Under Strength Companies at firing line Isandlwana

Martini,

I was thinking that you could look for more info on your relative if you look at the movements of the other three sappers killed from the same Coy (5th Coy)

Its a long shot but your relative may appear in a photograph with one of his comrades.

The names of the other sappers are:

7100 Corporal Gamble, W. (5th Coy)
13805 Sapper Maclaren J. (5th Coy)
12812 Sapper Wheatley M. (5th Coy)

Waterloo

Bonjour Frederic
Unfortunately I'm not home to check the quote
90th

Yes he was. Mr Whybra kindly supplied me with with Chard's statement - the parts that apply to me.

Regards

PS we share the same surname Sapper Cuthbert & I.

Yes I shall thanks Waterloo

Hi M/H

Sorry to go off thread, just wanted to add:

•2nd Field Company (Captain WRC Wynne RE) - despatched from England 2 December 1878
•5th Field Company (Captain WP Jones RE) - despatched from England 2 December 1878
•7th Field Company (Major FW Nixon RE) - the resident Royal Engineer unit in South Africa at the time.
•C Telegraph Troop (Major AC Hamilton RE) - arrived in South Africa in May 1879

Waterloo

No thanks - that is very kind of you indeed.

90th
Chard did take 5 sappers with him but he brought one back (Robson, his batman) leaving 4 behind.

Waterloo
The figures in your last post of 1.45 should read:
Lieutenant-Colonel………..………………. 1
Majors………………………..…………… 3
Captains…………………………..………. 6
Captain or Lieutenant as Adjutant………… 1
Lieutenants…………………………..……. 8
2nd Lieutenants………………………….... 4 (for a while this rank overlapped with Sub-Lieutenant)
Quartermaster………………………………1
Sergeant Major……………………………. 1
Bandmaster………………………………... 1
Quartermaster Sergeant……………………. 1
Sergeant Instructor of Musketry…………... 1
Orderly Room Sergeant……………………. 2
Colour Sergeants of Companies…………… 8
Sergeant Drummer………………………… 1
Cook Sergeant……………………………... 1
Pioneer Sergeant…………………………… 1
Sergeants/lance-sergeants………   ………. 24 (inclusive of ‘trades’ like Tailor Sergeant, etc.)
Drummers………………………………… 16
Corporals/lance-corporals…………………. 40
Privates………………………………..… 760
Total Strength of battalion………………. 881
Also I'm not sure of the point you're making.  These figures represent a battalion at full strength, the ideal; no-one expected a battalion to remain at that level and new drafts were sent out periodically to bring the battalion up in numbers.  The 24th was down in numbers but not radically or dangerously so.  Are you implying something else that I've missed?

Hi Julian,

Thanks for the feedback,

I was just trying to highlight what a battalion should look like at full strength. I was also under the impression that the 24th was 'dangerously low in numbers, I now realise that they were not 'dangerously low', but as you stated 'down in numbers'.

Thanks Julian
Robson was a lucky man !
90th

Bonsoir,
Posted  yesderday on this forum by Cam Simpson (subject: "Lt Walter Higginson's report of 17 Frebruary

Sir,

I have the honor to hand you the particulars of the Battle of Isandhlwana as I saw it on the 22nd Jan 1879.
(....) When I got into Camp I found three Companies of the 24th Regt marching out to take up a position on the left, and as I came amongst the tents I met two more Companies and two guns coming out. I made my Report to Col Pulleine, and returned to my Company. The guns were then first getting into action; the first four shells were thrown over the hill on the left o check the Zulus, who were coming over; as it had no effect the others were fired point blank at them, while the 24th men opened fire at about 800 yards. My Company were extended along the front of our line of tents. As the Zulus came over the hill in front, the mounted Contingent & Carbineers came round the side, bringing in Capt Barry, and the outlying picket. The Zulus rapidly extended along the whole of the front of the Camp, and soon the Battle was general. They came on in Columns of Skirmishers, and when the front rank was shot down the rear rank filled their places. They very soon came to close quarters, and the bullets came dropping amongst my men; they stood it very well for a short time, till at last one man had a bullet through his shield. He jumped up and tried to run away, and it was with the greatest difficulty we could get the others to stand. Up to the present time no attempt has been made to strike the Camp. In fact there were no men to do it except the natives, as Col Pulleine had ordered all men out of the Camp who could carry arms.

A testimony against the thesis of Lock and Quantrill in "Zulu Victory".

Cheers.

It certainly is an interesting point Frederic, in general comparing this statement with the later one on the 18th is quite illuminating. There are a lot of discrepancies in terms of the distances involved as well. And probably the most interesting one of all, why two statements so close together? Looking at the original statement its painstakingly put together in and extremely neat 'copper plate' time was taken in getting it right, not a slap dash effort. So why repeat it?

Unless he was asked to..............................

Frank,
I have your last sentence in mind.
Do you think; a "manufacturing" of the facts by someone, an officier of high-rank in the circle of LC?  
It seemed to me that you were against the conspiracy theory....
Cheers
Frédéric

The two versions of Higginsons report were written at Rorke's Drift on 17th and 18th February. Who else was there that might have caused him to make the changes?

Steve

Frederic
I don't believe in the 'mass cover up' that seems to prevail. No doubt a lot of people omitted facts from statements to cover them selves or show them in a better light.
I haven't had time to really analize the two statements but there are quite a few discrepancies, possibly more technical than anything else.
Its the fact of them being written on consecutive days that intrigues me.

Cheers

Bonjour Frank, Steve (and all)
I am also intrigued...
As you know there is a report in the Natal Mercury from 'a gentleman' that Melvill received the Queen’s Colour from Pulleine's hands and was entrusted with its safety.
Ian Knight thinks "the ‘gentleman’ was Col. Glyn, who was keen to make it clear, in the event of any public or press speculation, that Melvill was acting properly in leaving the battlefield with the Colour" (questions to IK / oct. 3, 2013).
Cheers
Frédéric

This is where you have non-military persons (I have no difficulty with Ian Knight's standing as a historian) discussing military etiquette. They have never served so do not understand. Melvill, as the appointed Adjutant of 1/24th was de facto responsible for safety of the Colour. He did not need Colonel Pulleine's instruction. Perhaps it was a request as Pulleine considered that Melvill was delaying his departure and all would be lost.

Wolseley, a high rank Officer,  seemed  also not to understand the intricacies of military etiquette (see his comment about Melvill and Coghill at Isandlwana)

Ouch !

The  mystery about the two versions of Higginson's report prompted me to take a look at some of the others in the archives. I went back to Cochrane's written report (WO32/7726/079/1472) which Julian has used as the base for his composite paper in "Studies in the Zulu War 1879 II".

Three things strike me. First, the report is not in fact the original, it is certified a true copy by Crealock. Second, there are two phrases underlined in the report, and only two,  both of which are to the effect that "Durnford took command". I wonder who did the underlining Cochrane or Crealock?

The third thing that is striking is the small sketch that is included (copy below) and is reproduced by Julian in his paper. It is the formation of the Impi that was met by Durnford, which Cochrane says "Was in skirmishing order and were 10 or 12 deep with supports close behind". We know it is the left horn (or part of it) and it is clearly in a moving column rather than spread on a wide front. It does not surprise me that it was interpreted slightly earlier  as a column moving towards the General and, for me, makes Durnford's move to intercept it entirely credible.
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So, a few things to chew on.

Steve

It's always interesting to learn who requested the report and what was specified in the request.
Sometimes it strongly influences the content of the report and directs the responses of the report's author, perhaps even at the expense of truth.

Steve
Quote: "We know it is the left horn (or part of it) and it is clearly in a moving column rather than spread on a wide front. It does not surprise me that it was interpreted slightly earlier as a column moving towards the General and, for me, makes Durnford's move to intercept it entirely credible."

Sorry I do need to disagree to an extent. I would suggest that the force facing Durnford was actually the reserve. I know Im going to get ripped to shreds on this but its my belief that the left horn was the force that decimated the Rocket Battery, or at least the forward elements of it. I believe that it was that force that moved across the plain and attacked the donga whilst the reserve peeled away to wait sat out on the plain. There are far to many pointers to a force waiting out on the plain to ignore and they had to have come from some where, I would suggest that the some where was out of the Quabe valley.
In terms of Durnford he had no idea he would me moving against that sort of force, his last reports were of a body of 400. I don't believe that Durnford was so militarily incompetent to knowingly take out 250 men against a force of 3 to 5000. No he expected to tackle a group of 400.

Just my thoughts

Cheers

Frank
So, you postulate that Durnford runs into the reserve which was coming down the Quabe, but the force that pursues him to the Donga is the left horn which came down the Notch? And the reserve then downs tools and remains on the plain awaiting events? Was not the left horn substantial enough to need to use both the Notch and the Quabe depending on starting point?

I am not sure about Durnford's perception of how many he might have been facing. He was among the most familiar with the Zulu method of battle and I don't think he imagined there would ever be small numbers involved. He may well have over estimated his ability to cope because he had a mounted force (it doesn't matter if we are surrounded we will cut through them).

The point I was really trying to make was that re-reading Cochrane's description and diagram of the Zulu formation brought home to me how someone might well imagine that here was a Zulu unit going somewhere else and in the direction of the General.

Steve

Hi Steve
Its a strange concept I know, but I seldom do 'normal' and it is just a theory, one that tends to fit a lot of areas.
In essence: There is a strange (ish) testimony that the impi coming over the plateau 'performed a turning movement so the left became the right etc'. I read that to mean the left horn became the right horn and vis a versa. In other words the left horn was on the plateau, not in the Quabe Valley.
The place the rocket Battery was decimated is the area known as the Notch, on the extreme East of the plateau adjacent to iThuse and to the East of the Conical hill. On the attack path of the impi from the North East, either point X or the Ngwebini Valley, the closet point for the left horn to peel of is that area.
There is testimony, Stafford plus, that at one point the Impi actually sits down to wait. This has always been interpreted as waiting for the left horn in the Quabe to catch up. I believe that the Chest and the LEFT were waiting on the plateau for the RIGHT to work across to the West. The element in the Quabe were therefore not the left horn, It has at times been said that the Quabe element were PART of the left horn with the other part on the plateau. Why on earth would the left horn commander split his force?
Sorry for being long winded but as above, if not the left who were the Quabe forces? Why doesn't Mehlokazulu talk of the chase down the Quabe and he was one of the commanders in the left horn? Simple answer is because he wasn't there he was coming over the plateau.
When the Rocket Battery came to grief I believe it was by forward elements of the Left horn, in order to effect a rescue Durnford deviated from his retreat sufficiently to ride across a fairly large area to get there. If he was being so hard pressed that would have given the chasing impi more than enough time to cut him of from the donga and force him to enter the camp more towards the centre. But he instead had time to visit the bottom of the Notch, have a chat, issue instructions and ride back to his line of retreat. It is at that TIME that I believe that the left horn came over the notch towards him and forced his mounted men towards the South and the donga, the pusuing impi slows down and comes to rest at there designated holding point on the plain and later becomes part of the outflanking left horn that proceeds on towards RD.

I can produce a fair amount of testimony to back up the theory but there again it will still only remain a theory.

I can almost hear the gnashing of teeth from the various authors and historians that log onto the forum incognito but make no apologise, outlandish as it is.

Thanks Frank. Not outlandish just thought provoking, which is what we need. If the gnashing teeth brigade were driven to respond you will have done an excellent job!

It's worth trying to set out the pros and cons of your proposition.

First the concept of the left horn and the reserve, which seem to me to be useful "constructs", but in actual fact we are just talking about different Zulu regiments with different allocated roles. We do not know the order of the regiments along the Nwegbeni and so it is entirely possible that some of them crossed on the plateau before descending onto the plain in their proper formation.

There are, as you say, reports of the Zulus sitting down at some stage. It is plausible that some regiments were waiting for others to manoeuvre. It might also be possible to interpret Durnford's initial success at holding the Zulu advance as having more to do with their pausing the attack.

In terms of the significance of Durnford's diversion towards the Rocket Battery and back, I don't have sufficient knowledge of the ground to judge. But looking at the aerial shots, the valleys of the Notch and the Quabe appear to converge. So how much of a diversion from Durnford's retreat line it actually was must depend a bit on how far south Durnford was at the time?

Finally the change over from one set of Durnford's pursuers (the reserve from the Quabe) to another (the left horn from the Notch). I am not aware of any recognition of this in the reports from those who were with Durnford. It may of course not have been easily noticeable, but it would help to have some primary source saying something had changed.

Keep up the good work! Were you really up at 3.45am!

Steve

Morning Steve
I was indeed up in the early hours. Baby sitting duties and the three year old was restless so I brought him out to my studio and he fell asleep in the cat box with the cats. He does that on occasion. in the meantime it gives me time to waffle on outrageously.
This concept isn't something out of the blue I ve been kicking it around for quite a number of years. I did at one point have a lengthy discussion with Julian on the position of the reserve. It is a tad more than just a case of labelling really. The reserve was not empowered to act aggresivly and so its entirely possible they backed away from direct action against Durnford, basically giving him a free passage. The left horn though was attack orientated and would be a lot more aggressive. The implications of that distinction can be quite thought provoking.
Then again remove the reserve from the rear of iSandlwana, or at least the Northern side and whats left to oppose the fugitives. If one then starts to look at the numbers involved in the right horn, and the right centre of the chest it actuall starts to assume quite significant purpose. The horns never met as they should have done, why? The right was delayed? The right was to weak? They were to involved stopping the men on the road? It starts to ask a lot of questions, again if the the right hor, as I suspect, was under powered then why would they have forced the companies on the ridge to retire? My answer to that would be because Cavaye Mostyn etc were attacked by the right chest or possible an attempt to cut them of. If that becomes acceptable then the traditional format and direction of the line on the ridge is at 90 degrees to the attack, so the possibility of THAT line being in a different position ( Ive argued against that position for years) becomes more feasible.
So the 'naming' of those elements does start to grow some interesting horns ( Pun Intended Im afraid).
There would have been a fairly significant detour by Durnford, even being forced around a reall bad system of Dongas at the bottom of the Notch.

Getting towards the time for settling down to a brilliant, I hope, afternoon of Rugby. Aussie v England, no loyalties there except the fervent wish that the kick the crap out of each other and then of course Brave Heart v the Boks. A dozen cans of beer, plate of Biltong, half a kilo of dried kudu sausage and a plate of sushi.............. heaven. May even crack a bottle of Chardonnay later.

Enjoy the games and the meals, almost sounds like health food! I shall be joining you, but without the old leather footwear to chew.

Steve

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"Frank and Steve I noticed you were talking about  Durnfords about face in the Qwabe Valley so I thought  to post one of my photos of it,  where Barker stood

On that faithful morning I hope it helps.

I always thought it was the Uve regiment that was after Durnford and the Gabmakosi that went down the notch to silence the rocket battery."
Photo & Text by Aussie Inkosi.

From the image above in three sections left to right
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Frank, Frank, Frank...oh no not that again.
(Gnashing of teeth from afar.)
IF the left horn had been in contact with the RB there would have been no survivors and the left horn would then have got between Durnford and the camp!!  The RB was not 'decimated'.  The attackers were skirmishers who fired volleys, brought down several of the men and mules, stampeded the rest and frightened the what-not out of Nourse's NNC such that they legged it.  As Durnford's retiring force appears, the skirmishers withdrew.  Every single British right front witness says that the Zulus chasing Durnford pursued him up to (what would become) the 'perimeter' and then outflanked him gradually.  No-one mentions a sudden change of front or sideways shifting of Zulu regiments.  The only person who comes near it is Hamilton-Browne writing in 1912 who says he saw a body of Zulus come round behind those attacking Durnford's front (and that doesn't quite fit your picture does it?).
Too much chardonnay I think, Frank!  Me I prefer Riesling (German, of course, from the Mosel).
Admin
Excellent photos - among the best I've seen.

Morning Julian, yes that again.
One step at a time.
I did say up front 'elements of the left horn':
Private Johnson describes the attack as "We had time to fire our rocket when they came over the hill in masses." I would note not the odd one or two but 'masses' that could be interpreted as the beginings of the left horn.
Private Trainer has a similar viewpoint, "when the first rocket was fired they appeared in force over the top of the hill."
Private Grant," Captain Russell and five of the men of the rocket battery were killed leaving only three of us." 60% of the force killed would in my opinion be well into the decimated class.
Johnson continues to describe his escape in making his way to the donga ( Not the Nyogane donga but most probably the Nxibongo ) and then comments that Durnford told him to go back for Russell. His response is significant in that he says: "I then pointed out to him (Durnford) that the enemy had already surrounded us." That would suggest to me that there were indeed two forces against Durnford, the first by then exiting the Quabe valley and a second coming of the Notch, which would put them to the rear and flanking Durnfords party.
Both Davies and Brown describe the mass of men on the plain, to significant in my opinion to ignore.
Nothing wrong with to much Chardonnay.

Cheers

Actually Frank, the last time I visited David Jackson (when we had our last discussion) I told him about your thoughts and asked his opinion about evidence for the reserve's track (plateau or plain).  He went into a deep reverie (he hadn't dropped off), closed his eyes and said nothing for about ten minutes.  He then suddenly said I need to give this more thought and he would give me his opinion in due course.  He hasn't to date but I'll press him when I see him next.
My point is that Mycroft had nothing immediately against the idea (though he might yet) and I (and he) as you know believe that a portion of the uNdi did take a course behind the left horn and over the Stony Koppie.  I can't extend that into the whole reserve, the Notch, the RB, etc, etc.

P.S. Russell plus five men kia, Goff plus 3 1/24th privates safe = 6 killed and 4 survivors...decimate?? Well, actually decimate means 1 man in ten, so you might be more than right...technically. must get back to work. Really busy today.

And I really look forward to Davids opinion, that is to be valued rather highly.

Cheers

Aussie Nkosi
Great photos mate. I see you have Barker sitting on top of Qwaby hill rather than iThusi. I personaly believe your right but there is a significant amount of evidence that places him on iThusi. Ian Knight has ventured an opinion on that in response to a question from me. Its on the forum.
Again who pursued Durnford really depends on how you classify them, Left Horn or Reserve. Its a key question.

Cheers