmsford was ten miles away. What Zulu would Durnford be driving to LC

How would Durnford know when he was required to advance.

What would he had done with the Rocket Battery.

How would he have replenished his troops with ammuntion.

24th Hopefully Springbok will confirm tomorrow regarding Durnford going off in the opposite direction. I can't recall him changing his mind.

Chard, you just don't get it do you.

You have been a member of the forum since 2010, in that time you must have read the posts by Julian and others, that LC wanted Bengough and Durnford to form a pincer to flush and drive the Matyanas towards a waiting Chelmsford. The plan had been arranged beforehand, hence the order telling Durnford to detach Bengough and send him via sandspruit. LC would have moved earlier and got into position, then Durnford would have moved from the camp whilst Bengough approached from another direction to form a pincer between himself and Durnford. They then would flush out and drive the zulus towards a waiting LC.

Springbok himself said that Durnford did NOT go in the opposite direction, he posted it in 2013, you may have missed it.

Mr M. Cooper wrote:

Chard, you just don't get it do you.

You have been a member of the forum since 2010, in that time you must have read the posts by Julian and others, that LC wanted Bengough and Durnford to form a pincer to flush and drive the Matyanas towards a waiting Chelmsford. The plan had been arranged beforehand, hence the order telling Durnford to detach Bengough and send him via sandspruit. LC would have moved earlier and got into position, then Durnford would have moved from the camp whilst Bengough approached from another direction to form a pincer between himself and Durnford. They then would flush out and drive the zulus towards a waiting LC.

Springbok himself said that Durnford did NOT go in the opposite direction, he posted it in 2013, you may have missed it.

Martin, you can't seemed to except, that LC was ten miles away. How was Durford going to covered that ground. He had the RB with him on foot, he wanted to take two Compaines of the 24th on foot. How was he going to do this. How would he have known what time to move to start he pincer movement as you say. How would he have know when the others were in position. How would he have known that Bengough didn't even get of the ground, well there's the pincer moved up the shoot.
You say it was all Pre- planned. Where the source that shows this. Because I have never heard of a Pre-plans involving Durnford being part of this pincer movement. And while Durford was at Isandlwana LC was chasing Zulus across the hills with his men spread all over the place. So when was LC going to start his pincer movement.

Chard mate, please try to understand. The pincer movement had been arranged PRIOR to LC getting that report from Dartnell. However, after he got the report from Dartnell, LC was under the impression that he had found the main impi, so he rushed to get into action before daybreak but failed to issue any proper orders informing Durnford of any changes to the pre-arranged plans. Crealock didn't inform Durnford about any changes to these plans, in fact he contributed towards them by telling Durnford that Bengough should come in a different direction, and of course Durnford would then be under the impression that the plan was going ahead, and that LC would be in wait some 10 miles distant, and that is why Durnford told Pulleine that he wasn't staying at the camp. But things had changed since LC had left, however, Durnford was still under orders to support LC, so when he got the report of zulus heading in LC's direction he had no choice but to try to support LC, that is why he set off to find out what they were up to and to try to get between LC and the zulus.

I'm sorry Martin. Your making it up, to fit in with your theory.

Extract John Young on Durnford

"  Reports were coming in from outlaying piquets and vedettes of increasing Zulu activity.  On e report stated that a Zulu column was moving off in the direction that Lord Chelmsford had taken his half column.  Fearful that the General's force might be attacked on two fronts Durnford took matters into his own hands.  He informed Pulleine that he intended to sweep the area thus drawing out the Zulus.  He asked Pulleine for some of his imperial infantry to assist him in the task.  Pulleine objected to the request, again stating his task was to defend the camp.  Durnford then asked for support should his force encounter difficulties to which acquiesced."

When he says sweep the area, he meant locally not ten miles away. Do you really think he would drag the RB and NNC ten miles on foot. The order had enough information to let Durford know what was going on. For his part just move to the camp. LC and Glyn were assisting Dartnell. But hey that would have been one hell of a pincer movement a 10 mile radius.
Plus I'm not convinced that I missed Springboks change of heart regarding the wrong direction. If you know where the post is, can you post it. Much appricated.

Chard. I am going off to the pit anytime, however, the post from Springy was in Durnford was he capable 2, Monday Oct 21st, 2013, at 11:20am.

Night mate.

I just know I'm going to dream about that 10 mile pincer movement. Speak later good night.

But CLERY was not present with CHELSMFORD and CREALOCK in the morning of the 22 january.
CLERY has on his own initiative written the order to PULLEINE (account of CLERY himself).
Cheers
Frédéric[/quote]

Bonjour à tous,
"But CLERY was not present with CHELMSFORD and CREALOCK...."
I mean to say GLYN and not CLERY of course!
Sorry for the confusion.
Thanks to 90th for the correction.
Cheers
Frédéric

Chard
Dont take this the wrong way but your Parliamentary post just goes to prove how far they were off the mark to what really happened .
Firstly ; The British invaded Zululand without the sanction of the Home Govt . As to plans being approved , by whom ?
No-one , and I'm damn sure even the Military Trusts in the UK had no clue of the invasion , let alone saw and approved plans !
Secondly ; 2024 Reconnaissances ! , who kept count ? , from where did this miraculous figure of 2024 appear ? . Does the 2024 number actually mean the number of Reconnaissances ? , possibly , it means something else ??????? .
Thirdly ; Funnily enough during the Second Invasion , LC entrenched , and Laagered every night ! .
Fourthly ; I decided not to read on !
90th

Still Like Chard says.

Chard1879 wrote:

We can all give a personal opinions about politicians, but it's good to get a view of what they were discussing back then. Only months after the event. Which of course carries on today, perhaps not with politicians, but with simular sites to ours. And there are still two camps. Lord Chelmsford & Col Durnford.

Agreed 24th
After reading Chard's Parliamentary Paper post ! , I wonder if the pro LC faction would've jumped ship if they only knew the truth of the matter or the facts , that was the point of my post . As I said I didnt see the reasoning in continuing to read on , I assume there were a few more '' Oddities '' ? . Did you find any ? , did you read the post ? .
90th

LCs, military career was quite impressive. Those back home seemed to have thought he was the right man for the job.

90th whats your thoughts on the current question being asked regarding, why would LC want Durnfords assisitence. But Places him 10 miles away from any would be engagement.

If your going into action. Knowing that you have planned to be reinforced, you would want the reinforcements to be as near as possible. Not ten miles away. That just doesn't make sense. And the fact that LC had engaged the Zulus albeit chasing shadows. Can anyone explain how Durnford would have been an asset to Lord Chelmsford at that distance.

24th
I'm not to sure LC's career was impressive , serviceable comes to mind before impressive . Obviously those at home thought he was the right man for the Job , that doesnt mean he was ! , and judging by what happened in early 1879 he wasnt ! . After all he was replaced wasnt he ? , although luckily for LC , he did get the job done eventually before Wolseley took command , I'm glad LC got the chance to even the Ledger , he would've been labelled a blunderer if he hadnt I expect ? . Although he isnt blameless in the events leading up to the falling of Isandlwana .
In regard to the question you ask , I tend to think the same as Martin , when the zulus were withdrawing Durnford had no idea where they were going , they could easily have decided to head off and attack LC , who at that point had his force spread to all points of the compass attempting to find the zulu army ! . I dont think the 10 miles has anything to do with it , as Durnfords force was mounted , except for the Rocket Battery , which in Hindsight , is a puzzling decision to have them follow along at walking pace , against a fast mobile enemy . I suppose , once again , it boils down to the fact that none of the British in the chain of command thought there was a possibility of the camp being attacked by such a massed and determined force . LC is on record as saying his greatest fear was that the zulu army would not come on ! . Hence , his orders for the Artillery not to open fire until the zulu army are 600 yds from the guns ! . Hope that has been some help .
90th

Mr M. Cooper wrote:

Chard. I am going off to the pit anytime, however, the post from Springy was in Durnford was he capable 2, Monday Oct 21st, 2013, at 11:20am.

Night mate.

Martin hope your well.

I have checked the posts from Springbok for the day you mentioned.
But he does post on the 21st Oct but in connection with the following.

[You must be registered and logged in to see this link.]

There are two posts on that subject and one welcoming new membes. Other than that nothing.

90th wrote:

I dont  think the 10 miles has anything to do with it ,

Even being mounted, it would have taken a good few hours to get to LC location.
The question always has been, why would LC want Durford at the camp, apart from reinforcing or strengthening it.

With regards to the Rocket Battery, it was never intended to be used as a unit on the move that would be expected to keep up with a mounted unit. It would have been used as a static defence force in a fortified position.

Durnfords men shook the hornets nest, and unleashed and Amy in superior numbers. After that it all comes down to tactical decisions. He got it wrong. In hindsight it doesn't  matter what the orders said. What mattered was when the Zulus attacked.
At that point, it neither mattered if LC was being attacked or not.
Durnford would have been no good to him, as Lord Chelmsford would have been to Durford due to distance.

It was the deployment of the troops to far from the camp insufficent supplies of ammunition and superior enermy numbers that lost the day.

Chard
How do you know it would take a good few hours to get to LC's location ??? . Durnford managed to get 5 or 6 , possibly more miles from the camp in nowhere near as much time '' as a good few hours ! '' . A mtd force especially with Colonial horses can cover , and did cover ground quickly . You are looking at the final result of the battle , it's called hindsight , where you try to determine what should've happened , as opposed to what did happen ! . Durnford being brought up to the camp just as easily means LC wanted him to be a mobile force on the move , seeking intelligence and ascertaining what was happening near the camp , he wouldnt have been much more use if he stayed in the camp . As for stirring up a hornets nest , that's hardly Durnford's fault , he wasnt there when Raw opened fire was he ? . Still no-one even then believed the camp was in danger of falling , they were all more than likely hoping that they did bring the zulus on , they , Durnford and the other officers would've been relishing the fact that the zulu were making a go at the camp ! . It's been quoted the Soldiers were all laughing and joking early in the engagement when they were bowling them over at an alarming rate . Unfortunately that joking and laughing would soon disappear when the realisation of what was coming became apparent ! .
90th

90th wrote:

As for stirring up a hornets nest , that's hardly Durnford's fault , he wasnt there

Neither was Chelmsford, Raw however was under the command of Durnford.

We have all said a number of times over the last few days that there are large gaps in what we know. CTSG helpfully pointed out that it helps to fill those gaps with logical thinking about what was going on.

So, I invite people to comment on this attempt by me at logical gap filling.

Firstly, everything that happens has to be seen in the light of Chelmsford's key strategy for the war. To bring the main Zulu army to battle.

1. Chelmsford leaves the camp very early on the 22nd to go to Dartnell who thinks he has found the Zulus to the East.

2. Chelmsford has this conveyed to Durnford and Bengough at that time and tells them to come up without telling them what to do. He may have intended to do that when he had found the Zulu army.

3. Some considerable time elapses, and then Durnford appears at the camp, after which it becomes apparent that Zulus are in the North East.

4. Nobody in the camp knows what Chelmsford is now doing or where he is.

5. Durnford then hears that the Zulus are in retreat, so he sets out after them because he fears this Impi may run away or descend onto Chelmsford's flank.

6. Remember he still believes Chelmsford is confronting the main Zulu army somewhere towards Mangeni.

7.Chelmsford never finds the Zulu army because it is not there.

8. Durnford does find them and the attack begins.

When it comes to pondering the 10 mile gap, you have to consider who is successful in bringing the main Zulu army to battle (which is Chelmsford's objective) and who is in the totally wrong place.

Poor scouting, no accurate maps and no good intelligence are major contributing factors. Chelmsford never follows up his order to Durnford with what he wants him to do because Chelmsford never finds the Zulus.


Steve

Oh2
You seem to forget LC was running the whole campaign ! , Not Durnford ! . Pulleine was following LC's tactics as did Pearson earlier in the day at Inyezane , you know of it I assume ? .
90th

Steve some goods points. Just few points not as knowledgeable as you guys. But like to have my say.

No2 If Bengough’s battalion has crossed the River at Hands Kraal it is to move up here (Nangwana Valley).” 

So Bengough knew what he was supposed to do.

No4 Agree, but that then puts pay to the ten mile pincer movement. In that no one knew where the others were.

90th wrote:

Oh2
You seem to forget LC was running the whole campaign ! , Not Durnford ! . Pulleine was following LC's tactics as did Pearson earlier in the day at Inyezane , you know of it I assume ? .
90th

Yes but we are constantly reminded that Durnford had his own independant command, and by all accounts could do whatever he wanted to do.

OH2

You are as entitled to your say as anyone else!

I think Chelmsford was just trying to place his support at an appropriate interim position while he sought out the Zulu army. Bengough was only to go to the Nangwana valley if he was crossing at Hands Kraal - his first option was to have him at Rorke's Drift wasn't it?

I'm not sure I know the topography well enough to say whether that looks sensible or not. Frank can probably help us.

Steve

Steve/OH
for Nangwana read Mangeni, for Hands Kraal read Elands Kraal.
Elands Kraal is on the Mzinyathi River a few kilometres South East from Rorkes Drift. Crossing at Elands Kraal effectively puts Bengough into the Mangeni Valley below the Matyanas kraal area.
Theres seems to be this disbelief that a Pincer movement over ten miles was possible? Think about the whole campaign as a pincer movement with Wood from one direction and Pearson the other with Glyn in the Centre. that's a pincer movement over 100 miles.

I would imagine that Chelmsford would have wanted Durnford close enough to be able to use his mounted force effectively but to get him from Rorkes Drift to the future Mangeni campsite involves going passed iSandlwana.

For the record the mangeni area, Dartnell.Chelmsfords path lies due East of iSandlwana across the plain. Durnford left the camp, and returned, skirting the conical koppie and then turned into the Quabe valley heading North. There is no intersecting point of the two paths.

I would firmly agree Steve, as I think 90th has pointed out Chelmsfords strategy was to induce the Zulu army to throw itself on the massed guns of the imperial troops. His concern was they wouldn't fight him. How in heavens name, considering the Zulus reputation, he came about that concept is probably the biggest single mystery/cause of the thrashing he received.

Round about now its New Year in Australia so happy New year to our Aussie members.

Cheers

Hi Springy
2015 is here with a bang ( Fireworks ) Currently 12.19 am . Hope you all have a wonderful and profitable 2015 !
Cheers 90th

Time for another Beer !

Frank

Thank you. Good stuff.

Gary

Happy new year!

Steve

Enjoy Gary, joining you in 8 hours. Amazing my daughters celebrated 3 hours ago, and my sons another 14 hours away. Gotta love the WWW so we can keep in touch.

Cheers all