Durnford's Level of Culpability

Julian,

So this important thing about papers on AWDs body - exactly what were the orders.

As you know Cochrane said that AWD told him "we are to proceed at once to Isandlwana"  In his later report he mentions HBP handing over command of the camp to AWD.

If AWD not given orders to take command of the camp but only took command while actually in the camp (in theory before the attack began and then when he rode back in after the attack had developed)

When Lord C chastised AWD (over the Schroeder incident) he said that as a independent commander he had free rein to act as required in response to intelligence (or words to that affect) - it would appear that AWD was doing just that he rode out.

Had the Zulu attack have started at 11ish, when AWD was in camp, he would have been CO at Isandlwana.

I do find it a bit vexing that many writers look at what the British did wrong, as compared to what the Zulus did right - it's almost as if it is believed that they couldn't have won, without British mistakes.

Tactically the Zulus did nothing, apart from what Zulu armies do (a double envelopment), but strategically, they humbugged the British, that is the real key to it.

I don't believe given the forces envolved that the British could have survived Isandlwana (and retained the camp) regardless of where AWD was galloping off to, unless Lord C had returned in time to force the Zulus to break off their attack.

Cheers

Sime

Kate
Problem?

Sime
It's more a case of what wasn't written in AWD's orders.

Orders re command of the camp are irrelevant.  AWD automatically took command on arrival.

"When Lord C chastised AWD (over the Schroeder incident) he said that as a independent commander he had free rein to act as required in response to intelligence (or words to that effect) - it would appear that AWD was doing just that he rode out."  I agree.

"I do find it a bit vexing that many writers look at what the British did wrong, as compared to what the Zulus did right - it's almost as if it is believed that they couldn't have won, without British mistakes." I agree.

"Tactically the Zulus did nothing, apart from what Zulu armies do (a double envelopment), but strategically, they humbugged the British, that is the real key to it."  Explain what you mean by this.

"I don't believe given the forces involved that the British could have survived Isandlwana (and retained the camp) regardless of where AWD was galloping off to, unless Lord C had returned in time to force the Zulus to break off their attack."  Broadly speaking I agree (with a slight reservation).

An interesting point. When Chelmsford ordered up Durnford was he aware that Durnford was senior to Pulleine?
Its quite important in that if he was aware, then he knew Durnford would take over the camp, or expect him to at least.

Hi Julian,

Tactically, the Zulus once deployed just followed their usual method - the chest engaged the enemy, whilst the two horns flanked them

The right horn cutting off any potential retreat (aided by Isandlwana hill and the Stoney Kopie). The left horn albeit delayed by the NNMC, and mounted volunteers, enveloped the British right. It wasn't perfect because the horns did not close fully.

By statigically, I meant that the Zulus, got were they were not supposed (and where least wanted) to be - on the flank of the British line of advance (on Ulundi), they did it largely undetected, it may have been good fortune, good screening on their behalf or a combination of the two (I think it was Zibhebhu who was in charge of the the Zulu scouts)

True they (apparently) did not know that Lord C had gone out, as far as they knew the British were split in two (Dartnells recce and the camp) - unless they did not know about Dartnells 'over nighter'

I do find it hard to believe that they were not aware of Lord C move - it was Zululand and regardless of whether Ntishigwayos was going to attack or the moon (whatever) - once discovered, Raw and Roberts forced the Zulus to either retreat, engage or negotiate.

Cheers

Sime

Frank Allewell wrote:

An interesting point. When Chelmsford ordered up Durnford was he aware that Durnford was senior to Pulleine?
Its quite important in that if he was aware, then he knew Durnford would take over the camp, or expect him to at least.

Well, I'd like to think he did....you'd think he would....Don't you think he would?

Cheers

Sime

Sime
Pulleine as has been mentioned a few times over the years neglected to Strike the Tents , as we all know this was a known signal to show an Alarm in the camp , we've mentioned this more than once , this was certainly something Pulleine should've carried out but didn't . . In regard to Durnford organising Ammunition for his men this was possibly going to be a problem ..... when Durnford left the camp his Wagons hadn't arrived , he sent Wyatt Vause with No3 troop of Sikali horse and a Company of the 1/NNC back to bring them up , this became a problem when Durnford arrived at the Donga , and began to send on at least 3 occasions men to the camp to bring up more ammunition , each time they returned empty handed ( with the exception of a half a box found near a tent in the Carbineers camp ! ) these men couldn't find their Wagons , which , in the end , was one of the reasons Durnford was forced to withdraw on the camp , several people believe if Durnford once he made contact , that instead of holding the left horn back ... had he returned to camp quickly things may've been different , I very much doubt it , numbers were always to win out . The orders to Durnford were .... '' 22nd Wednesday 2am , You are to march to this camp at once with all the force you have with you of No2 Column , Major Bengough's Battalion is to move to RD as ordered yesterday . 2/24 Artillery and Mounted Men with the General and Colonel Glyn move off at once to attack a zulu force about 10 miles distant .
JNC
If Bengough's Battalion has crossed the river at Eland's Kraal it is to move up here .
90th

SRB,

Addressing some of your comments:

"Now first of all, I'm a 'fan' (for want of a better word) of AWD."


If that’s hard to tell, it’s because you’re being objective. I’m partial to him myself, of the main three who get some or all of the blame, but it’s more about defending him from charges that it was mostly his fault than in trying to claim that he made exceptional decisions.


"If this is believed - then AWD had command of the camp until ordered not to command it, unless killed or incapacitated."


Hard to say that. I mentioned many messages ago that as I see it, there were various stops along the way on the back trail for the various columns, such as long-term camps, settlements used as supply depots, camps set up for a few days or a week and so on. Units and individuals were ordered to move to these, sometimes back and forth, and higher ups thus knew where they were. Durnford was ordered to move to Rorke’s Drift, but note that he was not ordered to take command even temporarily, and I believe he was senior officer even when he first stopped at Helmakaar. He moved
forward, and awaited further instructions, although if anything developed he would take charge (for example, had his orders been sent two days after they actually were, and he was moving from Helpmakaar to Rorke’s Drift on the afternoon of the 22nd, he would have wound up taking charge at the mission station. at the camp, had the Zulus moved en masse earlier, Durnford would have commanded the defensive battle right there. But since there were no signs that was happening, Durnford felt he was not going to form a defensive line "just in case" while a large Zulu army disappeared to the east where Chelmsford was.

Back to my point, his orders to proceed to the camp at Isandhlwana moved him to the next square, and not that his orders were not to stop somewhere on the track halfway between Dartnell’s night camp and the Isandlhwana camp, but to go to the main camp itself. Sure, he’d be senior officer, even if the orders did not tell him to take command. His force was not even much of a bolster to the strength, either, in my opinion. But it was better that they were there than back on the other side of the Buffalo. This may be why he was thinking there was more to be expected of him, soon, and that his presence at the camp would make it easier for Chelmsford to not only get the next message to him sooner, but to know that he had moved up and was at the camp, available.


"Did AWD do anything to compromise the defence of the camp? Not really, maybe he could have secured an ammunition supply for his troops (defending the donga), maybe he could have just raced back to organise the defence, when the left horn appeared."


I don’t think Durnford compromised the defense of the camp at all. He just pushed some fighting farther out for a time. If Pulleine and other thought that Durnford’s eventual defense at the donga out along the track would last a lot longer, they were not too bright and should have been prepared for such a move, although they probably expected that when Durnford moved back it would not be followed up so quickly. But he was out on a limb there, unlike the rest of the line, and Pulleine
could see that. Durnford, by the way, having just his cavalry with him from the time he moved out from the camp, could easily move around as needed and return quickly if he felt he wasn’t getting much done out there, so his presence far out of camp was not as much an irreversible move as many imagine it to be, as if it were a move that once made could not be fixed. When is another matter.


"Did HBP do anything to compromise the camp, I don't believe so (he could have got some more screwdrivers perhaps - joke) He deployed his forces as best he could following Lord Cs 'book of battles' (covered the dead ground as much as possible etc)"



No, I don’t believe Pulleine compromised the defense, either. I agree with Jackson that for the most part he was keeping a good grip on the dispositions. Even sending out two companies onto the alleged plateau was not a bad one, and he kept the other companies close in awaiting developments.

Bob

Hi Bob/Gary,

Maybe 'fan' gave the wrong impression, perhaps they wrong word - I am a follower of cricket and one of my childhood (and adult) heroes was Geoff Boycott - but I do realise he had his weaknesses, I'm an absolute Led Zeppelin fanatic but think some of their stuff was c**p.

Maybe 'supporter' would have been a better word.

Gary: Did Vause leave any info on what he was supposed to do on reaching the camp? Follow AWD, support Raw/Roberts, whistle Dixie? We know he ended up as part of the Northern defences (at least I think he did) - had he been told to link-up with AWD - the missing wagons wouldn't have been a problem.

A final point - have you (or Frank) ever stood in the Donga pretending to be a NNMC trooper? How does it affect your view to the front, your head is lower down, wouldn't that affect your view....long grass etc etc. Apart from protection, couldn't it have been better to line the far bank of the donga?

Cheers

Sime

Hi Sime
There has been a lot of degradation of the donga, nature, floods, and the earthworks when they built the infamous bridge. But in general the men in the donga would be firing up an incline onto the ridge. Sure the grass in front could have been a bit of an obstruction but not so much as to enable the zulus to use it for advancing.
In terms of Vause, when he was sent back I dont think Durnford was fully convinced on what he intended to do so I doubt he could have given any instructions as to what should happen when he returned to the camp.
Led Zeppelin crap? Go wash your mouth out with soap. I met Boycot a few years ago whilst he was commentating at Newlands, the old phrase: All mouth and trousers came to mind.

A snippet, the Vause and Raw families became intertwined and became Vause Raw. A descendant is an accountant and a neighbour of mine.
Just saying

Cheers Mate

SRB
Then yes I agree with you on 'strategy'
Re LC's awareness of AWD's seniority, he had to have been.  Durnford was in charge of an independent column - surely awareness enough.

My my Frank, you have friends in high places.

Just to clarify re LZ - SOME of the their stuff was crap. It could have been worse GB could have had no trousers on.

Back to the AZW. I did wonder about slope of the ground and it was a daft question being as the troops wouldn't have used it to defend, if they couldn't see adequately.

I suppose,  at the time, if the serious threat to the camp was perceived to be from the North, hence Vause heading heading that way - I wonder if he was ordered or went of his own accord to support R&R

Cheers

Sime

Ps Frank - no racial slurs please in Afrikaans....

SRB
Re the upward incline on the east bank of the donga - that's why a lone vedette was placed on top of it.
Re Vause - he had no instructions what to do on his return - neither did Erskine - they simply 'marched' to the sound of the guns.

In 1993 I was at the Durnford position along the donga (hard not to do when on the
track) and even then - 30 years ago - it was hardly anything like what was shown
in the film and I doubt it ever was like that. It was an impediment to some extent if
one had to run across it to close with a firing line on the far side of it, and there was some
cover for those in it. Don't know if there were two lines, one at the inside lip and one behind
and out of it.

Bob

Given the numbers involved and the length of front needing to be covered (and constantly extended) I'd be surprised if there were two lines.

BobTiernan wrote:

In 1993 I was at the Durnford position along the donga (hard not to do when on the
track) and even then - 30 years ago - it was hardly anything like what was shown
in the film and I doubt it ever was like that.  It was an impediment to some extent if
one had to run across it to close with a firing line on the far side of it, and there was some
cover for those in it.  Don't know if there were two lines, one at the inside lip and one behind
and out of it.

Bob

Correct bob, the Donga is wildly different both in width and depth, I think it’s also important to consider the weather in the weeks prior, on the best of days it retains some water but in January 1879 it would have considerably more in sections of the bed.

Steve Noon did a nice illustration of it a couple of years ago which I am pretty sure both Neil Thornton and Ian Knight gave some good insight into its composition, the ground certainly comes from accurate photography too.

I would say a fairly nice and accurate portrayal

https://www.steve-noon.co.uk/photo_17201995.html

The donga where Durnford made a stand, it seems to me, is not located where lots of water will seasonally run through it, unlike those that can be fed tons of water from miles of higher ground.
There isn't much that is above that donga so the drainage from the camp area and the other side
of the dead ground, plus some from the Nqutu plateau, is what it gets. Not sure what 14o years of that will do regarding depth. Also, my personal recon was only in the vicinity of the track - I don't know what it was like 100 yards away.

The Klip River, crossed a few miles before you get to the Blood River battlefield, is a bigger example
and if not technically a donga it has the seasonal flow they have - I mention this because we did a
roll-over in our car and wound up in the dry Klip riverbed, car on its side. I had plans on going back
and wanted to get a ziplock bag and pick up little piece of the car that were strewn all over, but they
must be all gone by now. If anyone here goes to Blood River battlefield once in a while take a look
for me -- heading to the battlefield it'll be on the right side of the road as it goes over the riverbed.

Bob T

BobTiernan wrote:

The donga where Durnford made a stand, it seems to me, is not located where lots of water will seasonally run through it, unlike those that can be fed tons of water from miles of higher ground.
There isn't much that is above that donga so the drainage from the camp area and the other side
of the dead ground, plus some from the Nqutu plateau, is what it gets.  Not sure what 14o years of that will do regarding depth.   Also, my personal recon was only in the vicinity of the track - I don't know what it was like 100 yards away.

The Klip River, crossed a few miles before you get to the Blood River battlefield, is a bigger example
and if not technically a donga it has the seasonal flow they have - I mention this because we did a
roll-over in our car and wound up in the dry Klip riverbed, car on its side.  I had plans on going back
and wanted to get a ziplock bag and pick up little piece of the car that were strewn all over, but they
must be all gone by now.  If anyone here goes to Blood River battlefield once in a while take a look
for me -- heading to the battlefield it'll be on the right side of the road as it goes over the riverbed.

Bob T

The base is bedrock in the main, it gets covered in a layer of mud every heavy rainfall but 140 years hasn’t done much. It’s fed by the streams coming from the ridge but 95% of the year these are dry and the Donga is dry but with various standing and sometimes quite stagnant pools :)

The track area has been disturbed and moved significantly over the years, originally further to the North it was moved when the original concrete 'ford' was cast. When the new bridge ws built it was again moved. All the chopping and changing has changed the path of the water and really destroyed the old donga. These days there is a permanent trickle down the donga as the three villages grow and the 'leakage' increases. At times its pretty foul. A sigificant amount of earth works putting in the track from above the new bridge to the west of Amatutshane has also affected the original donga.

Re Durnfords Waggons

One thing to consider in the Durnford Ammo situation was that any Martini ammo could have been used by the Martini Henry and Swinburn Henry Carbines.

In fact in the opening stages of the AZW carbine ammunition was not available - it seems that the red patched carbine (lower load) ammo was a 'new' innovation.

It still does not get around the over professional or zealous QMs - however it did not have to be Durnford's waggons that were located - it just had to be someone of sufficient rank or forceful personality collecting/getting it.

According to Neil Aspinshaw (on the old Rorkes Drift forum) -

The reality is that to fire a rifle round in the carbine is unpleasant, but not overtly bad. The variance in recoil means you have to hold onto the carbine a little more as it jumps about a bit.

I doubt though in the opening stages of the AZW that the carbine load was actually available. Most of the ammunition would have been circa 1876-77 manufacturing dates.

Cheers

Sime

Sime Ive never believed the QM's scenario. An of the cuff remark from Smith Dorrien has just got blown out of proportion by firstly Morris and then a number of 'historians' after that. The shortage for Durnford was just a case of nobody could find where Erskin dumped the wagons, maybe at the bottom of the western slope or did he, thinking of a future camp area, move the to the north of the camp.

Hi Frank

The point was, it didn't have to be his waggons - any ammo waggons would have done - the idea that the 24th ammo waggons would have held no carbine ammo, didn't really matter - was no such thing at start of the war.

The 24th ammo waggons would have been marked (with flags) and would have been at the rear of their camps.

The troopers sent back for ammo, probably rode past 400,000 suitable rounds (as they passed the camps of 24th) whilst looking for their waggons.

I believe SD said he used the example of the QMs to illustrate the 'coolness and professionalism' or words to that affect and its been misused (as you say)

Cheers

Sime

[You must be registered and logged in to see this image.]

The donga area as it is at present, pretty wide, no water and the banks pretty disrupted

In addition to the 1/24th wagons to the left of the track there would also in the immediate vicinity the waggon with emergency ammunition readied for Chelmsford if called for. That I would imaging would have been close to the track on the saddle away from the clutter of the waggon park area.
Cheers

I always think of the donga as being a line to defend rather than a defensive line (now that doesn't even make sense to me!)

By which, I mean - rather than offering significant protection, it was just a feature that could be used to form a firing line.

Looking at it (even allowing for erosion etc) the defensive value was small.

However it is a good photo for me because it shows the field of fire, with the slope etc.

GCameron
"whilst in command of the column's NNC (Natal Native Contingent)."
Durnford was No. 2 Column commander. If the caption is describing the picture then at that moment he was commanding two NNH troops from his own command. Anyone looking at the text will receive ambiguous messages (all NNC in the camp, which column, does the picture show NNC, etc.?)
"Durnford had gone out to investigate a sighting of the Zulus and came upon into the 'left horn' of the Zulu army."
A simple reading of the text shows that no-one had edited the caption: "came upon into" does not make sense.
"This painting shows his men in the donga, trying to slow the advancing Zulus of the left horn (uVe ibutho) who had perused them."
"Perused", really? No. He meant 'pursued'. This isn't a typo. Again, this can't have been edited.
"Durnford himself is stood up in the open."
This is just poor English. It should be 'standing'.
These are minor errors but they are sloppy. The picture deserves a better accompanying text.

Clarity, accuracy, non-ambiguity should be the goal.

Hi Frank
I believe Durnford was more to the Left from the pic you posted , basically down near the present day Medical Centre , from memory Chelmsford Ntanzi (?) told Ian Knight many years ago that was where the troops were , think he told Ian that he'd found many cartridge cases in that spot near the medical centre which obviously wasn't there in the 60's , as there were a couple of hundred men with Durnford they possibly lined the donga down to where your photo was taken , from memory it was a steep donga , 10 foot or so from the reports , which is still what it is today in the area of the medical centre . I remember Rob Gerrard saying they lined up along the donga to the left of the present day Bridge , which is further left again as to where your photo was taken , for those who haven't been the Medical centre is where the clump of trees are located further to the left of Frank's pic , you can plainly see the trees .
90th

90th
And do you believe they extended their line further down the donga as they were ouflanked?
How far?

Hi Gary
This photo was taken with my back to the bridge looking North. The Medical Centre is behind my left shoulder about 20 metre away. The trees are just below the village.
Cheeers

Frank Allewell wrote:

[You must be registered and logged in to see this image.]

The donga area as it is at present, pretty wide, no water and the banks pretty disrupted

Hiya,

Have you got a photo took from this point of Isandlwana hill/camp area?

Fanks Thrank

Cheers Frank , I was thinking the Medical Centre was in among the clump of trees to the left of centre . I didn't get to the Donga back in April - June , will get there next year , just have to work out when your Elections are Mate ....that way I can work out when to come over .

Julian
Yes they would've moved right somewhat to counter the Zulu flanking manoeuver , we'll never know exactly by how far ...but I'd expect somewhere in the region of 100 yds or so .
90th

Why did Henderson write about AWD 'loosing his head' - reading through the statements etc - no-one else seems to say anything of the sort - where they too polite or didn't they notice?

As Henderson says, he was with him through most of the fight - as OiC of one of the NNMC (but so was or could have been Harry Davies)

There is quite a lot of 'native' loyalty indicated by the accounts left by the NNMC but perhaps that is to be expected.

The only things I can think of are the "not surviving the disgrace" comment from AWD (disgrace of what? I believe this was early in the engagement, when he was still out in the Qwabe and the Zulus had first appeared) or that when having 150 -200 soldiers with diminishing ammunition and a few thousand zulus bearing down on him, he retreated - leaving the flank of the 24th firing line exposed.

Its not as though he ordered his his troopers to 'mount, dismounted and mount again'

Cheers

Sime

Sime, I do have photos all along the donga, I will fish out and post later today.
Gary, no sweat mate. Glad to see you did to the Netherlands what we couldnt.
Cheers

90th
100 yards is a reasonable assumption. I would have thought stretched to the absolute limit 200 yards might have been possible, but I wouldn't have liked to have been on the end of it.

2 troops of 50 plus another possible 50 volunteers at 1.5 spacings so over a potential 220 metres.

Cheers

This is I believe the position of the original track, its around 20 metre north of the current bridge. There are suggestions of groundworks there leading down to the donga. It also lines up with old plans where the track was north of the colonial cemetery not south as it is today.

Thanks a lot, Frank

Frank
Yes, I echo that - one of the best photos I've seen covering that ground.
SRB
Henderson's comment about "Durnford lost his head" is both curious and provocative.  It may be that he was describing Durnford 'at the end' when all hope was lost and the NNH were dismissed.  It may be that Henderson was trying to cover himself - after all he did withdraw from the field and when he arrived at RD with Hall was separated from those of his troop that also escaped - perhaps he'd been unable to control them in their flight.  He seems to have made no attempt to rally them at RD.  Perhaps it was guilt and he was the one who 'lost his head' and transferred the guilt to Durnford (he was writing to his father after all, albeit three days later).  Battlefield stress affects men in different ways and at different times.
One can only speculate and note that no other survivor from that part of the field wrote in a similar vein.

Hi Frank
I've absolutely no idea how the ' Boers ' beat you , a sporting anomaly of the highest order ! , I'm glad we belted them , we certainly needed to improve our run rate after 2 consecutive losses at the beginning of the Tournament . Yes as you're aware Frank the old drift & wagon track is still quite visible about 150 metres from memory.... to the right of the Medical centre with the Medical Centre being on your right .
90th

This thread may have run its course except for some mopping up, but I have a late addition
I should have remembered.

I've mentioned a few times already that I feel some (I'll say dozens) of the wagons could and should have been brought across the camp front to form an arc, and gaps to allow movement through them
would have been easy to close up on short notice.

In looking at David Jackson's "probably lay-out" sketch of the camp in HOTS, he shows wagons behind
the tent areas of each battalion or contingent where they obviously were parked after unloading camp equipment and remained for convenience when re-loading them. So there may already have been a line, or close to it, but in the rear of the tents rather than in front. No matter -- there was probably plenty of room between them and the hill slope and the slope and next level was of course where additional firing lines could and would have been deployed to fire over the men in front. The tents would have been struck and if everything went fairly well the tents would have been quite blood-soaked.

Bob

Hi Bob.

As you probably know each Battlion had its own wagons/carts and there would have been the HQ wagons etc - these would have been the ones behind the tent lines - some unloaded some still not.

In the main waggon 'park' I would have thought majority of the waggons were still loaded - probably quite organised into sections depending on what they contained.

Only a 'few' of the waggons (in the main park) would have been unloaded - the ones due to be sent back to RD were IIRC specifically  mentioned as being unloaded  - the contents removed for this purpose.

It does add an extra dimension on to the desired purpose of the camp at Isandlwana - these waggons had been unloaded to return RD.... obviously some waggons worth would have been consumed during the stay, but approximately 50 waggons worth - seems a lot to me.....so Smith-Dorrien goes back to RD,  loads up with biscuits & mealies etc.....returns next day (?) but he still has stuff at Isandlwana......and his waggons full.....

Cheers

Simon

PS going back to the original question and reading through the relevant posts, it does appear that AWD -despite one or two 'minor'(?) mistakes and despite what Col Snook would have us believe, he doesn't seem to have done 'much wrong'. Had he have had all the ammo under the sun, I doubt he could have held the left horn with 150 odd men.

Morning Simon
Durnford had no chance of holding the donga, the left horn just kept extending south so he was always going to be outflanked so yes fully agree with you.
The question would then be why did he opt to defend that donga when the ridge in front blocked his 'distance' view? For me the simplistic answer is he was forced to by the positions of the troops to the north, he merely extended the line from the 'rocky ridge'.
Error compounded error really.

Cheers

When the original surveys were done by H.G. Mainwaring he fortunatly left behind his sketches and measurements so its relativly easy to position the point where the track crossed the donga with a certain accuracy as it was at the time, or at least November of 79.
As the old track positions became more and more worn the drivers moved their crossing points to avoid the bad areas so the line of the track moved, over 100 plus years that movement was quite significant. So as Gary points out when the tour guides stand on the bridge and tell tourists, "this is where Durnford defended" they are 150 to 200 metres away. That changes the battlefield dynamics of the relationship between Durnford and Pope radically.

Cheers

The supply waggons would have had to be left at the rear of the tents for access by the company kitchens.

Julian Whybra wrote:

The supply waggons would have had to be left at the rear of the tents for access by the company kitchens.

That's torpedoed thar one.....

Being as was only a temporary camp, would there only been a few supply wagons per Battalion or the total supply behind each 'elements' camps?

Dont think so Sime, Julian agrees with you...............i think?

SRB
What do you mean by "the total supply"?

Julian Whybra wrote:

SRB
What do you mean by "the total supply"?

I couldn't think how to put put....

It was in theory an army on the move (perhaps 2 orb3 days after it arrived), would a Battalion (or other element) have moved all its stores behind its camp lines - or just one waggon of say canned meat, one of mealies, one of biscuits etc. Replenishing them if the stay was longer.

You have the problem of moving the waggons off track, cross country (even for a short distance) and then back again, when the army finally moved.

Cheers

Simon