Court of Enquiry regarding the disastrous affair of Isandlwana

THE following Despatch has been received by the Secretary of State for War from Lieutenant-General Lord Chelmsford, K.C.B., Commanding the Forces in South Africa:—

All statements in this thread were from: Despatches 1879. Eye witness accounts\Evidence laid before the court of inquiry on the Isandlwana battle.




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Subject: Major Clery Senior Staff Officer to the 3rd Column. Court of Enquiry Isandlwana Today at 11:46 pm

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"Major Clery states: I am Senior Staff Officer to the 3rd Column, commanded by Colonel Glyn, C.B., operating against the Zulus. The General commanding accompanied this Column from the time it crossed the border into Zululand.
On the 20th January, 1879, at the Camp, Isandlwana, Zululand, the Lieutenant-General commanding gave orders to Commandant Lonsdale and Major Dartnell to go out the following morning in a certain direction from the camp with their men, i.e., the Native Contingent, and the Police, and Volunteers, part of the 3rd Column. On the evening of the following day (the 21st) a message arrived from Major Dartnell that the enemy was in considerable force in his neighbourhood, and that he and Commandant Lonsdale would bivouac out that night. About 1.30 A.M., on the 22nd, a messenger brought me a note from Major Dartnell, to say that the enemy was in greater numbers than when he last reported, and that he did not think it prudent to attack them unless reinforced by two or three companies of the 24th Regiment. I took this note to Colonel Glyn, C.B., at once, he ordered me to take it on to the General. The General ordered the 2nd Battalion 24th Regiment, the Mounted Infantry, and four guns, to be under arms at once to march. This force marched out from camp as soon as there was light enough to see the road. The Natal Pioneers accompanied this column to clear the road. The General first ordered me to write to Colonel Durnford, at Rorke's Drift, to bring his force to strengthen the camp, but almost immediately afterwards he told Colonel Crealock that he (Colonel Crealock) was to write to Colonel Durnford these instructions, and not I. Before leaving the camp, I sent written instructions to Colonel Pulleine, 24th Regiment, to the following effect:—" You will be in command of the camp during the absence of Colonel Glyn; draw in (I speak- from memory) your camp, or your line of defence"—I am not certain which-"while the force is out: also draw in the line of your infantry outposts accordingly; but keep your cavalry vedettes still far advanced." I told him to have a wagon ready loaded with ammunition ready to follow the force going out at a moment's notice, if required. I went to Colonel Pulleine's tent just before leaving camp to ascertain that he had got these instructions, and I again repeated them verbally to him. To the best of my memory, I mentioned in the written instructions to Colonel Pulleine that Colonel Durnford had been written to to bring up his force to strengthen the camp. I saw the column out of camp and accompanied it"

From: Despatches 1879

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Subject: Captain Alan Gardner, 14th Hussars, Court of Enquiry Isandlwana Today at 11:49 pm

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"I accompanied the main body of the 3rd Column as Acting Staff Officer to Officer commanding 3rd Column when it left the camp at Isandlwana on the 22nd January, 1879. I was sent back with an order from the General between ten and eleven A.M. that day into camp, which order was addressed to Colonel Pulleine, and was that the camp of the force out was to be struck and sent on immediately, also rations and forage for about seven days. On arriving in camp I met Captain George Shepstone, who was also seeking Colonel Pulleine, having a message from Colonel Durnford, that his men were falling back, and asking for reinforcements. We both went to Colonel Pulleine, to whom I delivered the order. Colonel Pulleine at first hesitated about carrying out the order, and eventually decided that the enemy being already on the hill on our left in large numbers, it was impossible to do so. The men of the 24th Regiment were all fallen in, and the Artillery also, and Colonel Pulleine sent two companies to support Colonel Durnford, to the hill on the left, and formed up the remaining companies in line, the guns in action on the extreme left flank of the camp, facing the hill on our left. I remained with Colonel Pulleine by his order. Shortly after, I took the mounted men, by Colonel Pulleine's direction, about a quarter of a mile to the front of the camp, and loft them there under the direction of Captain Bradstreet, with orders to hold the spruit. I went back to Colonel Pulleine, but soon after, observing the mounted men retiring, I went back to them, and, in reply to my question as to why they were retiring, was told they were ordered by Colonel Durnford to retire, as the position taken up was too extended This same remark was made to me by Colonel Durnford himself immediately afterwards. By this time the Zulus had surrounded the camp, "the whole force engaged in hand to hand combat, the guns mobbed by Zulus, and there became a general massacre. From the time of the first infantry force leaving the camp to the end of the fight about one hour elapsed. I estimated the number of the enemy at about 12,000 men. I may mention that a few minutes after my arrival in camp, I sent a message directed to the Staff Officer 3rd Column, saying that our left was attacked by about 10,000 of the enemy; a message was also sent by Colonel Pulleine. The Native Infantry Contingent fled as soon as the fighting began, and caused great confusion in our ranks. I sent messages to Rorke's Drift and Helpmakaar Camp that the Zulus had sacked the camp and telling them to fortify themselves".

Despatches 1879

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Subject: Statement of Lieutenant-Colonel J. North Crealock, Acting Military Secretary. Isandlwana Today at 11:39 pm

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Soon after 2 A.M. on the 22nd January I received instructions from the Lieutenant-General to send a written order to Lieutenant-Colonel Durnford, R.E., commanding No. 2 Column, to the following effect (I copied it in my note-book which was afterwards lost): " Move up to Sandhlwana Camp at once with all your mounted men and Rocket Battery—take command of it. I am accompanying Colonel Glyn, who is moving off at once to attack Matyana and a Zulu force
said to be 12 or 14 miles off, and at present watched by Natal Police, Volunteers, and Natal Native Contingent. Colonel Glyn takes with him 2-24th Regiment, 4 guns R.A., and Mounted Infantry."

I was. not present during the conversation between Major Clery, Staff Officer to Colonel Glyn, and the Lieutenant-General, but the evening before, about 8.30 P.M., on this officer asking the Lieutenant-General if the 1-24th " Were to reinforce Major Dartnell in the Magane Valley," he said " No." The General received, I believe through Colonel Glyn, a subsequent representation which caused the fresh orders at 2 A.M. the 22nd, and the orders to Lieutenant-Colonel Durnford.

Lieutenant-Colonel Durnford, R.E., was not under Colonel Glyn's command at this time; he had been moved from his original position before Middle Drift, with some 250 Mounted Natives, 200 of Sikalis footmen, the Rocket Battery, and one battalion of the 1st Regiment Natal Native Contingent to the Umsinga District, on the Lieutenant-General's seeing the ease with which the Natal frontier could be passed in that part of the Buffalo River. The Lieutenant-General's order was therefore sent to him by me, being the only Head Quarter Staff Officer (except the Aide-de-Camps) with him. These details formed part of No. 2 Column under his command.

I sent the orders to him by Lieutenant Smith-Dorrien, of 95th Foot, with directions to leave as soon as he could see his way. I expected him to find Colonel Durnford at the Bashee Valley; it was delivered and acted upon.

Although I was not aware at that time of the Lieutenant-General's grounds for ordering the troops from camp, yet it was evident to me that he wished to close up to the camp all outlying troops, and thus strengthen it. He would naturally also consider that the presence of an officer of Colonel Durnford's rank and corps would prove of value in the defence of a camp, if it should be attacked.

The Lieutenant-General had himself noticed mounted men in one direction (our left front) on the 21st. A patrol of the Mounted Infantry had found another small body of the enemy in our front, and Major Dartnell, we knew, had a strong force before him on our right front. It was evident to me that the Zulu forces were in our neighbourhood, and the General had decided, on the evening of the 21st, to make a reconnaissance to our left front.

It did not occur to me that the troops left in camp were insufficient for its defence. Six Companies British Infantry, 2 guns, 4 Companies Natal Contingent, 250 Mounted Natives, 200 Sikalis men, and details of Mounted Corps appeared to me—had I been asked—a proper force for the defence of the camp and its stores.

I subsequently heard Major Clery state that the had left precise instructions to Lieutenant-Lionel Pulleine "to defend the camp." Such instructions would, I consider, as a matter of course, be binding on Colonel Durnford on his assuming command of the camp.

The first intimation that reached me on the 22nd of there being a force of Zulus in the neighbourhood of the camp was between 9.30 and 10 A.M. We were then off-saddled on neck facing the Isipise range, distant some 2 miles from camp. During the three previous hours we had been advancing with Colonel Glyn's Column against a Zulu force that fell back from hill to hill as we advanced, giving up without a shot most commanding positions. Major Clery at this time received a half sheet of foolscap with a message from Lieutenant-Colonel Pulleine informing him (I think it ran) that a Zulu force had appeared on the hills on his left front. Our own attention was chiefly bent on he enemy's force retiring from the hills in our front, and a party being pursued by Lieutenant Colonel Russell three miles off. This letter was not addressed to me, and I did not note on it the time of receipt, but one I received from Colonel Russell soon after is noted by me (I think, for it is at Pietermaritzburg) as received at 10.20.

Lieutenant Milne, R.N., A.D.C., shortly after this descended a hill on our left, whence he had been on the look-out with a telescope. All the news he gave regarding the camp was that the cattle had been driven into camp. I believe this to have been nearly 11 A.M.

In the meantime information reached the General that the right of our force was smartly engaged with the enemy's left. Two companies of 2-24th and the 2nd Battalion of the Natal Native Contingent climbed the hill to our right, and, striking across the flat hill, joined the Volunteers who were still engaged. Colonel
Glyn accompanied them, having first ordered back the four guns and two Companies 2-24th to the wagon track, with instructions to join him near the Mangane Valley. He had also sent back instructions by Captain Alan Gardner, 14th Hussars, to Lieutenant-Colonel Pulleine. I was not informed of their nature. I took the opportunity of ordering our own small camp to proceed and join us, as the General intended to move camp up to the Mangane Valley, as soon as arrangements could be made.

The 1st Battalion Natal Native Contingent had been ordered back to camp, and to skirmish through the ravines in case any Zulus were hanging about near the camp.

Not a sign of the enemy was now seen near us, and followed by the remaining two Companies 2-24th, we climbed the hill and followed the track taken by the others. Not a suspicion had crossed my mind that the camp was in any danger, neither did anything occur to make me think of such a thing until about 1.15, when Honourable Mr. Drummond said he fancied he had heard (and that natives were certain of it) two cannon shots. We were then moving back to choose a camp for the night, about 12 miles distant from Isandhlana. About 1.45 PM., however, a native appeared on a hill above us, gesticulating and calling. He reported that heavy firing had been going on round the camp. We galloped up to a high spot, whence we could see the camp, perhaps 10 or 11 miles distant. None of us could detect anything amiss; all looked quiet. This must have been 2 P.M.

The General, however, probably thought it would be well to ascertain what had happened himself, but not thinking anything was wrong, ordered Colonel Glyn to bivouac for the night where we stood; and taking with him some forty Mounted Volunteers proceeded to ride into camp.

Lieutenant-Colonel Cecil Russell, 12th Lancers, now joined us, and informed me that an officer of the Natal Native Contingent had come to him (about 12 noon, I think) when he was off-saddled, and asked where the General was, as he had instructions to tell him that heavy firing had been going on close to the camp. Our whereabouts was not exactly known, but the 2-24th Companies were still in sight, and Colonel Russell pointed them out, and said we were probably not far from them. This officer, however, did not come to us.

This information from Colonel Russell was immediately followed by a message from Commandant Brown, commanding the 1st Battalion Natal Native Contingent, which had been ordered back to camp at 9.30 A.M.—(the Battalion was halted a mile from us, and probably eight miles from camp)—to the effect that large bodies of Zulus were between him and the camp, and that his men could not advance without support. The General ordered an immediate advance of the Battalion, the Mounted Volunteers and Mounted Infantry supporting it.

am not aware what messages had been sent from the camp and received by Colonel Glyn, or his Staff; but I know that neither the General nor myself had up to this time received any information but that I have mentioned.

At 3.15 the Lieutenant-General appeared to think that he would be able to brush through any parties of Zulus that might be in his road to the camp without any force further than that referred to, viz.:—1st Battalion Native Contingent and some 80 mounted white men.

At 4 P.M., however, the Native Battalion again halted, and I galloped on to order the advance to be resumed, when I met Commandant Lonsdale, who remarked to me as I accosted him, "The Zulus have the camp." "How do you know?" I asked, incredulously. " Because I have been into it," was his answer.

The truth was now known, and every one drew his own conclusions; mine were unluckily true, that hardly a man could have escaped. With such an enemy and with only foot soldiers it appeared to me very improbable that our force could have given up the camp until they were surrounded.

The General at once sent back Major Gossett, A.D.C., 54th Regiment, to order Colonel Glyn to advance at once with everyone with him. He must have been five or six miles off. It was now 4 P.M. We advanced another two miles, perhaps. The 1st Battalion, 2 Regiment, Natal Native Contingent, deployed in three ranks, the first being formed of the white men and those natives who had firearms, the Mounted Volunteers and Mounted Infantry on the flanks, with,
scouts to the front.

About a quarter to five we halted at a distance, I should think, of two miles from camp, but. two ridges lay between us and the camp, and with our glasses we could only observe those returning the way they had come. Colonel Russell went to the front to reconnoitre, and returned about 5.45 with a report that "All was as bad as it could be;" that the Zulus were holding the camp. He estimated the number at 7,000.

The troops with Colonel Glyn had pushed on with all possible speed, though the time seemed, long to us as we lay and watched the" sun sinking. At 6 P.M. they arrived, and, having been formed into fighting order, were addressed by the General. We then advanced to strike the camp and attack any one we found in our path back to Rorke's Drift.

I consider it but just to the Natal Native Contingent to state that it was my belief that evening, and is still the same, that the two Battalions would have gone through any enemy we met, even as our own British troops were prepared to do. I noticed no signs of wavering on their part up to sunset, when I ceased to be
able to observe them.
(Signed) J. N. CREALOCK,
Lieutenant-Colonel, A- Mil. Sec.

From: northeastmedals

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Subject: Statement made by Natives regarding the Action of the 22nd January, at the Sandhlwana Hill. Sun Jan 18, 2009 12:08 am

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Information received from Umtegolalo, a Zulu well known to Mr. Longeast, Interpreter to the Lieutenant-General, found wounded at Rorke's
Drift on the 23rd January.
Statement made by Natives regarding the Action of the 22nd January, at the Sandhlwana Hill.

THE Zulu army had, on the day of the 21st January, been bivouacked between the Upindo and Babmango Hills, from which position a portion of them were able to see our mounted men, viz., the Natal Carabineers and the Mounted Police, on the Ndhlaza Kazi Hill, and were seen by them.
The army consisted of the Undi Corps, the Nokenke and Umcityu Regiments, and the Nkobamakosi and Inbonambi Regiments, who were severally about 3000, 7000, and 10,000 strong, being the picked troops of the Zulu army.
During the night of the 21st January, they were ordered to move in small detached bodies to a position about a mile and a half to the east of the camp at Sandhlwana, on a stony table-land about 1000 yards distant from and within view of the spot visited by Lord Chelmsford and Colonel Glyn on the afternoon of the 21st January.
On arriving at this position, they were ordered to remain quiet, not showing themselves or lighting fires. Their formation was as follows:—The centre was occupied by the Undi Corps ; the right wing by the Nokenke and Umcityu ; and the left by the Inbonambi and the Nkobama Kosi Regiments.
Their orders from the King were to attack Colonel Glyn and No. 3 Column, and to drive it back across the boundary river. They had, however, no intention whatever of making any attack on the 22nd January, owing to the state of the moon being unfavourable from a superstitious point of view. The usual sprinkling of the warriors with medicine previous to an engagement had not taken place, nor had the war song been sung, or the religious ceremonies accompanying been performed. They were going to make their attack either during the night of the 22nd or at daylight on the 23rd, and, trusting in their number, felt quite secure of victory.
When, on the morning of the 22nd January the mounted Basutos, under the command of Colonel Durnford, R.E., discovered their position and fired at a portion of the Umcityu Regiment, that regiment immediately sprung up without orders, and charged. It was at once followed by the Nokenke, Inbonambi, and Nkobamakosi Regiments, the Undi Corps holding its ground. Up to this point in the day there had been no fighting. Early in the morning, soon after the departure of Colonel Glyn and the troops with him, a bod (probably a company of the Natal Native Contingent) had been ordered to scout on the left, but do riot seem to have come upon the enemy. About nine A.M. (approximately), Colonel Durnford arrived with 250 mounted men and 250 Native Infantry, who were at once divided into three bodies, one being sent to the left, east (who came into contact with the Umcityu Regiment), one to the left front, and one to the rear, along the wagon-road (which is supposed to have gone after the baggage wagons brought up by Colonel Durnford,R.E).
At this period of the day the position of the troops was as follows. They were drawn up to the left of the Native Contingent Camp, with the guns facing the left. A message was now brought by a Natal Native Contingent officer, probably one of Colonel Durnford's mounted men, that the Zulus were advancing in great force, and firing was heard towards the left (the firing of the mounted Basutos against the Umcityu Regiment).
It is stated by a wagon driver that a consultation now took place between Colonel Durnford and Colonel Pulleine, during which he imagined there was a difference of opinion, Colonel Pulleine ultimately, however, giving way to his superior officer.
A Company of the 1st Battalion 24th were then moved up to the neck between the Sandhlwana Hill and the position occupied by the Zulus, where they at once became engaged with the Umcityu Regiment whose advance they completely checked for the time. The distance of this neck is about a mile and a half from camp.
Meanwhile the Zulus had advanced in the following order. The Umcityu Regiment formed the right Centre, and was engaged with one company 1st Battalion 24th Regiment, and about 200 of Colonel Durnford's natives; the left centre was composed of the Nokenke Regiment who were being shelled by the two guns as they advanced. Next to them on the left, came the Inbonambi Regiment with the Nkobamakosi Regiment outside of it) both making a turning movement and
threatening the front of the camp, while driving before them a body of Colonel Durnford's mounted men, supported by a patrol of Volunteers. The Undi Corps, on seeing that the other four regiments had commenced the attack, as above, inarched off to their right, and, without fighting, made for the north side of the Sandhlwana Hill, being concealed by it until, their turning movement being completed, they made their appearance to the west of the Sandhlwana at the spot were the wagon road crosses the neck. Meanwhile the Nkobaroakosi Regiment had become engaged on the left front of the camp with our infantry, and Buffered very severely, being repulsed three times, Until the arrival of the Inbonambi Regiment enabled them to push forward, along the south front of the camp and complete their turning movement. This produced an alteration in the position held by those defending the camp. Two companies of the 24th Regiment and all the mounted Europeans being sent to the extreme right of the camp, at the spot where the road cuts through it. The guns were moved to the right of the Native Contingent camp, having the nullah below them to their left lined by the Native Contingent; three companies of the 1st Battalion 24th Regiment remained on the left of the camp, supported on their left by the body of Mounted Basutos, who had been driven back by the Umcityu Regiment. The one company of the 1st Battalion 24th Regiment which had been thrown out to the neck, was now retiring, fighting.
By this time the attack of the enemy extended along the whole front of the camp, a distance of not less than 800 yards, and along the whole left, a distance of about 600 yards, and although they were still held in check by our fire, they were advancing rapidly towards the gaps between the troops. Up to this point their advance had been steady, and made without noise, but now they began to double and to call to one another. The camp followers and the Native Contingent began to fly, making for the right, and in a few minutes more the troops were forced to retire upon the tents to avoid being cut off, as the Zulus had now burst through the gaps. So far, very few men had fallen on our side, the fire of the enemy being far from good, but as the men fell back the Zulus came with a rush, and in a very few minutes it became a hand to hand conflict. About this time also the Undi corps, made its appearance on the right rear of the camp, completely cutting off any retreat towards Rorke's Drift. Fortunately the Nkobamakosi, instead of attempting to completely surround the camp by making a junction with the Undi, followed the retreating natives, thus leaving a narrow passage open for escape, which was taken advantage of by such as were able to escape out of the camp. A few were met and killed by the Uudi, but that corps, believing that the camp was already plundered, decided to make the best of their way to Rorke's Drift, and plunder it, never dreaming that any opposition could be offered by the few men they knew to be there.
The loss of the Zulus must have been exceedingly heavy. The Umcityu were frightfully cut up by the single company of the 1st Battalion 24th Regiment, which was sent out of camp, and never returned; the Nkobamakosi fell in heaps ; the hill down which the Nokenke came was covered with slain; and the loss of the Undi at Rorke's Drift cannot be less than 500; they killed all their own wounded who were unable to get away.
Much astonishment was expressed by the Zulus at the behaviour of our soldiers, firstly, regarding their death dealing powers considering their numbers; secondly, because they did not run away before the enormous numerical superiority of the enemy.
(Signed).
W. DRUMMOND,
Head-quarter Staff.

Source: northeastmedals

Captain Essex's Evidence. Rorke's Drift, January 24, 1879.
SIR,
I HAVE the honour to forward for the information of the Lieutenant-General Commanding, an account of an action which took place near the Isandlwana Hills on the 22nd instant. After the departure of the main body of the column, nothing unusual occurred in camp until about eight A.M., when a report arrived from a picquet stationed at a point about 1,500 yards distant, on a hill to the north of the camp, that a body of the enemy's troops could be seen approaching from the north-east. Lieutenant-Colonel Pulleine, 1st Battalion 24th Regiment, commanding in camp, thereupon caused the whole of the troops available to assemble near the eastern side of the camp, facing towards the reported direction of the enemy's approach. He also dispatched a mounted man with a report to the column, presumed to be about twelve or fifteen miles distant. Shortly after nine A.M., a small body of the enemy showed itself just over the crest of the hills, in the direction they were expected, but retired a few minutes afterwards, and disappeared. Soon afterwards, information arrived from the picquet before alluded to, that the enemy was in three columns, two of which were retiring, but were still in view; the third column had disappeared in a north-westerly direction. At about ten A.M. a party of about 250 mounted natives, followed by a rocket. battery, arrived with Lieu tenant-Colonel Durnford, R.E., who now assumed command of the camp. The main body of this mounted force, divided into two portions, and the rocket battery were about 10.30 A.M., sent out to ascertain the enemy's movements, and a company of 1st Battalion 24th Regiment, under command of Lieutenant Cavaye was directed to take up a position as a piquet on the hill to the north of the camp at about 1200 yards distant, the remainder of the troops were ordered to march to their private parades when the men were to be down in readiness, at this time, about eleven A.M., the impression in camp was that the enemy had no intention of advancing during the daytime, but might possibly-be expected to attack during the night. No idea had been formed regarding the probable strength of the enemy's force. At about twelve o'clock, hearing firing on the hill where the company 1st Battalion 24th Regiment was stationed, I proceeded in that direction. On my way I passed a company of the 1st Battalion 24th Regiment, under command of Captain Mostyn, who requested me, being mounted, to direct Lieutenant Cavaye
to take special care not to endanger the right of his company, and to inform that officer that he himself was moving up to the left. I also noticed a body of Lieutenant-Colonel Dunford's mounted natives retiring down the hill, but did not see the enemy. On arriving at the far side of the crest of the hill, I found the company in charge of Lieutenant Cavaye, a section being detached about 500 yards to the left, in charge of Lieutenant Dyson. The whole were in extended order engaging the enemy, who was moving in similar formation towards our left, keeping at about 800 yards from our line. Captain Mostyn moved his company into the space between the portions of that already on the hill, and his men then extended and entered into action. This line was then prolonged on our right along the crest of the hill by a body of native infantry. I observed that the enemy made little progress as regards his advance, but appeared to be moving at a rapid pace towards our left. The right extremity of the enemy's line was very thin, but increased in depth towards and beyond our right as far as I could see, a hill interfering with an extended view. About five minutes after the arrival of Captain Mostyn's Company I was informed by Lieutenant Melville, Adjutant, 1st Battalion 24th Regiment, that a fresh body of the enemy was appearing in force in our rear, and he requested me to direct the left of. the line formed, as above described, to fall slowly back, keeping up the fire. This I did; then proceeded towards the centre of the line. I found, however, that it had already retired. I therefore followed in the same direction, but being mounted had great difficulty in descending the hill, the ground being very rocky and precipitous. On arriving at the foot of the slope I found the two companies of 1st Battalion 24th Regiment drawn up at about 400 yards distant in extended order, and Captain Younghusband's company in a similar formation in echelon on the left. The enemy was descending the hill, having rushed forward as soon as our men disappeared below the crest, and beyond (?) the right of the line with which I was present had even arrived near the foot of the hill. The enemy's fire had hitherto been very wild and ineffective, now, however, a. few casualties began to occur in our line. The companies 1st Battalion 24th Regiment first engaged were now becoming short of ammunition, and at the request of the officer in charge I went to procure a fresh supply with the assistance of Quartermaster 2nd Battalion 24th Regiment and some men of the Royal Artillery. I had some boxes placed on a mule cart and sent it off to the companies engaged, and sent more by hand, employing any men without arms. I then went back to the line, telling the men that plenty of ammunition was coming. I found that the companies 1st Battalion 24th. Regiment before alluded, to had retired to within 300 yards of that portion of the camp occupied by the Native Contingent. On my way I noticed a number of native infantry retreating in haste towards the camp, their officer endeavouring to prevent them but without effect. On looking round to that portion of the field to our right and rear I saw that the enemy was surrounding us. I rode up to Lieutenant-Colonel Durnford, who was near the right, and pointed this out to him. He requested me to take men to that part of the field and endeavour to hold the enemy in check; but while he was speaking, those men of the Native Contingent who had remained in action rushed past us in the utmost disorder, thus laying open the right and rear of the companies of 1st Battalion 24th Regiment on the left, and the enemy dashing forward in a most rapid manner poured in at this part of the line. In a moment all was disorder, and few of the men of 1st Battalion 24th Regiment had time to fix bayonets before the enemy was among them using their assegais with fearful effect. I heard officers calling to their men to be steady; but the retreat became in a few seconds general, and in a direction towards the road to Rorke's Drift. Before, however, we gained the neck near the Isandlwana Hill the enemy had arrived on that portion of the field also, and the large circle he had now formed closed in on us. The only space which appeared opened was down a deep gully running to the south of the road into which we plunged in great confusion. The enemy followed us closely and kept, up with us at first on both flanks, then on our right only, firing occasionally, but chiefly making use of the assegais. It was now about 1.30 P.M. ; about this period two guns with which Major Smith and Lieutenant Curling, R.A., were returning with great difficulty, owing to the nature of the ground, and I understood were just a few seconds late. Further on the ground passed over on our retreat would at any other time be looked upon as impracticable for horsemen to descend, and many losses occurred, owing to horses falling and the enemy coming up with the riders; about half a mile from the neck the retreat had to be carried on in nearly single file, and in this manner the Buffalo River was gained at a point about five miles below Rorke's Drift. In crossing this river many men and horses were carried away by the stream and lost their lives ; after crossing the fire of the enemy was discontinued, pursuit, however, was still kept up, but with little effect, and apparently with the view of cutting us off from Rorke's Drift, The number of white men who crossed the river at this point was, as far as Icould see, about 40. In addition to these, there were a great number of natives on foot and on horseback. White men of about 25 or 30 arrived at Helpmakaar between five and six P.M., when, with the assistance of other men joined there, a laager was formed with wagons round the stores. I estimate the strength of the enemy to have been about 15,000. Their losses must have been considerable towards the end of the engagement.
I have, &c., (Signed) E. ESSEX, • Captain, 75th Regiment, Sub-Director of Transports.

From Lieutenant Curling to Officer Commanding No. 8. Helpmakaar, January 26, 1879.
SIR,
I HAVE the honour to forward the following report of the circumstances attending the loss of two guns of N Brigade, 5th Battery Royal Artillery, at the action of Isandlwana, on January 22. About 7.80 A.M. on that date, a large body of Zulus being seen on the hills to the left front of the camp, we were ordered to turn out at once, and were formed up in front of the 2nd Battalion 24th Regiment Camp, where we remained until eleven o'clock, when we returned to camp with orders to remain harnessed up and ready to turn out at a minute's notice. The Zulus did not come within range and we did not come into action. The infantry also remained in column of companies. Colonel Durnford arrived about ten A.M. with Basutos and the rocket battery ; he left about eleven o'clock with these troops in the direction of the hills where we had seen the enemy. About twelve o'clock we were, turned out, as heavy firing was heard in the direction of Colonel Durnford's force. Major Smith arrived as we were turning out and took command of the guns, we trotted up to a position about 400 yards beyond the left front of the Natal Contingent Camp, and came into action at once on a large body of the enemy about 3,400 yards off. The 1st Battalion 24th Regiment soon came up and extended in skirmishing order on both flanks and in line with us. In about a quarter of an hour, Major Smith took away one gun to the right, as the enemy were appearing in large numbers in the direction of the Drift, in the stream in front of the camp. The enemy advanced slowly, without halting; when they were 400 yards off, the 1st Battalion, 24th Regiment advanced about 30 yards. We remained in the same position. Major Smith, returned at this time with his gun, and came into action beside mine. The enemy advancing still, we began firing case, but almost immediately the infantry were ordered to retire. Before we could get away, the enemy were by the guns; and I saw one gunner stabbed as he was mounting on to an axle-tree box. The limber gunners did not mount, but ran after the guns. We went straight through the camp but found the enemy in possession. The gunners were all stabbed going through the camp with the exception of one or two. One of the two sergeants was also killed at this time. When we got on to the road to Rorke's Drift it was completely blocked up by Zulus. I was with Major Smith at this time, he told me he had been wounded in the arm. We saw Lieutenant Coghill, the A.D.C., and asked him if we could not rally some men and make a stand, he said he did not think it could be done. We crossed the road with the crowd, principally consisting of natives, men left in camp, and civilians, and went down a steep ravine leading towards the river. The Zulus were in the middle of the crowd, stabbing the men as they ran. When we had gone about 400 yards, we came to a deep cut in which the guns stuck. There was, as far as I could see, only one gunner with them at this time, but they were covered with men of different corps clinging to them. The Zulus were in them almost at once, and the drivers pulled off their horses. I then left the guns. Shortly after this. I again saw Lieutenant Coghill, who told me Colonel Pulleine had been killed. Near the river I saw Lieutenant Melville, 1st
Battalion 24th Regiment, with a colour, the staff being broken. I also saw Lieutenant Smith-Dorrien assisting a wounded man. During the action, cease firing, was sounded twice.
I am, &c. (Signed) H. T. CURLING, Lieutenant R.A.

I have come across the full transcripts relating to the Court of Inquiry, a large part of which has already been posted above.
These can be found at http://www.northeastmedals.co.uk/britishguide/zulu/despatch4_isandhlwana_isandlwana.htm
and also at http://www.northeastmedals.co.uk/britishguide/zulu/despatch6_isandhlwana_isandlwana.htm

I was particular interested in Lord Chelmsfords remarks in his introduction as follows " the court has very properly abstained from giving an opinion, and I myself refrain also from making any observations or from drawing any conclusions from the evidence theiren recorded" .

On reading these transcripts, my questions are:-
1) How appropriate was it for Chelmsford to initiate the Court of Inquiry, bearing in mine the officers officiating (who presumably were appointed by Chelmsford) were hardly likely to make adverse comment on their superior officer if they considered him at fault?
2) As regards Chelmsford's comments above, was he in effect asking his superiors back in England to make a judgement and if so, what was it?

JohnB

JohnB. The good Lord Chelmsford, you could say was taking the initiative. He assembled the court of enquiry to establish the facts while they were fresh in the minds of those that gave evidence.

“I myself refrain also from making any observations or from drawing any conclusions from the evidence theiren recorded”.

He really had no choice, he was not at Isandlwana. He probably in truth did have opinions, but the questions he had would not be answered truthfully, as far has he was concerned he left a 1000 men in the camp at Isandlwana when he left, and thought he had left them in the charge of competent officers, of course we now know this not to be the case.

At this particular court of enquiry, there could never have been a Guilty or not guilty verdict, a lot of people then and today can see no point as the relevance of this court of enquiry, but if they were to stand back and look at the bigger picture it was and always was meant to be a fact finding exercise. And that’s all the Good Lord Chelmsford ever meant it to be.

The gathering of the facts would have been useful if a court of enquiry was ever established to find the culprit for the disaster of course there would have been no point, as the real culprits were killed at Isandlwana, and that probably is the real reason why a court enquiry was never assembled.

Chelmsford had no option but to call for an enquiry. He had to establish a position and cause for his actions/non actions for the British Parliament and his military superiors. He was fully aware that the politicians and the people would be baying for blood. Ergo he had no option. What he did do though was give very definite guidelines to the members of the enquiry on their line of enquiry, hence the very truncated statements from the eye witnesses and also the reason that Essex was curtailed in his statement. His first attempt at a cover up.
It did him, Chelmsford no good as he was forced to expand on his decisions to parliament and the Horse Guards, this was in the form of a list of questions, his answers were condemned in no uncertain manner by the Duke of Wellington and lead to Chelmsford passing the rest of his service life doing the rounds of the clubs, and presumably expanding his knowledge and playing abilities in Billiards. Possibly the only thing he ever did right in his life time.
Chelmsford is adequatly summed up in one sentence written by Sir Garnet Wolseley, "I put up with dear old Wood, both he and Buller say Chelmsford is not fit to be a corporal." And that says it all.

Queen's Regulations the conditions under which the Court sits—

[i]A Court of Inquiry may be assembled by any officer in command to assist him in arriving at a correct conclusion on any subject on which it may be expedient for him to be thoroughly informed. With this object in view, such Court may be directed to investigate and report upon any matter that may be brought before it; but it has no power (except when convened to record the illegal absence of soldiers as provided for in the Articles of War) to administer an oath, nor to compel the attendance of witnesses not military."A Court of Inquiry is not to be considered in any light as a judicial body. It may be employed at the discretion of the convening officer to collect and record information only." Now, My Lords, Lord Chelmsford was absent from Isandula at the moment of the disaster. He could not from his own personal observation send home an entirely satisfactory account to the authorities in this country. There was but one course open to him—to order the assembly of such a Court of Inquiry to inquire merely into matters of fact and not into matters of opinion. If that Court of Inquiry had been directed, or if it were directed, to express an opinion, then it would be open to anyone to question the motives on which that opinion rested. But, as it is, it was appointed simply to collect facts for the information of the Commander-in-Chief, which he might employ as he thought best and send home to the authorities on his own responsibility.

CTSG / Springbok

Many thanks for these views - very helpful.

CTSG - can you recommend any book on Chelsmsford particularly of his life after the AZW?

Thanks,

JohnB

Lord Chelmsford’s Zululand Campaign. 1878-1879 This will give the best over-view of the Good Lord, in his own words.
Edited by John P.C Laband.

After the Zulu Campaign Lord Chelmsford became Lieutenant-General in 1882, Lieutenant of the Tower of London from 1884 until 1889, colonel of the 4th (West London) Rifle Volunteer Corps in 1887, full General in 1888, and colonel of the Derbyshire Regiment in 1889. He exchanged the colonelcy of the Derbyshires for that of the 2nd Life Guards in 1900, and was made GCVO in 1902.

He was the inaugural Governor and Commandant of the Church Lads' Brigade, a post he held until he died. he suffered a seizure and died while playing billiards at the United Service Club 1905. He is buried in Brompton Cemetery in London. ( A sad day in Englands History )

http://1879zuluwar.forumotion.com/pictorial-catalogue-of-azw-graves-memorials-f18/lord-chelmsford-t659.htm?highlight=chelmsford

Lord Chelmsford’s Zululand Campaign. 1878-1879. CTSG. What doe's this book actually contain?

Mr Greaves. Just about every letter he wrote during the Zulu War Campaign. Seriously it’s a book worth having. After reading it you will see that Chelmsford was actually a caring person. No disrespect but most of the members on this forum, only hear the bad opinions of the Good Lord Chelmsford, mostly off the back of Isandlwana. I have browse many forums, and they all same the same about the Good Lord Chelmsford, and it always relates to Isandlwana. And it’s a shame that he is only remembered because of the disaster at Isandlwana and he wasn’t even there. So yes buy the book and see for yourself. And you will get a better understanding of the Zulu war through his eyes as it happened.

hi ctsg.
I have nothing against The Good Lord as I know he was very well liked and respected by those under his command .
But he must share the blame with several others .
cheers 90th.

One question that springs to mind on reading Crealock's account. Faced with an enemy that apparently kept appearing and retreating and avoiding a major engagement, the pursuit carried on for some 3 miles. At which point would any leader of the pursuing force consider the risk that a) they were being led into a trap and b) they were being lured away from the other part of the column?

Also to be considered is that the further the pursuit went, the more stretched would be the lines of communications. Suspicions should have been further aroused by reports of a Zulu force in the rear, which as I understand from Crealock's report came as early as 9.30 am. Surely, consideration must have been given to the possibility that the Zulu intended to isolate the two halves of the column? If the intent was to continue the pursuit of the Zulus ahead of them, wouldn't it have made sense to move the base camp forward, thus solving these potential problems?

Hi Tom. Is this the account you speak of.

"The first intimation that reached me on the 22nd of there being a force of Zulus in the neighbourhood of the camp was between 9.30 and 10 A.M. We were then off-saddled on neck facing the Isipise range, distant some 2 miles from camp. During the three previous hours we had been advancing with Colonel Glyn's Column against a Zulu force that fell back from hill to hill as we advanced, giving up without a shot most commanding positions. Major Clery at this time received a half sheet of foolscap with a message from Lieutenant-Colonel Pulleine informing him (I think it ran) that a Zulu force had appeared on the hills on his left front. Our own attention was chiefly bent on he enemy's force retiring from the hills in our front, and a party being pursued by Lieutenant Colonel Russell three miles off. This letter was not addressed to me, and I did not note on it the time of receipt, but one I received from Colonel Russell soon after is noted by me (I think, for it is at Pietermaritzburg) as received at 10.20."

One question that springs to mind on reading Crealock's account. Faced with an enemy that apparently kept appearing and retreating and avoiding a major engagement, the pursuit carried on for some 3 miles.

Quote :

At which point would any leader of the pursuing force consider the risk that a) they were being led into a trap and b) they were being lured away from the other part of the column?

But on the other hand they could have thought they were routing the enemy, after all the British always thought the Zulu’s would be a walk over, But was it a trap, the Zulu’s that attacked Isandlwana only did so because they were accidentally found by Raw and co.

impi wrote:

But on the other hand they could have thought they were routing the enemy, after all the British always thought the Zulu’s would be a walk over, But was it a trap, the Zulu’s that attacked Isandlwana only did so because they were accidentally found by Raw and co.

Although it is true that the Zulus did not actually intend to attack at Isandlwana, and therefore not part of any Zulu masterplan, it is certainly possible that the force being chasing by the British was intentionally leading them away from the main Zulu army and in doing so was accidently isolating the camp at Isandlwana.

Surely it would not have been Chelmsford's intention to continue the chase deep into Zululand with the only provision for supplies being a single ammunition wagon being sent on from Isandlwana, as was the apparent plan? The problem with this kind of pursuit would be that, sooner or later, the force at Isandlwana would have to been called up to meet up with Chelmsford's force (to maintain supplies and ammunition). In order to do this, Chelmsford would have had to stop to wait for them to catch up, so contact would most likely be lost with the Zulu force ahead. Thus, unless it was clear that the Zulus intended to stand and fight, which was obviously not the case, this was a totally pointless exercise.

As I understand the original plan, the invading columns were supposed to meet up at a given point and time, and racing forward with a flying column, which is what Chelmsford was doing (contrary to his own invasion plan), would seem to imply glory-hunting (similar to the race for Berlin in WWII).

Tom
"Although it is true that the Zulus did not actually intend to attack at Isandlwana, and therefore not part of any Zulu "

Whats your source for this?

Regards

springbok9 wrote:

Tom
"Although it is true that the Zulus did not actually intend to attack at Isandlwana, and therefore not part of any Zulu "

Whats your source for this?

Regards

I'm sorry for this erroneous statement. What I really meant to say was that it was not the Zulu intention to make the attack at the time they did, and I believe that the expectation was that when the attack did occur, it was to be on the whole column. The accidental discovery of the Zulu army put paid to that. When I said that the actual attack was not part of a Zulu 'masterplan', I should have explained that if that had been the case, the natural progression would have been, once the camp was destroyed, to attack Chelmsford from the rear, with the Zulus he had been pursuing then attacking from his front.

Hi Tom
When I first joined the forum I made a mistake and appologised. I was told in no uncertain terms by 90th and Admin never say sorry.
So no problems mate.
The issue of when to attack is really a subject wide open to debate. Most authors have quoted various Zulu sources that say they only wanted to attack the following day. This to give time to send peace emmisaries as instructed by Cetswayo.
However there is another school of thought that suggests that the earliest sightings of Zulus on the Nyoni Ridge were actually the first elements of the right horn getting into position. These sightings were long before Raw spotted the main army. So there is that possibility that Ntshingwayo had decided that he was going to attack after all and strte to distribute his forces.
In How can Man die Better Mike Snook examins that aspect in fine detail and comes to the conclusion that the right horn was way in advance of the eventualy discovery.
Possibly a mid course scenario could have been that Ntshingwayo decided to ignore his chief or was in fact put under pressure by the other chiefs and so laid out a plan to attack on the 22nd.
Interesting topic though.

Regards

springbok9 wrote:

Hi Tom
When I first joined the forum I made a mistake and appologised. I was told in no uncertain terms by 90th and Admin never say sorry.
So no problems mate.

Thanks for that, springbok. I certainly don't profess to be an expert on the Zulu War, and I will no doubt make many more mistakes. I do think that it's fair that I should appologise when I do get things wrong, as I have become aware that some members are quite passionate on the subject and I wouldn't want to upset people unnecessarily.

However, I also have the ability to be very pig-headed when I want to be (just ask the wife!) :lol!:

Tom. We feel members join this forum because they are allow to make mistakes, "just look at my spelling at times". The good thing is no one makes a mockery of anyone or plays the head master. We are all learning as we go. As for pig headed we love pig headed CTSG is number 1 at the moment. But if you want to put him at number 2 feel free.

We have a few members, who are more knowledgeable, than us, but when we are wrong they explain in lay mans terms where we went wrong.

Quote :

As for pig headed we love pig headed CTSG is number 1 at the moment

Its you lot that have made me that way.

Quote :

Its you lot that have made me that way.

You were born that way. Tom your have alot of work to do, to take CTSG postion.

hi all.
I like it , :lol!: :lol!: :lol!: .
cheers 90th.

Lord Chelmsford’s Zululand Campaign. 1878-1879.

Here's couple of pages from the book. Found on a public domain.
[You must be registered and logged in to see this image.]

I have a suspicion that the book in question is 'Lord Chelmsford and the Zulu Wars' by Gerald French. If it is it was widely discredited for the changes Mr French made to various documents, in particular a map by Lt James.

Part of the Old boy cover up network.

Regards

Springbok. Only a suspicion? Not based on fact Ouch!!!!

Have to disagree.
The changes he made are fact, proven fact.
Compare the original map produced in March 1879 with the map printed.

Regards

Quote :

Compare the original map produced in March 1879 with the map printed.

You made the Allegation. Its for you show.

Its your topic, do the research

Of all the European Survivors, most of the British soldiers testified before official inquires or wrote letter that have been used in accounts of the Battle.
Captain Penn Symons (2/24th) reviewed some of the evidence in a regimental inquiry, including the testimonies of the six survivors of the 1st 24th (Privates Grant, Johnson, Trainer, Williams, Bickley, and Wilson) and observed: ‘

"it was very remarkable how their accounts afterward varied. Men forgot what they saw and did amidst great excitement, and mixed up what others told them with their own experiences and reminiscences"

"Some survivors. Like Lieutenant curling, were profoundly shocked by the experience and were not always lucid in his recollections; others embellished their accounts."

I think Symon’s observations just about sums it up. The accounts varied not giving a clear picture of what really did take place.

Moreover these accounts, as F.W.D Jackson has observed, "Do little more than hint at the final stages of the Battle”;

Quote :

"Do little more than hint at the final stages of the Battle”;

Now that makes sense!!!

Can I take it, that a regimental inquiry, is just that, and not an official inquiry. It was an inquiry in to a certain regiments actions during a Battle in this case the 1st /24th. In which case, the inquiry didn't find anything of consequence, that had not already been known. Do we know if any other regimental inquiries took place perhaps from the R.A or any of the colonial regiments.

It was a general court of enquiry rather than a regimental one.

Regards

Hi all.
The FWD Jackson mentioned by Pete ( Admin ) has two books which are worth reading and reaonably priced . .

http://www.rrw.org.uk/shop/shop.php?action=list&author=David+Jackson
cheers 90th .

90th
Funny you should list that, Ive ordered both this morning.

Regards

Hi Springbok.
I dont think you will be disappointed . As I said very well priced . Let me know what you think of them . Looking forward
to your reply in the future . Did you order them through the Royal Regt Wales ? .
cheers 90th

90th
Yes they are both on special. 10 GBP for the Hill and 2.50 for the the revisit. Dirt cheap considering the credentials of the author. Looking forward to getting them ( have to wait for the little man in the loin cloth running up the road with a forked stick.)

Regards

( you would notice that being a total gentleman Ive refrained from mentioning the two, hmmmm yes two, Aussie defeats of late) :lol!:

Hi Springbok.
:lol!: I'm surprisingly thick skinned considering we didnt loose at anything very much for a long long time !. But , Believe me I'm
getting used to it , and more than sure we'll be in trouble in the up - coming cricket series against you guys . .
cheers 90th.

90th
We are both going to develop really thick skins to take the stuff thats going to be coming over the Tasmin after the Cup final next week. Allready getting it from the son in law.

Regards

Would it have been official, or just a fact gathering excercise. I would imagine this regimental inquiry would have been carried out, after the official inquiry,so would have have no bearing on their findings.

springbok9 wrote:

I have a suspicion that the book in question is 'Lord Chelmsford and the Zulu Wars' by Gerald French. If it is it was widely discredited for the changes Mr French made to various documents, in particular a map by Lt James.

Part of the Old boy cover up network.

Regards

I have a copy of that book and have read it. It is a piece of Chelmsford apologetics. If people critcize Durnford and Colenso's histories on the basis of partisanship then this book is even more open to that criticism.

http://1879zuluwar.forumotion.com/t969-lord-chelmsford-question-in-the-house-of-commons-02-september-1880-regarding-the-battle-of-isandlwana