Ammunition Carriers

Posted on behalf of ymob.
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A man was allocated 70 rounds. I wonder how much of the ammuntion was damaged in the pouch prior to use, based on the brass of the cartridges being so thin. Most of the photos I have seen of cartridges they mostly show dents and creases and no doubt a few splits.
Which brings me on to another question? If the cartridge had a small split, and placeed in a MH would it fire as normal or explode at the weaker point, where the split is.

24th,

Troops would have seventy rounds, forty rounds carried in their sealed packets of ten, so each pouch contains twenty packed rounds. The additional thirty rounds were carried in the soldiers Valise or pack equipment. If they were not wearing their packs than the soldier would have been limited to forty rounds, in unopened sealed packets.

Once the packet was opened the soldier would transfer the contents of the opened packet to his expense pouch, so he would have ten rounds in his expense pouch.

The rolled brass cartridge was a problem in my opinion due to its method of manufacture which caused expansion in the rifle's breech. Another problem was caused by the overheated breech cooking off the cartridge and causing a premature detonated round.

John Y.

Is there anything that tells us the temperature the Rifles got up to, after firing over a prolonged period?

Dave,

Not wishing to take this away panniers from the L of C that Frederic has pointed out.

We know that the barrels of the Martini-Henry overheated due to the precautions the old sweats used to protect their hands. We know that rounds fouled the breeches when they expanded in the overheated barrels. What we don't have a recorded temperature during action. I imagine that subsequent experiments have been conducted to establish this, I recall it happening in one of the many documentaries that this campaign has spawned.

John Y.

"Maj. E. Gambier Parry, staff officer in the Sudan, regarding the actions at Suakin in 1885: "There are one or two things which need a reference to do with this fight at the zaribas. The first in importance is the clogging of the Martini-Henry rifles. Years ago, when first these rifles were issued to the army, every instructor of musketry was asked to send in a report upon the way they worked in his regiment. The common fault found in them then was that the extractor failed in the performance of its proper functions, and that the rifle was often rendered momentarily useless on account of the inability to extract the cartridge-case after firing without either repeatedly working the lever or drawing the cleaning-rod and forcing the case out by pressure from the muzzle. With regard to the cartridge itself, fault was found with its construction; but we were informed that the cartridge was only experimental, and would be replaced by a better one later on. However that may be, the clumsy built-up and bottle-shaped cartridge has been in use in the army ever since, and no other cartridge has ever been supplied; and more than this, a price is given per thousand for the empty cases returned into store. Thus the cartridges are refilled and the error continued ad infinitum. As a musketry instructor, I used to dress all my markers with the money I obtained for the old cartridge-cases, and thus I was a party to the sin; but I see no reason why all these built-up cartridges should not be got rid of at target practice, and reloaded as often as you like, provided they are not issued to men going on active service. It not unfrequently happened that the base of the cartridge was torn right off by the jaws of the extractor, when the rifle was at once rendered utterly useless. The sand and the temperature may have had a certain amount to do with the jamming, but the fault lay principally in the extractor of the rifle and the form of the cartridge. The extractor ought certainly to be improved upon if this rifle is to continue the arm of the services; and a drawn copper cartridge-case, unlubricated, should take the place of the present one. Many men have lost their lives through these two things in our late wars; and though years ago reports, as I say, were made by those best able to judge on the defects of the weapon and the cartridge, no notice was ever taken, and thus through a love of cheese-paring economy, and a penny wise and pound foolish policy, valuable lives have been sacrificed." (SUAKIN, 1885.) He then went on to condemn the worthless bayonets, which bent and twisted at least resistance. The defects were remedied by an improved cartridge, but the defects may have contributed to the disaster at Isandhlwana. Also: "In the late Zulu War, when our men were blazing at closely-packed masses of savages, the execution done was really by no means great, when you take into consideration of rapidity and precision in the fire of the modern breech-loader. Here we have proof positive that some ninety per cent. of the bullets fired in action are billetted nowhere." (Grey River Argus, 18 Feb. 1880.)
"The cartridge metal [of the Martini-Henry] was reported to be altogether 'too thin and papery,' and in too many pieces. When the charge is fired the metal expands, and thus jams in the chamber; while the case of the cartridge is so thin, that it often bends and breaks in the men's pouches when it is carried loose, as it must be. If kept well greased it does not jam; but this is not always possible in such a climate as the Soudan. The general opinion was that the case should be 'solid drawn,' thus obviating the necessity for so many component parts. With the rifle itself no fault was found; it was voted a perfect weapon. [But not by Gambier Parry!]" (James Grant, CASSELL'S HISTORY OF THE WAR IN THE SOUDAN.)"

Dave wrote:

Is there anything that tells us the temperature the Rifles got up to, after firing over a prolonged period?

it would have to be awfully hot to cook off a round in the chamber.

Free1954,

How hot do you think a barrel might have been after nearly twelve hours of firing, as at Rorke's Drift?

This again is off topic as far as Frederic's discovery of the panniers in the List of Changes.

John Y.

Frank Allewell wrote:

Posted on behalf of ymob.
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Were these panniers used at Isandlwana, its just that I have only read about ammunition boxes being used to supply the line. if these pouches were used then that alters things doesn't it? It seems to me that this would have been an effective method for keeping the line supplied.

waterloo50 wrote:

Frank Allewell wrote:

Posted on behalf of ymob.
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Were these panniers used at Isandlwana, its just that I have only read about ammunition boxes being used to supply the line. if these pouches were used then that alters things doesn't it?  It seems to me that this would have been an effective method for keeping the line supplied.

Can you elaborate!

Waterloo50,

The ammunition box would still need to be opened and the contents distributed into the panniers. Still a fairly slow process.

I note the panniers' pattern was sealed in December 1877, it is feasible that some units at Isandlwana might have had them. That said, I feel that the use of mules was more prevalent on the Indian sub-continent and given that there was a major campaign waging there that the Afghan campaign might have taken precedence over South Africa. Just my thoughts.

John Y.

I posted this extract from Bengough's memoirs in the context of another thread, but it occurs to me that the "appliances" referred to may well be the ammunition panniers discovered by Frederic.

"A secondary, though fateful contributory cause of the disaster was the absence of any satisfactory arrangement for the suppply and distribution of ammunition in the field. For this the regiment was in no way responsible. Indeed it is right to state that application for appliances for this purpose was made when the second battalion of the regiment was still at Greytown. The reply was to the effect that the articles are not in store and it was further observed that however useful and necessary such appliances may be in European warfare, it is not expected they will be required in a war such as the troops are about to enter upon."

Steve

Bonjour Steve,
You may be right....

All
The document " posted on behalf of Ymob" is not a " discovery". Frank for example knew perfectly it before I sent it to him.
cheers

Nevertheless an interesting find Frederic. And it could throw a slightly different light on the ammunition supply debate.

Here we have Bengough saying it was a "secondary though fateful contributory cause of the disaster". And he implies that someone drew his attention to the absence of the ammunition "appliances" which had been specifically asked for by the 2nd battalion. We now know there were such appliances. If they are one in the same as the man panniers posted by Frederic they do seem particularly suited to the situation that transpired at Isandhlwana.

Arguably, it indicates a view by some in the regiment that there was indeed an ammunition supply problem that might have been alleviated had they been given the equipment they wanted.

Steve

Have you considered how many packs of ammunition could have been carried in a helmet or Haversack or even on stretchers, ammo taken out, wounded brought back!

Unfortunately, I don't have a copy of the Bengough's memoirs. His comment seems to imply the absence of "appliances"  not only for the 2/1 NNC but for all the troops ( regulars, natives and colonials) in S.A. in January 1879. However, for the same reasons given by Mr Young ( today 4.50p.m.), I am not sure that the absence of "appliances" was a contributary  cause of the disaster ( we know that mules were used / ammunitions boxes).
We know that Dunrford's mounted troops met an ammunition supply problem. It seems also that Quatermaster(s) of the 24th didn't agree to give to the NNC ammunitions from the 24th reserve. However, these facts and the comment made by Bengough didn't mean that the Imperials  Coys met an ammunition supply problem on the firing line ( before the "retreat").
Just an opinion
Incidentaly, Mr Whybra wrote ( G Coy company on the firing line) that streatcher-bearer and men's of the band were used for the distribution of the ammunition not only for the 24th but also for ALL the others units on the battlefield. According to Bengough it seems that it was not the case
Cheers
Frédéric

I agree with John Young,

"The Ammunition box would still need to be opened and the contents distributed into the panniers. Still a fairly slow process."

Was ammunition available to those waiting to distribute. They could only go a fast as the ammuntion was being issued.

just a precision about my last point: according to Mr Whybra transport of ammunitions by stretchers bearers and band's men (24th) to the NNC troops from ammuntion wagons of the NNC ( not the 24th wagons).
first:If it was the case, Why Bengough wrote: " Indeed, it's right...was still at Greytown"?
second point: the 2nd column under Durnford were only natives troops ( except Russell's rocket battery). It was necessary for him to have his own arrangement for the supply and distribution of ammuntion. Imagine a fight without the help of Imperial troops ( in the absence of regulars)?
Cheers

Reserve ammuntion.

I could be wrong, but there was a story of a convoy of ammuntion coming from Greytown, when the Column commander heard about possible Zulu attacks, they buried the ammuntion, that night it rained and when they went back to retrieve the ammunition it could be found. And no doub't still there today. Well something along those lines someone else may have a more accurate version of the event.

under the command of Bray.

Not sure?

Firstly in all the subject matter I've read over the years , not once have I come across the Panniers being mentioned , or read they were available for use . I have Bengough's book but its one of the dozen or so I need to read ! . I got it from Keith Smith's fire sale he had earlier in the year , or late last year ?
Impi
It was a convoy commanded by Bray 2/ 4th from memory , and yes , they never found it when they returned to dig it up !
90th

Do we know how much ammuntion was supposedly buried?

Yes it was Bray.. does anybody still think that getting
the ammunition from A to B was in anyway a
problem?. think about what was happening, we have
an attack developing, the QM's are doing their thing,
ammunition is being readied in order to be issued as
required, that's all fine and dandy, but we know now
the time line for this, its happening with frightening
speed..within a half hour cohesion will be lost! and the
camp will swamped by overwhelming force!. so i asked
some time ago, where exactly was the front line to be
found! ( within the time frame ) the huge distances the
first suppliers were going was being reduced virtually
every minute, the British if nothing else were resourceful,
they would have used anything that was to hand!
and impi that was a capitol suggestion of yours re the use
of stretcher's, Helmets, officers tin baths? my point
always being that the lack of ammunition is a fallacy, a red
herring..they simply did not have the time to fire it off!
xhosa

Good point, didn't think of the bath! Or the kitchen sink.
However we do have Zulu accounts that the pouches on the dead Brits were empty. So what ammuntion they did have was used up.

However we do have Zulu accounts that the pouches on the dead Brits were empty. So what ammuntion they did have was used up. Says impi.

Impi there are accounts of soldiers having four or five cartridges still remaining in their pouches!

A few possibilities!

Killed before they could use them.
Rifles fowled.

Gary

Have a look at page 120 of Bengough's memoirs for the relevant passage. If the ammunition "appliances" he refers to were the panniers then of course there were none with Chelmsford's force because they were refused. So it is no surprise that they are not mentioned elsewhere.

My point is that someone, after Isandhlwana, has told Bengough that the 2nd Battalion had asked for these ammunition supply "appliances" and had been told they were not in stores and anyway would not be needed. The most likely source must be someone from the 24th who is saying to Bengough something along the lines of - we had problems with the ammunition supply and we knew this was going to be a problem because we had asked for the appropriate equipment in Greytown but we had been refused. Bengough is agreeing with that and says it was a secondary cause of the defeat.

It does not prove anything of course but it does not sound to me like it was made up by Bengough. It does, in my view, tend to demonstrate that there was a view in the regiment, current at the time, that the ammunition supply had been a contributory cause of the defeat.

Steve

And remember Bengough wasn't at Isandlwana.

Any accounts from those who were not at Isandlwana, is based on hearsay, and there for should be excluded. Personal opinion!

Bonjour Steve,
Obviously, you think that BENGOUGH had in mind the 2/ 24th and not the 2/1 NNC. I think you are right, but are you sure of this point?
Cheers
Frēdéric

Steve
Im pretty convinced that the arrogance of the British was so strong that they could not conceive a bunch of savages waving pointy sticks could overwhelm a battalion of soldiers armed to the teeth with the latest weaponry, that any excuses were seized upon with alacrity.
We ran out of ammo
There were spies
They didn't fight fair and enticed the OC away from the camp
They snook up through long grass
They got into the camp through a long trench.
And horrors of horrors, "the blighters outflanked us instead of just charging at our lines." Harrumph

Even in todays more enlightened atmosphere authors such as Snook are completely unwilling to consider that the 24th cocked it up, and they did.
Sorry I understand that the phrase 'cocked up' is no longer PC, so.... They were guilty of unauthorised deviation from criteria based standards.

( Please take the above with a large pinch of salt)

Cheers

ymob wrote:

Bonjour Steve,
Obviously, you think that BENGOUGH had in mind the 2/ 24th and not the 2/1 NNC. I think you are right, but are you sure of this point?
Cheers
Frēdéric

Bonjour,
If in Bengough's mind, the 2nd Battalion was the 2/24th and not the 2/1 NNC my « critical » against the hypothesis of Mr Whybra falls.
Cheers

Morning all.

I have no doubt that Bengough is referring to the 2/24th when he talks about their request for ammunition "appliances" when at Greytown. He goes on to talk about the Regimental Records.

I agree that there must have been a great temptation to look for excuses after the disaster - it is human nature. We do not know who fed this information to Bengough, but as I said before, given the context, the chances are it was an officer of the 24th. This is surely evidence of more than just casting about for excuses by someone who was desperate to rationalise the (to him) inexplicable events at Isandhlwana. Here is someone saying we asked for the right equipment and we were refused on spurious grounds! If that is true, and it certainly appears to be, then that is surely a new twist to an old chestnut (sorry that sounds painfull!).

Were the 2/1 NNC at Greytown?

Steve

Im pretty convinced that the arrogance of the British was so strong that they could not conceive a bunch of savages waving pointy sticks could overwhelm a battalion of soldiers armed to the teeth with the latest weaponry, that any excuses were seized upon with alacrity.
We ran out of ammo
There were spies
They didn't fight fair and enticed the OC away from the camp
They snook up through long grass
They got into the camp through a long trench.
And horrors of horrors, "the blighters outflanked us instead of just charging at our lines." Harrumph

Even in todays more enlightened atmosphere authors such as Snook are completely unwilling to consider that the 24th cocked it up, and they did. ..Amen Frank..

You will get no argument from me! its the inconvenient truth, i have been saying the same thing
for years, that you put it so starkly is to be applauded.. the deniers will not have any of that for
a second, but i believe it is the plain unvarnished truth. but there is still masses to understand if
we are to nail the definitive account of Isandhlwana..

Bonjour Steve, (all),
Thank you for your answer
According to Thompson (« Black soldiers of the Queen » / p.21).
« The partly formed column halted near Greytown on December 28th. Durnford detained in Pietermaritzburg until he relinquished his engineering responsabilities on the 26th, soon joined it and on 31st, ot moved to a camp at d'Almaine's farm near Kranskop » .


According to Keith I. Smith (« The Commandants : The leadership of the NNC in the AZW »
« ON 28th Novembrer, another General order was published promulgating the names of the commandinfg oficiers of the three NNC Regiments, with their base of operations.
1st Regiment, Lt Col. Durnford, station between Greytown and Krans Kop.
3rd Regiment, Commandant Lonsdale, late 74th Highlanders ; station..., with Colonel Glyn's Column.

Cheers

Frederic
Local General Order No 209 dated 28th November.

Cheers

Merci Franck.

Frank Allewell wrote:

Steve
Im pretty convinced that the arrogance of the British was so strong that they could not conceive a bunch of savages waving pointy sticks could overwhelm a battalion of soldiers armed to the teeth with the latest weaponry, that any excuses were seized upon with alacrity.
We ran out of ammo
There were spies
They didn't fight fair and enticed the OC away from the camp
They snook up through long grass
They got into the camp through a long trench.
And horrors of horrors, "the blighters outflanked us instead of just charging at our lines." Harrumph

Even in todays more enlightened atmosphere authors such as Snook are completely unwilling to consider that the 24th cocked it up, and they did.
Sorry I understand that the phrase 'cocked up' is no longer PC, so.... They were guilty of unauthorised deviation from criteria based standards.

( Please take the above with a large pinch of salt)

Cheers

There is a Zulu account that states just that, they got close the camp via the long grass, so it could be the Zulu were already in place, the major Zulu attack got the attention of the British army.

Artical originally posted by CTSG in another thread.

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Nelson Evening Mail, Volume XVI, Issue 16, 19 January 1881, Page 4

The whole issue of panniers being either used or not at Isandlwana is in my opinion quite significant especially in light of Bengough's statement the one 'Rusteze posted' where Bengough states that the lack of equipment probably the panniers were a 'secondary though fateful contributory cause of the disaster". What I can't understand is why such a simple yet significant piece of equipment wasn't kept with the battalion at all times and why the panniers weren't taken just in case they were needed, it just doesn't make any sense. I appreciate that they may not have been issued on the grounds that 'they won't be needed' but that just confirms to me that the British were supremely overconfident, what did they expect, did they really believe that the Zulus would run in the opposite direction everytime they encountered the British or did the British know that at some point they would have to engage the Zulus and form a firing line, if they did expect to be heavily engaged with the Zulus then they would need the panniers. I'm interested to know what contingency plan was put in place to compensate for the loss of the panniers, they wouldn't have planned to use stretchers and tin baths or helmets, I'm hoping they would have had slightly better planning in place than that.

I'm failing to see what difference these panniers would have made.

I'm interested to know what contingency plan was put in place to compensate for the loss of the panniers, they wouldn't have planned to use stretchers and tin baths or helmets, I'm hoping they would have had slightly better planning in place than that. said waterloo.....

Surely no body believes that there was any planning!. this is not just me with my cynical
head on!. or me trying to shut down debate..

This was no plan!. Pulliene was in command..his duties were to administer to the smooth
running of the camp,as far as he was aware everything was normal!..as he receive's
the reports of Zulu activity he still does nothing, Durford arrives..and with mounting aware-
ness rides out to intercept the enemy, the camp is attacked and over run, nothing in the camp
remains to tell any tale, any human or living creature is dead..that's it in a nut shell, no plan,
and certainly no plan B. why should there have been a plan? nothing was going to happen!. no
body believed the camp was going to be attacked, and those who might have been in a position
to help. would not even believe the camp was under attack as it was being destroyed..
and in the aftermath..nobody could believe it had happened!..now if you ask me planning was
none existent to say the least!. Helmets, tin baths, stretchers, panniers or whatever, the bullets
reached where they needed to be..ah! but the time to fire them off..that was a different kettle
of fish. xhosa

xhosa2000 wrote:

I'm interested to know what contingency plan was put in place to compensate for the loss of the panniers, they wouldn't have planned to use stretchers and tin baths or helmets, I'm hoping they would have had slightly better planning in place than that. said waterloo.....

Surely no body believes that there was any planning!. this is not just me with my cynical
head on!. or me trying to shut down debate..

This was no plan!. Pulliene was in command..his duties were to administer to the smooth
running of the camp,as far as he was aware everything was normal!..as he receive's
the reports of Zulu activity he still does nothing, Durford arrives..and with mounting aware-
ness rides out to intercept the enemy, the camp is attacked and over run, nothing in the camp
remains to tell any tale, any human or living creature is dead..that's it in a nut shell, no plan,
and certainly no plan B. why should there have been a plan? nothing was going to happen!. no
body believed the camp was going to be attacked, and those who might have been in a position
to help. would not even believe the camp was under attack as it was being destroyed..
and in the aftermath..nobody could believe it had happened!..now if you ask me planning was
none existent to say the least!. Helmets, tin baths, stretchers, panniers or whatever, the bullets
reached where they needed to be..ah! but the time to fire them off..that was a different kettle
of fish.                                                                                                          xhosa

I'm probably being a little optimistic here but I can't imagine that someone somewhere didn't bother to ask the question 'how will we supply a firing line without a means to effectively supply it', I would have thought that the question would have been discussed at some point, after all, a request appears to have been made for the panniers, someone had at least shown some common sense and thought about the difficulty in keeping the ammunition supplied. To be told that 'we won't need them', just seems a little ridiculous. Perhaps there were concerns about the logistics and the panniers were seen as extra baggage and a hindrance and not really necessary, 'don't worry about the panniers, 'just improvise'.
I appreciate the speed of the attack happened at such a fast pace that the outcome was probably inevitable and I'm not saying that the panniers would have prevented a massacre but I still think that the fact that they were not issued is quite remarkable but in fairness you raise a valid point,you say that the ammunition reached where it needed to be and if that is the case then the panniers are a non issue and them not being available really isn't that significant after all.

In terms of equipment required to carry out the invasion it is simply nonsense to say there was no planning. Just look at the number of wagons used and the provision for improving the road surfaces as they went. That is a different thing to planning a defence at Isandhlwana. In terms of the panniers remember that they were a new introduction and the forces in SA were small and not supposed to be invading anything! JY made the point that the war in Afghanistan was a much bigger deal - it would be interesting to know whether they were available there. It seems the 2/24th were aware of them and thought they would be useful but it can be no great surprise that they were not in store at a little place like  Greytown. But in hindsight they would probably have been ideal for a battle like Isandhlwana with its extended firing lines. Lets not get carried away though with the idea that they would have changed the outcome.

Steve

Steve,
Same thoughts.
Bloomfield and Pullen (24th) for exemple were experienced soldiers...
In reality, I suspect that these panniers are just (only) a "curiosity".
I imagine, if these panniers were so effective, they would have been used for many years in the British army and would be under these conditions well known by historians, researchers as Mr Young and others brillant "amateurs" (see no offense) of this forum.
As you know there is nothing on this specific subject written by researchers in the books about the AZW....
Cheers
Frédéric

...despite the hot debate around the "ammunition question"at Isandhlwana!

Impi in reply to your question re the amount of Ammo that was buried , and never found again , I'm sure an amount is mentioned , but cant remember where I read it , I can tell you with certainty ....it was a bloody lot !
90th

Impi in reply to your question about the ' Buried Ammunition ' this from Sonia Clarke's ' Zululand At War 1879 '
Page 108 , footnote 61 , Bray was moved to the Utrecht - Newcastle - Balte Spruit - Luneburg area . Wood criticized him for excessive caution ; Chelmsford Papers ( 9 ) No 107 . Wolseley ridiculed Bray who , when the latter heard of the disaster at Isndlwana , '' at once halted at Sand Spruit , dug a hole in which he buried his ammunition , then laagered himself '' ; Preston ,ed., Journal Of Wolseley p.70 .
I've read it somewhere else with I'm sure more detil , but have given up , took me nearly 3 hrs to find this !
90th

I remember reading someone tried to blame the disaster because spades hadn't been issued.