Durnford was he capable.5

John, Crealock was a proven liar, why should anyone believe anything he says?

Anyway, bedtime.

Martin without quoting JW posts. Please show the source that confirms what your saying.
Or are these personal observations.

Why didn't Crealock pull LC up, as it's supposed, when LC asked Clery to write the order.

from..invasion of Zululand..Clarke..all
posted before. xhosa

[You must be registered and logged in to see this image.]

Thanks Les.

I went to bed, but this was bugging me, so I got up and was rooting for this (trying not to wake you know who). I went online and, hey presto! you have posted it, cheers mate.

John wrote:

Crealock COE

"3. Lieutenant-Colonel Durnford, R.E., was not under Colonel Glyn's command at this time; he had been moved from his original position before Middle Drift, with some 250 Mounted Natives, 200 of Sikalis footmen, the Rocket Battery, and one battalion of the 1st Regiment Natal Native Contingent to the Umsinga District, on the Lieutenant-General's seeing the ease with which the Natal frontier could be passed in that part of the Buffalo River. The Lieutenant-General's order was therefore sent to him by me, being the only Head Quarter Staff Officer (except the Aide-de-Camps) with him. These details formed part of No. 2 Column under his command"

"2. I was. not present during the conversation between Major Clery, Staff Officer to Colonel Glyn, and the Lieutenant-General, but the evening before, about 8.30 P.M., on this officer asking the Lieutenant-General if the 1-24th " Were to reinforce Major Dartnell in the Magane Valley," he said " No."  The General received, I believe through Colonel Glyn, a subsequent representation which caused the fresh orders at 2 A.M. the 22nd, and the orders to Lieutenant-Colonel Durnford"

Hightlighted. Must have missed this, by relevant to the argument that Durnford was acting in line with those he received on the 19th. "FRESH"

John, the highlight you posted "FRESH ORDERS" are the orders for the men of the camp to be made ready for the wild goose chase to Dartnell, NOT FRESH ORDERS for Durnford.

24th wrote:

Martin without quoting JW posts. Please show the source that confirms what your saying.
Or are these personal observations.

Why didn't Crealock pull LC up, as it's supposed, when LC asked Clery to write the order.

The sources are, reading, studying, doing a little research, and applying a bit of logic.

Morning 90th
Quote"Springy
I dont think you'll get an argument from me regarding the distance Durnford had pitched his camp into Zululand , I said 2 - 4 miles as a generalization , I hadnt checked the books for the detailed estimation , when I get a chance I'll look it up . If , and then , your reply seems incorrect , then I'll let you now !
Cheers 90th

PS I'll have to check the scores from your Test Match Salute "

Yeah I did that bit of research because you seemed to say that Durnford was camped in the Bashee valley, that in response to queerie on why Crealock seemed to think he was. The positive of course is that you and C:D realock agree on something

Weather is overcast and drizzly this morning, temps down to 27 so not to sure how the crickets going to go. Early wickets or a draw !

Cheers

Mr M. Cooper wrote:

24th wrote:

Martin without quoting JW posts. Please show the source that confirms what your saying.
Or are these personal observations.

Why didn't Crealock pull LC up, as it's supposed, when LC asked Clery to write the order.

The sources are, reading, studying, doing a little research, and applying a bit of logic.  

Thanks Martin. Can you give me the titles of the books in question.

Mr M. Cooper wrote:

John wrote:

Crealock COE

"3. Lieutenant-Colonel Durnford, R.E., was not under Colonel Glyn's command at this time; he had been moved from his original position before Middle Drift, with some 250 Mounted Natives, 200 of Sikalis footmen, the Rocket Battery, and one battalion of the 1st Regiment Natal Native Contingent to the Umsinga District, on the Lieutenant-General's seeing the ease with which the Natal frontier could be passed in that part of the Buffalo River. The Lieutenant-General's order was therefore sent to him by me, being the only Head Quarter Staff Officer (except the Aide-de-Camps) with him. These details formed part of No. 2 Column under his command"

"2. I was. not present during the conversation between Major Clery, Staff Officer to Colonel Glyn, and the Lieutenant-General, but the evening before, about 8.30 P.M., on this officer asking the Lieutenant-General if the 1-24th " Were to reinforce Major Dartnell in the Magane Valley," he said " No."  The General received, I believe through Colonel Glyn, a subsequent representation which caused the fresh orders at 2 A.M. the 22nd, and the orders to Lieutenant-Colonel Durnford"

Hightlighted. Must have missed this, by relevant to the argument that Durnford was acting in line with those he received on the 19th. "FRESH"

John, the highlight you posted "FRESH ORDERS" are the orders for the men of the camp to be made ready for the wild goose chase to Dartnell, NOT FRESH ORDERS for Durnford.

It depends on how you read it. You and John don't seem to agree.

Its pretty distinct that he is referring to two separate orders:
" I believe through Colonel Glyn, a subsequent representation which caused the fresh orders at 2 A.M. the 22nd, and the orders to Lieutenant-Colonel Durnford.
The 'And' being the operative would

Cheers

John wrote:

Martin you have no proof to substantiate what your saying. Clery wound not have wrote that, unless Glyn authorised it. Clery statement at the COE states exactly what he done. No one at the COE pulled him up for taking it upon himself to write orders. The orders he wrote to Pulleine were in line with the one, he was ordered to write to Durnford before Crealock spoke up in a tent behind canvas. .
Glyn.
"I mentioned in the written instructions to Colonel Pulleine that Colonel Durnford had been written to to bring up his force to strengthen the camp. I saw the column out of camp and accompanied it."

Morning John
Clery did write it without authorisation he explains why and how in his letters Clery/Alison February 1879.
Second point it wasn't Glyn in connection with that last sentence it was Clery.

Cheers

John wrote:

And I think the reason, Crealock send the orders to Durnford, was because Durnford was not under the command of Glyn remembering Clery was Staff officer to Glyn. Nothing to do with Clery being junior.

Your dead right. Crealock says virtually that in his statement.

Cheers

John
Martin was referring back to the information I posted not to me personally. That information you have seen reiterated in the intervening posts. Orders went from Crealock, not Clery, to Durnford...and Clery to Pulleine... and all done by the book in military terms.
P.S. I am not an oracle. A conduit perhaps.

Springy, impi, Martin
Re the order moving Cavaye
Immediately after the CoI Chelmsford recalled a number of individuals to answer specific questions and to provide additional information re the disaster. One of those men recalled was Essex. He was not recalled any further and LC had no official contact with him after that. Chelmsford then placed into chronological order this subsequent information between Jan and Apr (datable from its content). It was never published, nor intended for publication (it's in the NA) but was for LC's own consumption and enlightenment. It was however eventually published by LC's biographer in 1925 (like Clery, "I write from memory" re the date) and by Laband in recent times. In it, under the heading Captain Essex, LC specifically states that the information that Cavaye was posted to the escarpment by Durnford came from Essex. This is not hearsay. It is additional information taken from witnesses not deemed necessary for immediate inclusion in the CoI findings. There is nothing nefarious in it, nothing controversial, just additional.
The little remark about who gave that order dates from the 27th Jan approx. and comes from specific questioning by the officer commanding forces in SA of the man (Essex) who probably actually carried the order to Cavaye. It also fits in timewise with events at the camp.
I will concede that it might have been Pulleine physically who gave the order at Durnford's suggestion (albeit a strong suggestion from a superior officer given in the presence of staff officers). That was not what Essex said but it might have been what he meant. But I cannot fly in the face of direct evidence and concede that it was Pulleine himself who decided upon Cavaye's disposition and ordered him to move. It may seem logical that Pulleine gave the order (and I fully understand that logic) but to me the illogicality of disregarding and contradicting a direct statement from a primary source (with no axe to grind) is fundamentally flawed. It goes against all historicity. The logicality of my illogicality argument wins out over the illogicality of your logicality argument. Can you try to prove to me why it shouldn't?
(Out of interest it was David Jackson who first noticed the importance of Essex's statement re Durnford's order and established the fact that Essex had been recalled.) John, take note, it almost always all goes back to Jackson the Oracle.

Phew Julian! Love your thesis, but your sentence "The logicality of my illogicality argument wins out over the illogicality of your logicality argument." requires a good slug of single malt before tackling.

Donald Rumsfeld at his best!

Steve

It makes perfect sense to me, baldly it means i'm right, your wrong!. :)
xhosa

While we are addressing messages back and forth we should perhaps listen to the General himself.
Letter Lt General Lord Chelmsford to Sir Bartle Frere. Head Quarter Camp, Insalwana Hill Zululand 21 January 1879.
'I enclose a memorandum which I am sending to Col Durnford and to Col Bray, which will shew you the arrangements I am making for moving forward, and for guarding my line of communication when I do.'
So orders were issued to Durnford on the 21st.

Notes by Chelmsford on the findings of the Court of Enquiry

Colonel Durnford then about 11 am sent two troops of mounted natives onto the hills at the left* and advanced himself with the two other troops and the rocket battery to the front.
*These were shortly afterwards reinforced by a third one which had been sent to assist the baggage into camp.

Under Captain Essex ( underlined)
At this time about 11am the impression in camp was that the enemy had no intention of advancing during the day time, but might possibly be expected to attack during the night.

Underlined

No idea had been formed regarding the probable strength of the enemy's force.

Letter from Lt General Lord Chelmsford to HRH the Duke of Cambridge

'I have gathered since from some of those who escaped that shortly before the final fatal attack was made by the Zulus, the impression in Camp seemed to be that the affair was finished, and it is reported that Lt Col Pullein and some officers actually returned to their tents.

Cheers

With all this logic and illogic, maybe we should ask Mr Spock the Vulcan for his opinion.

Julian, I can see that the order from Crealock to Durnford was done by the book, however, I can't see how the order from Clery to Pulleine was as it was done without any authorisation from either Glyn or LC. Clery took it upon himself to do it, and admits that he was at fault by not consulting either Glyn or LC, and admits that he would be censured for giving such orders, and he also gave Pulleine the false information that Durnford had been sent for to reinforce the camp. As a junior officer giving orders to a senior officer without any official authorisation surely that makes those orders unofficial and therefor invalid as they are not official orders. Many have suggested that when Col Durnford arrived at the camp, that 'Chelmsford's' orders to Pulleine would be binding on Durnford, but the orders were not from LC, they were unauthorised orders put together by a junior officer (Clery), and we have already seen that Crealock advised LC that Clery could not issue orders to a senior officer, ie; column commander, so how could these unauthorised and therefor unofficial orders have been binding on Col Durnford who was No2 column commander?

Hope you can see the logic of this. Live long and prosper.

Julian
In the 'notes' you refered to it also states from Essex that Lt Cavaye was on piquet. I mention that to clarify for the forum that I would believe Cavaye wasn't sent to support Durnfords men but as a piquet to keep watch on the earlier sightings in that direction.

Cheers

Interesting springbok, the man reeked of complacency!
" No idea had been formed regarding the probable
strength of the enemy".. "men had actually returned
to their tents". i wish you would say more about the
C in C's views, he saw straight through Chelmsfords
vacillations, and gave him a torrid time!. xhosa

Martin
it was indeed binding purely and simply because at the time it was deemed to be an order from Chelsford, that was only discounted after the battle. So in retrospect sure it was an illegal order but in the same time frame it was a logical order, and should be obeyed.

Cheers

Howzit Les
Just working my way through things, problem with most discussions on the forum is they range far and wide, Steve and I have been trying to focus in on individual issues. 'From small acorns grow............."

Cheers Mate

Just had a pm from a member that I wont name that says 'From small acorns grow.........lots of cricket bats"

Cricket bats are traditionally made from Willow although an Aussie (had to be) tried one out cast from aluminium, a few years back. Got a feeling it was Denis Lilley ?

Cheers

Hi Les.

Yes, HRH The Duke of Cambridge, saw right through this cover up didn't he, in fact he put together a set of questions for Chelmsford to answer. I would have just loved to have seen the expression on Thesiger's face when he was trying to wriggle his way off the hook. Thesiger never had a field command ever again after the mess he made in Zululand.

Springy, Yes, it was Lillee.

Rusteze/xhosa
A little forthright!  I have too much respect for Springbok and his posts which is why I asked him to try to prove why I should disallow that primary source statement.  In fairness it is too important an event not to nail down.

Martin
Yes, I totally agree.  I meant that it was ‘by the book’ in terms of Clery being able (because of his position/rank) to issue orders to Pulleine (in the same way he was not able to do so to Durnford).  I did not mean that he had been authorized to do so.

Springy/xhosa
They were indeed the comments from Chelmsford's Notes that I posted in my 5.31 pm post.  But Xhosa, please note, that these were Essex's factual words, not Chelmsford's complacent ones.
Springy, you also wrote:
“In the 'notes' you refered to it also states from Essex that Lt Cavaye was on piquet. I mention that to clarify for the forum that I would believe Cavaye wasn't sent to support Durnfords men but as a piquet to keep watch on the earlier sightings in that direction.”
I would agree with that – sent in fact to replace the NNC picquet that had already been sending in reports and was ‘picked up’ by the NNH on its way on to the plateau.  The exact quotation is:
“At the same time as Colonel Durnford left the camp, a company of 1/24th under Lt. Cavaye was sent out on picket to a hill north of the camp about 2000 yards distant – This was done at Colonel Durnford’s order –“

Julian I quoted from a Chelmsford letter that he was 'going to' send out a memorandum to Durnford and Bray.
Its the phrasing in the letter that tends to say' I am going to send it'. The question would therefore be that he had attached a copy ergo the memorandum was written, and if it was sent then where is it and what is it. Could it have been collected by Shepstone on the 21st? Or even Hamer on the 22nd? This letter appears in the Chelmsford papers, but obviously not the memorandum. Ive checked through the Cape Archives and I cant find it there either, any thoughts?

Cheers

An oak bat! Sounds like a typical Aussie move to me.

Going back to the topic, where do we think we now stand on the question of whether Durnford acted logically that morning, or acted rashly?

1.Reports of Zulu sightings to the N and NE had been coming in since early morning, some with substantial numbers.

2. Durnford arrives at say 10.00 and is deemed to be in command for as long as he is in camp. Chelmsford says until 11.00.

3. During that hour, forces are sent to investigate further  and report. The numbers reported now are growing smaller to the point where the message is that the Zulus are drawing back everywhere. The final figure sighted is 400.

4. Durnford leaves with some of his force and goes North because he fears a Zulu force may now be descending on Chelmsford's flank.

5. Chelmsford says later that, at that time, the general view in the camp is that the danger to the camp has passed for now, with senior officers returning to their tents.

6. Then an element of Durnford's force makes contact and a massive attack is launched on the camp, not on Chelmsford who is far away.

Are Durnford's actions up to that point reasonable, or irresponsible?

What do we think?

Steve

Bonjour steve,
Personally, nothing
I don't know with certitude the meaning (for him) of his orders.
So, it's difficult to analyse (to interpret) his action.
For exemple, personally, i can't answer to these 2 questions:
Why did he took with him, the rocket battery and natives infantry?
Why did he asked to Pulleine 2 compagnies (24th).
Cheers
Frédéric

Point 4: he goes North along the Quabe Valley.
I believe that up to that point Durnford was acting well within his orders. That is of course Steve until I find that missing memorandum from the 21st, that could change things.

Cheers
PS
Gets uncomfortable that wire on the fence.

I'm not completely convinced by the thesis of the "pincer movement" (for the rocket battery and others)
Cheers

Frank

Thank you, amended to North. Ah, the missing memorandum. Good hunting!

Frederic

I agree that the Rocket Battery and unmounted men are difficult to understand.


Steve

rusteze wrote:

Frank

Frederic

I agree that the Rocket Battery and unmounted men are difficult to understand.


Steve

Steve,
Answer to these two question are essential for me to understand and interpret his action.
Cheers
Frédéric

The 2 coy's and the rocket battery and its escort are a bit of a puzzle, however, I did post a theory that I had some time back, ie.
When the report came in about zulus heading in the direction of LC, did Durnford have the idea that Raw, Barton, etc, who he had sent over to the left, had disturbed the zulus, and that they were now moving over to the right towards LC. And did Durnford have the idea that if he could move quickly that he could get around to the right whilst Raw, etc, was still moving over from the left, and between them they could make an attempt to stop the zulus. He may well have had the idea of using the RB and its escort along with the 2 coy's, to form a sort of offensive/defensive wall, so that if Raw on the left and Durnford on the right could between them move the zulus towards the RB, escort and 2 coy's, who would then open up on them, they could then, perhaps, between them all, force the zulus to surrender. Don't forget, that at this time no one knew the size of the zulu force, the reports had been confusing and the zulus were now thought to be in the hundreds not the thousands. I think that the foremost thought in Durnford's mind was to stop these reported zulus that were said to be heading in LC's direction.

springy
You wrote:
"I quoted from a Chelmsford letter that he was 'going to' send out a memorandum to Durnford and Bray.
Its the phrasing in the letter that tends to say' I am going to send it'. The question would therefore be that he had attached a copy ergo the memorandum was written, and if it was sent then where is it and what is it. Could it have been collected by Shepstone on the 21st? Or even Hamer on the 22nd? This letter appears in the Chelmsford papers, but obviously not the memorandum. Ive checked through the Cape Archives and I cant find it there either, any thoughts?"
I have looked for this memorandum. It's not in the NA, the Blue Books, NAM or anywhere. I have always assumed, on the 22nd, that he was still going to send it...and events overtook him. But still I wonder...
There's still plenty out there that could be found if it hasn't rotted away on the field of Isandhlwana.

Martin.

Why would he stop the Zulu's, when they were treating in all directions. Perhaps it was the fearsome RB that cause them to retreat.

On a serious note.

Essex COE possibly gives a better reason, as to why the RD was sent out!

"At about ten A.M. a party of about 250 mounted natives, followed by a rocket. battery, arrived with Lieu tenant-Colonel Durnford, R.E., who now assumed command of the camp. The main body of this mounted force, divided into two portions, and the rocket battery were about 10.30 A.M., sent out to ascertain the enemy's movements

The weak links in your chain Martin are:
That the Rocket Battery couldn't stand up to the attack on them, it wasn't an attack by thousands merely skirmishers.
The companies on the plateau weren't given instructions regarding direction, as far as Im aware, but to sweep the plateau. After moving due north they then veared to the east and back towards the North. Not really in a direction to pinch any Zulu between the Quabe and the plateau. my other issue in that regard would be that Durnford only decided to set out long after the companies on the ridge had started.

The rocket battery is still an enigma.

Cheers

And how would a small party of men on foot hampered by mules laden with a cumbersome rocket battery be expected to ascertain enemy movements better than a force of 100 fast-moving mounted native troopers?

You will have to ask Essex!

Julian you posted in another topic, the following.

"Subject: Re: Durnford was he capable.2   Sat Nov 10, 2012 12:07 am
There is no question that Durnford was expecting orders to be waiting for him at Isandhlwana. This is a known fact"

Highlighted is my question. How is this a known fact. What source can we look at to see this.

Springy.

Did you not say in an ealier post that LC went due East, and that Durnford went due North East then turned due North, and would this not have been the correct thing to do to try to get in between the zulus and LC?

Julian
Where are the Frere papers kept? There are a number in the Cape Archives, I have gone through them but nothing dated the 21st, so probably your correct. I would wonder though if a General pens a dispatch would it be treated with speed? Considering that he, Chelmsford, had spent the day riding around the Malakathi I would imagine that his correspondence time would have been late afternoon.
What is so interesting however is that a dispatch WAS prepared for Durnford, he wasn't left out on a limb.

I might add that ive covered every inch of the battlefield and really didn't find them there either?

Cheers

Quite a large gap to cover, all 10 miles of it.!

The RB its escort and the 2 coy's would have all been together to form a sort of wall, so that if Raw, sweeping from the left, and Durnford, sweeping from the right, could move the zulus towards the waiting wall, they could then between them all, ie, Raw, Durnford and the RB, etc, get the zulus to surrender, that's what I meant Frank.

Hi Martin
I did indeed. Chelmsford East Durnford North and North East. Its a moot point weather he could have intercepted an impi, as it was they intercepted him. However he and Raw were not on converging courses. So would not have 'pinched' any force between them, that precludes any pre planned 'pincer' movement.
Touching on other comments though, I cant see why he would be bothered chasing down a very small, 400, Zulu component. No point really, except maybe for intelligence. But would he have gone chasing after 4000 with a force of 100 men? Nobody has yet come up with a plausible reason for him riding ( See Les, no Jaunting or Poncing, Im learning) of the way he did.

Cheers Mate

Cheers

Julian Whybra wrote:

John
Martin was referring back to the information I posted not to me personally.  That information you have seen reiterated in the intervening posts.  Orders went from Crealock, not Clery, to Durnford...and Clery to Pulleine... and all done by the book in military terms.
P.S.  I am not an oracle.  A conduit perhaps.

Springy, impi, Martin
Re the order moving Cavaye
Immediately after the CoI Chelmsford recalled a number of individuals to answer specific questions and to provide additional information re the disaster.  One of those men recalled was Essex.  He was not recalled any further and LC had no official contact with him after that.  Chelmsford then placed into chronological order this subsequent information between Jan and Apr (datable from its content).  It was never published, nor intended for publication (it's in the NA) but was for LC's own consumption and enlightenment.  It was however eventually published by LC's biographer in 1925 (like Clery, "I write from memory" re the date) and by Laband in recent times.  In it, under the heading Captain Essex, LC specifically states that the information that Cavaye was posted to the escarpment by Durnford came from Essex. This is not hearsay.  It is additional information taken from witnesses not deemed necessary for immediate inclusion in the CoI findings.  There is nothing nefarious in it, nothing controversial, just additional.
The little remark about who gave that order dates from the 27th Jan approx. and comes from specific questioning by the officer commanding forces in SA of the man (Essex) who probably actually carried the order to Cavaye.  It also fits in timewise with events at the camp.  
I will concede that it might have been Pulleine physically who gave the order at Durnford's suggestion (albeit a strong suggestion from a superior officer given in the presence of staff officers).  That was not what Essex said but it might have been what he meant.  But I cannot fly in the face of direct evidence and concede that it was Pulleine himself who decided upon Cavaye's disposition and ordered him to move.  It may seem logical that Pulleine gave the order (and I fully understand that logic) but to me the illogicality of disregarding and contradicting a direct statement from a primary source (with no axe to grind) is fundamentally flawed.  It goes against all historicity.  The logicality of my illogicality argument wins out over the illogicality of your logicality argument.  Can you try to prove to me why it shouldn't?
(Out of interest it was David Jackson who first noticed the importance of Essex's statement re Durnford's order and established the fact that Essex had been recalled.)  John, take note, it almost always all goes back to Jackson the Oracle.

Now this I like... There is a slight interference of Pulleine command by Durnford. Who may I say, said he wouldn't interfere with Pilleine command..

No no Julian, do not do yourself an injustice. It is you who is the Oracle, passed down by Jackson. I see you like the word Oracle, you have used it twice since I first posted it!

But Springy mate, no on knew what size the zulu force was, and Durnford had been told that a body of zulus were heading in the direction of LC, and he did say that 'if they are heading towards the general we must stop them at all hazzards', so there is your plausible reason for him riding.

The rocket battery as part of Durnford's column is a bit hard to understand in any circumstances.

The only way it makes any sense to me is as a poor substitute for guns, both in terms of mobility and effectiveness. Equally, native forces on foot also make little sense in a flying column. But perhaps, once you have accepted the substitution of the rocket battery for guns, you have to provide for the battery's protection.

If he had had guns available, would he have taken them with him out of the camp. Perhaps he would, as he did not know what he was facing. Is that also why he wanted two companies of the 24th, more reliable protection for the battery than his native forces?

Perhaps the rocket battery was taken because that was the only heavy fire power he had?

Steve

Martin.

Trooper Barker, Natal Carbineers.

“ ……[we] arrived on the hill [assessed to be Qwabe] about sunrise [0522 hrs] After being posted about a quarter of an hour we noticed a lot of mounted men in the distance and on their coming nearer we saw that they were trying to surround us….. we discovered they were Zulus. We retired to Lieut. Scott about two miles nearer the camp [assessed to be Conical Hill] and informed him of what we had seen, and he decided to come back with us but before we had gone far we saw Zulus on the hill we had just left and others advancing from the left flank  [an area including iThusi Valley] where two other videttes (sic), Whitelaw and another had been obliged to retire from. Whitelaw reported, a large army advancing ‘thousands’ I remember him distinctly saying ….this would be about eight a.m.”
…….. shortly afterwards numbers of Zulus being seen on all the hills to the left front.”  1

This report calls into question how thorough and vigilant these videttes had been at the earliest stages of daylight. The words ‘large’ and ‘thousands’ within the context of the source and allowing for exaggeration, show that by first light more than a Zulu reconnaissance patrol was sighted, and was viewed as having aggressive intent by the vedettes expressly sited to detect such manoeuvre that could continue until virtually unobserved.

 In Barker quoting ‘A large army’ and ‘thousands,’ the vedettes positioned across a frontage of a mile or so were compelled to abandon their posts and in doing so, large tracts of dead ground were exposed for the commencement of Zulu manoeuvre. Indeed this dead ground remained out of sight of the British until contact with the two troops of NNH at midday or thereabouts, as will be evidenced later. Here it would be prudent to add how extensive the shallow areas and ‘dead ground’ exist along the full length of the Ngwebeni streams on the tablelands. 

J.A.Brickhill, Interpreter.

On the morning of 22nd January between 6 & 7 O’clock in the morning the Zulus showed in considerable force at the southern end of Ingutu Mountain.  

Again, referring to Raw and Roberts, he records:
At about eleven a.m. a party of them were sent back round the way they came, round Isandhlawana, & from there round the Northernmost point of Ingutu. 

Brickhill went on to add:
Shortly afterwards another force came into sight about the middle of the hill and intervening space was speedily filled in. 

The intervening space may be interpreted as the vast space between iThusi Hill and Barry’s picquet situated on Magaga, namely the Nyoni Ridge. This is indicative of the arrival in strength of regiments, or major elements, having exited the area near the Ngwebeni Valley area and advanced to position themselves on the escarpment overlooking the Isandlwana camp within an hour or thereabouts of first light. Brickhill, as interpreter, was located centrally to a fairly commanding position in front of the Columns Office.  2

Captain Edward Essex.
75th (Stirlingshire) Regiment, serving as the Director of Transport for No 3 Column. 

“…… until about eight A.M., when a report arrived from a picquet stationed at a point about 1,500 yards distant, on a hill, to the north of the camp, that a    body of enemy’s troops could be seen approaching from northeast.”  3

 Essex possibly confused a picquet with a vedette. The distance described by Essex makes it probable that the hill described was iThusi on which a vedette was positioned. The significance of the report lies in its timing, and its coincidence with movements referred to by Barker. All l well before the arrival of Durnford.

Lieutenant J.R.M.Chard, RE.
Time approximately 0930 hrs by estimation.

  I also looked with my own, [field glass] and could see the enemy moving on the distant hills, and apparently in great force. Large numbers of them moving to my left, until the lion hill of Isandhlwana, on my left as I looked at them, hid them from my view. The idea struck me that they may be moving in the direction between the camp and Rorke’s Drift. 4

Further prime source corroboration of substantial Zulu deployment prior to Durnford’s arrival. Chard clearly made the point of the possible commencement of the deployment of the Zulu right horn. The ‘far distant hills’ may indicate the iThusi area.

Western Area

Lieutenant W. Higginson, 1/3rd Natal Native Contingent (NNC.)
The first intimation we received about the Zulus was at 6 a.m when. Lt. Honourable Standish Vereker came into camp and said that the Zulus were appearing on the extreme left, and nearly opposite his outlying picket [Assessed as being somewhere north of Magaga Knoll and south of the Nqutu Range of hills.] …… Soon afterwards Colonel Pulleine sent me and Sergt Maj Williams came with me. We found Captain Barry [Comment: Commanding the picquet] and Lt Vereker watching a large body of Zulus on the extreme left of the camp, and they informed me that a large force of about 5,000 had gone round behind the Isandula Hill.  5

This report, made shortly after first light, indicates substantial Zulu deployment sighted within view of Magaga Knoll, together with an approximate’5, 000’ moving westward, therefore well clear of the Ngwebeni Valley with the possible intent to envelop Isandlwana. This occurred before Durnford’s arrival thus indicating Zulu aggressive movement, not only to deploy, but to do battle on the 22nd, confirmed by the actions observed both on the eastern and western areas. The estimated size of the Zulu force estimated by Higginson also indicates a deployment of a major functional part of the Zulu army. It follows therefore, that a deliberate plan by the Zulu High Command was already in place with the right horn located out of the Ngwebeni valley and in position north of Magaga Knoll (Barry’s picquet) at first light 22nd January    

Lieutenant Hillier, Lonsdale’s Natal Native Contingent. (NNC)
 At half past seven a.m. Lt. Veriker [sic] of the NNC who was on picquet duty with Captain Barry rode into camp and reported to Colonel Pulleine that the Zulus were advancing on the camp in large numbers.  6

This report corroborates that of Lt. Higginson, in that Zulu deployment was taking place in the open and in view of the camp’s outposts.
The words advancing on the camp are unambiguous and show aggressive intent to attack. Note the time: 0730 hrs 22nd January. 

Lieutenant C. Pope’s Diary. 2/24 Regiment, portion of which read:
“ Alarm- 3 Columns Zulus and mounted men on hill E. Turn Out 7,000(!!!) more E.N.E., 4000 of whom went around Lion’s Kop.[Isandlwana Hill] Durnford’s Basutos, arrive and pursue.”  7

 Pope, by direct personal observation, provided confirmatory evidence that a large Zulu force was sighted. Furthermore, the deployment was taking place prior to Durnford’s arrival. This is a valuable, and completely uncorrupted, collateral source report.  

The Zulu War Diary of Lieutenant Richard Wyatt Vause, NNH, recorded:
Durnford ordered me to ride back to meet our wagons as the Zulus were seen in our rear and he expected they would try to cut them off.  8
The time was between 1015hrs and 1045 hrs, with Vause expressing the opinion that the right horn was perceived to be a threat and well deployed at that time.

Thus from both the Eastern and Western area reports, it may be concluded that significant elements of the amabutho were in the process of, or had already, deployed out of the Ngwebeni Valley. Within an hour or two of daylight, they were discernible from the camp and its remaining outposts, moving deliberately and in strength. It is logical to conclude that at the very least, some of the key preparatory moves for a deliberate attack on the camp were underway.
Source TMFH

Durnford must have had some idea. Don't you think.

Steve, you may be on the right track there.

John. Most of this that you are quoting was before Durnford arrived, Pulleine was the one who should have done something but didn't.

rusteze wrote:

The rocket battery as part of Durnford's column is a bit hard to understand in any circumstances.

The only way it makes any sense to me is as a poor substitute for guns, both in terms of mobility and effectiveness. Equally, native forces on foot also make little sense in a flying column. But perhaps, once you have accepted the substitution of the rocket battery for guns, you have to provide for the battery's protection.

If he had had guns available, would he have taken them with him out of the camp. Perhaps he would, as he did not know what he was facing. Is that also why he wanted two companies of the 24th, more reliable protection for the battery than his native forces?

Perhaps the rocket battery was taken because that was the only heavy fire power he had?

Steve

Mules , troughs and fire works. Heavy power.

The guns were a mounted unit. Of course he would have taken them.