Durnford's Level of Culpability

Last time I started a discussion it was about Chelmsford, and I mentioned that I'd
deal with Durnford later on.

I have a hard time figuring out where to place Durnford but I should mention
right away that I've never blamed him much for the outcome of Isandhlwana.
I base this on my long-held view (always subject to change) that he never took
actual command of the camp forces (yes, we know that according to one of the
surviving officers that he did "take command" when he met with Pulleine), but
he apparently was more interested in moving on once the Zulus were spotted,
as if he were still the independent column commander called up by Chelmsford.

Since he was the senior officer present he should be criticized for not taking
command of the force in the camp, added to his own. I'm not sure if his lack
of interest in deploying the units of the 24th and the colonial troops gave
Pulleine a green light to do nothing, and we know that Pulliene did a share of
this, although not as Chelmsford outlined in his general orders regarding what
to do in case of an attack. Durnford simply believed the battle was going to be
some miles to the east, closer to Chelmsford's force, and he wanted to be part
of it and knew that infantry could not have kept up with him. On that note
I am aware that upon departing he wasn't sure how far he would get, and that
he demanded that Pulleine send some troops forward if he got into a jam.
I'm still not sure what Durnford was expecting up ahead, but perhaps he
thought that the force of Zulus up ahead for the purpose of interfering with
any troops that might try to join or cooperate with Chelmsford, and that he
was not assuming he was following them towards Chelmsford or would be
moving parallel to them at some point.

Pulleine could still have had the tents knocked down and kept the companies
closer to the camp, but he did not. He did not need Durnford there to tell him
this. I don't know what Durnford would have done had he stayed close to the
camp due to the Zulus clearly coming towards the camp before Durnford opted
to move out with his column. By the time he did rejoin the poor deployment
and other decisions had already done their damage.

It should also be pointed out that Pulleine had received orders to break camp
and move on to join Chelmsford, the latter apparently believing the way was
clear (the column would have been far more vulnerable while on the move
in the event of a major attack). Durnford must have known of these and would
have seen to that taking place, but events up ahead prevented that.
Pulleine

There was a certain musical chairs aspect of that day covering the area
from the Buffalo River to where Chelmsford was in his advance, with
officers coming and going, staying put for a time or moving on, until
they were stuck in the battle, and Durnford appear to have moved into
the camp, stayed for a little while, and then moved on only to find that
it was too late for him to run a battle from the camp HQ.

Bob Tiernan

Morning Bob
This is the difficult one. Just very easy to say he should have taken charge, therefore he is to blame. That was the original attack line against him, but as you point out the situation is a lot more complex.

He was in command of an independent unit and to my mind not called up to reinforce the camp at iSandlwana or to take charge of it. In his letter to his mother his mind set is pretty clear, he was was to act against Matanya at some point, this was his task as he saw it. Even the next morning when his orders arrived he exclaimed "just as I thought."

So a pretty clear indication of his duties as he saw them so when he arrived at iSandlwana his opening statement to Pullein of "im not staying", or words to that effect seems to strengthen that perception of his orders.

He did then do what should have started happening the day before, and specifically that morning, he sent out scouting patrols to the dead ground to the North. I precis military action well within his remit using his own command.

He did, again my humble opinion, exceed his orders when requesting 2 companies of the 24th to accompany him. And well done to a junior officer for putting him in his place, Melvill.

His intentions of a pincer movement to entrap a zulu detachment by travelling along the Qwabe to meet up with Raw could be construed as outside of his orders of acting against the Matanya's but in terms of the situating on the ground it was a way of heading of any potential attack on the camp. What really was his alternate, staying in the camp and acting as infantry?

My chief complaint against him is once he had run into the force in the Qwabe was to engage them for what reason really, slow down the advance? That was a forlorn hope considering the numbers against him. I would believe that he should have turned tail and got back to the camp as fast as possible, he could have been in time to assist Russell and get to the camp to assist in organising the defence with an extra 100 men, a company sized force.

I fail to understand his reasoning for taking a Rocket Battery, slow moving, with him. About as much use as two companies of infantry tagged on to a fast moving cavalry unit. If his intention was to move quiclky, link up with Raw et al and encircle the zulu on the plateau the slow moving elements were wasted complatelly. They should rather have been left in camp, and agin could have been invaluable as an adjunct to the artillery.

So overall yes Durnford should share culpability for the unfortunate events. He made 2 critical errors of judgement that could, and I believe did, affect the outcome of the battle.

Cheers

Frank

Frank,

Many good points. To me it all boils down to the general view of criticizing Durnford for not taking
charge when he probably didn't think he was in charge even though he made sure some things got done while he was in the camp itself. I think of those who criticize Robert E. Lee for not directing Confederate strategy when he was in fact only in charge of most of the eastern theater until the last few months. He suggested things to higher command, much of it sound, but that wasn't his job.

In Durnford's case, I believe Cochrane is the source who stated that Durnford took command when he met with Pulleine, and that was to be expected even if Durnford was not planning on remaining long (as you stated, and which I recall as well, although I could not find that tonight when I looked).

I don't think Durnford's request for possible aid by two companies of the 24th meant that these would go far out of camp, but only if Durnford ran into trouble a lot closer to camp than he expected, and I think he assumed that he would get much farther away than what turned out to be the case.

His messages from Chelmsford, the final one arriving early in the morning near Rorke's Drift, were not firm enough on what he was to do and it's easy to see why Durnford felt he was riding ahead into what may have been turning out to be a very fluid situation. The "camp" was a logical place to stop again for then Chelmsford would know where he was, and this was like a chess game with all sorts of units, large and small, and individuals, being moved around.

It should also be pointed out that cavalry was not much of a boost in camp defense strength, and Chelmsford could have ordered up a few 24th companies from Helpmakaar even if it would take more time for them to arrive. As for requesting, even ordering, two companies to help him if he got into a jam, I disagree with Jakson that Durnford has no right to make such a request or give such an order. Well, he could - if he had been in command. That he didn't press the issue tells me that he did still see himself as an independent column commander passing through and with a lot to do that day before things settled down, and that he was still thinking of Pulleine as commander of everyone Durnford found in the camp, although while he was in camp he used rank to issue some orders that he thought Pulleine might not order had he not said anything. And Durnford was correct.

I'm still not sure if "defend the camp" meant just that, for while that was the main task so long as it was still a camp, we know that later on Pulleine received an order to break camp and move up the track, this being delayed by the presence of Zulus showing up, as Pulleine wrote to Chelmsford, but which turned out to be a permanent delay as we all know. It still seems like an odd order coming at that time, as if Chelmsford believed no Zulus were close enough to be a danger to a column on the march. But there was more going on to Chelmsford's left rear - and this is what Durnford and Pulleine knew, and created a more fluid situation than Chelmsford realized. That's what Durnford rode into, and although his force was small (the mounted units were all he had, not counting the rocket battery),
he knew he could use them to perhaps harass the Zulus while using mobility to avoid getting pinned down. of course, once forced into a defensive fight this value was lost and they were not as good as Imperial infantry. They would not have added much to the defense of the camp had Durnford not moved out.

Bob

Durnford as senior officer was in command while he was in camp.
But not when he left it.
It's that simple.
When Durnford returned to camp did he behave as a camp commander should?  At what point did that start?  At what point did Pulleine realize that Durnford was alive and with his returned NNH?  What agreement was there between them as to how to proceed?  They did meet but what did they discuss?
That's not so simple and allows for all sorts of confusions to creep in.

Julian,

First three lines pretty much sums it up.

As for Durnford's leadership, or lack of leadership, upon his return to the camp, I
think that by that time it was too late to have the same level of influence he might
have had by staying closer to camp HQ. He barely had an opportunity to direct
any units that were close to him. All Imperial infantry companies were back close
to the tent area by that time, I believe, but the Zulus were so close that it was too late
to move any of them around.

I'll have to look at that timeline again. The battle was decided, I think, by the initial
deployments. There was time later on to salvage the situation, at least in part, but that
depended on circumstances that were fleeting.

Bob

Durnford was the supreme Commander of the Camp he was warned more than once of large numbers of Zulus in the area. Lieutenant Chard being the first warning,  just before arriving in camp less than 15 minutes later he himself saw Zulus retiring from the Nyoni escarpment after seeing these Zulus retire he was then warned by Lieutenant Higginson that 5,000 Zulus moved behind Isandlwana  and it was another retiring Zulu move which prompted him to leave the camp,  if he had his way, he would off taken several Companies with him as well. Thankfully Pulleine opposed the idea.

He is solely culpable of the disaster.

I have always found HBPs (reported) quote of "I'm sorry you have come because now you are in command" (not the exact quote but my version) - rather churlish, speaking to a superior officer.....I don't dispute that is perhaps, what he was thinking but to voice it, does seem a little impolite.....Durnfords reply was, as you will all know was "I'm not staying" (once again my version).....

How reliable is reported exchange?

If I wanted to be cynical, I could think that someone was using this exchange to justify AWDs actions as not being the 'CO'.

Aussie,

I can't agree that much with your assessment. It's not clear at all that he was in charge of the camp
and all the men he found in it, and even though he was in his rights to give orders while there, his orders delivered that morning don't mention this at all as the assignment. The situation was also too fluid and unclear which added to his beliefs in what he was brought up for.

As for the warnings or reports, from Chard along the track and later in camp, these were hardly equal to, at the time, the sighting ships several miles from the Normandy beaches on June 6. There was nothing inevitable about an attack at that time. Your recollection of Higginson's report is also very inaccurate when it comes to direction and location of sighted Zulus.

Bob

.

SRB,

The exchanges between officers at the HQ may seem to be out of the norm expected but
they seem real enough coming from officers who knew each other and were in a not very
clear circumstance with some action apparently looming. I can believe the Pulleine remarks
because even Melville felt that he, too, could speak his mind to Durnford. Durnford's awareness
that he did not know everything about the situation with the camp and what Chelmsford expected,
and with little time for discussing matters, found it easy to let all of that pass.

Bob

Thanks Bob,

I do suppose we only have the remembered words from each conversation (AWD/HBP and the Melvill one) and have no idea of tone, facial expressions body language etc that can alter the perceptions of a conversation.

Cheers

Sime

SRB
I envisage Pulleine's words being spoken almost light-heartedly, ribbing a fellow officer, but not at all in earnest. But, yes, you are quite right: we are missing the body/visual language and microexpressions, voice tone, etc.
BobT
You wrote that Durnford's 'assignment', i.e. orders, did not include taking command of the camp. That is irrelevant in this situation. As senior officer he would automatically have taken command. This would have occurred in exactly the same way as that other Engineer, Chard, did at Rorke's Drift.
Durnford had no choice in the matter.
I don't think that "it was not clear at all that he was in charge of the camp". I think that it was not clear at all WHEN he was in charge of the camp.

The most important witness we have in relation to the topic being discussed is Captain Alan Colstoun Gardner 14th Hussars.

As one of Glyn's staff officers he witnesses the opening of the campaign and would be aware of Lord Chelmsford's mindset and command decisions leading up to the positioning of the camp at iSandlwana on the 20th January.
He is party to most of the major command decisions that morning. More than any of the other survivors.

He is out with Lord Chelmsford and sees how he behaves.

He returns to the camp and is by Pulleine's side just prior to and during the battle.
We don't know what was said between them but one can surmise, and this is just my opinion, that if Pulleine  did strongly disagree with Durnford's actions such views would have later surfaced in Alan's statements and letters.

He witnesses Durnford's actions and even speaks to him during the Zulu attack.
He is the last Imperial Officer to leave the field and then takes part in the inquiry on the 27th.

Lying in his bed up at Utrecht after being wounded at Kambula with plenty of time to think and re assess what has happened he can't help but blame Lord Chelmsford for the defeat.
And he has no axe to grind with him as he likes him.

In his writings he makes no mention of Durnford's actions or their consequences.

We try today, 143 years later, using a patch work of survivors accounts, to work out  why the disaster  occured and who was to blame.
Nobody is in a better position, in my opinion, to point the finger than the man who was actually there.
Captain Alan Colstoun Gardner.
Kate

Now that comes as no suprise young Kate! Your quite correct but, there is always a but, the key to my mind are the exchanges, actions and mind set before the battle. Unfortunatly Alan wasnt privvy at that point, mores the pity.
Whever you post about your great Hero it always puts me in mind of Letitia Landon :
" I looked upon his brow-no sign
Of Guilt or fear was there
He stood as proud by that death shrine
As even o'er despair
He had a power in his eye
There was a quenchless energy
A spirit that could dare
The deadliest form that death could take
And dare it for the daring's sake."

Interestingly enough (to me) AFAIK, Isandlwana was the first combat command (of any consequence) of both AWD and HBP

I know AWD held command at Bushmans Pass, and HBP raised a unit of cavalry.

Obviously, a number of officers were available to advise HBP.....

Cheers

Sime

Hi Sime
Yes Pulleine was more of an Administrative Officer , I don't believe he'd ever commanded a force in action , as you say Durnford was in command
at Bushman's Pass in 1873(?)from memory . Yes there would've been several Officers who had taken part in the 9th Frontier War and would've been able to advise Pulleine , some of these would've taken part in the final battle of the 9th Frontier War at Quintana / Kentani .
Frank & Kate
What can I say about the WC....  I do think we're a light of other days , bereft of confidence and skill to be honest , poor fielding and batting , not sure we'll even make the semi's ! , I did actually look to back you guys yesterday because of how you beat us in SA , but I thought we had a better team this time round so I didn't !! , well , at least this morning I backed you and India to win the Final , not sure if anyone else can ..maybe the Kiwi's ? , not convinced about England to be honest ! LOLL . Anyhow ... I do tend to agree with Kate , Gardner was with LC and his force up until the morning of the battle , he certainly would've known LC's mindset and what his plans were at that point in time , he also arrives at Isandlwana before that battle kicks off in earnest , so you'd expect he has some idea of what was said as it was beginning to unfold , he was with Pulleine when he received the letter from LC to move part of the camp ( that of the troops who were out with him etc etc ) , Gardner actually advised Pulleine as to his reply to LC , Gardner would've been with Pulleine or close by at several times during the battle as it was unfolding , so I've no doubt he was privy to several interesting conversations and knew what was said , and as Kate mentions , Gardner doesn't lay any of the blame with Durnford ( or Pulleine ) when he clearly could've done so if he thought it warranted , others who weren't there certainly blamed that pair... or more so Durnford it seems. Gardner puts the blame with Chelmsford ... I believe Pulleine has some culpability , he should've struck the Tents , I for the life of me can't understand why he didn't ? , Durnford's main mistake was to take the RB with him , they were always on a hiding to nothing ! .
90th

SRB,

Yes, we don't have the benefit of seeing body language, facial expression, hear tones, etc.,
but I think they were serious enough considering the proximity of Zulus here and there.
So long as Pulleine, and also Melville, didn't continue making their points and objections
there was room for this depending on the senior officer and also how complacent the
others might be. Durnford never comes across as someone who demanded instant
obedience, and the others, as mentioned, had more knowledge of what was going on
with the camp and the split column, and what they were more likely to be doing had
Durnford not appeared at all.


Bob

SRB,

I've not found any specific mention, but Pulleine and his 1st Battalion were
in the smaller war six or so month earlier. I do not know if Pullein was present
at any fighting, particularly since much of may have been a few companies
at a time with captains going out. I know Chelmsford was present for one or
two, if not more, and I would be surprised if Pulleine did not at least observe
some fighting. But yes, Isandhlwana was most likely his first if any real size,
and he was not the best choice to be stuck with this once the music stopped.
Still, from what we know of the first several stages, he was pretty much sticking
with Chelmsfordf's battle template, save for not striking the tents - something he
was perfectly in a position to order even right in front of Durnford.

Bob

I can't agree about Gardner. By no means can he be classed as the most important witness to the events being discussed. He was a General Staff Officer, there to be consulted and to give advice when asked. He would not have been privy to the contents of orders or private correspondence to column commanders. He was not there when Durnford arrived and was not privy to anything said. When he did arrive at about noon the action was beginning and he would not have had time for nuanced conversations with anyone who had been privy to them (though he might have later with surviving officers). Gardner would have been VERY busy. Pulleine really only had TWO field officers available to take messengers to the perimeter with instructions or toy direct groups of men - they were Melvill and Gardner. Both were so utilized and would have been coming and going. Pulleine would have had Degacher, his acting major, to discuss tactics and positioning and to act as a sounding board. While it was important for Gardner to understand fully the contents of orders conveyed to the front and Pulleine's intentions, he would not have been privy to the reasoning behind them (unless consulted, for which there was not much time available).

There is no other surviving officer who was out  with Lord Chelmsford, observed his actions and then returned to fight in the battle.
That is why he is so important.

And not just any officer. One who was part of the inner circle of the high command and who had been assigned to that position on the 3rd January.
With Glyn being column commander and Alan as his staff officer, surely Alan would  have been privvy to most if not all of the orders and private correspondence concerning the column.
This seems only reasonable as how could Alan assist his commanding officer in the staff officer role if he had no idea what was going on?

Alan arrives at the same time as Shepstone when Robert's and Raw's forces were falling back.
To say that Pulleine didn't have to time to appraise Alan of the situation or make a comment about Durnford's actions  seems to me  highly unlikely.
Also to say that Alan would not understand what was happening because Pulleine didn't explain it to him or that he was simply too busy to look  at the unfolding situation seems rather bizarre.
He sees what is happening and writes about it afterwards.
Indeed his comments made after the battle about how useful cavalry would have been had they had it is bourne out by its effectiveness at other battles such as Kambula and Ulundi.

Alan knew full well what was going on. The numerous accounts he writes afterwards show this.

The most imprtant thing to remember is he was a witness.
He observed Chlemsford's actions and then those of Durnford and Pulleine and not just as a private or an NCO but as an officer attached to the column and then camp commander.
He blames Lord Chelmsford for the disaster.
If there is another surviving officer out there who was part of the high command who was out with Chelmsford and then fought in the battle then I would be most grateful to know his name for my own research.
Thank you
Kate

ps (Something I have often thought about and this is only my opinion but it does tie in with the subject of the thread is that  Alan, as a cavalry officer, would have commented on Durnford's actions if he seen him misusing his own mouted force.)

Hi Kate,

I believe that ACGs comments were referring (or rather inferring) to about how useful 'regular' cavalry would have been?

He mentions a regiment or even two squadrons - so he feels that had there been 600 odd or even 240ish cavalry there things would have been different....you could also say that had there been another 6 to 7 infantry companies or even 2 to 3 companies things would have been different (Gary will argue against this of course....)

IIRC the cavalry employed at Khambula were 'irregulars' and were used to provoke a piecemeal Zulu attack and during the pursuit - not as part of a defence line. Similarly at Ulundi - Bullers cavalry revealed an ambush and drew the Zulus out - afterwards taking part (along with the Regulars) the pursuit if the broken foe (classic cavalry uses)

Isandlwana was a different kind of battle - the cavalry would have had to have been employed in a defensive role (albeit maybe activity offensively to maintain that defence - if that makes sense )

The old adage is "cavalry can take ground but cannot hold it"

AWDs only fault (once the battle was joined) was perhaps trying to hold or delay the left horn, instead of retreating as fast as possible to form a defensive line (without expending ammunition) or coordinate with HBP.

I'm not convinced that AWD had time to misuse his horse - the initiative was always in  Zulu hands and AWD was trying to react to it.

Cheers

Sime

BobTiernan,

To the best of my knowledge Brevet Lieutenant-Colonel Henry Pulleine, 1st/24th, took no active role in the 9th Cape Frontier War of 1877-8.  He had served in the Army since 16th November, 1855 yet the first day he would see active service would be his last, 22nd January, 1879.

It is also worth noting that Pulleine only joined the strength of No. 3 Column on 17th January 1879, having been serving on staff duties in Natal since September, 1878.

JY

No beginners luck then, JY?

Simon,

I’m afraid not.

JY

"If there is another surviving officer out there who was part of the high command who was out with Chelmsford and then fought in the battle then I would be most grateful to know his name."
But there isn't, or rather wasn't.
If there were, we would all be in a much more enlightened position.

JW-
"If there is another surviving officer out there who was part of the high command who was out with Chelmsford and then fought in the battle then I would be most grateful to know his name."
But there isn't, or rather wasn't.
If there were, we would all be in a much more enlightened position."

Which of course then shows how important a witness Alan is to the battle and how important his opinion about who was to blame is.
( By the way I already knew the answer to that question before I asked it )
To the best of my knowledge he wrote more accounts about the battle than anyone else.
Kate

Kate, you're incorrigible but I do admire the way you hold true to your hero.
However, as my dear old mum used to say - All your idols will have feet of clay!

Julian Whybra wrote:

However, as my dear old mum used to say - All your idols will have feet of clay!

Feet.....FEET?

Most of my idols are clay from the knees down....in one or two it starts just below the waist.....

Sime
You have my sympathy...

John Young,

Not really surprised as I found nothing other than that Pulleine commanded the 1st Battalion which was engaged in that war, although his presence in any fighting was never mentioned in anything I've read about the 1878 prelude. As for him showing up on Jan 17, that might still have been the way it worked out for him even if he had been a couple of the small battles a half year or more earlier.

The American west had similar examples of lt. colonels and colonels doing staff or administrative work for a "district" or "department" while majors and other lt. colonels went out on campaign. They organized these but waited behind. Larger campaign like the 1876 Sioux War are where you would find colonels and generals actually present in battles.

Bob

Bob
Isandhlwana WAS Pulleine's first taste of action.

Julian,

I am not disputing that.

But saying that Pulleine didn't join the column until Jan 17 is not proof of that. His
record of no combat is proof of that. I think he saw more action in Brecon.

Bob T.

Unless Chelmsford felt that the strength of the camp would allow even an untried
officer to successfully defend the camp from a large Zulu attack, this was something
he should have thought about before moving forward that morning. This was something
I did not address or think of in my previous thread on Chelmsford's level of blame.

To be fair to Pulleine, I'm not sure if the camp would have survived even had Pulleine
kept all infantry close to the camp to await the Zulus. It's possible that the deployments
made actually delayed the inevitable in that it caused the Zulus to waiver at times far
from camp, and to me once their numbers were upon the smaller camp area right upon
the column forces it might have been over quickly due to the odds at that face to face
point. The only thing that could have salvaged the situation would have been Chelmsford
coming along the track had he left earlier than he had. But the other half of that scenario
would have been the camp forces delaying the Zulus from closing in for as long as they could.
 
Bob T.

BobTiernan,

Pulleine’s substantive rank was that of Major, and that was obtained by purchase, as was his previous advancement to captaincy.

His career was mainly in administrative roles, he spent four years attached to the Commissariat Department, following that he spent two years on leave and performing staff appointments at the regimental depot.  He rejoined the 2nd/24th in the Far East, serving in Burma and India.  On his purchased promotion to Major he transferred to the 1st/24th, which meant travelling from India to Malta.  On his arrival in Malta he was appointed as Deputy Quartermaster General on the island, a role he performed for four months before the battalion was ordered to Gibraltar.  It was on Gibraltar he actually served with battalion for three years.

On the battalion’s arrival in Cape Colony in 1876, he was involved in garrison duties until 1877, when he was requested to raise two regiments - one infantry & one cavalry - of colonial volunteers for service in the 9th Cape Frontier War, a task he performed well at.  In June 1878 he rejoined his battalion in the now pacified Transkei, until September 1878 when he was ordered to Natal.  Initially he served as Commandant of the city of D’Urban, from there he replaced Colonel C. K. Pearson as Commandant of Pietermaritzburg until he was appointed as President of Remount Department, a role he performed until he convinced Lord Chelmsford to allow him to return to his battalion in the field on 17th January, 1879.

By-the-way Pulleine never served at the 25th Brigade’s Depot in Brecon.

JY

John,

That fills in a number gaps - thanks. I did read, for what it was worth, his entry in
Wikipedia or military Wiki, I don't recall which, and saw info on purchasing commission
at a young age after schooling for this kind of career, and being moved around like a
chess piece for years, but no action mentioned.

It makes me realize even more in retrospect how foolish it was for Chelmsford to leave
all those men and all that equipment, wagons in particular, under the command of
a man who apparently never even watched a battle before (except maybe a few days
earlier if that counts), and was still awaiting official promotion to Lt Colonel. I could see
if they were all still on the west side of the Buffalo River. Adding Durnford's 250 or so
cavalry, with native infantry coming up sooner or later, actually did very little on paper
to make the decision less risky.

Has anyone else ever questioned this?

Bob T.

Bob
"I am not disputing that. But saying that Pulleine didn't join the column until Jan 17 is not proof of that. His record of no combat is proof of that. I think he saw more action in Brecon."
In my clumsy way, that was what I was trying to imply.

"Has anyone else ever questioned this?"
They have.  Several authors point this out. It's also been discussed on this forum on numerous occasions.

To my mind Pulleine's 'administrative' background makes no difference to his ability as a professional soldier to behave professionally at Isandhlwana.  All his training would have been geared for action and he had experienced officers under him and to advise him.
I also agree with John, that in all likelihood nothing (given what Pulleine had to play with) would have influenced the outcome of the day.

HI

I was hoping my initial question about the combat experience of HBP and AWD would promote some discussion in this direction.

I think in HBP defence, the only known Zulu force of any strength was opposing Dartnell, hence Lord Cs jaunt.

All HBP had to do was pack the suitcases and follow along.

It does take a very good commander alter the course of a battle once deployment has being made and battle joined and this battle was fought on 2 fronts with no effective reserve (this is even before you consider the Zulu right horn showing up)

I believe he deployed as per Lord Cs  doctrine but unfortunately, once the situation changed, he was unable (given the area, forces and situation involved) to react, even Hannibal would probably struggled to the react.

I do flippant history for my kids and would probably sum up Isandlwana, thusly - "we have a scribbler and a map maker (with his own agenda), who between them had never commanded much more than a large patrol, having to defend a camp against a multi directional attack by overwhelming numbers" then I would ask EMAB2009 "what could possibly go wrong?"

When presented with a military scenario based on Little Big Horn, most West Point cadets, having similar forces and objectives - do what Custer did (obviously the real battle is not revealed until after the exercise is over)

I have wargamed Isandlwana many times and you have to deployed as HBP did,  if you wish to save the camp - sometimes it works, sometimes it doesn't - based on your luck (ie dice rolls)

Cheers (flippantly)

Sime

Julian,

Yes, Pulleine was still an infantry officer when you get right down to it,
and would have done well as commanding officer in any number of
battles.  Even at Isandhlwana I don't see that he can be accused of making
any blunders, and I never consider it a flaw to not perform perfectly.

I think I'll backtrack on my earlier statement about the battle probably
having the same ending whether all six British companies were kept
close to camp or were deployed as they actually were.  It may be true, as I
said, that the actual deployment delayed the Zulus eventual closing in on the
camp perimeter, perhaps by as much as an hour (?), and inflicted many casualties
although that fact did not seem to make the Zulus skittish when finally closing in.

So this all depends on the field of fire and whether or not the steady firing
starting when the Zulus were much closer to the camp, would have been
effective enough to keep them in check long enough to.still be around when
Chelmsford reappeared.   To maximize this the line would have needed to be
positioned close to the tent line to deal with the relatively small area between
the tents and the where the ground slopes away to the dead ground area where
thousands of Zulus would have been safe, and very close.  

David Jackson had me walk out to that spot to get some images and it was
clear to me that if the troops were going to be sent out in that direction they
needed to go out far enough for that ground to be in view, and if only halfway
or a third of the distance they would have had much less time to inflict the
number of casualties they probably did with the Zulus in view for a lobger
period.   Of course, the British would have been falling back and lengthening this
time, just as we know they did, and in good order apparently as Jackson mentions,
there being few bodies found out that way.  

As for the perimeter itself, it would have had to include positioning some units, probably
colonial units, on Isandhlwana itself as I feel the Zulus would have had no problem climbing
up the western side to get in behind Pulleine's force if their line was just a horseshoe shape
against the hill.  Too bad some men weren't up there anyway for a small number of them could
easily have survived until Chelmsford arrived if they were at the very top overlooking the
saddle.  They could not have been rushed by too many at one time.  I recall it was a small
spot with just that narrow way up to overlook the section below it.   For what it's worth, here I
am in a badly lit image at the very top, sitting with Satchmo, David Rattray's Man Friday. (Hope it appears)  Nope, doesn't seem to be working for me like it did some time earlier.

Bob T.

Hi,

Unfortunately the 'dead ground' was the key to it all.

I have always maintained that the Zulu left chest was close to breaking - the attack had stalled & pinned down, casualties must have been approaching critical levels, they were under intermittent artillery fire.....I have often wondered did the famous event when the induna berated them into advancing again come before the British retired or after....did the retirement cause the Zulus to gain heart or did the Zulus new impetuous cause the British to retire?

I'm not sure the sources are there to give exact timings.... oh that Melvill or Coghill had just made it.......

Had (and its a big 'had') the left chest retired wouldn't have caused the left horn to waver. As you all know casualties don't win or loose battles - morale does... yes casualties can affect morale, as do many things (leadership, support, tactical situation etc etc).

I'm always intrigued that we focus on the last stands and heroic actions but authors never tend to use the words 'rout' (or even broken) for the British, retreat, retirement but never rout......

Not wishing to disparage the bravely of these men but were the later 'last stands' (by which I refer to yhe ones over the saddle) from choice or from having no other options

Cheers

Sime

Sime
I think the noun most frequently used in connexion with Isandhlwana is neither rout nor retirement but 'disaster'.

Julian,

I suppose disaster does sum it up quite well....

I once read about a battle - I think it was possibly during the Seven Years War, a British Guards Battalion was forced to (albeit temporarily) retire from the firing line.

In the official Reginentsl history it says something along the lines of "at this stage, the Battalion dressed back"

Cheers

Sime

I think that might have been the Revolutionary Wars when the 54th Regt was obliged to retreat after a heroic and costly resistance at Nordhorn in 1795 under our local (Essex) hero General Strutt (nice early Victorian pub in Little Baddow - The General's Arms - named after him built on land that was his).  "Dressed back" sounds like late-Georgian terminology!
That was followed soon afterwards by the little-known Dunkirk-like evacuation of the British army from Bremerlehe.

Thanks Julian

It was about 40 years ago that I read the article, so in my inimitable style - I got both the war and regiment wrong.....but apart from that.....

But the event and quotation right...!

Regarding the West Point Cadets and Custer's decisions at LBH as a similar example of
a commander (like Pulleine) making decisions as if from a template, it should be pointed
out that in the former case many do not even get more than superficial views of Plains
warfare in the American West. There are those who judge Custer based on conventional
warfare rules when they first read about the battle, and they never change even after
50 years.

To be brief, the Plains warriors were never anything like the Zulus for they did not like
to take casualties in the course of trying to win any battle or fight, whether against
600 soldiers or twenty of them out on a woodcutting assignment. And the LBH was
not much of an exception for it was long and medium range firing that whittle down|
Custer's force in the broken terrain that provided a lot of cover for warriors getting
closer, and any chance that Indian casualties would cause many to keep their
their distance was minimized by the fact that they did not have any ability to know
how things were going elsewhere - in my opinion they didn't even know they were
winning until the final stages. Even so, there are accounts of warriors who witnessed
a fellow warrior get shot in the arm and then deciding they'd had enough for the day
and went back into the village with a captured horse that was running loose - so much
for a good day to die.

But the Indian fighting ability was just one thing. Custer attacked when he did because
Indian villages commonly scattered if army units were known to be near and closing in,
if they were fortunate enough to spot them in time. But the tern "scatter", or run, in
this context came with other activities that seasoned campaigners knew -- part of the
process was that warriors would stream out towards approaching troops, even possible
finding the troops still in bivouac, and snipe from ridges and knolls and engage in other
ruses to delay the approach and cause some troop deployments for this, and then
there are horses being hit, and even some casualties among the troopers that will
then be a burden for a command hoping to make an attack.

Custer wanted to prevent that (the Battle of the Rosebud, eight days earlier, is a great
example of the kind of battle you get when no Indian village is involved - shooting
all day, and very few casualties, with the Crook column left with nothing but depleted
ammo supply and a small number of casualties who needed to be sent back. In fact,
Crook thought the battle itself was a means to prevent him from getting to a nearby
village and he even sent four or so companies down the Rosebud as a strike force
which was to ignore pot shots along the way - but he was recalled (there was no village
there - it was in another direction and somewhat farther away).

So that was the reason Custer moved ahead when he did, even with minimal recon.
Contrary to general belief, the object of a campaign was to get into a village and burn
the lodges and other possessions, and shoot the ponies, not to kill warriors and other
villagers (Chivington aside). The warriors usually ran out with others, and then
formed a ring around the soldiers, at safe range, and helplessly watched the destruction.

So, fighting warriors miles from a village was pointless. Custer and others never really wrote about
all of this to explain why they were doing so many unorthodox things during these operations, although much can be pieced together by reading their accounts and the accounts of captains and lieutenants who were involved in these battles. And yet alleged "experts" like Roger Darling
wrote that people like Custer, Mackenzie etc. were never given a manual on how to operate
against Plains Indians, without realizing that the very people who "needed" the book were the
very people whose opinions were needed to write it!

It's easy to see Pulleine as doing what most others would have, and that's probably true.
I never see him as someone to put much blame on, except for failing to strike the tents.
In fact, as David Jackson points out, he was pretty much sticking to the Chelmsford
template in how he kept most of the infantry close in, awaiting developments.

Bob

Hi Bob,

My Custer example was just an example of given the relevant forces and objectives if how WP cadets (and probably wargames) follow historical tactics) and that given the Isandlwana force and orders to defend the camp, gave to deploy 'HBP' like.

GAC also wished to capture the non coms and hold them hostage - as he'd done some years before and he did sent his Crow scouts the Renos left, to drive off the NA pony herd (on the hills above the village)

At the Washita Custers luck held (Joel Eliots didn't though) - at LBH his luck ran out.

I do believe his plan was fairly sound and had Benteen 'come quick' and Reno been a little more offensive, things may have been different...but what's that adage about a plan not surviving contact with the enemy?

Going back on topic before we get shouted at.....why blame HBP for not striking the tents - they didn't interfere with the field of fire, had they been viewed by Milne and his telescope - the camp was supposed to be being broken up, so the tents would have been struck - so it wouldn't have told Milne much.You could argue that one the British were driven in the tents caused an obstruction but I don't think that the event was ever considered

Cheers

Sime

SRB,

I can't blame 100 percent single out Pulleine for not ordering the tents to be struck but he was certainly the officer who should have ordered that it be done more than any other, and 1) he didn't need to first think about whether or not they would be in the way; 2) he didn't need to wait for Durnford to order it; 3) his seasoned officers of the 24th were of mot much use to him on this matter, and I do believe that they were familiar with Chelmsford's general instructions - if not, then 1) and 2) are enough.

The wagons were more likely to have been a problem had the fight been pushed into the wagon park,
which is what took place for a good portion of the force. Rattray had a theory he told me that he
thinks the wagons prevented a consistent firing line from being maintained at that stage, and with the Zulus that close there was little time for re-loading.

While on that subject, a thought has occurred to me that while Chelmsford ignored his own general
instructions regarding laagering, and had reasonable cause for doing so, he might have been able to stick to the instructions while also satisfying some of the concerns that caused him to waive his them regarding laagering -- how practical would it have been to have the wagons parked in line in an arc in front of the camp so that they were already in line to move onto the track again, whether to continue on to Chelmsford or return to get supplies near Rorke's Drift? Barrier in place if needed. Anyone who says that this is impractical needs to think about the time that was wasted recovering from Isandhlwana versus the inconvenience in parking them as I described. The instruction were written for the very circumstances that existed there.

The camp was fortunate to have had the hill at its back, provided that was secured. The laager did not need to be formed on all sides, and even the arc I described could have been a game changer, as we say. I will admit that I am not familiar with re-hitching the oxen entailed, but again, Chelmsford wrote the instructions for good reasons and when they are ignored for what appears to be sound reasons "this one time", well, there are no do-overs.

Yes, we can't dwell on Custer too much here and I took up too much space, but your point about Pulleine was understood and he does not appear to be a blunderer when others are given the same set of circumstances and asked what they would do. It's just ironic in the Custer case that many agree with his decisions whether they are told erroneous points such as the Indians were known to just run every time, as opposed to the more complex and accurate definition of what "run" entailed. Still,
he's been unfairly trashed by many who can't grasp the unconventional aspects such as minimal recon needed, and ignoring odds.

Also, I've not been convinced about the "take hostage" theory as that was more likely to work following some fighting, and I think his move to the north was a probe to find more river crossings for possible use later on. He did not need luck at Washita for the Indians that surrounded him there inflicted no harm, and their presence was part of the expected template being formed. Elliott was a fool who simply grabbed an odd assortment of 18 men and the Sgt Major to chase after some refuges
for two miles -- something even a second lieutenant would have had no business doing.

Bob

Sime
The Tents needed to have been struck... this being the Signal which showed the camp was under attack etc , and certainly the standing tents
became a major impediment once the Companies had withdrawn and arrived at the Tent lines , the tents would've forced the companies to splinter into smaller groups , which they then certainly had a very limited view of what was unfolding quite close to them , basically only possible to see what was happening on a limited basis go their direct front .
Bob
I tend to agree with most of your observations , the sticking point being we must remember that no-one from Chelmsford down believed for one moment that the camp would be attacked , Chelmsford , as he stated in Correspondence before the War .. '' My only worry is the Zulu's may not wish to fight , I must make them attack '' , might not be exactly what LC said but that's the crux of the statement . Obviously Pulleine and those in the camp were thinking the same , once it became apparent that Pulleine did have a battle on his hands , he certainly wasn't expecting the numbers that confronted him . Agree Custer & Isandlwana very little similarity except for the end result .
90th

Regarding the tents, I should have added in response to the comment about Milne reporting that
the "tents have not been struck".

That was important because it was mentioned for one reason only -- tents still standing
meant not serious fight was imminent if it was assumed Pulleine or some other officer
was complying with Chelmsford instructions pertaining to an attack on or near a camp.
Milne did NOT mention the tents being up as a way of reporting that Pulleine had not yet
struck them for the purposes of packing and moving the column up the track.

Bob T.

Hi,
I realise why Milne mentioned the tents.

So Milne goes to his high ground and looks back at the camp. This glass must have been powerful enough to determine a standing tent from a struck one but oresumably due to the lie of the land etc, not the companies etc.

He sees the tents are struck (indulge me here), packs up and goes back to report to Lord C. In a situation where struck tents can be a indicator of serious fighting or packing up a camp....what would Lord Cs interpretation of struck tents have been after the events, if questioned....?

Presumably distance, lie of land and wind direction would have prevented the noise of artillery fire bring heard?

Could the tents not being struck be part of the Lord C defence. How much later emphasis was put on this.....?

Anyway I'm wandering off on my usual tangent away from the topic and will mention camp tents, GAC no more.

Here goes a brevet or a coffin

Sime

Presumably given the distance wind direction etc there was no sound from artillery fire?

SRB,

The significance of Milne's info regarding the tents has to be coupled with why he was asked to
take a look - a report that the camp force was engaged in at least a skirmish with approaching Zulus.

At the same time, it should be added that Chelmsford's order for breaking the camp and moving it up to join him. That in turn created ambivalence - seeing the tents struck could mean everything was fine and breaking the camp was proceeding, and seeing them standing could also mean everything was okay.

Yet another reason why in recent years I put a lot of blame on Chelmsford for creating the conditions that made the disaster more than possible. If Zulus were lurking about in more number than needed for keeping an eye on the columns, then Chelmsford shouldn't have sent word for the camp to move. It was Column # 2 (I think), not 2A and 2B.

Bob